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THE   CIVIL  WAR  ON 
THE  BORDER 


A  NARRATIVE  OF  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  MISSOURI,  KANSAS, 

ARKANSAS,  AND  THE  INDIAN  TERRITORY,  DURING  THE 

YEARS  1863-65,  BASED  UPON  OFFICIAL  REPORTS 

AND  OBSERVATIONS  OF  THE  AUTHOR 


i-.Y 


WILEY  BRITTON 

LATE    OF    THE    WAR    DEPARTMENT 

MEMBER    AMERICAN    ASSOCIATION    FOR    THE    ADVANCEMENT 
OF    SCIENCE 


VOLUME  II 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

NEW    YORK  LONDON 

37  WFST  TWKNTY-THIKU  STREET  24  BEDFORD  STRHTVr.   STRAND 

"Cbe  Tkntcfccrbochcr  press 
1899 


COPYRIGHT,  1898 

BY 
WILEY  BRITTON 


TTbe  TRnic'-crbocfccr  {press,  IRew  f  otfe 


PREFACE. 


THE  first  volume  of  my  "  Civil  War  on  the  Bor 
der  "  met  with  such  favorable  reviews  by  the  lead 
ing  journals  of  the  country,  and  the  demand  for  it 
by  the  public  has  been  such,  that  it  has  appeared 
to  me  advisable  to  issue  the  second  volume  of  the 
work,  the  two  volumes  covering  the  field  of  opera 
tions  in  that  section  during  the  war.  In  saying  that 
I  am  the  only  writer  who  has  attempted  to  cover 
that  particular  field  of  operations  during  the  war,  I 
do  not  mean  that  other  writers  have  not  covered, 
more  or  less  completely,  particular  campaigns  in 
that  section.  My  diaries  of  events  relating  to  the 
war  in  that  section  for  the  years  1863-65  cover  in 
outline  the  operations  described. 

In  the  examination  of  several  thousand  witnesses 
in  that  section  since  the  war  while  in  the  Govern 
ment  service  investigating  property  and  pension 
claims,  many  important  facts  w.ere  obtained  by 
making  extracts  from  depositions  and  using  the 
matter  where  it  had  an  appropriate  bearing.  A 
good  many  of  the  chapters  consist  almost  entirely 


PREFACE. 


of  material  drawn  from  officers  and  soldiers  who  par 
ticipated  in  the  events  described  and  whose  state 
ments  were  taken  down  with  the  care  of  taking  a 
deposition.  The  descriptions  of  the  larger  opera 
tions  are  mainly  based  upon  the  official  reports  as 
published  by  the  Government,  and  these  reports 
have  also  been  used  in  verifying  the  accounts  of 
minor  operations  as  far  as  practicable.  Having 
participated  in  the  operations  described,  and  having 
subsequently  for  years  travelled  over  that  section 
sifting  the  testimony  of  witnesses  relating  to  the 
war,  I  may  perhaps  justly  claim  special  advantages 
for  doing  the  work  which  I  have  undertaken. 

A  number  of  gentlemen  who  have  manifested 
an  interest  in  the  work  have  furnished  me  valu 
able  data  for  its  preparation.  I  am  particularly 
indebted  to  Colonel  George  S.  Grover,  of  St. 
Louis,  Missouri,  who  loaned  me  his  manuscript 
notes  of  the  Shelby  Raid  of  1863  and  the  Price 
Raid  of  1864,  on  which  I  have  drawn  in  connection 
with  other  material. 

The  substance  of  some  of  the  chapters  has  ap 
peared  from  time  to  time  in  the  National  Tribune, 
Washington,  a  paper  that  has  given  a  great  deal  of 
space  to  the  literature  of  the  war,  having  as  con 
tributors  nearly  all  the  leading  Federal  Generals 
of  the  late  war. 

It  has  not  been  an  easy  matter  to  fix  a  limit  to 


PREFA  CE.  V 

the  field  of  operations  described  in  this  work. 
After  some  consideration,  I  determined  to  embrace 
in  the  work  the  operations  of  the  Army  of  the 
Frontier,  even  if  that  army  should  go  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  territory  appropriately  designated  as 
the  Border,  meaning  by  the  Border  the  western 
parts  of  the  States  of  Missouri  and  Arkansas  and 
the  eastern  parts  of  Kansas  and  the  Indian  Terri 
tory.  When,  therefore,  the  Army  of  the  Frontier 
was  merged  into  and  became  a  part  of  the  Seventh 
Army  Corps,  and  was  officially  known  as  the  Fron 
tier  Division  of  that  corps,  it  seemed  appropriate 
that  I  should  describe  its  operations.  I  have 
therefore  described  the  Camden  Expedition  and 
given  one  chapter  to  the  Building  of  the  Red  River 
Dam  for  the  passage  of  the  gunboats,  because 
these  operations  were  intimately  connected  with 
the  operations  in  which  the  Frontier  Division  was 
actively  engaged. 

WILEY  BRITTON. 

WASHINGTON,  1898. 


CONTENTS. 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    FRONTIER    RETIRES    FROM 

NORTHWEST  ARKANSAS    .....  i 

Remarks  on  the  Prairie  Grove  campaign — Difficulties  of  holding  a 
position  south  of  the  Boston  Mountains  until  the  Lower  Arkansas 
should  be  opened  to  navigation — The  Army  of  the  Frontier  retires 
from  Rhea's  Mills  and  Prairie  Grove  to  the  north  line  of  the  State 
— General  Schofield  in  command — New  disposition  of  the  troops  of 
the  Army  of  the  Frontier — The  Indian  Brigade  under  Colonel  W.  A. 
Phillips  sent  to  Maysville  on  the  line  of  Arkansas  and  the  Cherokee 
Nation  to  protect  the  loyal  Indians — The  other  troops  of  the  Army 
of  the  Frontier  distributed  over  wide  area  in  Northwest  Arkansas 
and  in  Southwest  Missouri — Loyal  refugee  Indian  families  winter 
at  Neosho,  Missouri — Execution  of  ten  bandits  at  Palmyra,  Mis 
souri,  by  Colonel  John  McNeil,  and  the  excitement  and  comment 
it  caused — His  act  defended  —  Action  on  Little  Blue  River, 
Missouri. 


II. 

OPERATIONS  OF  THE  INDIAN  BRIGADE  IN  NORTH 
WEST  ARKANSAS  AND  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI  . 


16-29 


Large  numbers  of  refugee  families — Their  sufferings  and  hardships 
— Indians  and  negroes  not  disturbed  by  social  status — Organization 
of  a  Kansas  colored  regiment — Foraging  off  the  country — Opera 
tions  against  the  bandits — Colonel  Phillips  prohibits  pillaging— Or 
ganization  of  an  Indian  regiment — Cherokee  Council  discusses  the 
slavery  question — Slavery  among  the  Indians — Smallpox  breaks 
out  among  the  Indian  troops — Both  sides  preparing  for  the  spring 
campaign— On  the  march  to  the  Indian  Territory. 


viii  CONTENTS. 

III. 

PAGES 

FEDERAL  OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  GIBSON,  CHEROKEE 

NATION      ........         30-43 

Desolation  of  the  country  by  the  war — The  Indian  Brigade  enters 
the  Cherokee  Nation  and  occupies  Fort  Gibson — The  refugee 
Indian  families  return  from  Neosho,  Missouri,  and  join  the  Indian 
Brigade  at  Park  Hill,  Cherokee  Nation —  Many  of  them  go  to  their 
homes — Confederate  Generals  Steele  and  Cooper  endeavor  to  force 
Colonel  Phillips  to  evacuate  Fort  Gibson — Importance  of  the  posi 
tion — Description  of  the  place  and  the  country  around  it — Indians 
employed  in  erecting  new  fortifications — Difficulties  in  guarding 
the  long  Federal  supply  line — Dissatisfaction  among  the  Southern 
Indians — Colonel  Phillips  crosses  the  Arkansas  and  disperses  the 
rebel  Cherokee  Legislature  at  Webber's  Falls — Death  of  Dr.  Gill- 
patrick  after  the  skirmish — Confederate  General  Cabell  advances 
north  of  the  Boston  Mountains  in  Western  Arkansas. 

IV. 

ACTION   AT   FAYETTEVILLE,   ARKANSAS,   AND   RE 
PULSE  OF  GENERAL  CABELL     ....         44-60 

Operations  of  Federal  troops  under  Colonel  M.  La  Rue  Harrison 
at  Fayetteville — Recruiting  loyal  Arkansans  for  the  Federal  service 
— Improved  appearance  of  the  recruits  dressed  in  the  new  Federal 
uniforms — Confederate  General  Steele  assigned  to  the  command  of 
the  Indian  Territory — Finds  great  demoralization  of  the  Confeder 
ate  forces  in  his  new  command — Colonel  Harrison  sends  heavy 
scout  to  the  Arkansas  River  to  capture  steamboats  and  to  break  up 
partisan  bands — Unionists  from  Texas  reach  the  Federal  lines — 
Confederate  General  W.  L.  Cabell  assigned  to  the  command  of 
the  District  of  Northwestern  Arkansas — He  determines  to  attack 
the  Federal  force  at  Fayetteville — His  night  march  and  arrival 
near  Fayetteville  at  daybreak — He  makes  a  vigorous  attack  on  the 
Federal  force — After  four  hours'  hard  fighting  the  Confederates 
are  repulsed  and  retreat — Colonel  Harrison  evacuates  Fayetteville 
and  falls  back  to  Cassville,  Missouri. 

V. 

FIGHTING   GUERILLAS  IN    NORTHWEST  ARKANSAS 

AND  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI       ....         61-73 

Colonel  J.  F.  Philips  sends  out  scout  from  Elkhorn — General  Her- 
ron  sends  scout  to  Kingston,  Arkansas,  to  destroy  saltpetre  works 


CONTENTS.  ix 


— Skirmish  on  Crooked  Creek,  Arkansas,  and  capture  of  Confeder 
ate  muster  rolls — Colonel  Cloud  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
District  of  Southwest  Missouri — He  makes  a  scout  through  the 
southwest  Border  counties — Livingston's  guerillas  make  a  raid  on 
Neosho  and  capture  stock — Major  Eno  skirmishes  with  Living 
ston's  guerillas  on  Centre  Creek — His  method  of  operating  against 
the  guerillas — Major  Burch  makes  a  scout  into  McDonald  County 
— Lieutenant  Kelso  has  a  personal  encounter  with  bandits — Ban 
dits  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  and  violate  it — Bold  exploits  of 
Captain  Kelso. 


VI. 

ATTACK    ON    FEDERAL   TRAIN,   \ND   ACTION   AT 

FORT  GIBSON,  CHEROKEE  NATION  .         .         .  74-86 

Confederate  troops  in  Western  Arkansas  and  Indian  Territory 
becoming  more  aggressive — The  Confederate  commanders  threaten 
to  interrupt  Federal  supply  line — Guerillas  attack  a  forage  de 
tachment  of  the  colored  regiment  near  Baxter  Springs,  Kansas, 
and  show  no  quarter  to  the  colored  soldiers — Colonel  \Villiamsgets 
even  with  the  guerillas — Colonel  Phillips  makes  reconnoissances  to 
hold  the  Confederate  forces  south  of  the  Arkansas  River — General 
Cooper  keeps  advised  of  the  movements  of  the  Federal  trains — 
Southern  forces  attack  Fort  Gibson  and  are  repulsed— Federal 
stock  captured  while  grazing — Attack  on  Federal  train  near  Fort 
Gibson  repulsed. 


VII. 
ACTION  AT  CABIN  CREEK,  CHEROKEE  NATION     .         87-100 

General  Cooper  determines  to  make  another  effort  to  capture  the 
Federal  supply  train — A  Confederate  force  under  Colonel  Watie 
sent  north  through  the  Cherokee  Nation  to  threaten  Federal  rear — 
He  is  attacked  by  Federal  force  under  Major  Foreman  and  driven 
south  of  the  Arkansas  River — Skirmish  on  Greenleaf  Prairie — 
General  Cabell  to  cooperate  with  General  Cooper  in  an  effort  to 
capture  the  Federal  train — Colonel  Phillips  sends  troops  to  rein 
force  escort  to  his  train— Colonel  Watie  attacks  Federal  escort  at 
Cabin  Creek  and  is  defeated  and  his  force  dispersed — General 
Cabell  unable  to  cross  Grand  River  and  support  Watie — Gallant 
charge  of  the  colored  regiment  under  Colonel  Williams. 


X  CONTENTS. 

VIII. 

PAGES 

ACTION    AT    STOCKTON,   AND   DEATH   OF  MAJOR 

LIVINGSTON      .......       101-111 

Major  Livingston  as  a  Southern  partisan  leader— His  attack  on  the 
Union  militia  in  the  court-house  at  Stockton,  and  death — Descrip 
tion  of  the  fight — Pursuit  of  the  guerillas  by  the  Union  militia — 
Capture  of  Greenfield  by  Colonel  Coffee  in  1862 — The  attack  on 
the  Union  militia  at  Greenfield  by  guerillas  repulsed — Incidents 
of  guerilla  methods  and  cruelty. 

IX. 

BATTLE  OF  HONEY  SPRINGS,  CREEK  NATION       .       112-126 

The  fall  of  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  and  the  defeat  of  General 
Holmes  at  Helena,  Arkansas,  enables  Federal  forces  in  Western 
Arkansas  and  the  Indian  Territory  to  assume  the  offensive — Major- 
General  Blunt  arrives  at  Fort  Gibson  with  reinforcements  and 
assumes  command  of  Federal  forces  in  the  Indian  Territory — He 
determines  to  cross  the  Arkansas  River  and  attack  the  Southern 
forces  under  General  Cooper  at  Elk  Creek — Confederate  General 
Steele  orders  General  Cabell  in  Western  Arkansas  to  reinforce 
General  Cooper — General  Blunt  makes  a  night  march — The  battle 
of  Honey  Springs  described — Defeat  of  the  Confederate  forces  and 
destruction  of  General  Cooper's  depot  of  supplies — The  Federal 
troops  capture  handcuffs  which  the  Confederates  had  intended  to 
put  on  colored  soldiers  if  they  took  any — General  Cabell  arrives 
too  late  to  participate  in  the  fight — General  Blunt  returns  to  Fort 
Gibson. 

X. 

THE  LAWRENCE  MASSACRE          ....         127-148 

After  the  Confederate  forces  under  General  Hindman  were  driven 
south  of  the  Arkansas  River,  Southern  bandits  commenced  drifting 
back  to  Missouri  River  counties — A  detachment  of  Colonel  Pen- 
ick's  Missouri  militia  attacks  Southern  bandits  near  Independence, 
Missouri — Mistaken  notions  of  influential  Kansans  in  asserting  that 
there  was  no  loyalty  in  Missouri — A  rational  policy  of  dealing  with 
the  guerillas  now  and  then  suggested,  but  not  adopted — The  sug 
gested  policy  was  to  remove  Southern  families  south  of  the  Federal 
lines — General  Thomas  Ewing,  Jr.,  assigned  to  command  of  Dis 
trict  of  the  Border — Quantrill,  the  bandit  leader,  returns  to  his  old 
haunts  in  Jackson  County,  Missouri— Major  Ransom  skirmishes 
with  the  guerillas — Colonel  Lynde  burns  houses  in  Missouri — 


CONTENTS.  XI 

PAGES 

Colonel  Adams  makes  a  raid  into  Missouri  and  takes  property 
from  Union  militia  as  well  as  from  secessionists  — Rumors  of  gue 
rilla  concentration  for  a  raid  into  Kansas — Colonel  Lazear  on  the 
trail  of  the  guerillas — Quantrill  enters  Kansas  with  three  hundred 
men— Marches  to  Lawrence  without  opposition — He  sacks  and 
bums  the  city  and  murders  150  citizens — He  escapes  into  Missouri 
with  his  booty  with  slight  loss — General  Ewing  issues  his  famous 
Order  Number  Eleven, 

XI. 

THE    FEDERAL    OCCUPATION    OF    FORT    SMITH, 

ARKANSAS 149-164 

Colonel  Cloud  marches  to  reinforce  General  Blunt  at  Fort  Gibson 
— General  Cooper  reinforced  by  General  Cabell — Colonel  Cather- 
wood  disperses  Coffee's  command  near  Pineville — General  Blunt 
crosses  the  Arkansas  River  to  attack  Steele  and  Cooper — Steele 
and  Cooper  retreat  to  Perryville  and  are  overtaken  by  Blunt — 
After  a  short  skirmish  the  Confederates  retreat,  abandoning  their 
depot  supplies — General  Blunt  marches  for  Fort  Smith  and  takes 
the  place  without  a  battle — Action  of  Backbone  Mountain  — 
Colonel  Cloud  assigned  to  command  of  post  of  Fort  Smith — 
Skirmishes  in  Northwest  Arkansas. 

XII. 

THE   SHELBY   RAID  IN    MISSOURI    IN  OCTOBER, 

1863       ....  165-193 

Colonel  Shelby  leaves  Arkadelphia,  Arkansas,  with  picked  men 
from  his  brigade  and  two  guns,  for  an  expedition  into  Missouri — 
He  crosses  the  Arkansas  River  and  enters  Southwest  Missouri  with 
out  serious  opposition — He  attacks  and  captures  a  detachment  of 
Missouri  State  Militia  at  Neosho,  and  burns  the  court-house — He 
marches  northeast  and  crosses  the  Osage  River  at  Warsaw,  having 
burned  the  court-houses  at  Greenfield  and  Stockton — He  is  pur 
sued  by  the  Federal  forces  under  Colonel  Edwards  and  Majors 
King  and  Eno— The  Federal  forces  of  General  Brown  in  Central 
Missouri  march  to  meet  the  raiders — Lieutenant-Colonel  Lazear 
attacks  Shelby  near  Tipton  and  again  at  Dug  Ford  on  Lamine 
River — Colonel  Philips  comes  up  with  the  Seventh  Missouri  State 
Militia  and  assists  in  driving  the  raiders  from  their  position  on  the 
Salt  Fork  of  the  Lamine  River — A  rainstorm  and  darkness  ends 
the  fighting — General  Brown  sends  Colonel  Lazear  with  one  thou 
sand  men  to  head  off  Shelby  at  Marshall — The  action  at  Marshall 
and  cutting  in  twain  of  Shelby's  command  with  loss  of  one  gun — 


Xll  CONTENTS. 

PAGES 

Colonel  Philips  compels  Shelby  to  abandon  his  train — Shelby  turns 
south  in  demoralized  retreat  and  is  pursued  by  Colonels  Weer  and 
Lazear  and  by  General  Ewing  to  the  Arkansas  line — Shelby's  force 
under  Colonel  Hunter  loses  his  other  gun  near  Humansville,  Mis 
souri — Incidents  of  the  raid. 

XIII. 

GUERILLA  WAR  IN  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI  .         .         194-208 

General  Cabell  withdrawn  from  Northwest  Arkansas  —  Major 
Houts  skirmishes  with  Livingston's  band  on  Spring  River — A 
battalion  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry  stationed  at  Car 
thage — Captain  Kelso  in  a  hand-to-hand  conflict  with  guerillas — 
Skirmish  near  Neosho  and  death  of  Lieutenant  Smith — Brief 
sketch  of  life  of  Captain  Kelso. 

XIV. 

THE  BAXTER  SPRINGS  MASSACRE        .         .         .         209-225 

Arrival  of  General  Blunt  at  Fort  Scott  from  Fort  Smith — His 
successful  campaign  south  of  the  Arkansas — Reports  of  threat 
ened  guerilla  movement  against  Fort  Scott — A  military  post 
established  at  Baxter  Springs — General  Price  reported  to  be  march 
ing  upon  Fort  Smith — The  report  causes  General  Blunt  to  hasten 
his  return  to  his  command  at  that  place — No  active  guerilla  move 
ments  reported  in  the  Border  counties  of  Missouri — Quantrill 
moving  south  caused  an  alarm  at  Fort  Scott — General  Blunt  and 
escort  leave  Fort  Scott  for  Fort  Smith — The  hostile  forces  march 
ing  on  nearly  parallel  roads — Quantrill  attacks  the  post  of  Baxter 
Springs  and  is  defeated — He  then  attacks  General  Blunt's  escort 
in  sight  of  the  post — Nearly  two  thirds  of  the  escort  killed. 

XV. 

MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  SOUTHERN  AND  SOUTH 
WEST  MISSOURI  AND  NORTHWEST  ARKANSAS  .         226-236 

Quiet  in  Southwest  Missouri  after  the  Shelby  Raid — Southern 
guerillas  on  Neosho  River  in  Southern  Kansas — Party  of  Southern 
officers  killed  in  Southern  Kansas  by  Osage  Indians — Missouri 
militia  return  to  their  stations — General  Sanborn  in  command  of 
the  District  of  Southwest  Missouri — Operations  of  his  troops  in 
protecting  the  military  telegraph,  the  mails,  and  the  trains — Expedi 
tion  of  General  Holland  into  Southern  Missouri  and  Northern 
Arkansas — Death  of  Alf.  Bolin,  the  bandit — Scout  of  Major  King 


CONTENTS.  xiii 


into  Northern  Arkansas — Captain  Worthington  skirmishes  with 
Southern  partisan  bands — Raid  of  Colonel  Watie  into  northern 
part  of  Cherokee  Nation. 

XVI. 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  INDIAN  TERRITORY — EX 
PEDITION  TO  OLD  FORT  ARBUCKLE — ACTION 
AT  CABIN  CREEK  AND  CAPTURE  OF  FED 
ERAL  TRAIN 237-252 

General  Maxey  assigned  to  command  of  Southern  forces  in  the 
Indian  Territory — He  visits  the  Choctaw  Council  and  urges  the 
Choctaws  to  remain  at  home  and  raise  crops — General  McNeil 
sends  an  expedition  under  Colonel  Phillips  from  Fort  Gibson  in  the 
direction  of  Red  River — Success  of  the  expedition — A  detachment 
of  the  Indian  Brigade  from  Fort  Gibson  collecting  supplies  at 
Rhea's  Mills,  Arkansas — Federal  Indians  at  Mackey's  Salt  Works 
manufacturing  salt — The  Southern  Indians  show  activity  on  the 
opening  of  spring — Quantrill  crosses  the  Arkansas  River  above 
Fort  Gibson,  marching  north — Captain  Anderson  from  Fort  Gib 
son  makes  a  scout  into  the  northern  part  of  the  Cherokee  Nation — 
Major  Burch  from  Neosho  skirmishes  with  Southern  Indians — 
Action  at  Flat  Rock  and  burning  of  Federal  hay — Action  at 
Cabin  Creek  and  capture  of  Federal  supply  train. 

XVII. 

THE  CAMDEN  EXPEDITION 253-277 

Preparations  to  extend  Federal  operations  south  of  the  Arkansas 
River — Plan  of  the  campaign  contemplated  three  Federal  columns 
converging  upon  Shreveport,  Louisiana — General  Steele  leaves 
Little  Rock  with  two  divisions  of  troops — General  Thayer  leaves 
Fort  Smith  with  the  Frontier  Division — Difficulties  of  the  march 
— Steele  waiting  for  arrival  of  the  Frontier  Division — Steele's  rear 
guard  fiercely  attacked  by  Shelby  near  Okolona — Hard  fighting  on 
the  Little  Missouri  River — The  Confederates  obliged  to  abandon 
their  position — Arrival  of  the  Frontier  Division  and  uniting  of 
Steele's  forces — General  Steele  continues  to  advance — Action  on 
Prairie  d'Ane — Steele  manoeuvres  Price  out  of  his  intrenchments 
at  Prairie  d'Ane  and  then  marches  for  Camden — Price  pursues  with 
part  of  his  army  and  fiercely  attacks  the  Frontier  Division — The 
race  for  Camden — General  Marmaduke  gets  ahead  of  Steele,  but  is 
driven  off — Steele  enters  Camden,  the  fortified  city,  with  his  army 
with  little  opposition. 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

XVIII. 

PAGES 

THE  BATTLE  OF  POISON  SPRING,  ARKANSAS       .         278-291 

Information  received  of  the  defeat  of  General  Banks  above  Natchi- 
toches — General  Steele  nearly  out  of  rations  for  his  troops  and 
forage  for  his  animals — His  cavalry  captures  the  steamer  Homer 
with  a  cargo  of  corn — Large  forage  train  sent  out  under  Colonel 
Williams — The  escort  to  the  train  is  attacked  by  parts  of  three 
divisions  of  Confederate  mounted  troops — Desperate  fighting  of 
the  colored  regiment — Capture  of  the  train  near  Poison  Spring — 
No  quarter  shown  to  the  wounded  colored  soldiers. 

XIX. 
THE  BATTLE  OF  JENKINS'  FERRY,  ARKANSAS     .         292-311 

General  Steele  advised  of  the  arrival  of  General  E.  Kirby  Smith 
at  General  Price's  headquarters  to  assume  command  of  Confeder 
ate  forces — He  brings  with  him  three  divisions  of  Confederate 
infantry  from  Louisiana — Arrival  of  General  Steele's  supply  train 
from  Pine  Bluff — After  unloading,  the  train  is  sent  back  under 
heavy  escort  for  further  supplies — General  Smith  sends  out  a  large 
mounted  force  and  artillery  to  intercept  and  capture  the  train — 
The  Federal  escort  under  Colonel  Drake  attacked  near  Marks' 
Mill — After  desperate  fighting  the  train  and  most  of  the  escort 
captured  by  the  Confederates — General  Steele  evacuates  Camden 
and  retires  towards  Little  Rock — He  is  pursued  by  the  combined 
forces  of  Generals  Smith  and  Price — The  Federal  rear-guard  over 
taken  near  Jenkins'  Ferry  on  Saline  River — The  battle  of  Jenkins' 
Ferry — Defeat  of  the  Confederate  army — Federal  forces  out  of  sup 
plies  and  unable  to  follow  up  their  success — General  Steele  retires 
without  interruption  to  Little  Rock. 

XX. 

THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  RED  RIVER  DAM  THAT 

SAVED  THE  MISSISSIPPI  SQUADRON       .         .         312-330 

The  Red  River  Expedition  not  planned  by  General  Banks — Diffi 
culties  of  carrying  out  the  plan  of  the  campaign — The  three  Fed 
eral  columns  on  the  march  and  en  route  by  transports  to  Shreveport, 
the  objective  of  the  campaign — Cooperation  of  the  Mississippi 
Squadron  under  Admiral  Porter — After  his  defeat  at  Sabine  Cross 
Roads  General  Banks  retires  to  Grand  Ecore  and  Alexandria — 
Red  River  falling  instead  of  rising — Admiral  Porter's  fleet  caught 
above  Alexandria  Falls  by  low  water — The  threatened  disaster  to 


CONTENTS.  XV 

PAGES 

the  fleet — Colonel  Bailey  conceives  the  plan  of  raising  the  water  on 
the  falls  by  a  dam — The  building  of  the  dam — The  fleet  passes 
over  the  falls  through  the  chute  and  rides  in  safety  in  the  smooth 
waters  below. 

XXI. 

OPERATIONS  IN  NORTHWESTERN  ARKANSAS  .  331-339 
General  Sanborn  sends  an  expedition  into  Northern  Arkansas  to 
check  intended  raid — Skirmish  on  Tomahawk  Creek — Confederate 
force  moves  to  the  Federal  rear — General  Holland,  in  command  of 
Federal  forces,  disperses  Southern  partisan  bands — Sergeant  Jones' 
detachment  sustains  heavy  loss  on  Rolling  Prairie — Confederate 
Colonel  Freeman  defeated  with  heavy  loss  on  Sylamore  Creek — 
Colonel  Phelps'  operations  in  Northern  Arkansas — A  detachment 
of  his  regiment  loses  train  and  sustains  heavy  loss  on  Richland 
Creek — Major  Melton's  successful  operations  against  Colonel  Sis- 
sell  in  Limestone  Valley — Colonel  Harrison's  operations  against 
Watie's  Indians  and  Captain  Brown's  guerillas — Colonel  Bishop 
disperses  guerillas  in  Northwestern  Arkansas — Captain  Worthing- 
ton  attacks  and  inflicts  heavy  loss  in  the  ranks  of  guerillas — 
Major  Greeno's  scout  in  the  direction  of  Batesville. 

XXII. 
OPERATIONS  ON  THE  ARKANSAS  RIVER       .         .         340-352 

Return  of  the  Frontier  Division  to  Fort  Smith  from  the  Camden 
Expedition — The  Federal  forces  in  Arkansas  on  the  defensive — 
Large  quantities  of  army  supplies  brought  up  the  Arkansas  River 
to  Fort  Smith — Supply  boats  frequently  attacked  by  guerillas — 
Difficulties  of  keeping  the  river  open  to  navigation  between  Little 
Rock  and  Fort  Smith — Union  refugees  encouraged  to  go  north — 
They  were  subsisted  by  the  Government  and  consumed  supplies 
needed  by  the  troops — General  Maxey  advances  his  troops  north 
towards  the  Arkansas  River — Confederates  capture  the  steamer 
y.  R.  Williams  with  supplies  for  Fort  Gibson — General  Thayer 
sends  a  force  under  Colonel  Crawford  up  the  Arkansas  to  attack 
the  Confederates — Colonel  Crawford  skirmishes  with  Confederates 
at  San  Bois  Creek. 

XXIII. 

QUANTRILL'S    BANDITS    REPULSED    BY    UNION 

MILITIA  AT  LAMAR,  MISSOURI      .         .         .         353-362 
Federal  scouts  under  Major  Cosgrove  and  Colonel  Allen  on  trail  of 
Quantrill's  bandits  in  Southwest  Missouri — The  bandits  pass  near 


XVI  CONTENTS. 


Carthage — The  bandits  attack  the  Union  militia  at  Lamar  and  are 
repulsed  and  driven  off — Colonel  Blair  at  Fort  Scott,  hearing  of  the 
attack,  sends  a  detachment  to  reinforce  the  militia — The  bandits 
march  north  to  Missouri  River  counties — Union  militia  evacuate 
Lamar — Captain  Taylor's  company  of  Southern  men  burn  most  of 
Lamar — Scout  from  Neosho  under  Lieutenant  Baxter  to  Centre 
Creek — Skirmish  with  guerillas  and  death  of  Lieutenant  Baxter 
and  Dodson  Britton. 

XXIV. 
MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  WESTERN  MISSOURI  .         363-374 

Little  activity  of  guerilla  bands  in  Central  and  Western  Missouri 
during  the  winter  of  1863-64  and  spring  of  1864 — Vigilance  and 
active  scouting  of  the  Federal  troops  in  the  spring  of  1864 — Infor 
mation  of  Quantrill  returning  to  western  Missouri  River  counties 
— Federal  detachment  attack  bandits  in  a  house  near  German- 
town  and  compel  them  to  surrender — Federal  detachment  under 
Lieutenant  Couch  attacked  by  Quantrill's  band  near  Chapel  Hill — 
Colonel  McFerran  concentrates  his  forces  to  move  against  the  out 
laws — The  Federal  troops  adopt  guerilla  methods — Disaster  to 
Federal  detachment  under  Corporal  Parman — A  Federal  detach 
ment  under  Sergeant  Shackleford  attacked  and  sustained  a  heavy 
loss  while  guarding  train  above  Lexington — Expedition  from  Kan 
sas  under  Colonel  Moonlight  into  western  counties  of  Missouri — 
The  Kansas  forces  unable  to  find  any  considerable  number  of 
guerillas. 

XXV. 
THE  CENTRALIA  MASSACRE         ....         375-386 

Federal  forces  in  North  Missouri  operating  against  the  Southern 
bandits — The  Federal  troops  obliged  to  be  divided  up  into  small 
detachments — Atrocious  acts  of  the  bandits — Captain  Tiffin  attacks 
them  near  Wakenda  Prairie — Information  of  General  Price's  ad 
vance  north  of  the  Arkansas  River  to  invade  Missouri  causes 
intense  excitement — The  bandits  of  North  Missouri  immediately 
commence  to  display  activity — Bill  Anderson's  attack  on  Fayette 
repulsed  by  Missouri  militia — Anderson  marches  northeast  into 
Randolph  and  Monroe  Counties — Major  Johnston  starts  out  with  a 
detachment  in  pursuit  of  the  bandits — The  bandits  capture  a  train 
at  Centralia  and  take  off  it  and  murder  Federal  soldiers — Major 
Johnston  engages  the  bandits — His  command  overwhelmed  and 
nearly  all  killed — His  men  who  were  captured  and  wounded  were 
murdered. 


CONTENTS.  xvii 

XXVI. 

HAGES 

THE    PRICE    RAID    IN    MISSOURI  —  BATTLE    OF 

PILOT  KNOB  .  .  387-413 

After  the  failures  of  the  Red  River  and  Camden  expeditions,  the  Con 
federate  leaders  determine  to  send  an  expedition  into  Missouri — 
General  Shelby  sent  north  of  the  Arkansas  River  to  interrupt  Fed 
eral  communications  north  of  Little  Rock — His  exaggerated  re 
ports  of  his  achievements — General  Price  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  expedition  into  Missouri — After  final  preparations  he  de 
cides  to  cross  the  Arkansas  River  at  Dardanelle,  above  Little  Rock 
—The  expedition  of  12,000  men  and  fourteen  pieces  of  artillery  on 
the  march — Shelby  joins  Price  near  Batesville,  Arkansas — The  in 
vading  army  reorganized  at  Pocahontas  into  three  grand  divisions — 
The  Southern  army  invades  Missouri  in  three  columns  which  form 
a  junction  at  Fredericktown— Invaders  skirmish  with  the  Missouri 
militia — St.  Louis  and  Jefferson  City,  General  Price's  objective — 
General  Rosecrans,  commanding  Department  of  Missouri,  finds 
difficulty  in  ascertaining  Price's  objective — Price  marches  to  attack 
Pilot  Knob — General  Rosecrans  orders  the  concentration  of  his 
troops  to  defend  St.  Louis  and  Jefferson  City — Price  attacks  Pilot 
Knob  with  two  divisions — His  troops  repulsed  with  heavy  loss — 
He  makes  preparations  for  another  assault — General  Ewing  evacu 
ates  the  place  during  the  night,  blows  up  his  magazines,  and  retires 
to  Leasburg — Ewing's  retreating  fight  against  great  odds — Murder 
of  Major  Wilson. 

XXVII. 

DEFENCE   OF  ST.   Louis    AND   JEFFERSON    CITY, 

MISSOURI        .  414-43.' 

General  Rosecrans  concentrates  his  troops  for  defence  of  St.  Louis 
and  Jefferson  City — The  Enrolled  Missouri  Militia  called  into  active 
service — Price  marches  to  Richwoods,  near  St.  Louis,  but  decides 
not  to  attack  the  Federal  forces  defending  the  city — He  marches 
for  Jefferson  City— The  Federal  brigades  of  Sanborn  and  McXeil 
arrive  at  Jefferson  City  a  few  hours  ahead  of  Price's  advance — Con 
federate  forces  form  line  of  battle  in  front  of  fortifications,  but 
decline  to  make  an  assault — Price  marches  for  Lexington,  Kansas 
City,  and  Kansas— The  Federal  forces  in  pursuit  of  the  Southern 
army — General  Pleasonton  in  command  of  the  Federal  forces  in 
the  field— Sharp  actions  at  Russellville,  California,  and  Boonville 
— The  Confederates  tear  up  the  railroad  and  burn  bridges  on  their 


XVI 11  CONTENTS. 

PAGES 

line  of  march — General  A.  J.  Smith's  infantry  and  artillery  brought 
forward — Price  receives  several  thousand  recruits  at  Boonville — 
He  sends  General  Clark  with  a  large  force  to  capture  Glasgow. 

XXVIII. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  KANSAS  FORCES — MOB 
ILIZING  THE  MILITIA — SKIRMISHES  AT  LEX 
INGTON,  LITTLE  BLUE,  AND  INDEPENDENCE  .  433-450 

General  Curtis,  commanding  Department  of  Kansas,  informed  of 
Price's  movement  north  through  Arkansas — The  Federal  com 
mander  also  informed  of  General  Gano's  advance  north  through 
the  Indian  Territory  and  capture  of  Federal  supply  train — Rapid 
advance  of  the  Confederate  forces  west  of  St.  Louis  up  the  Mis 
souri  River  determines  General  Curtis  to  ask  the  Governor  of  Kan 
sas  to  call  out  the  militia — The  Kansas  militia  to  concentrate 
at  Olathe  and  Shawneetown  for  organization  and  equipment — 
Confederate  forces  rapidly  advance  towards  the  Kansas  border — 
General  Blunt,  with  Kansas  Volunteer  forces,  marches  into  Mis 
souri  to  meet  the  Southern  army — Foster's  battalion  of  Missouri 
cavalry  joins  the  Kansas  forces — General  Jeff.  Thompson  cap 
tures  Sedalia — General  Blunt  marches  to  Lexington  and  engages 
Price's  advance  under  Shelby — Federal  forces  retire  to  Little  Blue 
and  take  up  strong  position — Actions  at  Little  Blue  and  Independ 
ence—General  Curtis'  forces  concentrated  behind  the  Big  Blue 
River  and  establish  line  of  defence. 

XXIX. 

CAPTURE  OF  GLASGOW,  PARIS,  AND  CARROLL- 
TON,  MISSOURI  ......  451-460 

The  concentration  of  the  Federal  troops  at  Jefferson  City  and  St. 
Louis  left  the  smaller  stations  to  be  held  by  the  Missouri  militia — 
Colonel  Harding  disembarks  his  command  at  Glasgow  and  assumes 
command  of  post — He  was  not  advised  that  a  large  Confederate  force 
had  crossed  to  the  north  side  of  the  Missouri  River  and  threatened 
him  with  immediate  attack — On  hearing  that  the  Confederates  were 
advancing  he  makes  hasty  preparations  for  action — General  Clark 
opens  on  the  Federal  position  with  artillery — Severe  fighting  for 
two  hours — The  Federal  force  surrounded  and  Colonel  Harding 
obliged  to  surrender — General  Clark  crossed  his  command  to  the 
north  side  of  the  river  on  a  steam  ferryboat  captured  at  Boonville 
— Confederates  capture  Carrollton  and  murder  six  prisoners. 


CONTENTS.  XIX 

XXX. 

PAGES 

BATTLES  OF  INDEPENDENCE  AND  BIG  BLUE,  MIS 
SOURI      ........         461-474 

General  Pleasonton  assumes  command  of  the  Provisional  Cavalry 
Division— General  A.  J.  Smith's  infantry  division  within  support 
ing  distance — Active  Federal  operations  against  Price — Pleason- 
ton's  advance  overtakes  Price's  rear  -  guard  at  Little  Blue — A 
running  fight  to  Independence — Battle  of  Independence — Brilliant 
charge  of  Pleasonton's  cavalry  and  capture  of  Confederate  battery 
and  prisoners — Vigorous  pursuit  of  the  Confederates — Desperate 
fighting  in  the  dense  darkness  of  night — Pleasonton  forces  the 
crossing  of  the  Big  Blue — Stubborn  fighting— Artillery  brought 
into  use  on  both  sides — The  Confederates  driven  at  all  points — 
The  Southern  army  cut  in  twain — Shelby  by  desperate  charge 
breaks  through  the  Federal  line  and  joins  Price — General  McNeil's 
serious  mistake. 

XXXI. 

SKIRMISH  ON  BIG  BLUE  AND  BATTLE  OF  WEST- 
PORT,  MISSOURI 475-488 

General  Curtis  makes  the  Big  Blue  River  his  line  of  defence — The 
Kansas  militia  brought  up — Preparing  for  the  struggle — Federal 
troops  assigned  to  their  positions — Strengthening  the  line  of  de 
fence — Pressed  from  the  rear  by  Pleasonton's  cavalry,  Price's 
advance  attacks  Curtis'  line — The  Southern  forces  force  a  cross 
ing  at  several  fords  on  the  Big  Blue — The  Federal  forces  abandon 
the  line  of  the  Big  Blue  and  fall  back  on  Westport  and  Kansas 
City — Hearing  that  Pleasonton  was  pushing  Price,  General  Curtis 
marches  his  troops  out  of  Kansas  City  during  the  night  to  the  front 
— Disposition  of  his  troops  for  battle — General  Shelby  makes  a 
fierce  attack  on  the  Federal  line — The  Federal  troops  driven  back 
to  Westport,  but  advance  again — Shelby,  finding  himself  cut  off 
from  Price  by  Pleasonton,  withdraws  his  division  from  the  field. 

XXXII. 

BATTLES  OF   MINE  CREEK  AND   LITTLE  OSAGE, 

KANSAS.         .......         489-505 

The  Federal  forces  of  Missouri  and  Kansas  unite  at  Indian  Creek 
— General  Price  retreats  rapidly  down  the  State  line — The  Federal 
forces  take  up  pursuit  of  the  Confederates  the  next  morning — Fed 
eral  advance  under  General  Sanborn  comes  upon  the  Confederates 
in  camp  on  the  Marias  des  Cygnes  about  midnight — He  commences 


XX  CONTENTS. 

PACKS 

the  attack  before  daybreak — The  Confederates  move  out — The  hot 
pursuit  over  the  prairies — The  brigades  of  Colonels  Philips  and 
Benteen  to  the  front — Confederates  brought  to  a  stand  at  Mine 
Creek — Gallant  charge  of  Colonels  Philips  and  Benteen  and  cap 
ture  of  Confederate  artillery,  two  generals,  and  many  prisoners 
— Demoralization  of  the  Southern  army — Action  at  Little  Osage — 
Southern  army  seized  with  panic  and  destroy  their  train — Dispute 
and  bad  feeling  between  the  officers  of  Generals  Curtis  and  Pleas- 
onton  over  the  trophies  of  Mine  Creek — Pleasonton  declines  to 
take  further  part  in  the  campaign  by  his  presence — List  of  casual 
ties  in  Pleasonton's  cavalry  division. 

XXXIII. 

BATTLE  OF  NEWTONIA — SIEGE  OF  FAYETTEVILLE 

RAISED — CONCLUSION  OF  THE  PRICE  RAID  .         506-518 

General  Curtis  continues  the  pursuit  of  Price's  army  with  his  own 
troops  and  three  brigades  of  Pleasonton's  cavalry— He  overtakes 
the  Confederates  at  Newtonia — Federal  forces  under  General  Blunt 
make  a  vigorous  attack  and  are  repulsed — Arrival  of  General  San- 
born's  cavalry  on  the  field  turns  the  tide  of  battle  to  Federal  success 
— Missouri  troops  ordered  to  return  to  their  stations — General  Cur 
tis  abandons  the  pursuit  of  Price — He  receives  orders  from  the  War 
Department  to  continue  the  pursuit — Missouri  troops  under  Sanborn 
also  continue  pursuit — Too  much  time  lost  by  Curtis  to  overtake 
Price — Price  sends  Fagan  with  a  division  to  capture  Fayetteville — 
Appearance  of  Federal  forces  under  Curtis  causes  Fagan  to  abandon 
the  siege  of  Fayetteville — Curtis  continues  the  pursuit  of  the  Con 
federates  to  the  Arkansas  River — Great  destitution  among  the 
Confederate  troops — General  Curtis  issues  an  order  dissolving  the 
Army  of  the  Border. 

XXXIV. 

ATROCIOUS  ACTS  OF  BANDITS — ACTIONS  AT  ROSE- 
VILLE,  STONE'S  FARM,  LEE'S  CREEK,  AND 
MASSARD  PRAIRIE,  AND  DEMONSTRATIONS 
AGAINST  FORT  SMITH 5I9~535 

Federal  detachments  carrying  the  mail  and  repairing  telegraph  line 
frequently  attacked  by  bandits — The  bandits  nearly  all  wear  the 
Federal  uniform — Bandits  in  Federal  uniform  conceal  their  identity 
and  murder  Federal  detachment  at  mail  station,  Prairie  Grove — 


CONTENTS.  XXI 

PACKS 

The  bandits  captured,  tried,  convicted,  and  shot— Sharp  action  at 
Roseville  and  defeat  of  the  Confederate  assaulting  force — Surgeon 
Fairchild  and  escort  en  route  from  Fort  Smith  to  Roseville  attacked 
at  Stone's  Farm  by  bandits  and  about  half  of  the  party  killed — 
Bodies  of  the  Federal  dead  mutilated  —  Successful  operations 
against  the  bandits  by  Colonels  Cloud,  Ryan,  and  "Waugh — The 
mail  escort  attacked  by  bandits  on  Lee's  Creek  and  sustains  heavy 
loss — The  Confederate  forces  under  General  Maxey  in  the  Indian 
Territory  become  aggressive— Federal  outpost  on  Massard  Prairie 
near  Fort  Smith,  under  Major  Mefford.  attacked  by  General  Gano 
and  most  of  the  men  captured  after  desperate  fighting— General 
Cooper  makes  a  demonstration  against  Fort  Smith  and  is  repulsed. 

XXXV. 

THE  LAST  FIGHT  OF  BILL  ANDERSON,  THE  BAN 
DIT         .  536-546 

Human  life  held  at  a  low  estimate  by  the  Southern  bandits — De 
ceived  their  own  friends  by  wearing  the  Federal  uniform — Disaster 
to  Federal  detachment  near  Rocheport — Anderson  marches  up  the 
north  side  of  the  Missouri  River  and  keeps  in  communication  with 
Price  up  to  the  battle  of  Independence — In  the  absence  of  the 
Federal  troops  in  the  Price  Raid,  Anderson  a  terror  to  the  citizens 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Missouri  River — Major  Cox,  of  the  En 
rolled  Militia,  selected  to  operate  against  Anderson — Major  Cox's 
plan  of  drawing  Anderson  and  his  band  into  an  ambuscade — The 
exciting  conflict  and  death  of  the  noted  bandit  leader — His  band 
broken  up  and  leave  that  section. 


MAPS  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


PAGE 

FEDERAL  OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  GIKSON,  APRIL,  1863     .                  .  75 

ACTION  AT  CABIN  CREEK,  CHEROKEE  NATION  SS 

MAP  OF   BATTLE   OF    HONEY    SPRINGS    OR    ELK    CREEK,    CREEK 

NATION 113 

SKIRMISH  ON  THE  POTKAU  NEAR  FORT  SMITH,  AUGUST  31,  1863  .  150 

ACTION  AT  MARSHALL,  Mo.,  OCTOBER  13,  1863     .                  .         .  193 

THE  BAXTER  SPRINGS  MASSACRE     ...  219 

BATTLE-FIELD  OK  JENKINS*  FERRY,  ARKANSAS        ....  297 

BATTLE  OF  JENKINS'  FERRY,  ARKANSAS.     FIRST  FEDERAL  POSITION 

IN  THE  MORNING        .........  310 

BUILDING  THE  "RED  RIVER  DAM"        ...                          .  320 

GUNBOATS  PASSING  THROUGH    "RED  RIVER  DAM"         .         .         .  326 

PILOT   KNOB,    Mo.,    AND    ITS   APPROACHES.      REPRODUCED    FROM 

U.  S.  WAR  RECORDS  399 


THE  CIVIL  WAR  ON  THE  BORDER 


THE   CIVIL  WAR  ON   THE 
BORDER— 1863-65. 


CHAPTER  I. 

NEW    DISPOSITION    OF    THE    TROOPS    OF    THE   ARMY   OF 
THE   FRONTIER. 

THE  year  1863  opened  with  the  Federal  arms  in  pos 
session  of  the  country  north  of  the  Arkansas  River  above 
Little  Rock,  including  the  Indian  Territory  north  of  that 
river.  The  defeat  of  General  Hindman's  army  at  Prairie 
Grove,  his  retreat  to  the  south  side  of  the  Arkansas 
River,  and  the  capture  and  destruction  of  all  his  steam 
boats  and  their  valuable  cargoes  of  supplies  at  Van  Buren 
by  General  Blunt  so  demoralized  the  Southern  forces 
in  Western  Arkansas  that  General  Hindman  found  it  ex 
pedient  to  retreat  to  Little  Rock  and  Arkadelphia.  In 
fact,  everything  in  the  way  of  forage  and  subsistence  had 
been  so  completely  used  up  by  the  large  army  operating 
in  that  section  during  the  past  autumn  that  there  was 
nothing  left  for  him  to  forage  his  animals  or  subsist  his 
troops  upon.  He  was  dependent  upon  his  river  trans 
portation  for  his  supplies.  There  was,  therefore,  no 
course  left  for  him  but  to  retreat,  since  his  steamboats, 
his  only  means  of  transportation,  had  been  destroyed. 
The  destruction  of  General  Grant's  supplies  at  Holly 


2  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

Springs,  Mississippi,  in  December,  causing  him  to  change 
his  plan  of  operations  against  Vicksburg,  seems  to  have 
encouraged  the  Confederate  leaders  in  the  West  to  make 
desperate  efforts  to  hold  on  to  the  Arkansas  River  below 
Little  Rock. 

While  the  Southern  forces  occupied  the  lower  Arkan 
sas,  it  did  not  seem  advisable  to  General  Curtis,  com 
manding  the  Department,  to  have  the  Army  of  the 
Frontier  occupy  a  position  during  the  winter  south  of 
the  Boston  Mountains.  As  this  army  could  not  subsist 
off  the  country  south  of  the  mountains,  its  supplies  would 
have  to  be  hauled  in  wagon  trains  from  Fort  Leavenworth, 
Kansas,  or  from  Rolla,  Missouri,  a  distance  of  nearly 
three  hundred  miles.  The  supply  trains  would  each  need 
a  strong  cavalry  escort  with  one  or  two  pieces  of  light 
artillery  to  defend  it  against  attacks  of  guerillas.  In 
view  cf  tha  difficulties  of  keeping  open  such  a  long  line 
of  communication-!,  General  Schofield,  who  relieved  Gen 
eral  Blunt,  on  the  1st  of  January  and  resumed  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Frontier,  also  thought  it  advisable 
not  to  attempt  to  winter  his  troops  south  of  the  moun 
tains.  He  even  ordered  the  army  to  retire  from  Rhea's 
Mills  and  Prairie  Grove  to  the  northern  line  of  Arkansas. 
This  movement  was  probably  hastened  by  General  Mar- 
maduke's  rapid  march  through  Northern  Arkansas  and 
Southern  Missouri  to  make  an  attack  on  Springfield,  as 
well  as  by  the  growing  scarcity  of  forage  in  the  section 
where  the  army  was  then  encamped.  Had  Marmaduke's 
attack  on  Springfield  been  successful,  it  would  have  tem 
porarily  crippled  the  operations  of  the  Federal  troops 
in  Northwestern  Arkansas  and  the  Indian  Territory,  for 
Springfield  was  the  principal  depot  of  supplies  between 
Rolla  and  the  army. 

On  the  return  of  the  army  from  Van  Buren,  General 
Schofield  ordered  General  Blunt's  First  Division  from 
Rhea's  Mills  to  Elm  Springs,  about  twenty-two  miles 


NEW  DISPOSITION  OF  THE  TKOOPS.  3 

north,  and  the  Second  and  Third  Divisions  under  Gen 
eral  F.  J.  Herron,  from  Fayetteville.  There  were  some 
expressions  of  regret  in  the  army  at  this  retreating  move 
ment,  but  of  course  the  soldiers  were  not  in  position  to 
know  the  causes  which  determined  any  given  movement. 
They  knew  that  they  had  been  successful  in  all  the  recent 
operations  from  Newtonia  to  Van  Buren,  and  had  driven 
the  enemy  beyond  the  Arkansas  River  and  from  Western 
Arkansas,  and  could  not  understand  why  all  this  territory 
was  to  be  abandoned  so  soon  after  it  had  been  gained. 

The  Federal  sick  and  wounded  in  the  field  hospitals  at 
Rhea's  Mills  and  Prairie  Grove  were  removed  to  Fayette 
ville,  where  better  accommodations  were  to  be  had  for 
them  in  the  churches  and  houses,  several  days  before  the 
army  broke  camp.  As  there  was  no  organized  enemy  in 
front  of  the  Army  of  the  Frontier,  General  Schofield  re 
viewed  the  several  divisions  on  the  /th  and  8th,  after 
which  he  issued  orders  making  new  disposition  of  his 
troops.  General  F.  J.  Herron  retained  command  of  the 
Second  and  Third  Divisions;  Colonel  William  Weer, 
Tenth  Kansas  Infantry,  was  assigned  to  the  command  of 
the  First  Division;  and  Colonel  William  A.  Phillips, 
Third  Indian  Regiment,  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  Indian  Brigade,  consisting  of  the  three  Indian 
regiments,  a  battalion  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry, 
under  Captain  John  W.  Orahood,  and  Captain  Henry 
Hopkins'  four-gun  battery,  which  had  been  captured  at 
Fort  Wayne  in  October,  1862.  Having  received  infor 
mation  of  Marmaduke's  rapid  march  from  Lewisburg, 
Arkansas,  towards  Springfield,  Missouri,  General  Scho 
field  ordered  Colonel  Weer  to  put  the  cavalry  and  light 
artillery  of  his  division  in  immediate  motion  to  reinforce 
General  E.  B.  Brown,  commanding  at  Springfield. 

Colonel  Phillips  was  directed  to  take  position  with  the 
Indian  Brigade  at  or  near  Maysville,  on  the  line  of  Arkan 
sas  and  the  Indian  Territory,  so  that  he  could  give  pro- 


4  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

tection  to  such  of  the  Cherokee  families  as  might  wish  to 
return  to  their  homes.  His  district  embraced  the  Indian 
Territory  and  the  counties  of  Arkansas  and  Missouri 
bordering  on  that  Territory.  His  troops  would  be  em 
ployed  in  holding  in  check  the  Indians  who  had  joined 
the  Confederate  cause  and  the  white  troops  operating 
with  them,  and  particularly  in  giving  protection  to  the 
loyal  Cherokees  as  far  as  practicable.  His  troops  would 
also  be  posted  and  employed  in  such  manner  that  no 
considerable  body  of  the  enemy  would  likely  be  able 
to  enter  Kansas  through  the  Indian  Territory  without 
meeting  with  resistance.  General  Herron  moved  his 
two  divisions  from  Fayetteville  to  Huntsville,  thence  into 
Southern  Missouri  to  cover  any  possible  movements  of 
the  enemy  from  the  direction  of  Little  Rock,  and  to 
obtain  forage  for  his  cavalry  and  transportation  animals. 
This  gallant  officer  and  his  gallant  division  were  ordered 
in  the  spring  of  1863  to  reinforce  General  Grant  in  the 
Vicksburg  campaign,  and  his  name  does  not  figure  any 
more  in  the  operations  herein  described.  Detachments 
of  his  cavalry,  however,  had  a  few  spirited  contests  with 
the  Southern  guerillas  of  Northern  Arkansas  and  South 
ern  Missouri ;  but  no  regularly  organized  force  appeared 
in  his  front  before  his  departure  for  Vicksburg. 

In  the  reorganization  of  the  Army  of  the  Frontier,  and 
in  making  new  disposition  of  the  troops,  General  Schofield 
left  Colonel  M.  La  Rue  Harrison,  First  Arkansas  Union 
Cavalry,  in  command  of  the  post  of  Fayetteville,  with 
instructions  to  keep  as  much  of  his  cavalry  as  could  be 
spared  from  the  post  scouting  the  country  between  that 
point  and  Van  Buren,  and  to  the  southeast  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Ozark.  It  was  considered  almost  certain  that  as 
soon  as  the  withdrawal  of  the  main  part  of  the  Federal 
army  from  Northwest  Arkansas  became  known  to  General 
Holmes,  commanding  the  District  of  Arkansas,  he  would 
order  a  force  of  Confederate  cavalry  into  that  section. 


NEW  DISPOSITION  OF  THE  TROOPS.  5 

As  all  the  sick  and  wounded  from  the  Army  of  the  Fron 
tier,  particularly  the  large  number  of  wounded  from 
Prairie  Grove  and  Cane  Hill,  were  left  in  the  general 
hospital  at  Fayetteville,  and  as  the  place  was  a  recruiting 
rendezvous  for  raising  two  new  regiments  of  loyal  Arkan- 
sans,  it  was  regarded  as  an  important  point  which  should 
not  be  given  up  without  a  struggle.  It  was  well  known 
to  the  Federal  officers,  even  up  to  the  Department 
commander,  that  there  had  been  a  strong  Union  senti 
ment  in  Northwest  Arkansas  from  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  and  the  Federal  occupation  of  Fayetteville  it  was 
thought  would  encourage  the  Unionists  to  organize  for 
their  own  defence.  Having  made  such  disposition  of  his 
troops  as  seemed  desirable,  General  Schofield  returned  to 
Springfield  and  thence  to  St.  Louis,  from  whence  he 
directed  their  further  movements  as  Department  com 
mander. 

Up  to  this  time  the  operations  of  the  Federal  forces  in 
Southwest  Missouri  and  Northwest  Arkansas  had  been 
mainly  as  an  army  directed  against  an  army,  and  no  de 
termined  effort  had  been  made  to  hold  any  place  of  less 
importance  than  Springfield.  Now  that  the  Southern 
army  had  been  driven  beyond  the  Arkansas  River  in  a 
demoralized  condition,  it  was  the  policy  of  the  General 
Government  to  have  the  loyal  militia  of  the  State,  to 
gether  with  such  Regular  forces  as  might  be  required, 
occupy  all  the  country  towns  in  Southwest  Missouri.  As 
soon  as  all  the  towns  of  importance  were  occupied  by  the 
military,  the  loyal  people  who  had  become  refugees  to 
Kansas,  Springfield,  and  Sedalia,  during  the  Southern 
domination,  would  find  encouragement  to  return  and  re 
establish  themselves  in  their  homes.  Even  if  the  militia 
stationed  in  any  town  were  not  from  that  county,  they 
would  be  loyal  men  from  some  other  section  of  the  State 
and  would  feel  an  interest  in  protecting  the  loyal  people 
of  every  locality.  It  would  also  be  an  advantage  to  have 


6  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

the  military  stationed  in  the  midst  of  a  friendly  popula 
tion  as  far  as  practicable,  for  then  the  mutual  cooperation 
could  be  turned  to  preserving  the  tranquillity  of  that 
locality. 

Very  few  of  the  Southern  families  had  moved  South, 
and  the  male  members  of  these  families  were  in  nearly 
every  case  either  in  the  Southern  army,  with  some  gue 
rilla  band,  or  hiding  out  and  communicating  with  their 
families  clandestinely.  So  many  Southern  men,  even  of 
the  non-combatant  class,  had  expressed  such  strong  hos 
tility  to  all  Unionists  during  the  occupation  of  that  section 
by  the  Southern  army,  that  up  to  this  time  they  rarely 
had  the  courage  to  come  into  any  of  the  military  posts 
and  throw  themselves  upon  the  mercy  of  the  Federal 
officers.  This  would  certainly  have  been  the  safest  course 
for  those  who  were  simply  Southern  sympathizers  and 
who  had  taken  no  conspicuous  part  in  the  war,  for  if 
found  in  the  brush  with  the  guerillas  they  would  have 
been  fired  upon  by  the  militia  the  same  as  if  they  had 
been  waging  open  war.  Many  Southern  men  who  would 
not  act  with  the  knights  of  the  brush  sympathized  with 
them  and  encouraged  them  in  their  mode  of  war,  and 
assisted  them  when  they  felt  they  could  do  it  with  safety. 
In  all  the  county-seat  towns  the  court-houses,  which 
were  generally  of  brick,  two  stories,  and  standing  on  a 
square,  isolated,  were  used  by  the  militia  for  defensive 
purposes.  The  windows  on  the  four  sides  of  such  a 
building,  with  a  few  portholes  if  necessary,  made  a  good 
defensive  position  for  one  or  two  companies  if  suddenly 
attacked  by  a  superior  force  without  artillery.  At  all 
these  stations  the  troops  were  generally  mounted,  and  it 
frequently  happened  that  as  much  as  one  half  of  the  men 
were  away  on  scouting  service.  In  some  of  the  towns 
where  no  strong  brick  buildings  standing  isolated  could 
be  obtained,  the  commanding  officers  had  blockhouses 
built,  with  earthworks  thrown  up  around  them.  The 


NEW  DISPOSITION  OF  THE  TROOPS.  J 

Southern  sympathizers  who  lived  in  town,  in  the  vicinity, 
or  who  had  been  pulled  out  of  the  brush,  were  required 
to  furnish  teams  and  help  work  on  the  fortifications  thus 
constructed,  much  against  their  inclinations. 

When  the  troops  of  the  Indian  expedition,  including 
the  recently  organized  Indian  regiments,  fell  back  to 
Baxter  Springs,  in  Southern  Kansas,  in  August,  1862, 
nearly  all  the  families  of  the  loyal  Indians  left  their 
homes  and  followed  the  army  to  that  point ;  for  no  sooner 
had  the  Federal  forces  commenced  to  retreat  than  the 
Southern  forces  under  General  Cooper  and  Colonel  Stand 
Watie  crossed  to  the  north  side  of  the  Arkansas  River 
and  advanced  north  through  the  Cherokee  Nation  until 
they  came  in  contact  with  Colonel  Phillips'  scouting  par 
ties.  There  was  soon  a  large  camp  of  refugee  Indian 
families  at  Baxter  Springs.  In  the  fall  of  1862,  when 
the  Federal  forces  advanced  into  Northwest  Arkansas, 
the  families  of  the  Indian  soldiers  moved  to  Neosho,  in 
Newton  County,  where  they  went  into  camp  and  into 
such  houses  as  could  be  obtained.  A  battalion  of  In 
dian  soldiers  was  sent  to  Neosho  under  Major  John  A. 
Foreman,  Third  Indian  Regiment,  to  afford  protection  to 
these  Indian  families  against  the  raids  of  guerilla  bands 
and  to  relieve  them  from  the  suffering  and  hardships  of 
their  situation  as  much  as  possible.  There  was  a  good 
deal  of  suffering  among  them  during  the  winter,  in  spite 
of  the  efforts  of  those  whose  duty  it  was  to  look  after 
them.  There  was  probably  no  suffering  for  want  of  food, 
for  there  was  a  fair  supply  of  corn,  wheat,  cattle,  and 
hogs  in  that  section  that  fall,  and  there  were  several 
good  water-power  mills  near  Neosho  to  make  flour  and 
meal.  Such  suffering  as  existed  came  from  exposure 
incident  to  the  changed  conditions  these  people  were  re 
quired  to  meet.  Considering  their  hard  situation,  it  is  to 
their  credit  that  very  few  complaints  were  made  against 
them  for  depredations  against  property.  Whatever  was 


8  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE   BORDER. 

taken  for  their  benefit,  was  taken  by  direction  of  proper 
officers  of  the  army.  As  supplies  for  the  Southern  army 
had  been  drawn  mainly  from  the  Unionists  when  it  was 
in  that  section,  it  was  regarded  as  no  more  than  right 
that  the  secessionists  of  the  country  should  contribute 
some  of  the  supplies  for  subsisting  the  troops  and  Indian 
families  at  Neosho  during  the  winter. 

Generals  Blunt  and  Herron  had  depended  upon  the 
country  they  occupied  to  furnish  forage  for  their  cavalry, 
artillery,  and  transportation  animals,  numbering,  perhaps, 
nearly  six  thousand  horses  and  mules.  This  large  num 
ber  of  animals  would  have  drained  the  country  of  forage 
quite  rapidly,  even  had  it  not  contributed  largely  to  the 
Southern  troops  in  the  early  part  of  the  last  autumn.  It 
was  therefore  considered  desirable  that  the  cavalry  should 
be  distributed  over  as  large  an  area  as  easy  cooperation 
between  different  commands  would  permit.  With  the 
cavalry  distributed  over  a  large  area  and  with  foraging  and 
scouting  parties  going  out  constantly  from  every  camp 
and  station,  the  different  guerilla  bands  could  be  more 
effectually  broken  up  or  driven  out  of  the  country  occu 
pied.  Confederate  recruiting  officers  with  a  few  followers 
each,  from  the  Missouri  troops  under  General  Hindman, 
were  found  now  and  then  endeavoring  to  work  their  way 
into  Missouri  for  the  purpose  of  visiting  their  families 
and  obtaining  recruits  for  the  Southern  army.  It  was 
very  important  that  the  Federal  officers  should  use  such 
vigilance  as  would  prevent  recruiting  in  the  rear  of  the 
Federal  lines  as  far  as  practicable.  If  such  recruiting  was 
not  checked,  the  enemy  would  soon  become  more  formi 
dable  in  the  rear  of  the  Federal  forces  than  in  their  front. 

In  spite  of  the  activity  and  vigilance  of  the  Federal 
cavalry,  some  of  the  Confederate  recruiting  parties  were 
able  to  march  a  hundred  miles  or  so  into  the  State  un 
observed.  This  was  not  remarkable  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  the  soldiers  in  the  Confederate  army  from  Missouri 


NEW  DISPOSITION'  OF  THE  TROOPS.  9 

were  as  familiar  with  every  section  of  the  State  as  the 
Unionists.  These  recruiting  parties  not  only  knew  the 
country  through  which  they  would  pass,  but  they  gener 
ally  had  friends  in  neighborhoods  on  their  line  of  march 
who  would  give  them  information  of  the  strength  and 
position  of  Federal  detachments,  and  how  to  avoid  them. 
It  sometimes  happened  that  some  of  the  small  parties 
from  the  Southern  army  were  men  who  had  become  tired 
of  the  war  and  who  had  returned  with  the  determination 
of  surrendering  to  the  nearest  Federal  officer  and  renew 
ing  their  allegiance  to  the  Government.  The  recent 
reverses  of  the  Southern  army  in  Western  Arkansas  had 
had  the  effect  of  increasing  the  number  of  men  who 
wished  to  sever  their  connection  with  it,  and  who  were 
anxious  to  return  to  their  homes  and  to  remain  if  they 
could  do  so  unmolested.  Very  many  of  these  men  who 
were  returning  from  the  Confederate  service,  and  many 
other  secessionists  who  had  gone  South  when  the  South 
ern  army  was  driven  out  of  Missouri  and  were  desirous 
of  returning  to  their  homes,  misapprehended  the  humane 
policy  of  the  Federal  Government,  or  took  it  for  weak 
ness,  and  violated  their  oaths  of  allegiance  with  impunity. 
A  man  who  had  been  brought  in,  or  who  had  come  in,  to 
take  the  oath  of  allegiance,  and  who  had  been  drinking 
when  he  took  it,  was  heard  to  say  to  some  of  his  friends 
directly  after  leaving  the  provost-marshal's  office  that 
he  had  vomited  up  the  oath,  meaning  that  he  did  not 
regard  it  as  binding.  In  the  contests  with  the  bandits  it 
frequently  occurred  that  when  the  Federal  cavalry  killed, 
wounded,  or  captured  one,  the  oath  of  allegiance  was 
found  in  his  pocket,  even  in  the  face  of  the  fact  that  there 
was  printed  at  the  end  of  the  oath  this  solemn  warning: 
"  The  penalty  for  the  violation  of  this  solemn  oath  and 
parole  of  honor  will  be  death." 

This  shameful  violation  of  their  oaths  led  to  the  exe 
cution  of  ten  Southern  bandits  at  Palmyra,  Missouri,  on 


10  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

the  1 8th  of  October,  1862,  under  orders  of  General  John 
McNeil,  in  retaliation  for  their  crimes  in  murdering,  or 
for  participating  in  murdering,  Union  citizens  in  that  sec 
tion,  and  was  the  subject  of  correspondence  the  latter 
part  of  December  between  General  Curtis,  commanding 
the  Department  of  the  Missouri,  and  Confederate  General 
Holmes,  commanding  the  District  of  Arkansas.  Under 
instructions  from  President  Davis,  General  Holmes  re 
quested  to  be  informed  of  the  circumstances  in  regard 
to  the  execution  of  these  "  ten  Confederate  citizens  of 
Missouri,"  as  he  called  them,  and  in  reply  General  Curtis 
stated  that  there  were  no  "Confederate  citizens"  in 
Missouri,  and  reminded  him  that  he  had  no  military 
power  in  the  State  and  had  had  none  in  North  Missouri 
for  the  past  year ;  that  there  was  only  one  class  of  citi 
zens  in  Missouri,  and  that  they  were  Federal  citizens. 
For  the  execution  of  these  bandits,  General  McNeil  was 
severely  criticised  by  some  of  the  conservative  news 
papers  of  the  North,  and  the  editorials  of  several  English 
newspapers  were  even  more  severe.  But  it  is  perhaps 
safe  to  state  that  no  loyal  man  in  Missouri  who  was 
familiar  with  all  the  circumstances  in  regard  to  their  exe 
cution  ever  censured  General  McNeil  for  the  act.  His 
conduct  was  not  only  not  censured  by  his  immediate 
superiors  and  the  Federal  authorities  at  Washington,  but 
Mr.  Lincoln  soon  afterwards  appointed  him  Brigadier- 
General  of  Volunteers,  thus  giving  him  a  wider  field  of 
service. 

It  will  be  well  to  give  a  brief  account  of  the  occurrences 
which  led  to  the  execution  of  the  men  about  which  so 
much  was  said  at  the  time  by  those  who  were  continually 
finding  fault  with  the  general  policy  of  the  Government 
in  regard  to  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and  for  which  the 
Confederate  authorities  demanded  the  surrender  of  Gen 
eral  McNeil.  It  was  difficult  for  any  one  not  living  in 
Missouri  at  that  time  to  understand  and  appreciate  the 


NEW  DISPOSITION  OF  THE  TROOPS.  II 

situation  of  affairs  in  that  State.  When  General  Price 
was  driven  into  Southwest  Missouri  in  the  latter  part 
of  1861,  he  not  only  sanctioned,  but  authorized  and  en 
couraged,  guerilla  operations  in  the  rear  of  the  Federal 
army,  for  the  purpose,  as  he  alleged,  of  destroying  roads, 
burning  bridges,  and  tearing  up  culverts,  and  when  he 
was  driven  from  the  State  with  all  the  organized  Southern 
forces  at  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  guerilla  bands  appeared 
in  nearly  every  part  of  the  State,  robbing  and  plundering 
and  murdering  Union  men,  even  in  North  Missouri,  which 
was  upwards  of  two  hundred  miles  within  the  Federal 
lines.  These  bandits,  who  sometimes  called  themselves 
Partisan  Rangers,  always  dressed  in  the  garb  of  citizens, 
or  in  the  uniforms  of  Federal  soldiers  whom  they  had 
killed,  and  in  many  cases  when  not  out  on  their  maraud 
ing  expeditions  might  have  been  found  at  their  homes 
as  peaceable,  law-abiding  citizens,  or  in  the  towns  or 
camps  where  the  soldiers  were  stationed.  But  they  held 
themselves  in  readiness  to  respond  to  the  calls  of  their 
leaders  when  a  particular  movement  or  midnight  raid 
was  to  be  made  upon  their  Union  neighbors.  Early 
in  September  a  force  of  these  men,  several  hundred 
strong,  from  Marion  and  adjoining  counties,  collected 
under  Colonel  J.  C.  Porter,  and  at  daylight  on  the  morn 
ing  of  September  I2th  made  a  dash  upon  the  town  of 
Palmyra,  and,  driving  in  the  picket,  attacked  the  small 
force  of  militia  left  to  guard  the  place  in  the  absence  of 
General  McNeil,  who  was  then  in  pursuit  of  Porter. 
After  a  skirmish,  in  which  some  of  the  militia  and  several 
citizens  were  killed  and  wounded,  the  bandits  captured 
the  town,  released  the  prisoners  in  the  jail,  and  burnt  the 
provost-marshal's  office.  A  part  of  this  force,  on  enter 
ing  the  town,  went  to  the  house  of  Andrew  Allsman,  a 
prominent  Union  man  of  Marion  County,  who  was  too 
old  for  the  military  service  and  who  was  not  in  the  army, 
and,  in  spite  of  the  entreaties  of  his  family,  took  him  off 


12  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

and  murdered  him  in  the  woods,  leaving  his  body  to  be 
devoured  by  hogs  or  birds  of  prey. 

General  McNeil  was  at  the  time  north  of  Palmyra,  in 
Lewis  County,  but  was  quickly  informed  of  what  had 
taken  place,  and  hastened  to  overtake  the  bandits,  which 
he  did,  killing  and  capturing  a  good  many  in  the  pursuit. 
He  continued  to  press  them  day  and  night  until  they 
broke  up  into  small  parties  and  finally  disappeared  as  an 
organized  force  in  the  wooded  region  through  which  they 
were  pursued.  On  his  return  to  Palmyra  the  General 
found  the  Union  citizens  expressing  great  anxiety  in  re 
gard  to  the  fate  of  Allsman,  for  it  was  not  then  known 
whether  he  had  been  murdered  or  whether  he  was  still 
held  a  prisoner  by  Porter.  After  ascertaining  the  cir 
cumstances  under  which  Allsman  had  been  taken  away, 
General  McNeil  caused  a  letter  to  be  addressed  to  Colonel 
Porter,  which  was  published  in  many  of  the  newspapers 
of  North  Missouri,  stating  in  effect  that  if  Allsman  was 
not  returned  unharmed  to  his  family  within  ten  days  from 
the  date  of  the  letter,  ten  of  the  bandits,  whom  he  had 
recently  captured  and  was  holding,  "  will  be  shot  as  a 
meet  reward  for  their  crimes,  among  which  is  the  illegal 
restraining  of  said  Allsman  of  his  liberty,  and,  if  not 
returned,  presumptively  aiding  in  his  murder." 

The  mild  policy  of  the  Government  had  so  often  been 
mistaken  for  its  weakness  by  the  Southern  people  in 
Missouri  that  many  of  them  in  General  McNeil's  district 
believed  that  his  letter  to  Porter  in  regard  to  executing 
the  bandits  was  simply  a  threat  to  scare  them,  and  de 
clared  that  he  dared  not  do  it.  At  the  expiration  of  ten 
days  nothing  was  heard  from  Allsman,  and  the  ten  bandits 
were  shot.  They  had  all,  before  they  were  captured, 
been  once  pardoned,  and  had  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance 
and  given  their  paroles  of  honor  not  to  take  up  arms 
against  the  United  States  again,  and  had  justly  forfeited 
their  lives.  They  all  belonged  to  the  band  who  had  re- 


NEW  DISPOSITION  OF  THE  TROOPS.  13 

cently  shot,  hung,  and  cut  the  throats  of  eight  to  ten 
Union  men  in  that  section,  besides  whipping  and  hang 
ing  nearly  to  death  other  Union  men,  and  one  of  them 
was  one  of  the  party  who  murdered  a  Mr.  Pratt  near 
Palmyra. 

General  Halleck,  commanding  the  Department,  had  in 
March,  1862,  announced  in  General  Orders  that  guerillas 
"  will  not,  if  captured,  be  treated  as  prisoners  of  war,  but 
will  be  hung  as  robbers  and  murderers."  And  General 
Schofield,  who  afterwards  commanded  the  Department  of 
the  Missouri,  in  General  Orders  characterized  the  gueril 
las  in  Missouri  as  robbers  and  assassins,  and  stated  that 
"  when  caught  in  arms,  engaged  in  this  unlawful  warfare, 
they  will  be  shot  down  upon  the  spot." 

Persons  who  engaged  in  guerilla  warfare  in  the  rear  of 
the  Federal  lines  without  uniforms  to  distinguish  them 
from  private  citizens  were  regarded  by  most  of  the  Union 
generals  as  a  kind  of  land  pirates  and  not  entitled  to  the 
treatment  of  prisoners  of  war,  and  General  McNeil  was 
not  the  only  Federal  officer  who  ordered  their  execution 
when  they  were  caught.* 

Action  on  Little  Blue,  November  n,  1861. 

In  the  fall  of  1861,  after  Price  had  been  driven  into 
Southwest  Missouri,  large  bodies  of  secessionists  passed 
to  the  rear  of  the  Federal  lines  to  the  Missouri  River 
counties  in  Central  and  Western  Missouri.  These  organ 
ized  bodies  of  secessionists  were  well  mounted,  and  as 
they  were  not  burdened  with  artillery  or  trains  they 
could,  when  attacked  or  threatened  by  a  superior  force, 
retreat  without  inconvenience  and  take  up  another  posi 
tion  where  the  advantages  would  be  in  their  favor.  They 
were  constantly  kept  advised  of  the  movements  of  the 

*  See  oration  of  Colonel  Wells  H.  Blodgett,  at  memorial  exercises  dedi 
cating  McNeil  Monument,  in  the  Archives  of  the  Loyal  Legion,  St.  Louis, 
Missouri. 


14  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE  BORDER. 

Federal  troops  by  the  Southern  sympathizers  of  every 
neighborhood.  In  fact,  these  western  counties  of  Mis 
souri  were  so  much  overrun  by  bodies  of  secessionists 
that  most  of  the  outspoken  Union  men  who  were  subject 
to  military  duty  left  their  homes  by  the  early  part  of  the 
winter  of  1861. 

In  the  autumn  of  that  year  Colonel  C.  R.  Jennison 
was  sent  to  Kansas  City  with  his  regiment,  the  Seventh 
Kansas  Cavalry,  and  frequently  sent  out  scouting  de 
tachments  into  different  parts  of  Jackson  County.  These 
scouts  sometimes  saw  small  parties  of  secessionists,  but 
had  no  important  skirmishes  with  them,  and  could  hear 
of  no  considerable  body  of  the  enemy  until  the  early 
part  of  November.  Information  then  reached  the  com 
manding  officer  at  Kansas  City  that  a  force  of  several 
hundred  secessionists  under  Colonel  Upton  Hays,  of 
Jackson  County,  was  on  the  waters  of  Little  Blue  River, 
twelve  to  fifteen  miles  southeast.  The  number  of  men 
he  had  was  not  known,  but  a  force  of  three  companies  of 
the  Seventh  Kansas  Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel 
D.  R.  Anthony,  was  sent  to  the  neighborhood  where  the 
enemy  were  reported  to  have  been  seen  to  make  a  recon- 
noissance  on  the  nth  of  November.  When  Colonel  An 
thony  arrived  at  the  edge  of  the  timber  on  Little  Blue, 
near  the  Alex.  Majors  farm,  his  advance  was  fired  upon 
by  an  unseen  foe.  He  then  rapidly  advanced,  driving  the 
pickets  of  the  enemy  before  him  for  some  distance  back 
upon  the  main  body,  when  he  dismounted  his  companies, 
every  fourth  man  holding  horses,  to  fight  the  secession 
ists  on  foot.  Colonel  Hays  had  taken  up  a  strong  posi 
tion  behind  logs  and  trees,  and  it  would  have  required 
a  superior  force  to  dislodge  him.  A  hot  fire  was  kept 
up  between  the  opposing  forces  for  more  than  an  hour, 
when  the  secessionists  commenced  flanking  Colonel  An 
thony,  and  he  was  obliged  to  retire.  He  was  satisfied 
from  his  observations  during  the  fight  that  the  secession- 


NEW  DISPOSITION  OF  THE  TROOPS.  15 

ists  had  at  least  five  hundred  men,  while  he  did  not  have 
half  that  number  in  the  action.  In  this  fierce  little  fight 
his  casualties  were  seven  men  killed  and  one  officer  and 
eight  enlisted  men  wounded.  Mr.  James  A.  Capen,  of 
the  Seventh  Kansas,  who  participated  in  the  fight,  and 
who  furnished  the  data  for  this  account  of  it,  thought  that 
the  loss  of  the  secessionists  was  fully  as  heavy  as  on  the 
Federal  side. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OPERATIONS   OF  THE   INDIAN   BRIGADE   IN  NORTHWEST 
ARKANSAS  AND    SOUTHWEST   MISSOURI. 

THE  Indian  Brigade  under  Colonel  Phillips  had  scarcely 
pitched  their  tents  on  the  camping  ground  of  Camp 
Walker,  near  Maysville,  on  the  line  of  Arkansas  and  the 
Indian  Territory,  on  the  I  ith  of  January,  1863,  when  snow 
commenced  falling  and  continued  to  fall  until  it  covered 
the  ground  to  the  depth  of  from  four  to  five  inches. 
This  place  had  become  somewhat  noted  from  the  fact  that 
in  the  early  part  of  the  war  it  had  been  used  as  a  rendez 
vous  and  camp  of  instruction  in  the  organization  of  the 
Arkansas  State  forces.  It  was  an  excellent  place  for  a 
camping  ground,  for  there  was  an  abundance  of  timber 
and  water,  with  a  level  prairie  near  at  hand  for  drilling 
purposes.  In  this  section  the  prairie  region  opens  up 
and  is  much  more  inviting  than  the  rough,  hilly  region  to 
the  eastward. 

The  refugee  camp  near  the  camp  of  the  troops,  made 
up  mostly  of  Indian  families,  and  negro  families  who  had 
recently  left  their  masters  to  taste  their  newly  acquired 
freedom,  did  not  present  a  very  cheerful  sight  for  mid 
winter  weather.  Had  not  the  military  authorities  fur 
nished  food  for  these  people,  there  would  have  been 
actual  suffering  among  them.  The  improvised  quarters 
of  some  of  these  families  was  little  more  than  a  quilt 
stretched  over  a  horizontal  pole  and  brought  down  to  the 

16 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  INDIAN  BRIGADE.  I/ 

ground  on  each  side  and  fastened  to  wooden  pins  driven 
into  the  ground  like  a  wedge  tent,  with  a  blanket  or  some 
article  of  clothing  to  close  up  the  ends.  By  banking  up 
the  earth  around  such  quarters  and  using  plenty  of  straw 
inside  for  bedding,  the  tenants  were  able  to  stand  quite 
severe  weather. 

Such  were  the  hardships  which  the  war  in  this  section 
imposed  upon  hundreds  of  not  only  Indian  and  negro 
families,  but  upon  hundreds  of  white  families  who  had 
been  either  driven  from  their  homes  or  robbed  by  the 
guerillas,  so  that  they  were  obliged  to  leave  their  homes 
in  an  almost  destitute  condition. 

The  white  and  colored  refugees  were  sent  north  to  Fort 
Scott  with  nearly  every  empty  supply  train  that  returned 
to  that  post  for  supplies  for  the  army.  This  arrangement 
prevented  the  white  refugees  in  particular  from  increasing 
in  very  large  numbers.  With  the  Indian  families,  and 
many  of  the  negro  families,  it  was  different.  All  the  loyal 
Indian  families  who  had  returned  to  their  homes  in  the 
nation,  or  who  were  not  with  the  Indians  at  Neosho,  were 
encamped  near  the  Indian  soldiers,  under  Colonel  Phillips, 
and  moved  whenever  his  command  moved.  Most  of  the 
colored  men  who  had  belonged  to  Indian  masters  had 
enlisted  in  the  Indian  regiments,  and  of  course  their  fami 
lies  encamped  with  the  Indian  families.  There  was  no 
recognized  difference  of  social  status  between  the  Indians 
and  negroes,  so  they  mingled  together  on  terms  of  perfect 
equality.  No  matter  how  poor  a  white  family  was,  the 
fortunes  of  war  did  not  bring  it  to  the  point  of  yielding 
anything  to  the  social  recognition  of  the  colored  people. 
Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  did  the  colored  people  exhibit 
any  desire  for  such  recognition,  as  had  been  predicted  by 
those  who  had  been  fearful  of  the  freedom  of  the  slaves. 
Unionists  held  that  they  could  wish  even  for  the  abolition 
of  slavery  without  wishing  to  disturb  racial  relations  to 
the  extent  of  free  intermingling  of  the  two  races. 


VOL.  II.  — 2 


1 8  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

The  organization  of  a  colored  regiment  in  Kansas  by 
Colonel  James  M.  Williams  had  been  in  progress  for 
several  months,  so  that  a  good  many  of  the  negro  men 
of  Southern  Missouri  and  Northern  Arkansas,  who  had 
come  to  the  Army  of  the  Frontier,  took  the  first  oppor 
tunity  to  go  to  Kansas  with  the  view  of  enlisting.  There 
had  up  to  this  time  been  a  good  deal  of  opposition  all 
over  the  country  and  in  the  Union  army  to  the  enlistment 
of  negro  men  for  the  service,  and  the  discussion  of  the 
question  was  carried  on  in  camp  among  officers  and  sol 
diers,  as  well  as  in  the  newspapers  and  by  politicians. 
Some  officers  were  so  strongly  opposed  to  the  measure 
that  they  resigned  their  commissions  in  the  army  after 
Mr.  Lincoln  issued  his  emancipation  proclamation,  offer 
ing  freedom  to  the  slaves  if  the  Confederate  authorities 
did  not  accept  the  terms  which  he  had  offered  them. 
From  the  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  the  slaves  had  been 
used  to  raise  the  supplies  for  supporting  the  Southern 
armies,  and  in  many  instances  to  build  their  fortifications, 
and  on  account  of  the  growing  sentiment  against  slavery, 
no  thoughtful  person  who  had  been  watching  the  course  of 
events  could  reasonably  hope  for  the  continued  existence 
of  the  institution,  should  the  war  close  at  once.  Senti 
ment  had  already  changed  to  such  an  extent  in  the  army 
that  no  officer  or  soldier  thought  of  discouraging  the 
negroes  from  coming  into  the  Federal  lines  when  they 
had  left  their  masters  to  gain  their  freedom.  In  fact,  the 
humane  policy  of  the  Government  was  gaining  it  friends 
everywhere. 

Shortly  after  assuming  command  of  the  Indian  Brigade, 
Colonel  Phillips  was  impressed  with  the  fact  that  impor 
tant  responsibilities  had  been  imposed  upon  him — respon 
sibilities  that  required  him  not  only  to  look  after  the 
interests  of  his  troops  and  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy 
in  his  front  and  rear,  but  responsibilities  that  required  him 
to  look  after  the  interests  and  well-being  of  several  thou- 


OPERATIONS  OF   THE  INDIAN  BRIGADE,  19 

sand  Indian  families  of  different  tribes  who  were  exiles 
from  their  homes.  He  had  been  prominently  identified 
with  the  Free-State  movement  in  Kansas ;  he  had  been  a 
friend  of  Horace  Greeley  and  a  correspondent  of  the  New 
York  Tribune  in  Kansas  during  Territorial  times,  and  had 
written  a  history  of  the  Territorial  troubles ;  he  had  been 
a  careful  observer  of  events  of  national  interest,  and 
believed  that  the  Government's  Indian  policy  should  be 
based  upon  principles  of  justice  and  honor,  and  without 
doubt  there  was  not  another  officer  in  the  Army  of  the 
Frontier  who  was  so  well  qualified  to  take  charge  of  the 
Indian  troops  and  to  administer  the  affairs  of  the  Indian 
Territory  as  he.  His  connection  with  the  organization 
of  the  Indian  regiments  during  the  past  year  had  won 
him  the  confidence  of  the  Indians,  and  he  showed  on 
every  occasion  that  their  confidence  should  not  be  abused. 
When  the  severe  winter  weather  came  upon  his  com 
mand  near  Maysville,  he  had  men  detailed  to  repair  the 
mills  in  that  section  and  to  run  them  in  grinding  such 
corn  and  wheat  as  could  be  obtained  to  make  meal  and 
flour  for  the  refugee  families  in  and  about  his  camp.  The 
people  who  had  not  left  their  homes  raised  fair  crops  of 
corn,  wheat,  and  oats  in  that  section  the  past  year,  and 
as  the  armies  had  not  so  nearly  exhausted  the  forage  and 
subsistence  as  in  the  counties  south  of  his  position,  he  de 
termined  as  far  as  practicable  to  winter  his  command  there 
and  feed  the  refugee  families  in  Northwest  Arkansas  and 
Southwest  Missouri  off  the  country.  He  kept  his  wagon 
trains  busy  going  to  and  returning  from  Fort  Scott  for 
supplies  for  his  troops,  and  when  it  became  difficult  to 
obtain  within  ten  or  twelve  miles  of  his  camp  forage  for 
his  animals  and  subsistence  for  the  refugees  he  moved 
to  a  neighborhood  where  these  supplies  were  more  abun 
dant.  Even  in  the  most  severe  weather  most  of  his  troops 
were  kept  busy.  It  took  upwards  of  two  hundred  men 
to  escort  a  train  to  and  from  Fort  Scott.  He  was  obliged 


2O  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

to  keep  mounted  detachments  constantly  employed  on 
scouting  service  to  the  south  of  his  position,  and  his 
forage  trains  that  had  to  go  sometimes  twenty  miles  or 
more  for  forage  had  to  have  ample  escorts,  for  he  was 
almost  daily  advised  by  his  scouts,  or  by  Unionists  coming 
into  his  camp,  of  small  parties  of  guerillas  or  of  seces 
sionists  quietly  returning  to  nearly  every  neighborhood. 

A  good  many  secessionists  who  had  left  Missouri  when 
the  Southern  forces  were  driven  out  of  the  State  during 
the  Pea  Ridge  campaign  and  during  the  past  autumn 
hoped  to  return  with  General  Hindman  in  his  proposed 
march  to  the  Missouri  River,  but  since  his  defeat  they 
determined  to  venture  through  the  Federal  lines  and  if 
possible  reach  their  homes.  Having  ascertained  that  the 
policy  of  the  Federal  Government  was  not  as  rigorous  as 
had  been  represented  to  them,  some  of  these  secession 
ists  reported  to  the  commanding  officers  of  the  near 
est  posts  and  took  the  oath  of  allegiance,  while  others 
were  picked  up  by  the  Federal  cavalry  and  brought  into 
different  posts  and  took  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
Government. 

In  Northwest  Arkansas,  Southwest  Missouri,  and  in 
the  Cherokee  Nation  there  was  very  little  land  in  cultiva 
tion  except  along  the  creek  valleys,  which  generally  did 
not  exceed  half  a  mile  in  width.  Rough,  steep  hills  rose 
precipitously  from  one  side  or  the  other  of  the  creek, 
which  were  here  and  there  broken  by  deep  hollows  or 
gorges  that  extended  back  a  mile  or  so.  It  was  this 
rough,  hilly  region  that  afforded  favorite  haunts  for  gue 
rilla  bands,  and  it  was  along  the  bluffs  of  these  creeks, 
where  the  roads  ran  near  them,  that  Federal  detachments 
and  escorts  to  trains  were  firecf  upon  by  the  bandits. 
Having  taken  up  a  good  position  that  gave  him  easy  ac 
cess  to  the  Spavinaw  Hills,  the  hills  of  Honey  Creek,  and 
of  other  small  streams  in  that  section,  Colonel  Phillips 
determined  to  make  a  vigorous  campaign  against  the 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE   INDIAN  BRIGADE.  21 

bandits  of  his  district.  The  hunting  habits  of  his  Indian 
troops  made  them  well  adapted  to  going  into  the  woods 
and  hills  in  pursuit  of  marauders  or  bandits. 

On  the  I2th  of  January  he  sent  Captain  H.  S.  Ander 
son,  of  the  Third  Indian  Regiment,  with  a  company  of 
mounted  men,  to  Spavinaw  Creek,  some  twelve  miles 
south  of  Maysville,  where  he  had  received  information 
that  there  was  a  force  of  upwards  of  one  hundred  gue 
rillas  belonging  to  the  band  of  Major  Thomas  R.  Living 
ston,  who  had  been  the  leader  of  the  Partisan  Rangers, 
as  they  called  themselves,  in  Jasper  and  Newton  Counties, 
Missouri,  the  past  year.  Captain  Anderson,  having  as 
certained  the  position  of  the  enemy,  attacked  them  with 
such  energy  that  they  soon  broke  up  into  small  parties, 
and  were  pursued  until  they  were  lost  in  the  woods  and 
hills  of  that  region.  The  bandits  were  under  the  imme 
diate  command  of  Captains  Timon,  Smith,  and  Alex. 
Price,  who  had  been  operating  in  that  section  for  some 
time.  In  the  action  and  in  the  pursuit,  Captain  Ander 
son  reported  one  of  his  own  men  killed,  and  eight  of  the 
bandits  killed,  including  Captain  Smith. 

This  vigorous  action  of  the  Federal  commander  had 
the  effect  of  making  guerilla  leaders  cautious  about  ap 
proaching  very  near  the  Indian  troops.  Instead  of  being 
constantly  on  the  alert  to  meet  the  attacks  of  these 
bandits,  it  would  now  be  the  policy  of  Colonel  Phillips 
to  hunt  them  down  by  following  them  into  their  most 
obscure  hiding  places  when  practicable.  Heretofore  the 
Federal  troops  passing  through  that  section,  if  fired  upon 
by  the  bandits,  pursued  them  until  they  lost  sight  of 
them  in  the  woods  and  hills,  generally  inflicting  very 
little  punishment  upon  them. 

Having  used  up  very  closely  the  forage  and  subsistence 
supplies  in  the  vicinity  of  Maysville,  Colonel  Phillips 
moved  his  command  on  January  3Oth  twenty-two  miles 
north  to  Elk  Mills,  on  Elk  River,  in  McDonald  County, 


22  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Missouri.  Along  this  stream  and  along  Buffalo  Creek, 
that  empties  into  it  near  Elk  Mills,  there  were  some  of 
the  best  farms  in  the  county,  and  as  there  had  been  no 
large  body  of  troops  of  either  side  encamped  in  that  sec 
tion  during  the  past  autumn  for  more  than  a  few  days  at 
a  time,  Colonel  Phillips  calculated  that  these  farms  would 
furnish  forage  for  his  command  until  spring,  when  he 
proposed  to  face  south  and  move  into  the  Cherokee 
Nation. 

Cowskin  Prairie,  which  had  been  noted  as  the  rendez 
vous  of  the  Southern  forces  of  Missouri  in  the  early 
part  of  the  war,  was  only  two  or  three  miles  from  Elk 
Mills.  The  place  had  also  been  a  favorite  camping 
ground  for  smaller  commands  of  Southern  troops,  In 
dians  and  whites,  operating  in  the  northern  part  of  the 
Cherokee  Nation  and  in  Southwest  Missouri.  Most  of 
the  people  of  that  section  were  secessionists,  and  had 
been  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  the  Southern  forces  and 
guerilla  bands,  so  that  Colonel  Phillips  deemed  it  ex 
pedient  to  let  them  contribute  some  of  their  supplies 
towards  supporting  the  Federal  forces  for  a  while. 
Though  his  position  as  a  Federal  officer  commanding  a 
large  force  in  the  enemy's  country,  or  a  section  recently 
occupied  by  the  enemy,  imposed  upon  him  the  necessity 
of  taking  property  from  the  citizens  for  the  use  of  his 
troops,  he  was  always  careful  that  such  property  was 
taken  by  officers  or  non-commissioned  officers  regularly 
detailed  for  the  purpose. 

His  orders  strictly  prohibited  any  soldier  or  citizen 
connected  with  his  command  from  taking  anything  from 
citizens  not  actually  required  for  the  use  of  his  troops. 
While  encamped  near  Maysville,  half  a  dozen  or  so  negro 
men,  refugees,  or  "  contrabands,"  as  they  were  called, 
were  arrested  and  brought  before  his  provost-marshal  on 
the  charge  of  taking  property  from  citizens  and  appro 
priating  it  to  their  own  private  use,  and  found  guilty  and 


OPERA  TIONS   OF  THE  INDIAN  BRIGADE.  2$ 

a  punishment  imposed  upon  them.  They  were  each  re 
quired  to  carry  a  log  or  stick  of  wood  four  or  five  feet 
long  and  of  forty  to  fifty  pounds  weight  on  their  backs 
up  and  down  a  beat  for  about  half  a  day,  with  a  guard  to 
keep  them  moving.  This  public  punishment  was  seen 
by  nearly  every  one  in  camp,  and  was  talked  about  and 
no  doubt  had  a  good  effect,  for  complaints  of  pillaging 
rarely  came  in  to  the  commanding  officer  after  that. 
Nearly  all  the  white  people  of  that  section  had  all  their 
lives  heard  of  Indian  massacres  and  cruelties,  and  they 
were  generally  instinctively  afraid  of  the  Indian  soldiers, 
so  that  any  loose  discipline  which  would  have  permitted 
them,  or  the  colored  contrabands  with  them,  to  commit 
against  the  citizens  any  unlawful  acts,  or  acts  not  directed 
by  military  authority,  would  likely  have  attracted  wide 
attention  and  called  forth  protests  from  other  sections 
of  the  country.  There  was  one  white  officer  and  a  white 
orderly  sergeant  to  each  Indian  company  to  enforce  the 
discipline  prescribed  for  companies  of  white  regiments, 
and  it  was  the  general  verdict  of  these  white  officers  that 
the  Indian  officers  and  soldiers  did  not  show  a  disposition 
to  ignore  the  prescribed  discipline.  These  Indian  troops 
had  been  in  Southwest  Missouri  and  Northwest  Arkansas 
the  last  six  months  as  a  part  of  the  Army  of  the  Frontier, 
and  they  had  shown  by  their  conduct  that  their  service 
should  not  disgrace  the  cause  which  they  had  espoused. 
While  the  Indian  Brigade  was  encamped  at  Elk  Mills, 
known  also  as  Scott's  Mills,  a  few  Cherokee  families 
returned  to  their  homes  in  the  nation,  along  Elk  and 
Grand  rivers,  within  twelve  to  fifteen  miles  of  the 
troops.  Their  country,  however,  had  been  so  completely 
despoiled  during  the  past  year  of  its  herds  of  cattle  and 
horses,  that  these  families  found  very  little  to  live  upon 
except  wild  game,  which  had  multiplied  in  the  desolated 
localities.  Even  the  families  of  the  Indians  who  were 
fighting  on  the  Southern  side  had  lost  nearly  all  their 


24  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE   BORDER. 

cattle  and  horses  during  the  past  summer  and  autumn, 
and  were  therefore  too  poor  to  divide  such  little  subsist 
ence  as  they  had  with  any  families  who  returned  to  the 
neighborhood.  There  were  very  few  of  the  Cherokees 
who  had  yet  become  prosperous  farmers, — farmers  who 
raised  large  quantities  of  corn,  wheat,  and  oats, — having 
up  to  the  war  depended  very  largely  upon  Western 
Missouri  and  Arkansas  for  the  meal  and  flour  required 
for  consumption.  The  wealth  of  these  people  then  con 
sisted  mostly  of  herds  of  cattle  and  horses  that  lived  on 
the  range  the  year  round.  These  facts  being  known  to 
Colonel  Phillips,  he  knew  that  to  be  able  to  obtain  forage 
for  his  command  and  subsistence  for  the  refugees  during 
the  winter  he  must  look  to  the  counties  of  Western  Mis 
souri  and  Arkansas.  And  as  there  was  a  general  thawing 
out  of  the  ground  in  that  section  in  the  early  part  of 
February,  and  freezing  and  thawing  after  that  off  and  on 
up  to  about  the  middle  of  March,  making  the  roads  al 
most  impassable  for  heavy  wagon  trains,  it  was  of  course 
desirable  that  the  troops  should  be  encamped  as  near  the 
neighborhoods  furnishing  forage  as  practicable. 

The  Cherokee  Council  was  in  session  for  a  week  or  so 
while  the  Indian  Brigade  was  encamped  at  Elk  Mills,  and 
had  under  consideration  some  important  measures  touch 
ing  the  interests  of  the  Indians.  During  the  session  of 
the  Council  the  question  in  regard  to  the  abolition  of 
slavery  in  the  Cherokee  Nation  was  brought  before  it  for 
consideration,  and  the  discussions  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Indians  showed  that  they  were  in  favor  of  being  guided 
by  and  of  following  the  policy  of  the  General  Government 
relating  to  the  matter.  Although  slavery  had  existed 
for  some  generations  among  the  Cherokees,  Choctaws, 
Chickasaws,  and  Creeks,  it  was  well  known  to  those 
familiar  with  the  institution  that  it  never  existed  in  the 
form  that  characterized  it  in  the  slave  States  of  the 
Union,  particularly  the  Southern  States.  The  worst 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  INDIAN  BRIGADE.  2$ 

features  of  slavery,  such  as  the  hard  treatment  imposed 
upon  the  slaves  of  the  South,  was  hardly  known  to  the 
slaves  of  these  Indians  prior  to  the  war.  Indeed,  the 
negroes  brought  up  among  the  Indians  were  under  such 
feeble  restraint  from  infancy  up,  that  owners  and  dealers 
in  slaves  in  Missouri  and  Arkansas  did  not  hesitate  to 
acknowledge  that  Indian  negroes  were  undesirable  be 
cause  of  the  difficulty  of  controlling  them.  Most  of  the 
men  who  owned  slaves  in  the  Indian  Territory  were  white 
men  who  had  married  Indian  women,  or  half-breeds  who 
were  the  children  of  such  unions;  and  it  was  mostly 
these  white  men  and  half-breeds  who  had  espoused  the 
Confederate  cause,  particularly  among  the  Cherokees. 

The  Rev.  John  B.  Jones,  chaplain  of  the  Second  In 
dian  Regiment,  had  passed  most  of  his  life  up  to  the  time 
of  the  war  as  a  missionary  among  the  Cherokees,  and 
on  account  of  his  perfect  knowledge  of  the  Cherokee  lan 
guage  had  great  influence  among  them.  He  was  a  stanch 
friend  of  the  Union  and  strongly  opposed  to  slavery  at 
the  breaking  out  of  the  war,  and  probably  no  man  among 
the  Indians  did  more  to  mould  and  prepare  public  sen 
timent  to  acquiesce  in  the  downfall  of  the  institution. 
The  agitation,  however,  of  the  slavery  question  among 
the  Indians  had  been  so  feeble  that  it  never  excited  the 
interest  that  it  had  among  the  people  of  the  States  of 
the  Union.  There  were  no  large  slave-owners  among 
the  Indians,  and  the  institution  had  so  little  to  do  with 
social  status  that  perhaps  a  considerable  majority  were 
indifferent  as  to  its  existence.  In  the  discussion  of  the 
slavery  question,  therefore,  the  leaders  of  these  Indians 
never  exhibited  the  strong  bias  that  characterized  its  dis 
cussion  among  the  whites. 

On  the  2 1st  of  February,  immediately  after  the  ad 
journment  of  the  Cherokee  Council,  the  Indian  Brigade 
moved  from  Elk  Mills  up  Elk  River  to  Pineville,  and 
from  that  place  marched  to  Bentonville,  Arkansas,  where 


26  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

it  encamped  for  several  weeks.  This  movement  was  pre 
liminary  to  opening  the  spring  campaign,  and  of  march 
ing  into  the  Cherokee  Nation.  The  Indian  soldiers  in 
particular  were  delighted  that  there  was  a  prospect  of 
going  back  into  their  own  country  again  in  a  short  time. 
While  encamped  at  Bentonville  the  smallpox  broke  out 
among  the  Indian  soldiers,  and  a  good  many  were  taken 
down  and  a  few  died  before  the  surgeons  could  check  the 
spread  of  the  disease  by  vaccination.  Very  few  of  the 
Indians  had  been  vaccinated  up  to  this  time,  and  when 
the  disease  appeared  among  them,  it  soon  spread  rapidly. 
Nearly  all  the  white  soldiers  escaped  the  disease,  having 
been  vaccinated  before  or  shortly  after  enlistment.  A 
smallpox  hospital  was  established  about  half  a  mile  from 
the  camp  of  the  troops,  but  in  spite  of  the  isolation  of 
the  patients  the  disease  did  not  die  out  until  late  in  the 
spring.  It  was  impossible  to  prevent  the  spread  of  the 
disease  while  the  refugee  families  and  the  soldiers  of 
these  families  freely  mingled  together. 

Now  that  he  had  advanced  twenty-five  miles  south, 
Colonel  Phillips  sent  his  scouting  parties  to  the  front 
almost  to  the  Arkansas  River,  to  ascertain  as  far  as  practi 
cable  what  preparation  the  Confederate  leaders  were  mak 
ing  to  oppose  him.  He  soon  found  that  General  Steele, 
commanding  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  District  of  the 
Indian  Territory,  was  at  Fort  Smith  with  three  hundred  or 
four  hundred  men,  and  that  he  was  making  preparations 
to  open  the  spring  campaign  as  soon  as  the  roads  were 
in  condition  to  enable  him  to  march  his  troops  with  their 
artillery  and  trains  from  Red  River,  where  they  had  been 
sent  to  be  reorganized  and  equipped,  to  the  south  bank 
of  the  Arkansas.  The  Texas  and  Indian  soldiers  who 
had  been  furloughed  in  the  early  part  of  winter  had 
been  ordered  to  return  to  their  several  stations  at  once, 
and  General  Steele  was  making  every  possible  effort  to 
have  a  strong  and  well-equipped  force  on  the  banks  of  the 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  INDIAN  BRIGADE.  2J 

Arkansas,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Fort  Gibson,  at  an 
early  day.  He  ordered  his  chief  quartermaster  and  chief 
commissary  to  obtain  large  amounts  of  supplies  for  their 
respective  departments  on  Red  River,  which  were  to  be 
brought  forward  with  his  troops,  so  that  there  might  be 
no  delay  when  the  moment  arrived  to  commence  active 
operations.  He  kept  himself  advised  of  the  movements 
of  the  Federal  troops  in  his  front,  and  of  the  departures 
of  the  wagon  trains  which  brought  them  supplies  from 
Fort  Scott. 

These  signs  of  activity  displayed  by  the  Confederate 
leaders  convinced  Colonel  Phillips  that  he  should  estab 
lish  his  headquarters  at  Fort  Gibson  as  early  as  practi 
cable,  if  it  was  determined  to  hold  the  Indian  country 
north  of  the  Arkansas  River.  He  could  march  into  the 
Indian  Territory  any  day,  but  he  knew  the  moment  he 
entered  that  Territory  the  Indian  families  at  Neosho 
would  wish  to  return  to  their  homes,  and  he  was  desirous 
that  they  should  remain  where  they  were  until  spring 
should  advance  far  enough  to  enable  their  ponies  to  live 
on  the  range.  He  saw  that  if  these  families  should  join 
his  command  before  entering  the  Indian  Territory  they 
would  increase  the  size  of  the  refugee  camp  and  expose 
them  to  the  contagion  of  smallpox,  which  had  already 
invaded  a  good  many  families  encamped  near  his  troops. 
He  had  been  able  to  forage  off  the  country  during  the 
past  winter,  but  when  he  entered  the  Indian  country  he 
would  be  obliged  to  have  corn  and  oats  for  his  animals 
transported  from  Fort  Scott  in  wagon  trains.  In  a  few 
weeks  the  grass  on  the  Arkansas  River  bottom  would 
furnish  good  grazing  for  such  of  his  cavalry  horses  as 
would  not  be  employed  in  active  scouting.  In  the  mean 
time  he  determined  to  keep  out  strong  detachments  of 
cavalry  scouting  the  country  to  Van  Buren  and  north 
of  the  Arkansas  River  as  far  west  as  Fort  Gibson,  de 
pending  on  Colonel  Harrison,  commanding  at  Fayette- 


28  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

ville,  to  keep  the  enemy  from  menacing  his  left  flank  on 
the  east  and  southeast. 

The  continuous  and  active  scouting  and  escort  duty 
required  of  his  mounted  troops  during  the  past  winter, 
and  the  increasing  scarcity  of  forage  toward  spring,  had 
so  reduced  in  strength  and  flesh  many  of  the  horses  that 
they  were  unfit  for  active  service.  Indeed,  there  were 
times  when  the  forage  ration  was  reduced  to  such  extent 
that  many  of  the  horses  tied  near  each  other  in  camp  ate 
each  other's  manes  and  tails  off,  so  keenly  did  they  feel 
the  pinch  of  hunger.  A  few  weeks'  herding  on  the  range 
in  the  grazing  section  of  the  Cherokee  country  would 
greatly  improve  this  stock  and  fit  it  for  light  service.  It 
was  desirable,  therefore,  that  the  command  should  move 
forward  to  its  destination  as  rapidly  as  the  opening  of 
spring  and  circumstances  would  permit,  for  the  Indians 
were  anxious  to  get  back  into  their  own  country.  They 
had  suffered  much  from  the  war — as  much  as,  or  perhaps 
even  more  than,  the  people  of  the  States  bordering  on 
their  Territory.  It  was  the  earnest  wish  of  the  Federal 
authorities  to  restore  them  to  their  homes  as  early  as 
practicable  and  to  afford  them  protection.  The  Federal 
troops  had  twice  occupied  their  country  for  a  short  time 
during  the  past  year,  so  that  when  he  got  ready  to  march 
into  it  again,  Colonel  Phillips  determined  to  take  up  a 
position  which  the  Government  could  not  well  afford  to 
abandon. 

On  the  I7th  of  March,  a  day  or  so  after  the  return  of 
his  forage  train  of  one  hundred  wagons  from  White  River, 
loaded  mostly  with  corn,  his  command  broke  camp  at 
Bentonville  and  marched  fifteen  miles  southwest  to  Big 
Springs  at  the  head  of  Flint  Creek  en  route  to  Fort 
Gibson.  His  position  here  and  on  Illinois  Creek,  twelve 
miles  south,  where  he  was  encamped  some  ten  days,  had 
the  effect  of  checking  a  movement  of  Colonel  Carroll's 
Confederate  brigade,  which  was  stationed  a  short  distance 


OPERA  TIONS  OF  THE  INDIAN  BRIGADE.  2g 

below  Van  Buren,  and  which  was  preparing  to  march 
north  of  the  mountains  to  threaten  Colonel  Harrison  at 
Fayetteville.  While  the  Indian  "Brigade  and  the  Federal 
force  at  Fayetteville  were  only  fifteen  to  twenty  miles 
apart,  Colonel  Carroll  did  not  deem  it  advisable  to  move 
north  of  the  mountains  with  his  main  command.  But 
his  scouting  detachments  and  the  partisan  companies  of 
that  section  kept  him  well  informed  of  the  movements  of 
the  Federal  troops  in  his  front. 


CHAPTER  III. 


FEDERAL   OCCUPATION   OF   FORT   GIBSON. 


THE  signs  of  renewed  life  and  activity  brought  by 
spring  to  other  sections  of  the  country  were  but  feebly 
displayed  in  Northwest  Arkansas  and  Southwest  Mis 
souri,  so  severely  had  that  section  been  swept  by  the 
flames  of  war  during  the  past  year.  Nearly  all  the  Union 
people  had  most  of  their  property  that  could  be  used  for 
subsistence,  foraging,  or  for  other  army  purposes  taken 
from  them  by  the  Confederate  forces  and  partisan  bands 
when  the  Federal  army  came  into  that  section  the  past 
autumn,  and  had  been  obliged  to  move  north,  to  Spring 
field,  or  into  some  of  the  Federal  posts  to  obtain  sub 
sistence.  A  good  many  of  their  farms  had  the  fences 
burned  from  around  them  by  troops  camping  on  the 
premises.  The  Southern  families,  too,  who  still  remained 
on  their  farms,  had  fared  very  little  better  than  their 
Union  neighbors  in  this  respect,  for  the  fences  had  also 
been  at  least  partly  burned  from  around  their  farms  in 
many  instances. 

Such  preparations  as  the  people  were  making  to  put 
in  crops  were  on  a  much  smaller  scale  than  usual.  On 
many  of  the  farms  the  fences  had  been  burned  only  along 
the  roads  and  in  exposed  places,  leaving  the  inconvenient 
lines  of  fences  untouched.  Where  the  fences  had  been 
thus  partially  destroyed,  they  were  reconstructed  by 
collecting  the  rails  to  inclose  smaller  tracts.  The  means 

30 


FEDERAL    OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  GIBSON.  3! 

of  cultivation  had  also  been  reduced.  All  the  horses  and 
mules  fit  for  army  use  had  been  taken  from  the  people  by 
either  the  Confederate  or  Union  forces,  leaving  only  the 
old,  blind,  or  inferior  stock  for  farm  purposes.  And  then 
only  women  and  children  and  old  men  could  with  safety 
remain  at  home  to  carry  on  such  farming  as  was  possible. 

Prior  to  the  war  very  few  of  the  white  women  in  that 
section  worked  in  the  fields,  but  now  the  stress  of  circum 
stances  not  only  obliged  them  to  work  in  the  fields,  but 
to  endure  many  other  hardships  incident  to  the  war  on 
the  Border.  There  was  very  little  encouragement  for 
the  people  of  some  parts  of  that  country  to  raise  a  surplus 
of  farm  productions,  for  if  the  war  continued  they  were 
not  only  likely  to  have  any  surplus  they  might  have 
raised  taken  from  them  by  the  armies,  but  they  would  be 
fortunate  if  they  could  keep  enough  of  such  products  for 
their  own  use.  The  officers  of  the  Confederate  forces 
paid  the  Southern  people  in  vouchers  or  Confederate 
money  for  supplies  taken  from  them,  but  the  vouchers 
and  Confederate  money  were  worthless  when  the  Federal 
forces  occupied  the  country.  All  supplies  taken  from 
the  people  by  the  Federal  troops  were  or  should  have 
been  receipted  for  by  the  officer  taking  them,  the  officer 
generally  adding  the  remark  to  the  receipt,  "  Payable  on 
proof  of  loyalty,"  if  the  loyalty  of  the  party  was  regarded 
as  questionable.  The  holders  of  these  receipts  could 
take  them  to  the  nearest  quartermaster  or  commissary, 
and,  on  proper  identification,  obtain  vouchers  for  them, 
and  get  the  vouchers  cashed  at  a  slight  discount  by  the 
nearest  merchant  or  banker,  provided  the  voucher  did 
not  contain  the  fatal  remark,  "Payable  on  proof  of 
loyalty. ' ' 

Very  few  of  the  Unionists  ever  received  receipts  or 
vouchers  or  any  evidence  of  indebtedness  for  the  supplies 
taken  from  them  by  the  Confederate  forces.  They  some 
times,  however,  had  a  broken-down  horse  or  mule  left  with 


32  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

them  for  a  serviceable  one  taken  from  them.  But  they 
could  not  keep  even  this  broken-down  animal  after  they 
had  fed  it  and  put  it  in  condition  to  use,  unless  it  had 
some  defect  rendering  it  unfit  for  army  service.  A  Fed 
eral  force  in  hot  pursuit  of  the  foe,  or  being  closely 
pressed  by  him,  might  sometimes  appropriate  property 
of  the  citizens  in  an  irregular  manner;  but  except  under 
some  such  conditions  the  appropriations  were  regular, 
and  often  even  profitable  to  the  citizens.  The  blockade 
of  the  ports  of  the  Southern  States  by  the  United  States 
Navy,  the  stoppage  of  commerce  between  the  loyal  and 
insurrectionary  States,  and  the  prohibition  of  the  sale  of 
all  articles  held  as  contraband  of  war  to  the  people  living 
in  insurrectionary  districts  were  depriving  the  people  of 
the  South,  and  even  of  Western  Arkansas,  of  many  articles 
of  food  and  clothing  which  they  had  always  esteemed  as 
necessaries  of  life.  Many  Southern  families,  therefore, 
who  lived  near  Federal  posts  or  camps,  were  only  too 
anxious  to  exchange  their  butter,  eggs,  chickens,  and 
dried  fruits  with  the  soldiers  for  coffee,  tea,  sugar,  salt, 
and  other  articles  which  could  not  be  obtained  from  any 
other  source.  Nearly  every  company  commissary  had  a 
surplus  of  some  of  these  articles  which  he  was  authorized 
to  exchange  with  citizens  for  other  articles  that  the  com 
pany  desired. 

It  was  the  policy  of  the  Federal  authorities  to  prohibit 
the  wanton  destruction  of  property.  On  the  line  of 
march  of  the  Federal  troops  a  standing  chimney  and  the 
ashes  of  a  recently  burnt  house  might  now  and  then  have 
been  seen ;  but  in  every  case  in  which  a  house  had  been 
burned  by  the  troops,  investigation  showed  that  it  had 
been  burned  because  the  troops  had  been  fired  upon  from 
it  by  the  occupants,  or  by  bandits  harbored  by  the  occu 
pants.  Those  who  wilfully  harbored  bandits  were  held 
as  no  better  than  bandits,  and  the  destruction  of  their 
property  was  regarded  as  a  legitimate  penalty  for  their 


FEDERAL    OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  GIBSON.  33 

offence.  This  was  so  well  known  to  the  Southern  sym 
pathizers  that  they  did  not  often  encourage  the  bandits 
to  stay  about  their  premises  when  the  Federal  troops 
were  in  the  neighborhood.  The  bandits,  too,  who  did 
not  wish  to  bring  such  severe  punishment  upon  their 
friends,  were  generally  cautious  about  visiting  them  or 
of  being  seen  about  them. 

On  the  return  of  Captain  N.  B.  Lucas,  Sixth  Kansas 
Cavalry,  from  a  scout  of  several  days  in  the  direction  of 
Fort  Smith  with  one  hundred  men,  the  Indian  Brigade, 
on  April  3d,  moved  from  Illinois  Creek  to  Cincinnati,  a 
small  place  on  the  line  of  Arkansas  and  the  Indian  Terri 
tory,  via  Dutch  Mills  to  Park  Hill,  which  is  only  seven 
miles  from  Tahlequah,  the  capital  of  the  Cherokee  Na 
tion.  The  information  obtained  by  Captain  Lucas  showed 
that  there  was  no  Southern  force  north  of  Van  Buren  or 
north  of  the  Arkansas  River  in  the  Indian  Territory,  and 
as  the  grass  on  the  bottoms  of  the  Illinois  and  Arkansas 
rivers  was  getting  so  that  stock  could  live  on  the  range, 
Colonel  Phillips  regarded  the  time  as  propitious  for  leading 
the  Indians  back  into  their  own  country.  When  it  had 
become  definitely  known  to  the  Indian  soldiers  that  they 
were  on  the  march  to  Fort  Gibson,  every  morning  on 
starting  out  they  put  on  their  faces  their  brightest  war 
paint,  and  their  war-whoops,  which  commenced  at  the 
head  of  the  column  and  ran  back  to  the  rear  several  times 
in  succession,  had  more  animation  than  usual,  for  the 
realization  of  their  hopes  appeared  to  them  near  at  hand. 

On  leaving  Dutch  Mills  Colonel  Phillips  sent  Major 
Foreman,  with  three  hundred  mounted  men,  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Webber's  Falls,  on  the  Arkansas  River,  with  in 
structions  to  thoroughly  scout  that  section  and  to  rejoin 
the  main  command  at  Park  Hill.  While  on  this  recon- 
noissance  the  Major  came  up  with  a  detachment  of 
Southern  Indians  of  General  Cooper's  command  near  the 
mouth  of  Illinois  River,  and  in  the  skirmish  that  took 

VOL.    II.— 3 


34  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE   BORDER. 

place  six  of  the  enemy  were  killed,  including  one  captain 
and  one  sergeant,  and  several  men  captured.  The  prison 
ers  were  badly  frightened,  for  they  probably  expected  to 
be  killed  in  retaliation  for  six  loyal  Indians,  known  as  Pin 
Indians,  who  had  recently  been  surprised  and  killed  near 
Park  Hill  by  a  party  of  Southern  men  dressed  in  Federal 
uniform.  The  Federal  detachment  also  captured  and 
brought  in  about  three  hundred  head  of  cattle,  some  of 
which  were  in  fair  condition  for  beef.  This  scout  de 
veloped  the  fact  that  the  Indians  in  the  southern  part  of 
the  Cherokee  Nation  had  not  suffered  as  much  from  the 
war  as  those  in  the  northern  part,  for  many  of  those  who 
had  espoused  the  Confederate  cause  had  lost  but  little  of 
their  live  stock,  as  horses  and  cattle.  In  this  part  of  the 
Indian  Territory  Federal  detachments  had  penetrated 
several  times,  but  had  not  taken  time  to  bring  out  any 
stock;  whereas  in  the  northern  part  of  the  Territory 
each  side  had  collected  and  driven  off  the  horses  and 
cattle  of  the  Indians  to  prevent  the  other  side  from  get 
ting  them.  Of  course  in  this  indiscriminate  spoliation  of 
the  Indians  a  great  deal  of  their  property  was  appropri 
ated  to  private  use  by  white  men  who  did  not  belong  to 
the  army. 

On  the  morning  of  April  Qth  the  refugee  train,  a  train 
of  wagons  perhaps  more  than  a  mile  long,  with  an  escort 
of  three  hundred  Indian  soldiers  under  Captain  A.  C. 
Spillman,  arrived  at  Park  Hill  from  Neosho,  Missouri, 
bringing  all  the  Indian  families  who  had  spent  the  winter 
at  that  place.  Many  of  the  Indian  women  and  children 
were  riding  their  ponies,  their  effects  and  the  old  and  the 
invalids  being  hauled  in  the  wagons.  This  meeting  of 
the  Indian  soldiers  with  their  families  near  the  capital  of 
their  country,  after  a  separation  of  nearly  a  year  in  some 
instances,  was  the  occasion  for  much  rejoicing,  for  it  was 
an  event  the  consummation  of  which  they  had  been  ear 
nestly  wishing  for  through  the  long  weary  months  of 


FEDERAL    OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  GIBSON.  35 

hardship  and  exile.  But  while  all  these  people  were 
gratified  and  even  thankful  to  be  able  to  come  together 
under  the  bright  skies  of  their  own  beautiful  country, 
all  the  greetings  of  husbands  and  wives  and  members 
of  families  and  friends  did  not  present  scenes  of  rejoic 
ing.  Many  of  these  families  had  been  exposed  to  the 
epidemic  of  measles  at  Neosho  during  the  past  winter, 
and  the  mortality  from  the  resulting  sequelae  of  the  dis 
ease  had  been  very  great,  particularly  among  the  children, 
on  account  of  the  inadequate  facilities  for  taking  proper 
care  of  the  patients.  There  was  very  little  correspond 
ence  by  writing  between  the  Indian  soldiers  and  their 
families,  and  at  the  greetings  of  parents,  reference  was 
soon  made  to  a  child  or  member  of  the  family  who  had 
fallen  a  victim  to  disease  and  had  been  left  behind  to  be 
mourned  by  loving  hearts.  Thus  were  hearts  torn  by 
trials  and  severe  afflictions,  so  that  there  was  weeping 
as  well  as  rejoicing  when  the  Indian  soldiers  met  their 
families  returning  from  exile. 

Now  that  nearly  all  the  families  of  the  loyal  Indians 
had  been  brought  together  in  their  own  country,  the 
question  was  at  once  presented  to  the  Federal  com 
mander,  Would  not  the  presence  of  these  families  in 
crease  the  burden,  already  great,  of  providing  subsistence 
for  his  troops,  since  the  only  part  of  the  ration  he  could 
depend  upon  the  country  to  furnish  would  be  fresh  meat? 
While  he  saw  that  he  might  be  obliged  to  issue  to  some 
of  the  Indian  families  part  of  the  subsistence  supplies 
brought  down  from  Fort  Scott  for  his  troops,  it  was  his 
policy  to  encourage  the  families  living  north  of  the  Ar 
kansas  River  to  return  to  their  homes  as  far  as  practicable 
for  the  purpose  of  putting  in  their  usual  crops  of  corn 
and  garden  stuff.  Even  in  peaceable  times  a  good  many 
Indian  women  had  been  in  the  habit  of  working  such 
patches  of  corn  and  potatoes  as  were  cultivated.  When 
leaving  their  homes  most  of  these  Indians  had  been  able 


36  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

to  bring  out  a  good  many  of  their  ponies,  probably  at 
least  one  for  each  member  of  the  family  to  ride,  except 
children  in  the  arms  of  their  mothers,  and  now  that  the 
range  was  getting  good  this  stock  could  be  better  taken 
care  of  and  made  more  useful  at  the  homes  of  families 
than  in  camp  near  the  troops. 

Very  few  of  the  houses  and  fences  had  been  burned  in 
the  Indian  Territory,  except  such  as  were  burned  by  acci 
dental  fires  breaking  out,  and  those  families  who  returned 
to  their  homes  generally  found  their  premises  in  nearly 
the  same  condition  in  which  they  left  them,  and  in  some 
cases  were  able  to  find  on  the  range  some  of  their  horses 
and  cattle  which  had  not  been  killed  or  driven  off  in  their 
absence.  After  the  defeat  and  breaking  up  of  General 
Cooper's  force  at  Fort  Wayne  in  October,  the  Southern 
Indians  had  not  ventured  north  of  the  Arkansas  River, 
except  along  the  State  line  between  Fort  Smith  and  the 
Boston  Mountains  a  week  or  so  during  the  Prairie  Grove 
campaign,  so  that  they  had  not  been  able  to  collect  and 
drive  off  much  stock  during  the  past  winter. 

As  the  winter  had  not  been  very  severe,  most  of  the 
abandoned  stock  in  the  Territory  had  been  able  to  live 
in  the  can  ^brakes  and  on  the  range  in  the  timber  along 
the  st  .ins.  A  process  of  natural  selection  had  made  the 
Indian  cattle  and  horses  hardy  breeds,  and,  as  many  of 
the  cattle  would  soon  be  in  condition  for  making  good 
beef,  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  that  they  should 
be  protected  from  the  depredations  of  partisan  bands  who 
were  already  making  efforts  to  collect  herds  of  them  to 
drive  south  for  the  use  of  the  Southern  army.  When 
the  loyal  Indian  families  commenced  returning  to  their 
homes,  the  presence  in  any  neighborhood  of  partisan 
bands  or  other  agents  of  the  Confederacy  collecting 
stock  quickly  excited  attention  and  was  likely  in  a  short 
time  to  be  made  known  to  the  Federal  commander  of 
the  Indian  troops,  for  an  Indian  woman  did  not  seem  to 


FEDERAL   OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  GIBSON.  37 

regard  it  as  much  of  a  hardship  to  mount  her  pony  and 
ride  twenty-five  to  thirty  miles  in  a  day  or  night  on  an 
important  mission. 

Having  by  his  scouting  detachments  made  himself 
better  acquainted  with  the  situation  in  the  Indian  Terri 
tory,  and  having  given  the  Indian  soldiers  and  their 
families  several  days  to  make  such  arrangements  as  they 
desired  for  the  future,  Colonel  Phillips  marched  his  com 
mand,  with  baggage  trains  and  artillery,  from  Park  Hill  to 
Fort  Gibson,  arriving  at  the  latter  place  in  the  afternoon 
of  April  1 3th.  He  had,  however,  several  days  before 
sent  forward  a  battalion  of  the  Second  Indian  Regiment 
and  one  company  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry  to  recon 
noitre  the  position  and  to  ascertain  if  practicable  if  there 
was  a  Confederate  force  in  the  vicinity  south  of  the  Ar 
kansas  or  west  of  Grand  River.  The  commanding  officer 
of  the  detachment  ascertained  before  reaching  Fort  Gib 
son  that  there  was  a  company  of  Colonel  Stand  Watie's 
Southern  Indians  there,  and  determined,  on  nearing  the 
place,  to  charge  them,  which  he  did  in  a  gallant  manner. 
In  the  charge  the  enemy  were  put  to  flight,  four  or  five 
killed  and  wounded,  several  captured,  and  the  remainder 
so  completely  hemmed  in  near  the  mouth  of  G  nd  River 
that  they  were  obliged  to  plunge  into  the  Arkai.  .s  and 
swim  it  to  save  themselves  from  capture.  In  a  few  days 
after  his  arrival  at  Fort  Gibson,  Colonel  Phillips  saw  that 
Generals  Steele  and  Cooper  were  preparing  to  use  all  their 
power  to  compel  him  to  evacuate  his  position.  But  know 
ing  the  importance  of  that  position,  and  that  it  would  be 
ruinous  to  the  Union  cause  in  the  Indian  Territory  to 
evacuate  it,  he  determined  to  hold  on  to  it  to  the  last 
extremity. 

The  military  post  of  Fort  Gibson  was  established  by  the 
Government  about  1830,  and  two  or  three  companies  of 
Regular  troops  were  stationed  there  up  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  war.  No  defensive  works  had  been  constructed 


38  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

except  a  couple  of  blockhouses,  which  were  in  a  state  of 
decay  and  which  were  practically  useless  as  a  defence 
against  modern  artillery.  The  position  was  naturally  a 
strong  one,  for  there  was  no  point  of  equal  height  within 
a  mile  or  so  from  which  an  enemy  could  use  artillery 
against  it  with  advantage.  The  new  Government  build 
ings  stood  on  a  bluff,  probably  seventy-five  feet  high,  on 
the  east  side  of  Grand  River,  three  miles  above  its  junc 
tion  with  the  Arkansas.  Looking  to  the  east  one  could 
see  in  the  distance,  some  ten  miles  off,  in  bold  outlines, 
the  range  of  hills  which  were  the  western  terminus  of  the 
Ozark  Mountains.  Turning  to  the  south  and  overlooking 
the  Arkansas  River,  three  miles  distant,  the  eyes  rested 
upon  the  opposite  heights  and  the  prairie  country  be 
yond.  Turning  to  the  west  and  southwest  were  pre 
sented  to  the  view  the  western  heights  of  Grand  River,  a 
mile  and  a  half  to  two  miles  off.  Farther  to  the  south 
west  could  be  seen  a  prairie  region  with  a  strip  of  timber 
running  through  it  in  a  southeast  direction.  This  ribbon- 
like  strip  of  timber  marked  the  course  of  the  Verdigris, 
which  empties  into  the  Arkansas  five  or  six  miles  above 
the  mouth  of  Grand  River.  The  junction  of  these  rivers 
within  a  few  miles  of  each  other  had  made  Fort  Gibson 
a  central  point  from  the  fact  that  it  was  the  head  of  navi 
gation  on  the  Arkansas  and  its  tributaries.  There  were 
two  good  substantial  stone  buildings  standing  on  the 
bluff  a  hundred  yards  or  so  from  the  water's  edge,  which 
had  been  used  by  the  Regular  army  as  quartermaster 
and  commissary  storehouses,  and  which  were  turned  to 
that  use  again. 

The  wagon  trains  hauling  supplies  for  the  troops  from 
Fort  Scott  passed  down  on  the  military  road  on  the  west 
side  of  Grand  River,  and  crossed  the  river  opposite  the 
fort  on  ferryboats,  which  Colonel  Phillips  had  constructed 
for  the  purpose  on  moving  in.  In  view  of  the  activity  the 
enemy  were  displaying  in  his  front  a  few  days  after  his 


FEDERAL    OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  GIBSON.  39 

arrival  at  Gibson,  he  put  all  of  his  troops  not  employed 
in  scouting  and  escort  duty  to  working  on  fortifications 
on  the  bluff  a  few  hundred  yards  north  of  the  old  wooden 
buildings  around  the  plaza. 

In  spite  of  the  reputation  of  the  Indian  for  a  dislike  of 
manual  labor,  the  Indian  soldiers  worked  on  the  fortifica 
tions  with  picks  and  shovels  with  commendable  industry 
without  a  murmur,  and  in  a  few  weeks  threw  up  a  line  of 
breastworks  about  a  mile  in  length,  including  the  angles. 
The  breastworks  thus  constructed  extended  around  three 
sides  of  an  area  of  about  fifteen  acres,  the  precipitous 
bluff  forming  the  west  side,  which  was  large  enough  for 
all  the  troops  and  trains  to  camp  on  the  inside  in  an 
emergency.  Barbettes  were  also  constructed  for  the 
guns  of  the  battery  so  that  they  could  fire  over  the  para 
pet  and  sweep  the  approaches  in  every  direction  except 
along  the  west  bluff.  In  view  of  the  strong  probability 
that  he  would  be  obliged  to  use  the  greater  part  of  his 
troops  in  making  reconnoissances  and  in  furnishing  escorts 
to  his  supply  trains,  the  Federal  commander  saw  that  his 
position  should  at  once  be  strengthened  so  that  he  could 
hold  it  with  the  smaller  part  of  his  command  against  any 
attacking  force  which  General  Cooper  would  likely  be 
able  to  bring  to  bear  upon  it. 

The  Arkansas  was  sometimes  fordable  at  different 
points  below  the  mouth  of  Grand  River  even  in  the 
spring  season,  and  Colonel  Phillips  determined  to  be 
prepared  to  meet  any  movement  the  Confederate  leaders 
might  attempt  to  make.  He  knew  that  inasmuch  as 
they  held  no  particular  place  in  the  Indian  Territory  they 
could  and  probably  would  use  all  their  forces  to  threaten 
and  disturb  his  line  of  communication  with  his  base  of 
supplies  at  Fort  Scott,  a  distance  of  160  miles  north. 
He  would  be  obliged  to  guard  eighty  to  one  hundred 
miles  of  this  line,  as  far  north  as  Baxter  Springs,  which 
would  constantly  require  large  details  from  his  mounted 


4O  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

troops.  He  proposed,  however,  to  hold  his  troops  in 
hand  in  such  manner  that  he  could  use  them  to  act  on 
the  offensive  when  desirable,  and,  if  practicable,  strike 
the  enemy  when  they  would  least  expect  his  blows. 

He  saw  that  the  Southern  leaders  would  not  likely 
have  any  great  advantage  over  him  in  regard  to  ascertain 
ing  each  other's  movements,  for  considerable  numbers 
of  Creek  and  Seminole  Indians  who  had  hitherto  been 
friendly  to  the  Confederate  cause,  and  whose  territory 
lay  south  of  the  Arkansas,  had,  within  a  few  days  after 
his  arrival  at  Fort  Gibson,  sent  in  a  request  under  a  flag 
of  truce  to  ascertain  on  what  conditions  they  could  come 
in  and  renew  their  allegiance  to  the  Government.  When 
they  found  that  no  hard  conditions  would  be  imposed — 
in  fact,  that  they  would  be  welcomed — they  commenced 
coming  in  in  squads  of  a  dozen  or  so  at  a  time,  and  in  a 
week  or  two  more  than  one  hundred  had  arrived,  a  good 
many  of  whom  at  once  joined  the  First  Indian  Regiment, 
which  was  composed  of  loyal  Creeks  and  Seminoles. 
The  statements  of  these  Indians  showed  that  there  was  a 
good  deal  of  dissatisfaction  among  the  Southern  Indians 
of  General  Steele's  command  on  account  of  the  indiffer 
ence  with  which  their  interests  had  been  treated  by  the 
Confederate  authorities. 

It  was  through  information  obtained  from  these  Indians 
and  from  white  deserters  from  General  Cooper's  com 
mand  that  Colonel  Phillips  ascertained  that  a  proclama 
tion  had  been  issued  for  the  rebel  Cherokee  Legislature 
to  meet  at  Webber's  Falls,  twenty-five  miles  below  Fort 
Gibson,  on  the  south  side  of  the  Arkansas,  on  the  25th 
of  April,  and  that  a  Confederate  force  of  about  five  hun 
dred  men  was  being  concentrated  at  that  point  under 
Colonel  Stand  Watie,  the  leader  of  the  Cherokees  who 
had  espoused  the  Confederate  cause.  When  this  informa 
tion  was  received,  the  Federal  troops  at  Fort  Gibson  had 
just  completed  the  celebration  of  the  event  of  raising  the 


FEDERAL   OCCUPATION   OF  FORT  GIBSON.  41 

National  Flag  at  that  post,  and  Colonel  Phillips  had  just 
sent  out  two  hundred  cavalry  to  meet  and  reinforce  the 
escort  to  his  supply  train  of  125  wagons  from  Fort  Scott, 
for  a  rumor  prevailed  that  day  that  General  Cooper 
had  despatched  a  cavalry  force  of  about  one  thousand 
men  to  cross  the  Arkansas  above  Fort  Gibson  for  the 
purpose  of  capturing  or  destroying  the  train  if  practi 
cable.  The  train,  however,  came  in  during  the  night 
without  accident,  and  Colonel  Phillips  determined  to 
make  a  night's  march,  and  surprise,  attack,  and  break 
up  the  Confederate  force  at  Webber's  Falls  at  once. 
There  had  recently  been  a  rise  of  several  feet  in  the  Ar 
kansas,  and  he  soon  found  that  he  would  be  obliged  to 
wait  a  day  or  two  for  it  to  fall  before  he  would  be  able 
to  cross  it  at  any  of  the  fords  below  Fort  Gibson.  Dur 
ing  this  interval  he  heard  of  General  Cabell's  attack 
on  Fayetteville,  Arkansas,  on  the  i8th,  and  of  his  repulse 
by  the  Federal  troops  under  Colonel  Harrison  after 
several  hours'  sharp  fighting.  The  information  of  the 
success  of  the  Federal  arms  at  that  point  relieved  him  of 
anxiety  about  a  hostile  movement  from  the  direction 
of  the  Arkansas  line. 

On  the  24th  his  scouts  informed  him  that  the  Arkansas 
was  fordable  at  the  point  where  he  desired  to  cross  it, 
and  that  evening  about  dark  he  took  some  six  hundred 
mounted  men,  drawn  from  the  three  Indian  regiments 
and  the  battalion,  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry,  and  started  out 
to  seek  the  enemy.  He  forded  the  Arkansas  below  Fort 
Gibson,  and,  making  a  night  march,  at  daylight  struck  the 
enemy  under  Stand  Watie  at  Webber's  Falls,  and  after  a 
short,  vigorous  attack,  completely  routed  them,  killing 
fifteen,  including  two  captains,  wounding  about  the  same 
number,  and  capturing  a  few  prisoners,  together  with  all 
their  camp  equipage.  The  sudden  appearance  of  the 
Federal  force  at  that  early  hour  was  a  surprise  to  Stand 
Watie,  who,  after  his  partially  formed  line  gave  way, 


42  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

made  very  little  further  effort  to  rally  his  men,  a  good 
many  of  whom  dispersed  into  the  cane,  but  most  of  whom 
fled  in  the  direction  of  Northfork,  where  General  Cooper 
was  encamped  with  his  main  command.  Some  of  the 
members  of  the  rebel  Cherokee  Legislature,  who  were 
also  closely  pressed  by  the  Federal  cavalry,  dispersed 
into  the  canebrakes,  and  were  soon  lost  sight  of  by  their 
pursuers. 

A  hard  night's  march  had  so  exhausted  the  strength  of 
the  horses  of  the  Federal  mounted  troops  that  they  could 
not  be  used  to  advantage  in  making  a  vigorous  pursuit 
of  the  flying  foe.  The  Federal  loss  in  the  affair  was  two 
men  killed,  including  Dr.  Gillpatrick,  a  special  agent  of 
the  Government,  who  accompanied  the  expedition  from 
Fort  Gibson.  After  the  skirmish  was  over  he  was  re 
quested  by  some  one  to  dress  the  wound  of  a  Southern 
soldier  who  had  fallen  near  the  scene  of  action,  and  while 
attending  to  this  duty  was  shot  by  a  small  party  of 
Southern  men  who  came  out  of  the  cane  only  a  few  rods 
off.  He  was  a  prominent  citizen  of  Kansas,  and  was 
brought  back  with  the  command  to  Fort  Gibson  and 
buried  there  Sunday  afternoon. 

After  destroying  such  of  the  captured  property  of  the 
Confederate  camp  as  he  did  not  wish  to  bring  away, 
Colonel  Phillips  recrossed  the  Arkansas,  fording  it  at 
Webber's  Falls  while  it  was  rising  and  very  deep,  with 
his  command,  and  marched  in  the  direction  of  Evans- 
ville,  on  the  western  line  of  Arkansas,  where  he  was  in 
formed  there  was  a  Confederate  force  encamped  for  the 
night.  Before  reaching  that  place,  however,  the  Confed 
erates  heard  of  his  approach  and  of  the  affair  at  Webber's 
Falls,  and  immediately  retreated  back  towards  Fort 
Smith.  Hearing  of  the  retreat  of  the  Confederates,  he 
changed  his  line  of  march  and  returned  to  Fort  Gibson. 
On  his  return  to  that  post  he  heard  with  a  feeling  of  keen 
disappointment  of  the  evacuation  of  Fayetteville  by 


FEDERAL    OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  GIBSON.  43 

Colonel  Harrison  on  the  25th,  and  of  his  retreat  to  Cass- 
ville,  Missouri.  He  had  expected  the  cooperation  of 
Colonel  Harrison  to  keep  the  enemy  off  his  flank.  This 
movement  threatened  to  give  him  serious  trouble,  for 
General  Cabell,  who  had  recently  been  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  Western  Arkansas, 
would  probably  move  north  of  the  Boston  Mountains  at 
once,  if  he  had  not  already  done  so,  and  occupy  the  terri 
tory  which  Colonel  Harrison  had  evacuated.  This  would 
isolate  the  position  at  Fort  Gibson  and  expose  it  to  a 
flank  attack  on  the  east  for  nearly  one  hundred  miles 
north. 

Indeed,  on  the  same  day  of  his  return  from  Webber's 
Falls,  Colonel  Phillips  was  informed  by  his  scouts  that 
General  Cabell  had  already  advanced  north  of  the  moun 
tains  and  was  encamped  in  the  vicinity  of  Cane  Hill  with 
about  one  thousand  cavalry.  He  determined  to  check 
the  advance  of  this  force  on  his  flank,  and  at  once  sent 
out  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fred.  W.  Schaurte,  Second  In 
dian  Regiment,  with  eight  hundred  men  and  a  section 
of  Hopkins'  battery,  to  attack  the  enemy  if  found. 
After  nearly  a  week  of  hard  marching  in  the  mountainous 
region  along  the  State  line,  Colonel  Schaurte  was  unable 
to  get  nearer  than  within  about  ten  miles  of  the  Confed 
erate  force,  which  retreated  in  the  direction  of  Van  Buren 
on  his  approach.  His  expedition,  however,  had  the  effect 
of  temporarily  checking  the  boldness  of  the  enemy,  who 
were  endeavoring  to  work  around  the  Federal  flank  on 
the  east  so  that  they  could  menace  the  Federal  line  of 
communication  with  Fort  Scott. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ACTION    AT    FAYETTEVILLE,    ARKANSAS,    AND    REPULSE 
OF   GENERAL  CABELL. 

ATTENTION  may  now  be  directed  briefly  to  the  opera 
tions  of  the  troops  under  Colonel  M.  La  Rue  Harrison, 
commanding  the  post  of  Fayetteville.  After  the  different 
divisions  of  the  Army  of  the  Frontier  had  been  withdrawn 
from  the  vicinity  of  that  post  and  distributed  to  points  in 
the  northern  counties  of  Arkansas  and  in  Southern  Mis 
souri,  his  position  became  isolated  and  one  likely  to 
attract  the  attention  of  Southern  officers  commanding 
troops  south  of  the  Arkansas  River.  His  command  then 
consisted  of  his  own  regiment,  the  First  Arkansas  Union 
Cavalry,  part  of  the  Tenth  Illinois  Cavalry,  under  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  James  Stuart,  temporarily  assigned,  and 
as  much  of  the  First  Arkansas  Union  Infantry  as  had 
been  recruited,  under  Colonel  James  M.  Johnson.  This 
last-named  regiment  was  filled  up  rapidly  by  the  loyal 
Arkansans  who  had  been  conscripted  into  the  Confederate 
service  and  who  had  refused  to  serve,  and  by  other  Union 
men  who  had  made  their  way  into  the  Federal  lines  from 
adjacent  counties  and  from  distant  parts  of  the  State. 
At  Huntsville  and  other  towns  in  Northern  Arkansas 
public  meetings  were  held,  which  were  addressed  by 
prominent  men  who  discussed  the  issues  involved  in 
the  war.  Detachments  of  Federal  cavalry  were  sent  to  the 
towns  where  these  meetings  were  held  to  protect  the  peo- 

44 


A CTION  AT  FA  YE TTE VILLE.  45 

pie  in  the  expression  of  their  views  and  from  inter 
ference  by  any  of  the  independent  or  partisan  compa 
nies  of  that  section.  In  the  hilly  and  mountain  regions 
of  the  State  the  people  generally  owned  small  farms; 
they  had  no  interest  in  slavery,  were  devoted  to  the 
Union  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  were  deter 
mined  not  to  fight  for  the  Confederate  cause  under  any 
circumstances.  As  they  had  been  hunted  and  harassed 
and  threatened  by  Confederate  conscripting  officers  and 
Southern  Home  Guards,  they  welcomed  the  Federal 
cavalry  with  expressions  of  joy,  and  were  soon  offering 
their  services  to  the  Government.  They  had  been  in 
timidated,  robbed,  and  plundered,  and  obliged  to  live  in 
the  woods  and  hills  and  caves  until  their  ragged  clothing 
presented  a  most  disagreeable  sight  to  those  who  had 
been  strangers  to  such  hardships  and  modes  of  life. 
After  some  of  these  men  enlisted  and  had  their  hair  cut 
and  put  on  their  new  blue  uniforms,  their  friends  hardly 
knew  them,  they  were  so  changed  in  appearance.  Long 
hair  was  the  fashion  in  the  South,  in  that  section,  and 
among  Southern  soldiers,  and  there  was  at  least  one  in 
stance  where  one  of  these  Arkansas  recruits  refused  to 
have  his  hair  cut  and  had  to  be  caught  and  held  until  the 
operation  was  performed,  and  where  one  man  was  sent 
to  the  guardhouse  because  he  refused  to  serve  as  one  of 
the  detail  to  catch  and  hold  the  comrade  for  shearing. 
Most  of  these  men  were  therefore  already  inured  to  hard 
ships  and  dangers  equal  to,  if  indeed  not  greater  than, 
those  entailed  by  camp  life  or  service  in  the  field.  It 
was  desirable  that  this  infantry  regiment  should  complete 
its  organization  as  early  as  practicable,  so  that  it  could  do 
the  garrison  duty  at  Fayetteville,  for  Colonel  Harrison 
wished  to  use  his  cavalry  for  scouting  service;  and  then 
the  constant  communication  between  these  soldiers  and 
their  families  scattered  over  Northern  Arkansas  would 
likely  be  useful  in  disclosing  the  movements  of  guerilla 


46  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

bands,  and  perhaps  even  larger  Southern  forces.  At 
any  rate,  scouting  parties  visiting  the  localities  of  these 
Union  families  had  already  received  important  informa 
tion  from  them  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy  in  their 
neighborhoods. 

Within  ten  days  after  General  Blunt  had  withdrawn 
his  troops  from  Van  Buren,  Brigadier-General  William 
Steele,  of  the  Confederate  army,  was  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  Indian  Territory,  with  headquarters  at 
Fort  Smith.  He  reported  that  on  his  arrival  at  that 
post  he  found  that  section  utterly  exhausted  of  its  re 
sources  from  having  had  to  contribute  to  the  large  Con 
federate  forces  which  had  been  stationed  or  operating  in 
and  about  Fort  Smith  since  the  beginning  of  the  war; 
that  the  recent  retreat  of  General  Hindman  had  left  the 
people,  with  few  exceptions,  gloomy,  desponding,  and 
thoroughly  demoralized ;  that  he  found  only  about  350 
men  for  duty  under  Colonel  J.  C.  Monroe,  First  Arkansas 
Confederate  Cavalry,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  P.  Crump, 
of  Lane's  Texas  Regiment,  Partisan  Rangers,  with  about 
fifteen  hundred  inmates  of  the  numerous  hospitals  of  the 
place  in  a  wretched  condition ;  and  that  in  view  of  the 
difficulty  of  obtaining  supplies  for  his  command  from 
Red  River  or  Texas,  he  urged  the  commanding  general 
of  the  Department  to  send  a  sufficient  force  of  cavalry 
for  service  along  the  north  side  of  the  Arkansas  River  to 
protect  the  boats  bringing  up  army  stores  from  Little 
Rock,  and  to  annoy  the  Federal  troops  at  Fayetteville. 
He  also  strongly  encouraged  the  formation  of  partisan 
companies,  or  guerilla  bands,  as  the  Federal  troops 
called  such  organizations. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  very  soon  after  the  different 
divisions  of  the  Army  of  the  Frontier  were  withdrawn 
from  the  vicinity  of  Fayetteville,  Colonel  Harrison  would 
have  all  that  he  could  do  to  maintain  his  position.  From 
Unionists  south  of  the  Arkansas  River,  and  from  desert- 


ACTION  AT  FA  YETTEVILLE.  47 

ers  from  the  Southern  army,  he  ascertained  that  General 
Steele  had  a  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Colonel  Carroll  at 
Roseville,  about  forty  miles  below  Fort  Smith,  and  about 
a  regiment  above  that  point  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river  to  protect  his  boats  bringing  up  supplies  from  Little 
Rock.  Colonel  Harrison  determined  if  possible  to  cap 
ture  the  boats  employed  in  transporting  supplies  to  the 
enemy,  and  to  break  up  or  demoralize  the  force  of  cavalry 
guarding  them,  and  for  this  purpose,  on  the  23d  of  Jan 
uary,  directed  Lieutenant-Colonel  James  Stuart,  Tenth 
Illinois  Cavalry,  to  take  sixty  men  of  his  own  regiment 
and  ninety  men  from  the  First  Arkansas  Cavalry,  under 
Captain  Charles  Galloway,  and  two  howitzers,  and  pro 
ceed  to  Van  Buren,  or  some  point  on  the  river  in  that 
vicinity  where  he  might  obtain  definite  information  of  the 
movements  of  the  enemy.  He  crossed  the  Boston  Moun 
tains  on  the  Frog  Bayou  road  and  arrived  at  Van  Buren 
the  next  evening,  where  he  received  information  that  a 
steamboat,  the  Julia  Roan,  in  the  service  of  General 
Steele,  had  recently  gone  up  the  river  to  Fort  Smith  with 
a  cargo  of  corn  and  other  supplies  for  the  Southern  troops, 
and  was  expected  down  that  night  or  early  the  next 
morning.  He  at  once  placed  a  patrol  guard  on  the  bank 
of  the  river  to  watch  for  the  boat,  and  with  the  remain 
der  of  his  detachment  patrolled  the  town  and  captured 
twenty-five  Confederate  soldiers  with  their  horses  and 
arms.  Shortly  after  daybreak  the  next  morning  the  boat 
was  sighted  coming  down  the  river  and  he  made  arrange 
ments  to  receive  her  and  soon  brought  her  to,  opposite 
the  levee.  He  found  on  board  248  Confederate  officers 
and  soldiers  who  were  on  their  way  to  Little  Rock,  part 
of  the  men  being  of  the  sick  from  the  hospitals  at  Fort 
Smith.  All  the  officers  and  men  thus  captured  were 
paroled,  subject  to  exchange  for  Federal  prisoners,  and 
the  boat  allowed  to  proceed  down  the  river.  A  small 
Confederate  force  came  down  from  Fort  Smith  and  fired 


48  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

on  Colonel  Stuart's  command  from  across  the  river  oppo 
site  Van  Buren  that  day,  but  he  soon  dispersed  it  with  a 
few  rounds  from  his  howitzers  which  he  had  along. 
After  stopping  nearly  two  days  in  Van  Buren,  Colonel 
Stuart  returned  to  Fayetteville  without  the  loss  of  a  man 
on  the  expedition.  He  received  important  information 
to  the  effect  that  General  Steele  had  only  four  hundred 
or  five  hundred  men  at  Fort  Smith  fit  for  duty;  that 
there  was  great  demoralization  among  the  Southern  forces 
in  that  section,  and  that  there  was  such  disaffection 
among  the  Choctaw,  Chickasaw,  and  Creek  Indians  that 
they  were  ready  to  join  the  Federal  side. 

In  about  ten  days  after  the  abovementioned  expedi 
tion,  Colonel  Stuart  returned  to  the  Arkansas  River  with 
a  scout  of  225  men  and  two  howitzers  for  the  purpose  of 
attacking  and  dispersing  any  Confederate  troops  found  in 
that  section.  Shortly  after  he  had  advanced  south  of  the 
mountains  he  ascertained  that  a  small  force  of  the  enemy 
was  encamped  about  three  miles  below  the  mouth  of  Frog 
Bayou  on  the  south  side  of  the  Arkansas  at  Threlkeld's 
Ferry.  He  determined  to  make  an  effort  to  capture  this 
force,  and  at  once  obtained  some  skiffs  and  had  others 
constructed  with  which  he  had  one  hundred  of  his  men 
ferried  over  to  the  south  side  of  the  river,  with  instruc 
tions  to  proceed  cautiously  to  the  enemy's  camp  and  at 
tack  them.  When  he  got  his  men  ferried  over  the  river, 
he  moved  down  on  the  north  bank  with  the  balance  of  his 
command  and  the  two  howitzers,  opposite  the  camp  of 
the  enemy,  for  the  purpose  of  driving  them  out  of  their 
log  buildings  should  they  take  to  them  for  defence.  The 
attacking  party  moved  forward  as  directed  and  engaged 
the  enemy,  and  a  sharp  skirmish  took  place  in  which 
several  of  the  Southern  men  were  killed  and  wounded 
and  seven  taken  prisoners.  The  movement  of  the  Fed 
eral  detachment  was  discovered  by  the  enemy  in  time  to 
enable  many  of  them  to  escape. 


A CTION  AT  FAYETTE VILLE,  49 

A  day  or  two  after  this  affair  while  marching  along 
the  Ozark  road,  some  eight  miles  below  Van  Buren, 
Colonel  Stuart's  detachment  was  attacked  by  about  one 
hundred  men  of  Colonel  C.  A.  Carroll's  Arkansas  Con 
federate  Cavalry,  who  were  taking  down  the  telegraph 
wire  along  the  road  to  Ozark.  The  Federal  commander 
quickly  formed  his  men  in  line  and  directed  Captain  W. 
A.  Chapin  to  take  fifty  men  and  charge  the  enemy, 
which  he  did  in  a  gallant  manner,  dispersing  them  in 
every  direction. 

On  this  scout  Colonel  Stuart  captured  and  brought 
into  Fayetteville  thirty  bales  of  Confederate  cotton,  and 
captured  and  paroled  twenty-one  Confederate  soldiers. 
His  casualties  were  one  man  drowned  in  crossing  the 
Arkansas  River,  and  one  taken  prisoner. 

Within  a  few  days  of  the  movement  under  Colonel 
Stuart,  another  scout  was  sent  out  from  Fayetteville 
under  Captain  Charles  Galloway,  with  eighty-one  men  of 
the  First  Arkansas  Cavalry,  via  Huntsville  to  the  Arkan 
sas  River.  After  winding  through  the  mountains  south 
of  Huntsville,  the  Captain  marched  to  Ozark,  on  the 
Arkansas,  where  he  was  informed  there  was  a  small  Con 
federate  force  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  a  steamboat. 
On  his  arrival  at  that  place,  and  finding  no  enemy  or 
steamer,  he  proceeded  on  the  inarch  up  the  river  on  the 
Van  Buren  road  until  he  came  to  White  Oak  River,  where 
his  advance  was  attacked  by  180  men  of  Colonel  Dor- 
sey's  Confederate  Cavalry.  After  exchanging  shots  with 
the  enemy,  his  advance  under  Lieutenant  James  Rose- 
man  fell  back  on  his  main  column,  which  he  had  drawn  up 
in  line  in  a  strong  position,  and  then  awaited  the  further 
movements  of  the  enemy.  In  a  few  moments  the  Con 
federates  advanced,  charging  furiously  and  yelling  like 
demons.  They  were  allowed  to  approach  within  150 
yards  when  Captain  Galloway  ordered  his  men  to  fire. 
The  volley  from  his  rifles  emptied  some  saddles  and 

VOL.   II.— 4 


50  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE   BORDER. 

brought  the  assailants  to  a  sudden  halt,  after  which  they 
soon  retreated  and  were  pursued  about  ten  miles.  Captain 
Galloway  reported  that  his  casualties  were  two  horses 
killed  and  one  of  his  men  slightly  wounded,  and  that 
the  enemy  lost  eight  men  killed  and  fifteen  to  twenty 
wounded,  besides  six  horses  killed. 

The  next  day  Captain  Galloway  sent  Captain  R.  E. 
Travis  of  his  detachment,  with  eight  men,  to  reconnoitre 
a  canebrake  near  the  mouth  of  the  Mulberry,  where  he  was 
informed  there  were  a  number  of  men  belonging  to  Man- 
kin's  Partisan  Company.  Captain  Travis  was  not  long 
in  finding  the  enemy,  thirty  strong,  as  he  was  informed, 
in  a  log  house,  and  he  at  once  attacked  them  with  seven 
men,  leaving  one  man  to  hold  his  horses.  He  kept  up 
the  attack  for  about  half  an  hour,  when  the  enemy  re 
treated,  leaving  most  of  their  horses.  But  in  the  mean 
time  the  Captain  had  been  seriously  wounded  in  the  hip; 
two  of  his  men  had  been  killed  and  one  mortally  wounded, 
so  that  he  was  unable  to  profit  by  his  success.  On  re 
turning  to  Fayetteville,  Captain  Galloway  reported  cap 
turing  on  this  scout  three  Confederate  officers  and  nine 
soldiers. 

When  General  Hindman  was  driven  from  Fort  Smith 
the  last  of  December,  he  ordered  General  Cooper,  com 
manding  the  troops  in  the  District  of  the  Indian  Territory, 
to  retire  on  his  depots  on  the  South  Canadian,  about 
ninety  miles  southwest  of  Fort  Smith,  and  to  furlough 
his  Indian  troops  as  far  as  practicable  for  periods  of  sixty 
to  ninety  days. 

On  assuming  command  of  his  district  at  Fort  Smith 
General  Steele  found  the  regiments  of  Speight's  Texas 
Brigade  in  such  a  demoralized  condition  that  he  was 
obliged  to  send  them  to  Red  River  to  be  subsisted,  re 
cruited,  and  equipped  until  they  could  be  made  available 
for  active  service.  As  an  illustration  of  the  demoraliza 
tion  that  existed,  he  found  Lane's  Texas  Regiment,  which 


A  CTION  AT  FAYETTE  VILLE,  5  I 

originally  consisted  of  fourteen  full  companies,  able  to  re 
port  only  150  men  present  for  duty.  He  could  not  there 
fore  assume  aggressive  operations  north  of  the  Arkansas 
River  until  he  reorganized  his  forces,  which  could  not  be 
efficiently  done  before  spring.  This  demoralized  condi 
tion  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  Indian  Territory 
and  Western  Arkansas  enabled  the  Federal  commander 
at  Fayetteville  to  scout  the  country  to  the  Arkansas 
River  with  very  little  opposition,  except  such  as  came 
from  the  partisan  bands  which  had  sprung  up  in  differ 
ent  localities,  until  towards  spring.  The  reduction  in 
numerical  strength  of  the  Confederate  regiments,  Gen 
eral  Steele  asserted,  was  due  in  large  measure  to  deser 
tions;  and  he  seems  to  have  been  disturbed  more  by 
the  operations  of  what  he  termed  "  traitors,  deserters, 
and  Union  men  "  around  him  than  by  the  regularly  or 
ganized  Federal  forces  in  his  front.  Indeed,  the  Union 
men  and  deserters  from  the  Southern  army  collected  in 
the  mountains  south  of  Fort  Smith  in  such  numbers  as 
to  give  the  Confederate  forces  a  good  deal  of  trouble. 
Early  in  March,  Captain  Brown,  a  Union  man  from  Ark- 
adelphia,  arrived  at  Fayetteville  with  eighty-three  men 
from  south  of  the  Arkansas,  some  of  whom  were  recruits 
for  the  First  Arkansas  Infantry,  and  reported  that  on  the 
1 5th  of  February  he  was  attacked  in  the  mountains  of 
Washita  River  by  three  hundred  Southern  men  ;  that  the 
action  was  a  hotly  contested  one  and  lasted  from  early 
morning  until  noon,  when  the  enemy  were  driven  from 
their  position  with  a  loss  of  sixteen  killed  and  twelve 
wounded.  He  reported  his  own  casualties  at  two  killed 
and  four  wounded. 

When  the  skeleton  Texas  regiments  had  been  sent  back 
from  Fort  Smith  to  Red  River  to  be  subsisted,  equipped, 
and  reorganized  for  service,  the  success  of  the  Federal 
arms  in  Western  Arkansas  and  the  Indian  Territory 
gradually  became  known  among  the  people  of  Northern 


52  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Texas.  The  knowledge  of  this  success  encouraged  the 
Union  men,  who  were  numerous  enough  in  some  counties 
to  have  secret  organizations  of  their  own,  and  who  had 
been  much  persecuted  on  account  of  their  suspected  loy 
alty  to  the  Government,  to  collect  together  in  small  par 
ties  with  the  view  of  making  their  way  to  the  Federal 
lines.  At  Gainesville,  Texas,  sixteen  men  were  hung  on 
one  tree  on  account  of  their  Union  sentiments.  This 
hard  action  of  the  Confederate  authorities  created  con 
sternation  among  the  Unionists  and  those  suspected  of 
Union  sentiments  in  Northern  Texas,  and  they  deter 
mined  to  get  out  of  the  country  if  possible.  Captain 
Martin  Hart,  a  prominent  lawyer  of  Greenville  and  the 
leader  of  the  Union  men  of  Hunt  County,  and  Captain 
Joseph  R.  Pratt,  a  leader  of  the  Unionists  in  the  section 
around  Gainesville,  Texas,  were  able  after  many  hard 
ships  and  dangers  to  make  their  way  through  Southern 
Arkansas  to  the  Federal  lines  with  a  few  followers.  They 
represented  that  the  Union  men  of  Northern  Texas  were 
hunted  down  by  the  Southern  men  with  bloodhounds, 
and  in  many  instances  treated  with  great  cruelty,  and 
that  others  had  great  difficulty  in  getting  out  of  the  State 
when  the  bloodhounds  were  put  upon  their  tracks. 
These  men  travelled  overland  upwards  of  three  hundred 
miles  to  reach  the  Federal  lines,  and  they  were  then  in 
nearly  an  exhausted  and  destitute  condition,  for  their 
long  journey  over  mountains  and  through  swamps,  and 
in  rain,  mud,  sleet,  and  snow,  with  scanty  clothing  and 
shelter,  had  taxed  their  power  of  endurance  to  the  utmost 
limit. 

In  Texas  and  Arkansas,  and  even  in  some  parts  of 
Missouri,  it  cost  a  man  a  terrible  sacrifice  when  his  judg 
ment  and  conscience  led  him  to  affirm  his  allegiance 
to  the  Government  and  to  oppose  secession.  The  in 
terest  in  the  institution  of  slavery  had  made  it  impossible 
for  toleration  and  the  free  discussion  of  political  issues  to 


A CTION  AT  FAYETTE VILLE.  53 

gain  a  footing  as  rapidly  in  the  slave  States  as  in  the 
Northern  States  of  the  Union.  The  leaders,  and  indeed 
the  creators,  of  public  opinion  in  the  South  had  been 
in  the  habit  of  presenting  only  their  own  side  in  the  dis 
cussion  of  political  questions,  and  of  suppressing  or  mis 
representing  and  painting  in  the  darkest  possible  colors 
the  views  of  their  opponents,  so  that  the  great  mass  of 
the  people  were  kept  incorrectly  informed  of  the  true 
situation,  and  were  easily  led  not  only  to  adopt  but  to 
clamor  for  harsh  treatment  towards  their  opponents. 
When  the  Southern  soldiers,  who  were  mostly  from  the 
poorer  classes  of  Southern  men,  saw,  from  the  prisoners 
they  had  taken,  or  when  they  were  themselves  by  the 
fortunes  of  war  made  prisoners,  how  well  the  Federal 
soldiers  had  been  provided  with  clothing,  subsistence, 
and  medical  supplies,  and  how  neat  and  clean  they  were 
in  personal  appearance,  and  contrasted  all  this  with  their 
own  untidy,  half-clothed  and  half-starved  condition,  it 
commenced  to  dawn  upon  their  minds  that  the  "Yan 
kees"  were  not  such  bad  people  as  had  been  represented. 
It  was  not  therefore  surprising  that  General  Steele 
should  feel  obliged  to  refer  to  the  numerous  desertions 
from  Confederate  regiments,  and  of  the  general  demoral 
ization  that  existed  in  his  district.  But  in  spite  of  the 
embarrassments  with  which  he  had  to  contend,  he  seems 
to  have  been  not  without  hopes  of  accomplishing  some 
thing  for  the  Confederate  cause  in  his  field  of  operations, 
for  he  urged  General  Holmes,  commanding  the  Depart 
ment,  to  send  a  cavalry  force  to  the  rear  of  Colonel  Har 
rison  at  Fayetteville,  and  to  instruct  Colonel  Carroll, 
commanding  a  brigade  of  Arkansas  cavalry  at  Roseville, 
to  move  against  the  Federal  front,  with  the  view  of 
beating  or  forcing  the  Federal  commander  to  evacuate 
Northwestern  Arkansas.  The  movement  to  the  rear  of 
Fayetteville  was  not  made  with  any  Confederate  force  ex 
cept  by  partisan  companies;  but  early  in  March  Colonel 


54  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

Carroll  moved  his  brigade  to  the  north  side  of  the  Arkan 
sas  River,  a  few  miles  below  Van  Buren,  and  commenced 
sending  out  scouting  detachments  in  the  direction  of 
Fayetteville.  In  the  meantime  Colonel  Phillips  moved 
the  Indian  Brigade  from  near  Pineville,  Missouri,  to 
Bentonville,  Arkansas,  and  was  in  position  not  only  to 
cooperate  with  Colonel  Harrison,  but  to  send  mounted 
detachments  to  the  neighborhood  of  Van  Buren  to  guard 
his  own  front.  Colonel  Harrison's  force  had  also  grown 
stronger,  for  the  First  Arkansas  Infantry  had  nearly  com 
pleted  its  organization,  which  enabled  him  to  use  most  of 
his  cavalry  for  scouting  purposes.  It  was  upwards  of  fifty 
miles  from  Fayetteville  to  Van  Buren  and  points  on  the 
Arkansas  River,  and  as  the  roads  over  the  Boston  Moun 
tains  were  very  rough,  every  scout  to  the  south  of  them 
made  a  severe  draught  on  the  strength  and  endurance  of 
his  cavalry  horses.  But  the  safety  of  his  command  de 
pended  upon  his  vigilance,  and  as  spring  advanced,  which 
came  a  week  or  so  earlier  south  of  the  mountains  than 
north  of  them,  the  Confederate  leaders  began  to  display 
greater  activity  by  sending  scouting  detachments  of  up 
wards  of  one  hundred  men  north  of  the  mountains,  even 
to  the  neighborhood  of  Fayetteville.  They  were  also 
making  every  possible  effort  to  obtain  recruits  to  fill  up 
their  depleted  regiments,  promising  pardon  to  all  desert 
ers  who  returned  to  their  commands  at  once.  They  de 
termined,  as  soon  as  reorganization  and  equipment  put 
their  troops  in  condition  for  the  field,  to  open  an  aggres 
sive  spring  campaign  in  Northwestern  Arkansas,  and  if 
practicable  drive  out  the  Federal  forces  and  occupy  that 
section  with  Southern  troops. 

The  latter  part  of  March,  Brigadier-General  William 
L.  Cabell  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Confed 
erate  forces  embraced  in  the  District  of  Northwestern 
Arkansas,  and,  on  his  arrival  at  Ozark,  immediately 
commenced  collecting  his  troops  to  prepare  for  a  move- 


A CTION  AT  FA  YE TTE VILLE.  5 5 

ment  north  of  the  mountains,  with  the  view  of  attacking 
Colonel  Harrison,  commanding  the  post  of  Fayetteville. 
He  knew  that  Colonel  Phillips,  commanding  the  Indian 
Brigade,  had  marched  from  Northwestern  Arkansas  into 
the  Cherokee  Nation  and  had  captured  and  was  occupy 
ing  Fort  Gibson,  thus  leaving  Colonel  Harrison's  position 
at  Fayetteville  isolated.  He  saw  that  the  distance  from 
Fayetteville  to  Fort  Gibson  was  upwards  of  sixty  miles, 
a  distance  too  great  to  allow  the  forces  at  those  places  to 
support  each  other  in  an  emergency,  and  a  distance 
greater  than  he  would  be  obliged  to  march  to  attack 
Fayetteville.  And  when  he  got  ready  to  move  he  knew 
that  General  Steele  had  ordered  his  Texas  and  Indian 
troops,  under  General  Cooper,  from  Red  River  to  the  north 
bank  of  the  Arkansas,  to  threaten  the  front  and  flank  of 
Colonel  Phillips.  He  had  a  section  of  artillery,  six- 
pounder  guns,  which  would  give  him  an  advantage  over 
Colonel  Harrison,  who,  he  was  informed,  had  no  artillery, 
and  was  on  the  point  of  leaving  Fayetteville  to  join 
Colonel  Phillips.  General  Cabell  was  also  led  to  believe 
that  Colonel  Harrison's  command  was  composed  of  de 
serters  from  the  Southern  army  and  of  Union  men  from 
the  mountains  of  Arkansas,  who  would  not  fight  and  who 
could  be  easily  stampeded  by  his  artillery.  Early  in 
April,  Colonel  Harrison  commenced  constructing  earth 
fortifications  and  rifle-pits,  that  he  might  be  prepared  to 
meet  an  attack  from  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy.  He 
was  informed  of  General  Cabell's  presence  at  Ozark  with 
several  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  of  his  intention  of  shortly 
moving  north  of  the  mountains,  so  he  kept  his  scouts 
well  out  in  that  direction.  His  troops  had  been  well 
supplied  with  subsistence,  and  Colonel  Johnson's  First 
Arkansas  Infantry  had  recently  been  armed  and  equipped, 
so  that  he  determined  that  the  enemy  would  be  obliged 
to  do  some  hard  fighting  before  he  would  evacuate  his 
position.  Most  of  his  men  were  familiar  with  the  use  of 


56  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

firearms  and  were  good  marksmen  even  before  entering 
the  service,  and  with  the  new  long-range  rifles  recently 
issued  to  the  infantry  he  felt  that  he  would  be  able  to 
annoy  the  enemy  a  good  deal  before  they  could  approach 
very  near  his  fortifications.  And  then  any  of  these  in 
fantrymen  detached  as  sharpshooters  would  also  be  able 
to  render  effective  service  if  the  troops  should  have  time 
to  prepare  for  action. 

Lieutenant  J.  S.  Robb  returned  to  Fayetteville  from  a 
scout  in  the  direction  of  Ozark  on  April  I7th,  and  re 
ported  to  Colonel  Harrison  that  he  could  hear  of  no 
preparation  of  the  enemy  to  advance  north.  Having 
obtained  information  of  the  strength  and  position  of  the 
Federal  force  at  Fayetteville,  General  Cabell  determined 
to  attack  it,  and  for  this  purpose  left  Ozark  before  day 
break  on  the  morning  of  April  i6th,  with  Colonel  Carroll's 
regiment,  Arkansas  Cavalry,  commanded  by  Colonel  John 
Scott,  Colonel  Monroe's  regiment,  Arkansas  Cavalry, 
Major  Caleb  Dorsey's  battalion,  Arkansas  Cavalry,  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  -  —  Noble,  commanding  battalion  of 
Parsons'  Texas  Cavalry,  a  section  of  artillery  under 
Captain  W.  M.  Hughey,  and  the  partisan  companies  of 
Mankins,  Palmer,  and  Brown,  and  crossed  the  moun 
tains  on  the  Frog  Bayou  road.  After  he  got  his  command 
over  the  mountains  about  noon  on  the  i/th,  he  halted  to 
feed  and  rest  until  sunset,  when  he  resumed  the  march 
with  the  intention  of  reaching  Fayetteville  at  daybreak. 
The  night  was  dark  and  the  roads  so  rough  that  he  was 
obliged  to  make  a  few  short  halts  for  his  artillery  to  come 
up.  This  delayed  him  so  that  he  did  not  get  his  troops 
in  position  to  open  the  attack  until  some  time  after  day 
light.  He  managed,  however,  to  surprise  and  capture 
Colonel  Harrison's  picket,  but  not  before  the  picket  dis 
charged  his  rifle,  which  alarmed  the  Federal  camp  and 
enabled  the  officers  to  get  their  men  in  position  to  receive 
the  Confederates  as  they  came  up  within  range.  On 


A CTION  AT  FAYETTE VILLE.  5 / 

hearing  the  shouting  and  yelling  of  the  Confederates  as 
they  approached  the  town,  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  J. 
Searle,  assisted  by  Major  E.  D.  Ham,  quickly  formed 
the  First  Arkansas  Infantry  on  their  parade-ground. 

They  soon  left  this  position,  however,  for  Colonel  Har 
rison  ordered  Colonel  Searle  to  retire  slowly  towards  the 
camp  of  the  First  Arkansas  Cavalry,  Union,  where  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  A.  W.  Bishop  was  forming  his  men,  dis 
mounted,  for  action.  As  the  First  Arkansas  Infantry 
had  not  yet  received  their  uniforms,  it  occurred  to  Colonel 
Harrison  that  they  might  be  taken  for  the  enemy  and 
fired  upon  by  his  cavalry  if  assigned  to  a  position  requir 
ing  separation  from  the  cavalry.  He  therefore  ordered 
Colonel  Searle  to  post  five  companies  of  his  regiment  in 
a  sheltered  position  in  the  rear  of  the  line  as  a  reserve. 
In  forming  his  line,  Colonel  Harrison  took  command  of 
the  centre  in  person,  composed  of  four  companies  of  the 
First  Arkansas  Cavalry  and  three  companies  of  the  First 
Arkansas  Infantry.  Major  Ezra  Fitch,  with  the  Third 
Battalion,  First  Arkansas  Cavalry,  commanded  his  right 
wing,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bishop,  assisted  by  Major 
T.  J.  Hunt,  with  the  Second  Battalion,  First  Arkansas 
Cavalry,  and  two  companies  of  the  First  Arkansas  In 
fantry,  commanded  the  left  wing.  The  Federal  force 
thus  formed  had  only  a  few  moments  to  wait  when  they 
were  furiously  charged  by  a  regiment  of  Confederate 
cavalry  led  by  Colonel  Monroe  from  the  east  side  of  the 
town.  A  well-directed  volley  from  the  Federal  line  and 
from  sharpshooters  posted  in  houses  and  sheltered  posi 
tions  repulsed  the  attack  and  sent  the  Confederate  cav 
alry  in  confusion  back  to  the  timber  and  brush  from 
whence  it  had  emerged,  with  the  loss  of  a  number  of  men 
and  horses  killed  and  wounded.  Immediately  after  the 
charge  of  his  cavalry  failed  to  penetrate  the  Federal  line, 
General  Cabell  ordered  Captain  Hughey  to  take  position 
on  the  hillside  east  of  the  town  with  his  section  of  artillery 


58  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

and  open  fire  on  the  camp  of  the  First  Arkansas  Cavalry, 
which  he  did,  with  canister  and  shells,  but  without  wound 
ing  any  men  or  doing  any  serious  damage  to  property. 

The  fire  from  the  battery  was  kept  up  but  a  short  time 
when  two  companies  of  the  First  Arkansas  Union  Cavalry, 
under  Lieutenant  Robb,  advanced  within  rifle  range,  and 
guided  by  the  smoke  from  the  discharge  of  the  guns, 
which  were  nearly  concealed  by  brush,  poured  several 
volleys  into  the  position,  killing  and  wounding  four 
horses,  killing  one  man,  and  wounding  several  others, 
including  Captain  Hughey.  This  disaster  caused  General 
Cabell  to  withdraw  his  battery  from  that  position  and 
use  it  at  a  safer  distance.  But  it  was  practically  useless 
afterwards,  for  he  believed  that  the  range  of  the  Federal 
rifles  was  equal  to  the  range  of  the  guns  of  his  battery. 
After  some  further  skirmishing  he  ordered  another  cav 
alry  charge,  which  was  made  by  Colonel  Scott,  command 
ing  Carroll's  regiment  and  Dorsey's  squadron,  Arkansas 
Cavalry.  Colonel  Harrison  had  advanced  his  entire  line 
and  was  prepared  for  this  movement,  so  that  the  Confed 
erates  were  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  moment  they 
came  within  range  of  his  rifles  until  they  passed  beyond 
range  in  their  precipitate  retreat.  The  firmness  of  the 
Federal  line  and  the  heavy  casualties  in  killed  and 
wounded  in  each  charge  convinced  the  Confederate  offi 
cers  that  they  had  underestimated  the  fighting  qualities 
of  their  opponents.  Before  giving  up  the  contest  Gen 
eral  Cabell  determined  to  make  another  effort,  and 
directed  Colonel  Monroe  to  dismount  his  regiment  and 
charge  the  Federal  position  on  foot.  The  Colonel  de 
tailed  a  sufficient  number  of  men  to  hold  horses,  formed 
the  remainder  of  his  regiment  in  line,  and  then  moved 
forward  to  the  attack.  Colonel  Harrison  saw  the  Con 
federates  the  moment  they  touched  the  open  ground  in 
his  front,  and  when  they  approached  within  easy  rifle 
range,  opened  such  a  hot  fire  upon  them  that  they  were 


A CTION  AT  FAYETTE VILLE.  59 

obliged  to  retire  to  the  cover  of  the  woods,  leaving  on 
the  ground  a  number  of  men  killed  and  wounded. 

Finding  that  he  could  not  dislodge  the  Federal  troops 
from  their  position  after  nearly  four  hours'  fighting,  Gen 
eral  Cabell  withdrew  his  command  and  returned  to  Ozark, 
leaving  all  his  killed  and  seriously  wounded  on  the  field. 
He  reported  his  loss  at  twenty  killed  and  thirty  wounded, 
besides  a  good  many  horses  killed  and  deserted  by  his 
men  during  the  action.  Colonel  Harrison  reported  his 
loss  at  five  men  killed  and  seventeen  wounded,  including 
Captains  William  C.  Parker,  G.  W.  R.  Smith,  and  Wil 
liam  S.  Johnson.  He  also  reported  that  he  captured 
during  the  action  Major  H.  G.  Wilson,  wounded,  Captain 
T.  P.  Jefferson,  wounded,  fifty-three  enlisted  men,  part 
of  whom  were  wounded,  fifty  horses,  and  one  hundred 
stands  of  arms.  His  horses  had  been  so  actively  employed 
in  scouting,  and  many  of  them  so  worn  down,  that  he 
was  unable  to  mount  a  force  strong  enough  to  pursue  the 
enemy. 

The  uniforms  of  the  First  Arkansas  Infantry  had  just 
arrived  in  a  train  from  Springfield,  and  he  was  anxious 
to  have  them  issued  to  the  men  at  once  so  that  he 
would  not  again  be  subject  to  the  embarrassment  which 
had  just  occurred,  of  keeping  them  with  the  cavalry 
and  in  reserve  that  they  might  not  be  mistaken  for 
the  enemy.  He  considered  his  victory  so  decisive  that 
he  issued  a  congratulatory  address  to  his  troops,  com 
mending  them  on  their  good  behavior  during  the  action. 
This  was  the  first  substantial  success  that  had  been  gained 
by  the  loyal  Arkansans  without  the  assistance  of  other 
troops,  and  they  felt  very  much  elated.  The  moral  effect 
was  also  good,  for  they  had  been  so  much  dominated,  in 
sulted,  and  traduced  on  account  of  their  Union  senti 
ments,  that  as  soldiers  they  had  been  spoken  of  with 
contempt  by  the  secessionists,  even  after  they  had  entered 
the  Federal  service.  The  raid  of  General  Marmaduke 


60  THE   CIVIL    W.AR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

into  Southeast  Missouri  at  this  time  had  the  effect  of 
drawing  the  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Frontier  in  that 
direction,  so  that  Colonel  Harrison's  command  at  Fay- 
etteville  was  the  only  Federal  force  in  Northwest  Ar 
kansas.  It  was  no  miles  to  Springfield,  from  whence 
Colonel  Harrison  drew  all  his  supplies  in  wagon  trains, 
requiring  strong  escorts;  the  partisan  bands  were  grow 
ing  bolder,  and  General  Cabell  had  given  out  that  he 
would  soon  return,  better  prepared  to  take  the  place,  and 
that  if  he  could  not  take  it  by  assault  he  would  operate 
in  its  rear  and  cut  off  Colonel  Harrison's  supplies.  His 
position  being  thus  isolated  and  his  line  of  communica 
tion  with  Springfield  threatened,  the  Colonel  determined 
to  evacuate  Fayetteville  and  retire  to  Cassville,  Missouri, 
fifty-five  miles  north.  A  few  days  before  the  action  with 
General  Cabell  he  had  sent  many  of  the  Union  families 
north  in  the  empty  trains  returning  to  Springfield,  and 
on  April  25th  he  evacuated  Fayetteville  with  his  entire 
command  and  marched  to  Cassville. 


CHAPTER  V. 

FIGHTING    GUERILLAS    IN    NORTHWEST    ARKANSAS    AND 
SOUTHWEST    MISSOURI. 

THE  several  divisions  of  the  Army  of  the  Frontier  were 
held  in  the  counties  of  Northern  Arkansas  and  Southern 
Missouri  until  spring  so  that  the  troops  might  cover 
Springfield  and  be  in  readiness  to  cooperate  in  any 
movement  from  Southeast  Missouri  against  Little  Rock. 
It  was  also  necessary  to  distribute  the  troops  over  a  large 
section  so  that  the  cavalry  and  artillery  horses  could  be 
foraged  off  the  country.  The  cavalry  of  each  division 
was  kept  constantly  scouting  in  every  direction  and  had 
a  few  contests  with  guerilla  bands,  who  had  hitherto 
regarded  that  section  as  a  safe  retreat. 

On  the  8th  of  January,  only  a  short  time  before  the 
First  Division  moved  into  Carroll  County,  Colonel  John 
F.  Philips,  Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  com 
manding  station  at  Elkhorn,  on  the  battle-field  of  Pea 
Ridge,  sent  out  a  scout  of  seventy-five  men  under  Cap 
tain  T.  W.  Houts  of  his  regiment,  in  the  direction  of 
Berryville,  to  look  after  a  gang  of  guerillas  reported  to 
be  in  that  section.  The  Captain  made  a  rapid  night 
march,  and  near  Berryville  surprised,  attacked,  and  killed 
ten  guerillas,  who  were  well  armed,  mounted  on  good 
horses,  and  clothed  in  Federal  uniforms.  Only  one  of 
the  party  of  guerillas  escaped,  and  he  was  wounded. 
All  their  arms  and  horses,  except  those  killed  and 

61 


62  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

wounded,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Federal  detachment 
and  were  brought  back  to  camp.  Bandits  who  put  on 
the  Federal  uniform  for  the  purpose  of  deceiving  Union 
men  and  small  Federal  detachments  rarely  offered  to 
surrender,  even  when  forced  into  the  most  desperate  sit 
uations,  for  they  knew  their  acts  were  not  recognized  as 
legitimate  war. 

From  Dardanelle,  on  the  Arkansas  River,  to  the  north 
line  of  the  State  was  a  rough  region  of  country  that  had 
been  rarely  visited  by  Federal  scouting  detachments, 
and  the  saltpetre  works  established  by  General  Hindman 
on  Buffalo  River,  in  Newton  County,  continued  in  opera 
tion  for  some  time  after  he  was  driven  from  Western  Ar 
kansas.  Information  in  regard  to  the  operation  of  these 
works  reached  General  Herron,  and  he  determined  to  de 
stroy  them  at  once,  and  thus  deprive  the  Confederacy 
of  the  means  of  obtaining  powder  for  its  troops  so  near 
his  lines.  He  ordered  Major  J.  W.  Caldwell,  First  Iowa 
Cavalry,  then  encamped  at  Huntsville,  to  take  three  hun 
dred  men  of  his  regiment  and  to  proceed  to  Kingston 
and  thence  to  the  works,  and  if  practicable  capture  the 
parties  engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  the  contraband 
article.  The  Major  left  Huntsville  on  the  morning  of 
January  Qth,  and  encamped  that  evening  four  miles  east 
of  Kingston,  having  in  the  meantime,  with  the  new  guides 
whom  he  had  secured,  ascertained  the  exact  location  of 
the  saltpetre  works.  He  resumed  the  march  the  next 
morning  before  daybreak,  and  at  daylight  surprised  the 
small  force  at  the  works,  capturing  seventeen  out  of 
twenty  of  the  men  employed,  the  lieutenant  and  two 
men  making  their  escape.  The  entire  plant,  consisting 
of  fourteen  new  buildings,  two  steam  engines,  three  boil 
ers,  and  seven  large  iron  kettles,  with  half  a  ton  of  salt 
petre,  was  destroyed,  the  buildings  being  fired.  While 
completing  the  destruction  of  this  plant,  Major  Caldwell 
sent  a  detachment  of  one  hundred  men  of  his  command, 


FIGHTING   GUERILLAS.  63 

under  Captains  A.  G.  McQueen  and  D.  C.  Dinsmore, 
four  miles  down  the  river  to  destroy  another  plant  which 
was  engaged  in  making  saltpetre.  The  party  working  it 
received  notice  of  the  Federal  advance  in  time  to  escape, 
but  the  works,  consisting  of  several  new  frame  buildings 
and  four  large  iron  kettles  in  full  operation,  were  de 
stroyed  by  the  Federal  detachment.  In  addition  to  the 
destruction  of  the  saltpetre  works  in  that  section  and 
the  capture  of  nearly  all  the  force  operating  them,  Major 
Caldwell's  expedition  captured  and  brought  in  some 
twenty  well-known  bandits  and  their  horses  and  arms 
from  the  mountainous  region  visited. 

In  the  spring  after  Major  Caldwell's  expedition  was  in 
that  section,  a  Confederate  force,  about  four  hundred 
strong,  was  sent  into  the  southeast  part  of  Carroll  County 
and  encamped  on  Crooked  Creek  for  a  short  time.  The 
presence  of  this  force  at  Clapper's  steam-mill  was  soon 
made  known  to  Colonel  Weer,  commanding  the  First 
Division,  Army  of  the  Frontier,  then  encamped  at  Car- 
rollton.  He  immediately  sent  a  detachment  of  the  Third 
Wisconsin  Cavalry,  with  two  howitzers,  under  Lieutenant 
Colonel  R.  H.  White,  with  instructions  to  attack  and 
disperse  the  enemy  if  practicable.  Colonel  White  made 
a  rapid  march  that  afternoon,  took  in  the  Confederate 
picket,  and  opened  on  the  Confederate  camp  with  his 
howitzers  about  ten  o'clock  that  night,  completely  sur 
prising  it.  He  then  drew  up  his  cavalry  in  line,  and, 
there  being  a  field  in  front  of  the  camp,  the  fences  inter 
vening  were  quickly  thrown  down,  and  he  charged  into 
the  camp,  but  all  the  enemy,  except  one  man  wounded, 
had  made  their  escape,  leaving  many  of  their  arms, 
wagons,  mules,  and  camp  equipage  on  the  ground. 
Owing  to  the  darkness  of  the  night  and  the  camp  being 
in  the  timber,  it  was  impossible  for  the  Federal  cavalry 
to  pursue  the  fugitives  with  advantage.  The  muster- 
rolls  and  correspondence  of  the  Confederates  were  cap- 


64  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

tured,  and  showed  that  these  troops  had  been  sent  there 
by  Colonel  Brooks  from  Clarksville,  and  that  the  Confed 
erate  leaders  were  making  every  possible  effort  to  obtain 
recruits  for  their  depleted  regiments. 

In  the  new  assignments  of  troops  to  posts  and  districts, 
the  Army  of  the  Frontier  gradually  lost  its  organization 
as  an  army.  Early  in  February,  Colonel  W.  F.  Cloud, 
Second  Kansas  Cavalry,  who  had  commanded  the  Third 
Brigade  of  the  First  Division  during  the  Prairie  Grove 
campaign,  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  District 
of  Southwest  Missouri,  with  headquarters  at  Springfield. 
He  had  shown  himself  to  be  an  energetic  officer  in  the 
field,  and  he  was  now  placed  in  charge  of  a  district  that 
would  require  his  best  efforts  to  make  it  an  uncomfortable 
abiding-place  for  the  different  bands  of  guerillas,  who 
were  increasing  in  numbers  and  activity.  He  was  not  an 
officer  who  could  be  satisfied  by  simply  sending  out  scout 
ing  parties,  but  at  the  head  of  two  or  three  hundred 
cavalry  he  visited  in  person  every  part  of  his  district 
where  the  bandits  were  reported  to  have  been  recently 
operating.  On  the  I5th  of  February  he  left  Springfield 
with  one  hundred  men  of  the  Second  Kansas  Cavalry  and 
two  hundred  men  of  the  Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia 
Cavalry  for  a  week's  scout  in  the  counties  of  Lawrence, 
Jasper,  and  Newton,  and  to  ascertain  the  efficiency  of 
the  troops  stationed  at  Neosho,  Granby,  and  Newtonia. 
He  could  hear  of  the  depredations  of  the  guerillas  of 
that  section  under  the  notorious  leader,  Major  Thomas 
R.  Livingston,  but  was  unable  to  find  him.  This  noted 
partisan  leader  had  been  very  successful  in  making  his 
appearance  at  points  where  he  was  least  expected,  and, 
when  pursued,  of  soon  vanishing  so  completely  as  to 
leave  no  trail.  His  men  were  thoroughly  acquainted 
with  that  section,  and  when  closely  pressed  took  to  the 
paths  and  by-roads  in  small  parties,  and  were  soon  lost 
to  the  pursuers  in  the  thick  woods  and  timber  that  ex- 


FIGHTING  GUERILLAS.  6$ 

tended  back  a  mile  or  so  from  the  valleys  of  the  streams. 
They  had  friends  or  relatives  in  every  town,  and  were 
constantly  advised  of  the  movements  of  the  Federal 
troops  stationed  in  the  towns,  and  were  generally  pre 
pared  to  attack  small  detachments  going  out,  or  to  evade 
those  too  strong  to  attack. 

The  picket  of  Captain  A.  C.  Spillman's  Indian  com 
mand  at  Neosho  was  fired  upon  one  night  the  early  part 
of  February,  and  a  detachment  of  mounted  men  was  sent 
out  at  once,  but  returned  without  being  able  to  find  the 
bandits.  A  few  weeks  after  this,  part  of  Livingston's 
men  made  a  raid  on  Neosho  in  the  night  and  captured 
and  took  off  ten  to  fifteen  negroes  and  as  many  head  of 
horses  and  ponies.  Captain  Spillman  immediately  sent 
out  a  force  in  pursuit,  but  was  unable  to  overtake  the 
enemy. 

While  scouting  in  the  western  part  of  Jasper  County, 
in  February,  Captain  Theodore  Conkey,  Third  Wisconsin 
Cavalry,  had  a  skirmish  with  Livingston,  and  lost  eleven 
men  by  capture.  About  the  1st  of  February  a  forage 
detail  of  some  thirty  men  was  sent  out  from  Neosho  to 
Buckhart  Prairie,  sixteen  miles  northwest,  and  meeting 
with  part  of  Livingston's  command  a  lively  skirmish  took 
place,  in  which  two  of  the  Federal  detail  were  seriously 
wounded.  On  the  return  of  the  detachment  to  Neosho, 
a  stronger  force  was  sent  out,  but  when  it  reached  the 
place  of  the  skirmish  the  enemy  had  left  the  neighbor 
hood,  and  it  was  impossible  to  ascertain  in  what  direction 
they  had  gone.  It  was  the  policy  of  Livingston  to  use 
his  force  in  attacking  small  Federal  detachments  engaged 
in  foraging,  carrying  the  mail,  or  escorting  trains.  As 
the  Federal  cavalry  were  almost  constantly  hunting  him, 
he  was  sometimes  surprised  and  obliged  to  fight;  but  it 
was  generally  a  running  fight,  in  which  he  was  endeavor 
ing  to  get  away.  His  operations  were  of  such  character 
as  to  develop  in  the  loyal  militia  officers  of  that  section 

VOL.  II. — 5 


66  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

an  aggressiveness  that  put  him  on  the  defensive  and  in 
creased  his  casualties  until  they  probably  exceeded  those 
on  the  Federal  side. 

In  February,  Major  Edward  B.  Eno,  Eighth  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry,  an  energetic  officer,  was  sent  to 
Newtonia  with  a  battalion  of  his  regiment,  with  instruc 
tions  to  hunt  down  the  guerillas  of  Newton  and  Jasper 
Counties,  and  to  give  them  no  rest  until  they  were  driven 
from  that  section.  A  Federal  officer  acquainted  with 
that  section  knew  that  a  march  down  Spring  River  below 
Carthage,  or  down  Centre  Creek  to  its  mouth,  or  down 
Shoal  Creek  below  Neosho  to  its  mouth,  would  almost 
certainly  enable  him  to  obtain  information  of  the  move 
ments  of  some  of  Livingston's  guerillas.  Shortly  after 
arriving  at  his  station  Major  Eno  started  out  on  a  scout 
with  150  men  in  search  of  the  marauders.  He  marched 
down  Centre  Creek  to  Sherwood,  thence  up  Spring  River 
to  Carthage,  where  he  met  about  sixty  men  of  the  En 
rolled  Militia  from  Bower's  Mills,  who  had  just  returned 
from  a  skirmish  with  Livingston's  men  on  Dry  Fork,  in 
the  direction  of  Lamar.  These  men  of  the  Enrolled  Mi 
litia  reported  that  the  guerillas  had  scattered,  and  Major 
Eno  returned  to  Centre  Creek  and  beat  the  brush  until 
within  a  short  distance  of  Fidelity,  a  small  place  of 
probably  half  a  dozen  houses,  and  then  charged  in  and 
wounded  one  and  captured  three  of  the  bandits,  the 
others  of  the  party  making  their  escape,  being  mounted 
upon  fresh  horses. 

The  strips  of  timber  and  brush  along  the  creeks  in  that 
section  were  generally  from  a  half  to  a  mile  or  so  wide, 
the  country  beyond  this  timber  line  being  open  prairie. 
If  he  had  reason  to  believe  that  the  bandits  were  in  the 
brush  and  timber  along  any  particular  creek,  Major  Eno 
adopted  the  method  of  a  "drive,"  similar  to  that  of  a 
"wolf  drive."  He  divided  his  command,  sending  a  half 
or  a  third  around  so  as  to  strike  the  stream  at  a  point 


FIGHTING   GUERILLAS.  6? 

eight  to  ten  miles  above  or  below  the  point  where  he  en 
tered  the  timber  with  the  other  division.  This  division 
which  made  the  drive  was  formed  like  an  extended  skir 
mish  line  across  the  strip  of  timber  and  brush,  and  then  he 
moved  forward  up  or  down  the  stream  in  the  direction  of 
the  detachment  that  had  been  stationed  at  a  given  point 
to  take  in  any  of  the  bandits  who  attempted  to  pass.  In 
the  spring  of  1863  the  Major  made  one  of  these  drives 
down  Centre  Creek,  entering  the  timber  about  six  miles 
south  of  Carthage,  and  had  not  one  of  his  captains,  whom 
he  had  ordered  to  take  position  at  French  Point,  some 
ten  miles  below,  with  fifty  men,  retreated  from  his  sta 
tion  without  orders,  would  probably  have  captured  or 
killed  most  of  the  bandits  started  up.  In  making  dispo 
sition  of  his  force  for  the  drive,  he  ordered  Captain  Jacob 
Caissart  to  move  down  the  south  side  of  the  creek  with 
forty  men  of  the  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry, 
and  Captain  M.  C.  Henslee,  with  thirty-five  men  of  the 
Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  to  move  down  on 
the  north  side,  while  he  took  seventy-five  men  and  moved 
down  the  centre.  The  bluffs  and  rough  nature  of  the 
ground  along  the  creek  made  it  impracticable  for  his 
centre  to  keep  up  with  his  flanks.  Early  in  the  afternoon 
the  detachments  of  Captains  Henslee  and  Caissart  drove 
in  the  pickets  of  the  bandits  from  the  north  and  south 
sides  of  the  creek  and  pursued  them  in  an  exciting  chase 
to  the  main  body  of  guerillas,  who  were  strongly  posted 
in  and  around  a  log  house  in  the  woods,  fully  one  hun 
dred  strong,  under  Livingston,  on  the  south  side  of  the 
creek,  about  one  and  a  half  miles  from  French  Point. 
The  Federal  detachments  at  once  commenced  a  vigorous 
attack  on  the  marauders,  and  as  some  of  them  were 
dressed  in  Federal  uniforms,  the  opposing  forces  soon 
became  engaged  in  a  hand-to-hand  conflict.  In  a  short 
time,  however,  the  Federal  detachment  was  obliged  to 
fall  back  to  the  edge  of  the  prairie,  where  Captains  Cais- 


68  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

sart  and  Henslee  rallied  and  re-formed  their  men  and 
opened  fire  again  upon  the  enemy,  who  in  turn  retreated. 
Major  Eno,  who  had  not  kept  up  with  his  flanks,  was 
back  about  two  miles  when  he  heard  the  firing,  and  then 
pushed  forward  in  a  gallop  and  came  up  just  as  the  fight 
was  over.  Finding  that  the  enemy  had  retreated  when 
he  came  up,  he  immediately  started  in  pursuit  and  pressed 
them  so  closely  that  he  recaptured  several  of  his  men  who 
had  been  taken  prisoners  in  the  fight  in  the  brush  around 
the  log  house.  As  he  had  anticipated,  the  guerillas 
passed  through  French  Point,  and  he  was  keenly  dis 
appointed  when  he  was  informed  that  the  detachment 
which  he  had  sent  there  did  not  remain. 

Major  Eno  reported  his  casualties  in  this  action  at  four 
men  killed  and  two  wounded,  and  that  the  guerillas  lost 
fifteen  to  twenty  men  wounded.  The  next  day  the 
Major  struck  the  trail  of  the  bandits  and  followed  it  to 
Spring  River,  and  thence  on  to  the  prairie,  where  he  lost 
it,  the  enemy  appearing  to  have  divided  up  into  small 
parties  of  four  or  five  men  each,  and  each  party  taking  a 
different  direction  after  separation.  He  continued  to 
scout  that  section  for  three  or  four  days  longer,  fre 
quently  starting  up  and  chasing  small  parties  of  the 
bandits  of  three  or  four  men  each,  and  overtook  and  shot 
down  two  and  wounded  several  others. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Thomas  T.  Crittenden,  Seventh 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  who  commanded  the  post 
at  Newtonia,  and  who  had  eight  companies  of  State 
Militia  and  a  section  of  Rabb's  Second  Indiana  Battery 
at  that  station,  reported  that  the  scout  under  Major  Eno 
had  a  good  effect  in  checking  the  boldness  of  the  gue 
rillas,  and  probably  prevented  Livingston  from  concen 
trating  a  force  of  three  or  four  hundred  men  for  an  attack 
upon  the  Federal  troops  at  some  point  in  that  section. 

After  Colonel  Harrison  had  been  obliged  to  fall  back 
from  Fayetteville  to  Cassville,  the  country  was  open  from 


FIGHTING   GUERILLAS.  69 

Neosho  and  Newtonia  to  the  Arkansas  River,  so  that  all 
the  Southern  sympathizers  and  bandits  who  had  been 
driven  out  of  Western  Missouri  into  Southern  Arkansas 
during  the  past  autumn  and  winter  were  drifting  back 
into  the  State  and  increasing  in  boldness. 

Major  Milton  Burch,  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia 
Cavalry,  commanding  a  battalion  of  his  regiment  at 
Neosho,  had  distinguished  himself  on  several  occasions 
in  conflicts  with  guerilla  bands  in  the  Ozark  Mountains 
of  Southern  Missouri,  and  Lieutenant  John  R.  Kelso  of 
his  command  was  one  of  the  most  noted  guerilla  fighters 
in  the  State.  It  was  generally  understood  that  bandits 
did  not  stop  long  in  the  vicinity  of  Major  Burch's  com 
mand,  for  they  were  as  likely  to  be  surprised  in  the  deep 
recesses  of  their  hiding-places  in  the  night  as  during  the 
day.  Shortly  after  he  was  ordered  to  Neosho  in  the  spring 
of  1863,  the  Major  received  information  of  a  small  party 
of  bandits  in  the  neighborhood  of  Elk  Mills,  in  McDonald 
County,  who  were  gathering  up  the  stock  of  Union  men 
whom  they  had  driven  from  their  homes  and  were  pre 
paring  to  drive  it  south.  He  ordered  Captain  Ozias 
Ruark  of  his  command  to  take  Lieutenant  Kelso  and 
thirty  men  and  proceed  to  the  disturbed  locality,  and  if 
practicable  punish  the  outlaws. 

Nearly  all  the  families  living  in  the  western  part  of  Mc 
Donald  County  were  Southern  sympathizers,  the  Union 
families  having  been  driven  out,  so  that  it  was  almost 
impossible  for  a  Federal  scout  to  that  section  to  obtain 
reliable  information  of  the  movements  of  guerilla  bands. 
Knowing  this  fact  Captain  Ruark  marched  until  the 
middle  of  the  afternoon  without  discovering  any  signs  of 
the  enemy,  and  then  detailed  Lieutenant  Kelso  with  five 
men  dressed  as  citizens,  or  in  "  butternut,"  and  well  armed, 
and  sent  them  forward  to  obtain  such  information  as  they 
could  pick  up,  while  he,  with  the  balance  of  the  detach 
ment,  marched  to  Elk  Mills  and  encamped,  and  awaited  the 


70  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

return  of  the  Lieutenant  and  his  comrades.  They  returned 
to  the  detachment  about  midnight,  and  the  Lieutenant 
reported  that  he  had  found  a  "  kennel"  of  the  maraud 
ers,  and  that  in  the  fight  that  ensued  two  of  them  were 
killed.  He  also  reported  that  he  found  a  pasture  on 
Cowskin  Prairie  with  a  number  of  cattle  in  it  which  the 
bandits  had  gathered  up  with  the  intention  of  driving  to 
the  Southern  army  in  a  few  days.  Captain  Ruark  at 
once  ordered  his  men  to  saddle  their  horses,  and  he 
started  in  search  of  the  bandits,  and  after  surrounding 
several  houses,  started  up  the  desperate  outlaws,  who 
fought  to  the  death.  He  then  went  to  the  pasture  and 
found  forty  head  of  cattle  which  the  bandits  had  collected, 
and  took  them  and  drove  them  to  Neosho  and  turned 
them  over  to  the  commanding  officer  for  the  benefit  of 
the  Government. 

On  leaving  the  detachment  that  afternoon  Lieutenant 
Kelso  had  little  trouble  in  passing  himself  off  with  the 
Southern  families  along  the  valley  of  Buffalo  Creek  and 
on  Elk  River  as  a  Southern  officer  in  that  section  on  im 
portant  business,  and  obtained  their  confidence  in  such  a 
degree  that  they  gave  him  all  the  information  in  their 
possession  in  regard  to  the  partisan  bandits  in  that  region. 
The  information  thus  obtained  enabled  him  to  go  straight 
to  two  of  the  bandits  who  were  collecting  cattle,  and  in 
troducing  himself  as  a  Confederate  officer  of  a  certain 
command,  soon  obtained  their  confidence.  The  conver 
sation  of  the  men  drifted  along  on  certain  subjects  until 
it  came  to  their  arms,  and  then  in  such  manner  that  he 
was  permitted  to  seize  hold  of  one  of  their  guns  and  in 
the  struggle  wrenched  it  from  his  hands.  The  moment 
he  disarmed  the  bandit,  he  opened  fire  on  them  and  shot 
them  down,  and  then  mounting  his  horse  with  his  trophies 
joined  his  comrades,  who  had  been  stationed  a  short  dis 
tance  off,  and  rode  into  camp  with  them.  Before  the  last 
act  he  was  playing  in  the  game  with  the  bandits,  he 


FIGHTING   GUERILLAS.  Jl 

agreed  to  assist  them  in  collecting  cattle  to  sell  to  the 
Southern  army,  and  actually  helped  them  drive  in  a  few 
head.  He  would  despoil  a  slaughtered  foe  of  his  arms 
or  of  anything  that  he  valued  as  a  trophy,  but  he  was 
never  charged  with  committing  any  acts  of  plunder,  or  of 
turning  captured  property  into  channels  of  private  gain. 
His  acts  were  of  course  characterized  as  cruel  by  those 
who  sympathized  with  the  South,  but  he  modestly  justi 
fied  his  conduct  on  the  ground  that  those  upon  whom  his 
avenging  hand  had  fallen  had  been  guilty  of  violated 
oaths,  of  murdering  and  robbing  Union  men,  or  of  wil 
fully  harboring  those  who  were  guilty  of  such  acts.  One 
of  the  men  killed  on  this  scout  had  the  oath  of  allegiance 
in  his  pocket,  and  he  boasted  that  he  had  been  up  to 
Fort  Scott,  and  as  a  prisoner  took  the  oath  to  get  re 
leased,  and  that  he  then  stole  a  mule  team  and  returned 
to  his  home  in  McDonald  County  and  assisted  in  driving 
out  Union  men. 

Captain  Kelso,  for  he  was  promoted  about  this  time, 
had  scouted  over  Southern  and  Southwest  Missouri,  and 
was  acquainted  with  the  characters  of  most  of  the  bandits 
of  that  section,  and  made  no  mistakes  as  to  the  men  he 
dealt  with.  He  knew  that  a  small  party  of  a  dozen  or  so 
Southern  bandits,  with  their  headquarters  in  the  almost 
inaccessible  regions  of  the  hills  and  mountains  of  Southern 
Missouri  and  Northern  Arkansas,  could,  by  making  one  or 
two  night  marches,  strike  at  daybreak  the  picket  of  some 
post,  as  at  Ozark,  Galena,  Cassville,  or  Neosho,  and  by 
killing  such  men  as  the  opportunity  afforded,  capture  and 
get  away  with  some  booty.  His  experience  had  shown 
him  that  when  vigorously  pursued  the  bandits  scattered 
and  took  different  paths,  and  being  generally  mounted 
upon  the  best  horses  in  the  country  were  rarely  over 
taken  and  captured  or  killed,  but  soon  regained  their 
hiding-places  to  prepare  for  another  raid.  No  Federal 
outpost  or  escort  to  trains  felt  secure  from  the  sudden 


72  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

and  unexpected  attacks  of  these  desperate  bandits.  Was 
there  not  some  way  by  which  these  desperate  outlaws 
might  be  made  insecure  in  their  isolated  hiding-places  ? 
Captain  Kelso  believed  there  was. 

On  another  occasion,  while  scouting  in  the  rough,  hilly 
regions  of  McDonald  County,  and  after  several  days  had 
been  consumed  in  marching  and  examining  the  roads  and 
dim  paths  for  horse  tracks  in  the  section  where  the  bandits 
had  been  reported  as  having  been  seen,  he  finally  heard 
of  half  a  dozen  marauders  who  made  their  headquarters 
in  the  almost  inaccessible  brakes  of  Elk  River.  He  was 
satisfied  from  what  he  knew  of  the  rugged  and  precipitous 
bluffs  along  that  stream  that  their  position  was  such  that 
it  could  not  be  approached  without  giving  them  the  alarm 
and  time  to  scatter  in  the  thick  woods  and  along  the 
bluffs  of  the  river.  He  therefore  determined  to  disguise 
himself  and  visit  their  camp,  ascertain  their  plans,  and  if 
possible  execute  some  desperate,  bloody  act  before  leaving 
them.  He  designated  a  place  where  he  proposed  to  re 
join  his  command  in  a  few  days,  and  then,  leaving  them, 
took  it  afoot  and  started  in  search  of  the  camp  of  the 
guerillas.  He  was  not  long  in  finding  it,  for  he  had  been 
accustomed  since  the  early  days  of  the  war  to  following 
dim  paths  through  dark  forests  and  over  the  rough  regions 
of  the  Ozark  Mountains. 

Approaching  the  camp  of  the  bandits  he  introduced 
himself  as  a  knight  of  the  brush,  and  by  his  affable  man 
ners  apparently  soon  won  their  confidence.  There  were 
six  men  in  the  squad,  and  he  noticed  after  a  while  whis 
perings  among  them  that  satisfied  him  that  they  mis 
trusted  him.  He  pretended,  however,  not  to  notice  the 
signs  of  their  mistrust  and  acted  towards  them  as  if  he 
had  unlimited  confidence  in  them  as  knights  of  the 
Southern  cause.  After  staying  with  them  a  day  or  so, 
he  felt  that  he  had  somewhat  allayed  their  suspicions  as 
to  his  true  character,  so  that  on  the  second  morning  all 


FIGHTING   GUERILLAS.  73 

the  men  except  two  left  camp  on  some  business  unknown 
to  him,  leaving  him  with  their  two  comrades.  But  he 
noticed  all  day  that  the  two  men  with  whom  he  was  left 
stayed  together  and  never  took  their  hands  off  their  guns 
for  a  moment.  Being  satisfied  from  their  conduct  that  they 
had  him  under  surveillance,  in  the  afternoon  he  pretended 
to  have  got  a  thorn  or  splinter  in  his  finger,  and  making 
a  display  of  the  feigned  injury  and  of  trying  to  get  the 
thorn  out  for  their  benefit,  in  a  few  moments  went  di 
rectly  to  them  to  have  them  assist  him  in  getting  it  out. 
The  confidential  manner  in  which  he  approached  them 
for  this  purpose  caused  them  to  slightly  relax  their  vigil 
ance,  so  that  each  let  the  butt  of  his  gun  drop  to  the 
ground  while  holding  it  with  one  hand  near  the  muzzle. 
The  moment  the  men  assumed  this  position  to  inspect 
his  finger,  the  Captain  with  his  left  hand  seized  the  gun 
of  the  nearest  bandit  and  in  another  moment  with  his 
right  hand  drew  his  revolver  and  shot  him,  and  the  other 
bandit  also  before  he  could  get  his  gun  in  position  for 
defence.  He  saw  that  his  own  life  was  in  the  greatest 
peril,  and  deliberately  planned  the  scheme,  so  that  when 
the  opportunity  came  he  put  it  into  execution  with  such 
rapidity  that  the  bandits  were  dazed  and  powerless  to  help 
themselves.  The  struggle  was  short,  but  desperate  and 
bloody,  and  when  he  had  despatched  his  foes  to  the 
shades  of  darkness,  and  despoiled  them  of  such  of  their 
arms  as  he  desired  as  trophies,  he  mounted  one  of  their 
horses  and  rejoined  his  command  as  prearranged,  and, 
like  some  of  the  heroes  of  ancient  times,  delighted  in 
relating  to  his  comrades  the  success  of  his  bold  exploit. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

ATTACK    ON    FEDERAL    TRAIN,     AND    ACTION    AT    FORT 
GIBSON,    CHEROKEE   NATION. 

ABOUT  the  time  of  Colonel  Harrison's  evacuation  of 
Fayetteville,  General  Marmaduke's  raid  into  Southeast 
Missouri,  and  the  requisition  on  the  Department  of  Mis 
souri  for  troops  to  reinforce  General  Grant  before  Vicks- 
burg,  had  drawn  away  from  Southwest  Missouri  so  many 
of  the  Federal  troops  that  Colonel  Cloud,  commanding 
that  district,  was  unable  to  make  frequent  reconnoissances 
into  Northwest  Arkansas.  In  a  short  time,  therefore, 
after  Colonel  Schaurte's  expedition  to  the  vicinity  of 
Cane  Hill,  General  Cabell  moved  back  north  of  the 
mountains  and  occupied  Fayetteville  with  a  brigade  of 
Arkansas  cavalry.  In  connection  with  this  movement, 
General  Steele  ordered  General  Cooper  to  move  forward 
with  his  brigade  of  Texas  and  Indian  troops  and  battery 
of  four  guns  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Arkansas  in  the 
vicinity  of  Fort  Gibson.  In  compliance  with  this  order, 
General  Cooper  with  very  little  delay  marched  forward 
and  took  up  a  position  about  five  miles  south  of  the  fort, 
and  his  camp  might  have  been  seen  by  the  Federal  troops 
from  their  fortified  position  on  the  bluff  except  for  the 
intervening  timber  along  the  Arkansas.  From  his  posi 
tion  he  could  watch  the  movements  of  the  Federal  troops 
at  Fort  Gibson,  and  by  fording  the  Arkansas  and  Verdi 
gris  Rivers  a  few  miles  above  his  camp  he  could  send 

74 


ATTACK  ON  FEDERAL   TRAIN. 


75 


out  his  cavalry  to  attack  and  annoy  the  trains  of  the 
Federal  army  going  to  and  returning  from  Fort  Scott. 
With  General  Cooper  encamped  only  a  few  miles  in  his 


FEDERAL  OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  GIBSON,   APRIL,  1863. 

front  on  the  south  side  of  the  Arkansas  with  a  brigade 
consisting  of  two  Texas  and  four  Indian  regiments,  and 
General  Cabell  with  a  brigade  in  position  on  his  flank, 


76  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

Colonel  Phillips  saw  that  he  would  be  obliged  to  exercise 
the  greatest  vigilance  and  caution  to  maintain  his  posi 
tion  in  the  face  of  so  much  preparation  to  make  it  unten 
able  or  to  crush  him.  Indeed,  he  was  not  himself  more 
correctly  informed  of  the  departure  of  trains  from  Fort 
Scott  and  their  progress  en  route  than  were  Generals 
Cooper  and  CabelL 

The  country  along  the  State  line  from  Maysville  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Fort  Scott  was  open,  depopulated,  and 
nearly  as  much  traversed  by  the  Southern  guerillas  and 
their  friends  as  by  Federal  scouting  detachments,  so  that 
information  of  Federal  movements  in  the  direction  of 
Fort  Scott  or  Springfield  was  easily  obtained  and  carried 
south  to  the  nearest  Confederate  officer  as  rapidly  as 
mounted  couriers  could  take  it.  That  the  Confederate 
leaders  had  planned  and  determined  to  capture  or  destroy 
his  next  train  with  supplies  from  the  north  was  no  secret 
to  Colonel  Phillips,  for  he  was  constantly  advised  of  their 
contemplated  movements  by  information  brought  into 
his  lines  by  deserters  from  their  forces,  and  by  his  own 
scouts  and  spies.  To  meet  the  increased  danger  to  which 
his  next  train  would  be  exposed  en  route,  he  determined 
to  send  out  a  strong  detachment  to  reinforce  the  escort, 
and  to  request  Colonel  Blair,  commanding  at  Fort  Scott, 
to  send  with  it  a  stronger  escort  than  usual  from  that 
place,  for  Major  Livingston,  with  a  well-armed  force  of 
two  or  three  hundred  Partisan  Rangers,  had  recently 
crossed  the  Arkansas  and  Verdigris  rivers  about  ten  miles 
above  Fort  Gibson  en  route  to  the  scenes  of  his  former 
operations  in  the  western  parts  of  Jasper  and  Newton 
Counties,  Missouri,  and  would  certainly  know  the  strength 
of  the  escort,  and,  if  weak,  attack  it. 

In  the  meantime  Colonel  James  M.  Williams,  com 
manding  the  First  Kansas  Colored  Infantry,  which  he 
had  recently  recruited  and  organized,  and  which  was  one 
of  the  very  first  colored  regiments  raised  in  the  country, 


ATTACK  ON  FEDERAL   TRAIN.  77 

was  directed  to  take  up  a  position  at  Baxter  Springs, 
sixty  miles  south  of  Fort  Scott  on  the  military  road  to 
Fort  Gibson,  a  point  within  the  range  of  Livingston's 
operations.  This  force,  which  had  a  section  of  Captain 
E.  A.  Smith's  Second  Kansas  Battery  attached  to  it, 
would  of  course  afford  protection  to  the  trains  passing 
that  point;  and  Colonel  Williams  would  be  able  to  rein 
force  the  escorts  if  threatened  in  that  vicinity ;  but  having 
no  cavalry  for  scouting  purposes,  his  operations  were 
necessarily  confined  within  narrow  limits.  There  was  at 
this  time  among  the  white  soldiers  a  decided  feeling 
against  serving  with  colored  troops,  and  this  was  perhaps 
the  reason  he  had  no  cavalry  attached  to  his  command. 
But  events  were  rapidly  forcing  a  more  rational  view  of 
this  matter,  so  that  in  a  month  or  two  later  the  white 
soldiers  when  hotly  engaged  with  the  foe  manifested  but 
little  interest  in  regard  to  the  color  of  the  troops  who 
supported  them  on  the  right  or  left  of  the  line.  The 
companies  of  this  colored  regiment  were  well  drilled  for 
the  time  they  had  been  in  service,  and  Colonel  Williams 
had  confidence  that  the  men  would  give  a  good  account 
of  themselves  when  the  time  came  to  test  their  courage 
and  endurance.  Their  behavior  under  fire  in  the  first 
general  action  was  looked  forward  to  with  a  good  deal 
of  interest,  for  if  it  was  creditable  it  would  do  much  to 
disarm  many  people  of  the  prejudice  they  entertained 
against  enlisting  colored  men  for  soldiers  in  the  war. 

In  the  organization  of  the  colored  troops  the  commis 
sioned  officers  were  all  white  men,  and  perhaps  most  of 
them  had  seen  service  in  other  regiments;  besides,  they 
were  men  who  were  thoroughly  loyal  to  the  interests  of 
the  Government  in  regard  to  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and 
believed  that  the  time  had  come  for  the  abolition  of 
slavery,  and  that  the  slaves  should  be  permitted  to  assist 
the  Federal  Government  in  fighting  for  their  freedom. 
The  non-commissioned  officers  of  the  companies  were 


78  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE   BORDER. 

colored  men,  and  though  generally  unlettered,  were  in 
telligent  in  other  respects,  and  took  an  interest  in  per 
forming  their  duties  as  soldiers.  And  under  the  careful 
discipline  of  Colonel  Williams,  the  regiment,  after  the 
men  had  received  their  uniforms,  arms,  and  equipments, 
presented  a  fine  appearance,  of  which  men  and  officers 
exhibited  conscious  pride.  Even  before  these  colored 
troops  were  put  in  the  field  to  the  front,  a  good  many 
Southern  officers  threatened  to  show  them  no  quarter, 
asserting  that  they  would  not  take  colored  soldiers 
prisoners,  meaning  that  they  would  shoot  down  all  who 
fell  into  their  hands.  This  was  no  idle  or  meaningless 
threat  made  in  the  heat  of  passion,  but  a  deliberate  in 
tention,  for  on  the  iSth  of  May,  a  short  time  after  his 
arrival  at  Baxter  Springs,  Colonel  Williams  had  occasion 
to  send  out  a  forage  detail  of  forty  to  fifty  white  and 
colored  soldiers  with  five  or  six  mule  teams  some  ten  to 
twelve  miles,  to  the  vicinity  of  Sherwood,  Missouri.  The 
detail  was  surprised  and  attacked  by  Livingston's  com 
mand,  and  twenty  negroes  and  three  white  men  of  Cap 
tain  E.  A.  Smith's  Second  Kansas  Battery  killed,  the 
negroes  being  shot  down  without  being  given  any  quarter. 
After  this  affair,  Colonel  Williams  was  furnished  with  a 
detachment  of  cavalry,  and,  ascertaining  from  his  scouts 
the  retreat  of  the  enemy,  surprised  them,  and  took  good 
care  that  a  sufficient  number  to  balance  the  number  of  his 
negro  soldiers  killed  did  not  escape. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place  on  the  line  of 
communication  with  his  base  of  supplies,  Colonel  Phillips 
was  still  able,  by  making  frequent  reconnoissances,  to  hold 
General  Cooper's  force  south  of  the  Arkansas  River.  In 
the  meantime  the  Federal  and  Confederate  commanders 
had  picket  stations  placed  at  different  points  along  their 
respective  sides  of  the  river  to  watch  each  other's  move 
ments  or  attempts  to  cross  the  river.  This  proximity  of  the 
hostile  pickets  soon  drew  each  other's  fire,  and  then  after 


ATTACK  ON  FEDERAL  TRAIN.  79 

that  every  day  for  several  weeks,  at  intervals  of  an  hour 
or  so,  there  was  firing  between  these  pickets  across  the 
river,  which  was  distinctly  heard  at  Fort  Gibson.  There 
were  a  few  men  wounded  on  each  side  by  this  firing,  but 
as  those  engaged  in  it  shielded  themselves  behind  trees 
and  logs,  and  as  the  range  was  very  long,  the  casualties 
were  not  very  serious.  These  pickets  gradually  became 
more  tolerant  of  each  other's  presence  at  some  points  on 
the  river,  and  finally  there  was  an  agreement  between  the 
men  of  some  of  the  hostile  stations  not  to  fire  upon  each 
other  except  under  certain  contingencies.  This  truce 
was  faithfully  kept  except  in  one  or  two  instances,  and 
the  belligerent  pickets  became  so  friendly  that  several  of 
each  side,  divesting  themselves  of  their  arms,  would  come 
down  on  sand-bars  to  the  water's  edge  at  a  narrow  point 
in  the  river  on  their  respective  sides  and  talk  for  some 
time — generally  of  the  most  recent  news  each  side  had  of 
army  operations  in  the  East,  where  everything  was  on  a 
larger  scale  than  along  the  Upper  Arkansas  River.  They 
not  only  held  mutual  conversation  across  the  water,  but 
in  a  short  time  ventured  to  go  in  swimming  together, 
each  keeping  nearest  to  his  own  side  except  when  they 
agreed  to  mutual  exchange  of  certain  articles.  They 
then  approached  in  midstream,  swimming,  or  wading  if 
the  water  was  not  of  too  great  depth,  and  the  young 
Federal  soldiers  generally  gave  the  Confederates  coffee 
for  tobacco,  coffee  being  scarce  and  a  luxury  in  the  Con 
federate  camp,  and  tobacco  being  scarce  in  the  Federal 
camp.  Of  course  the  soldiers  of  both  sides  who  partici 
pated  in  these  friendly  conversations  on  the  picket-line 
were  white  men,  those  on  the  Southern  side  belonging  to 
the  Texas  regiments,  and  those  on  the  Federal  side  be 
longing  to  companies  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry.  In 
these  conferences,  as  a  rule,  the  men  did  not  give  each 
other  information  of  important  movements  of  their  respec 
tive  sides.  On  several  occasions,  however,  the  Confed- 


8O  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

erates  did  mention  facts  showing  that  they  were  familiar 
with  the  movements  of  the  Federal  supply  train  from  the 
north,  stating  that  Livingston  had  written  General  Cooper 
that  the  negro  regiment  would  escort  the  next  train. 

The  unusual  activity  displayed  in  General  Cooper's 
camp  about  the  middle  of  May  was  noted  by  Federal 
officers  with  field-glasses  from  the  roofs  of  the  stone 
buildings  on  the  bluff  at  Fort  Gibson,  and  that  the  Con 
federates  were  preparing  for  an  important  movement  was 
confirmed  by  the  reports  of  the  Federal  scouts.  Whether 
this  movement  was  a  heavy  reconnoissance  to  cross  the 
Arkansas  below  Fort  Gibson  to  attract  the  attention  of 
the  Federal  troops  on  the  east  while  a  larger  force  crossed 
that  river  above  the  fort  for  the  purpose  of  marching 
north  to  meet  the  train,  or  whether  it  was  simply  a  dem 
onstration  to  feel  the  strength  of  the  Federal  forces, 
Colonel  Phillips  was  unable  fully  to  determine.  To  as 
certain,  if  practicable,  whether  the  Confederates  were 
making  a  movement  on  his  right,  he  sent  out  some  four 
hundred  cavalry,  which  forded  the  Arkansas  above  Fort 
Gibson,  and,  marching  to  the  Creek  Agency,  captured 
from  the  Confederate  force  encamped  at  that  place  sixty 
head  of  horses  and  mules.  This  scout  obtained  informa 
tion  which  showed  that  General  Cooper  had  made  exten 
sive  preparations  to  capture  the  Federal  train  en  route 
south,  and  had  a  heavy  force  of  cavalry  all  in  readiness 
to  march  up  on  the  west  side  of  Grand  River  to  meet  it. 

From  the  moment  the  Federal  troops  occupied  Fort 
Gibson,  their  serviceable  cavalry  horses  had  been  con 
stantly  employed  in  scouting  and  escort  duty,  and  much 
of  the  time  on  short  rations  of  corn  and  oats,  which  had 
greatly  reduced  them  in  strength  and  flesh.  As  soon  as 
the  grass  on  the  prairie  and  open  grounds  within  two  or 
three  miles  of  the  fort  was  high  enough  for  good  grazing, 
Colonel  Phillips  directed  that  all  the  stock  not  in  use  be 
sent  out  to  graze  from  morning  until  night,  under  proper 


ATTACK  ON  FEDERAL  TRAIN.  8 1 

guards.  This  stock  was  divided  into  several  herds  and 
driven  to  different  localities  within  a  safe  distance  of 
the  fort.  From  the  heights  on  the  south  side  of  the  Ar 
kansas,  the  Southern  officers  with  good  field-glasses  saw 
this  stock  daily  driven  out  from  the  fort  and  grazing  upon 
the  prairie.  This  was  a  prize  that  General  Cooper  could 
not  resist  the  temptation  to  make  an  effort  to  capture. 
When  his  attention  was  first  called  to  this  stock  grazing 
several  miles  from  the  fort,  the  Arkansas  was  past  fording 
from  a  recent  rise,  so  that  he  was  obliged  to  wait  a  few 
days  for  it  to  fall  before  making  his  intended  raid.  At 
this  time  some  eight  hundred  Federal  troops  were  guard 
ing  the  line  north  to  cover  supply  trains  that  were  en 
route  to  Fort  Gibson,  and  the  scouts  of  Colonel  Phillips 
reported  everything  quiet  and  no  enemy  north  of  the 
Arkansas,  nor  on  the  east  or  west  side  of  Grand  River. 

On  the  iQth  of  May  General  Cooper  ascertained  that 
the  Arkansas  was  fordable  at  several  points  below  Fort 
Gibson,  and  that  night  sent  out  parts  of  five  regiments 
to  cross  the  river  below  that  post  to  make  a  demonstra 
tion  against  the  Federal  troops  and  to  capture  as  much  of 
their  stock  as  practicable.  After  his  troops  crossed  the 
river  they  advanced  rapidly,  killing  and  capturing  the 
Federal  pickets  and  herders  until  they  arrived  within  less 
than  two  miles  of  the  Federal  fortifications.  Some  of 
the  pickets  and  herders,  however,  who  were  not  cut  off 
from  the  fort,  on  hearing  the  firing  and  seeing  the  enemy 
advancing  in  large  numbers,  hurried  in  and  reported  the 
situation  about  nine  o'clock.  The  bugles  at  once  sounded 
the  alarm  and  the  troops  at  the  fort  were  under  arms  in  a 
few  moments,  but  mostly  dismounted,  for  their  horses 
had  been  sent  out  with  the  herds  early  that  morning. 
All  the  men  that  could  be  mounted  at  the  post  were 
quickly  sent  forward  under  Majors  Foreman,  M.  B.  C. 
Wright,  and  James  M.  Pomeroy,  and  Captain  N.  B. 
Lucas,  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry,  to  check  the  advance  of 


82  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

the  enemy,  and  if  possible  recapture  some  of  the  stock 
they  were  driving  off.  After  passing  the  open  ground 
for  nearly  a  mile  east  of  the  fort,  this  Federal  mounted 
force  came  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  who  were  forming  in 
line  in  the  timber  on  the  western  slope  of  the  mountain. 

A  sharp  skirmish  took  place  in  which  the  Federal  cav 
alry  were  driven  back  some  distance,  and  it  looked  for  a 
time  as  if  the  Confederates  intended  attacking  the  Federal 
troops  behind  their  fortifications.  In  a  short  time,  how 
ever,  a  number  of  herds  were  driven  into  the  fort,  and  as 
rapidly  as  the  men  could  be  mounted  they  were  sent  for 
ward  to  reinforce  those  at  the  front.  Not  knowing  the 
strength  of  the  attacking  force,  Colonel  Phillips  ordered 
everything  moved  inside  the  fortifications,  and  then  took 
two  battalions  of  Indian  infantry  and  a  section  of  Hop 
kins'  battery  under  Lieutenant  B.  S.  Bassett  and  moved 
out  about  a  mile  east  of  the  fort,  and  ascertaining  from 
his  skirmishers  the  position  of  the  enemy  opened  fire 
upon  them  with  shell.  His  cavalry  having  now  been 
strengthened,  he  ordered  an  advance  on  his  left,  and  with 
the  assistance  of  the  heavy  fire  from  the  guns  of  his  bat 
tery  soon  drove  the  enemy  from  their  position  in  the 
timber,  and  gradually  pushing  them  back  over  the  moun 
tain  recaptured  part  of  the  stock  which  had  been  taken 
in  the  morning.  A  shell  from  one  of  his  guns  burst  in 
the  midst  of  a  body  of  Southern  Indians,  killing  and 
wounding  a  number  and  throwing  the  others  into  a  panic. 
The  Federal  cavalry  pursued  the  retreating  foe  ten  to 
fifteen  miles  down  the  Arkansas  River  in  the  direction  of 
Webber's  Falls,  continually  firing  upon  their  rear-guard 
and  causing  some  casualties. 

While  the  force  which  he  had  sent  north  of  the  river 
was  engaging  the  Federal  troops  in  front  of  their  fortifi 
cations,  General  Cooper  ordered  the  captain  of  his  battery, 
with  three  guns,  supported  by  a  strong  force  of  infantry, 
down  to  the  ford  on  the  Arkansas,  three  miles  south  of 


ATTACK  ON  FEDERAL  TRAIN.  83 

Fort  Gibson,  and  opened  a  heavy  cannonade  upon  the 
Federal  picket  station,  and  sent  some  of  his  men  into 
the  river  as  if  he  intended  to  force  a  crossing.  The  at 
tention  of  Colonel  Phillips  having  been  directed  to  this 
demonstration  in  his  front,  he  left  his  cavalry  to  pursue 
the  retreating  enemy,  and  took  his  infantry  and  section 
of  artillery  down  to  the  river  opposite  the  Confederates 
who  were  threatening  to  force  a  crossing,  and  opened 
fire  upon  their  guns  with  shot  and  shell  with  the  hope  of 
dismounting  them,  and  soon  compelled  the  captain  to 
withdraw  his  battery.  The  Federal  loss,  including  the 
pickets  and  herders,  was  twenty  men  killed  and  as  many 
wounded.  Colonel  Phillips  reported  that  from  the  best 
information  he  could  obtain,  the  Confederate  loss  was 
about  equal  to  his  own.  Most  of  the  Federals  killed  were 
herders  and  pickets  who  were  surprised,  cut  off,  and  shot 
while  endeavoring  to  get  back  to  the  fort. 

After  the  raid  and  demonstration  of  May  2Oth,  General 
Cooper  continued  for  several  days  to  attract  the  attention 
of  the  Federal  troops  at  Fort  Gibson  by  cannonading  the 
Federal  picket  stations  on  the  Arkansas  below  the  fort. 
And  on  the  return  of  his  troops  who  were  on  that  raid  he 
sent  out  an  expedition  of  upwards  of  one  thousand  men 
under  Colonel  Mclntosh  to  cross  the  Arkansas  and  Ver 
digris  above  the  mouth  of  Grand  River  and  march  up  the 
west  side  of  that  river  to  attack,  capture,  or  destroy  the 
Federal  train,  which  he  was  informed  was  en  route.  This 
force  had  no  sooner  crossed  the  Verdigris  and  headed 
north  than  a  Federal  scout  who  was  watching  it  returned 
to  the  fort  at  once  and  reported  the  movement  to  Colonel 
Phillips.  The  Colonel  had  also  received  information  that 
General  Cooper  had  recently  been  largely  reinforced  by 
troops  from  Fort  Smith  and  was  preparing  to  send 
another  force  north  to  cooperate  with  Colonel  Mclntosh 
in  the  effort  to  capture  the  Federal  supply  train,  and  de 
termined  to  make  a  demonstration  against  the  Confeder- 


84  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

ate  camp  with  the  view  of  delaying  the  departure  of  this 
last-named  force  as  long  as  practicable.  On  Sunday  af 
ternoon,  May  24th,  he  took  about  five  hundred  cavalry 
and  dismounted  men  and  a  section  of  Hopkins'  Kansas 
Battery  and  marched  down  to  the  Rabbit  Ford  on  the 
Arkansas,  five  miles  below  the  fort,  and  opened  a  heavy 
artillery  fire  on  the  Confederate  outpost  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river.  After  shelling  the  woods  on  each  side 
of  the  road  around  the  outpost  for  some  time,  his  column, 
which  had  been  in  position  a  short  time,  started  forward, 
and  when  the  advance  had  reached  the  middle  of  the 
stream,  which  was  running  well  up  on  the  sides  of  the 
horses,  the  Confederates,  who  had  posted  themselves  be 
hind  trees  and  logs,  commenced  a  hot  fire  with  small-arms 
upon  their  adversaries.  The  channel  of  the  river  was  close 
to  the  south  bank,  and  there  was  a  sand-bar  on  the  north 
side,  perhaps  a  hundred  yards  wide,  on  which  the  Federal 
infantry  formed.  This  infantry  was  posted  so  as  to  cover 
the  advance  of  the  cavalry,  and  returned  the  fire  of  the 
Confederates,  but  as  the  movement  was  intended  only  as 
a  feint,  Colonel  Phillips  retired  with  his  cavalry  without 
crossing.  His  artillery,  however,  kept  up  a  cannonade 
until  sunset,  when  he  returned  to  the  fort  with  his  troops, 
except  a  guard  left  at  the  ford  to  watch  the  movements 
of  the  enemy.  This  reconnoissance  had  the  effect  of 
causing  General  Cooper  to  reinforce  his  outpost  at  the 
ford  and  of  interfering  with  his  plans  in  regard  to  captur 
ing  the  Federal  train. 

That  night  after  returning  to  the  fort  from  Rabbit 
Ford,  Colonel  Phillips  ordered  all  his  troops  to  move  in 
side  the  fortifications,  and  then  sent  out  all  his  available 
mounted  men  to  meet  and  reinforce  the  escort  to  his 
train,  which  he  believed  would  be  attacked  by  the  enemy 
during  the  night  or  the  next  day.  These  troops  formed 
a  junction  with  the  train  escort  about  eight  to  ten  miles 
out  on  the  military  road,  and  as  it  was  known  that  the 


ATTACK:  ON  FEDERAL  TRAIN.  85 

enemy  were  in  the  vicinity  watching  for  the  train  every 
precaution  was  taken  to  guard  against  a  surprise.  It  was 
decided  by  the  commanding  officer  of  the  escort  to  make 
a  night  march  and  reach  Fort  Gibson  early  in  the  morning 
of  the  25th,  instead  of  that  evening.  This  movement 
might  throw  the  enemy  off  their  guard  ;  besides,  the  train 
could  be  as  easily  defended  at  night  as  in  the  daytime. 
The  wagon-masters  were  instructed,  if  an  attack  was 
made,  to  drive  the  teams  two  abreast  as  far  as  the  road 
would  permit,  to  shorten  the  length  of  the  train,  which 
had  about  two  hundred  wagons  in  it  and  stretched  out  a 
distance  of  upwards  of  a  mile. 

The  escort  when  reinforced  from  Fort  Gibson  was  per 
haps  fully  a  thousand  strong,  and  disposed  in  such  man 
ner  as  to  be  ready  for  immediate  defence.  Scouts  were 
kept  out  on  each  flank  with  the  view  of  discovering  the 
presence  of  the  enemy  in  time  to  make  some  preparation 
to  meet  his  attack.  The  train  and  escort  moved  along 
during  the  night  up  to  about  an  hour  before  daybreak 
without  particular  incident  until  approaching  the  timber 
on  Grand  River,  about  five  miles  northwest  of  the  fort, 
when  the  Texans  and  Southern  Indians  were  discovered 
advancing  in  line,  and  at  once  commenced  the  attack 
by  firing  a  volley  into  the  escort.  The  Federal  escort 
promptly  returned  the  fire,  and  in  a  few  moments  the 
action  became  general,  the  flashes  in  the  darkness  from 
the  long  lines  of  muskets  giving  an  aspect  to  the  fight 
not  usually  seen  by  those  engaged.  Perhaps  nearly  one 
half  the  escort  fought  dismounted,  so  that  the  outlines 
of  the  mounted  troops  of  the  enemy  standing  out  against 
the  clear  sky  in  the  darkness  made  excellent  targets  for 
the  Federal  soldiers.  The  Federal  force  was  so  disposed 
as  to  keep  the  road  open  in  front,  so  that  the  train  was 
kept  moving  during  the  entire  action,  and  arrived  at  Fort 
Gibson  shortly  after  sunrise  without  the  loss  of  a  wagon. 
Every  assault  of  the  enemy  was  repulsed,  and  they  were 


86  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE  BORDER. 

finally  driven  off  and  pursued  to  the  Verdigris  River, 
leaving  thirty-five  men  killed  on  the  field.  The  Federal 
loss  was  five  men  killed  and  ten  to  twelve  wounded.  Two 
wagon-loads  of  the  Confederate  dead  were  picked  up  and 
brought  into  Fort  Gibson  that  day  and  buried,  most  of 
whom  were  Indians.  General  Cooper  had  another  force 
north  of  the  Arkansas,  which  failed  to  cooperate  with 
the  one  attacking  the  train,  the  original  plan  of  attack 
being  impracticable  after  holding  troops  in  camp  to  meet 
the  Federal  reconnoissance  from  the  fort  the  day  before. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

ACTION    AT   CABIN    CREEK,    CHEROKEE   NATION. 

WHILE  the  failure  of  his  troops  to  capture  or  destroy 
the  Federal  train  was  a  keen  disappointment  to  General 
Cooper,  it  did  not  cause  him  to  relax  his  efforts  to  harass 
and  annoy  the  Federal  forces  at  Fort  Gibson  as  much  as 
possible.  He  knew  that  the  capture  or  destruction  of 
the  train  would  at  once  compel  the  Federal  commander 
to  evacuate  that  post,  and  in  fact  all  the  Indian  Territory 
except  the  northern  part  of  it,  and  fall  back  in  the  direc 
tion  of  his  base  of  supplies  at  Fort  Scott.  And  such 
movement  he  fully  realized  would  perhaps  completely 
demoralize  the  Indian  troops  in  the  Federal  service.  In 
a  few  days,  therefore,  after  the  return  of  the  expedition 
sent  against  the  Federal  train,  he  ordered  Colonel  Stand 
Watie,  with  the  available  men  of  his  regiment,  which 
was  composed  of  Cherokees,  to  cross  the  Arkansas  below 
Fort  Gibson  and  make  a  raid  up  through  the  Cherokee 
Nation  for  the  purpose  of  collecting  such  supplies  as 
practicable  for  the  Southern  troops  and  to  threaten  the 
Federal  supply  line  in  that  direction.  This  force  he  de 
sired  to  operate  on  the  Federal  flank  east  of  Grand  River 
until  the  next  Federal  train  might  be  expected  en  route 
the  latter  part  of  June.  While  some  of  the  men  of  this 
command  were  plundering  the  house  of  a  loyal  Indian 
family  near  Tahlequah,  the  Indian  woman  of  the  house, 
unobserved,  mounted  one  of  their  horses  and  rode  to  Fort 

87 


88 


THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 


Gibson  and  informed  Colonel  Phillips   that   the  enemy 
were  in  her  neighborhood  on  their  way  north. 

If  Colonel  Watie  did  not  in  the  meantime  draw  a  large 
number  of  the  troops  from  Fort  Gibson  to  pursue  him  in 
fruitless  efforts  to  engage  him,  General  Cooper  determined 


' 


TRAIN 


IB 


CONFEDERATE. 


ACTION  AT  CABIN  CREEK,  CHEROKEE  NATION. 


to  order  him  to  reinforce  the  troops  which  he  proposed 
to  send  up  on  the  west  side  of  Grand  River  in  another 
effort  to  capture  the  Federal  train.  While  the  Arkansas 
was  yet  fordable  he  sent  another  Confederate  force  to  the 


ACTION  AT  CABIN  CREEK.  89 

north  side  of  it,  below  Fort  Gibson,  to  threaten  the  Fed 
eral  troops  from  the  east,  and  to  raid  their  herds  again  if 
practicable.  He  hoped  by  his  superior  numbers  and  large 
proportion  of  white  troops  to  keep  the  Federal  force 
confined  within  a  space  of  a  few  miles  around  their 
fortifications. 

The  movements  of  the  Confederate  forces  were  made 
known  to  Colonel  Phillips  with  very  little  delay,  and  he 
showed  by  his  vigorous  action  that  he  had  no  intention 
of  confining  his  operations  within  a  limit  of  a  few  miles 
around  his  post.  When  his  commissary  train  had  finished 
unloading  he  started  it  back  to  Fort  Scott,  and  sent  with 
it  most  of  his  available  cavalry  and  one  howitzer  as  far 
north  as  Baxter  Springs.  On  returning  to  Fort  Gibson 
the  commanding  officer  of  this  cavalry  was  instructed  to 
march  down  on  the  east  side  of  Grand  River  and  endeavor 
to  strike  the  force  under  Colonel  Watie  and  to  drive  it 
out  of  that  section.  Hearing  that  the  enemy  were  in  the 
vicinity  of  Maysville  committing  depredations  upon  the 
loyal  Indians,  Major  Foreman  was  sent  after  them  with 
325  of  this  cavalry,  and  advancing  near  the  Southern 
Indians  prepared  to  attack  them,  when  Colonel  Watie, 
to  avoid  a  fight,  moved  over  on  Grand  River  near  the 
mouth  of  Spavinaw  Creek,  where  he  endeavored  to  cross 
the  river  to  join  a  Confederate  force  on  the  west  side,  but 
was  unable  to  do  so  on  account  of  the  river  being  up. 
He  then  retreated  down  Grand  River  to  Grand  Saline, 
where  he  again  attempted  to  cross  to  the  west  side  and 
failed.  At  this  place  his  rear-guard  was  overtaken  by 
Major  Foreman,  and  in  the  attack  three  of  the  Southern 
Indians  were  killed.  After  this  affair  he  retreated  rapidly 
in  a  southeast  direction  through  Tahlequah  and  Park 
Hill  to  the  Arkansas  River,  where  he  was  met  by  a  large 
Confederate  force  which  General  Cooper  had  sent  over, 
under  Colonels  Thomas  C.  Bass  and  Tandy  Walker,  to 
cover  his  retreat.  Major  Foreman  gave  up  the  pursuit 


90  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

at  Tahlequah  on  account  of  his  horses  being  worn  out 
from  constant  marching,  and  returned  to  Fort  Gibson. 

Colonel  Watie  was  being  pressed  closely  when  he  passed 
through  Tahlequah,  and  information  of  the  fact  was  con 
veyed  to  Colonel  Phillips  in  about  two  hours,  who  at 
once  collected  some  four  hundred  men,  mounted  and  un 
mounted,  and  sent  them  out  under  Colonel  S.  H.  Wattles, 
with  one  piece  of  artillery,  on  the  road  leading  down  the 
north  side  of  the  Arkansas,  for  the  purpose  of  intercept 
ing  the  Southern  Indians  before  they  crossed  the  river. 
He  also  sent  orders  to  Major  Foreman  to  continue  to 
press  the  enemy  with  all  possible  energy,  at  the  same 
time  advising  him  of  the  cooperating  force  sent  out 
under  Colonel  Wattles.  But  when  the  orders  reached 
the  Major  he  had  given  up  the  pursuit  and  was  en  route 
to  Fort  Gibson. 

In  the  meantime  Colonel  Wattles  had  marched  about 
fifteen  miles  down  the  river  in  the  night,  and,  ascertain 
ing  that  Foreman  had  given  up  the  pursuit,  was  at  some 
loss  to  determine  what  further  movements  he  should 
make.  He  also  received  information  about  daylight  from 
his  scouts,  whom  he  had  stationed  at  several  points  to 
watch  any  movements  the  enemy  might  attempt  against 
his  flank  or  rear,  that  the  Confederates  had  crossed  the 
Arkansas  during  the  night  and  were  forming  in  his  rear 
in  the  timber  on  the  south  side  of  Greenleaf  Prairie.  In 
view  of  this  unexpected  pfcase  of  the  situation,  he  deter 
mined  to  return  at  once  and  attack  the  force  formed  in  his 
rear,  which  he  did,  and  soon  succeeded  in  driving  it  back 
towards  the  river.  The  Confederates,  however,  receiving 
a  reinforcement,  rallied  and  drove  his  mounted  men  back 
upon  his  infantry  and  howitzer,  and  attempted  to  take  it, 
but  were  repulsed  and  driven  again  towards  the  river,  Cap 
tain  Sol.  Kaufman,  commanding  the  howitzer,  using  shell 
and  canister  when  he  could  do  so  effectively.  When  he 
arrived  at  Greenleaf  Prairie,  which  lay  between  him  and 


ACTION  AT   CABIN  CREEK.  9! 

Fort  Gibson,  Colonel  Wattles  noticed  the  enemy  at  the 
farther  edge  of  it  and  in  the  timber  on  his  left  forming  in 
line,  which  threatened  to  cut  him  off  from  the  fort.  He 
gained  the  timber,  however,  on  the  west  side  of  the 
prairie  with  very  little  opposition,  again  formed  line,  and 
sending  out  scouts  in  different  directions,  rested  his  in 
fantry  until  he  could  obtain  more  definite  information 
of  the  strength  and  intentions  of  the  enemy.  Shortly 
after  taking  up  this  position  he  was  relieved  by  Colonel 
Schaurte,  who  had  been  sent  forward  with  five  hundred 
infantry  and  cavalry  and  one  howitzer,  with  instructions 
to  push  the  enemy  more  vigorously.  On  the  arrival  of 
Colonel  Schaurte's  command,  the  Confederates  retreated 
down  the  river  and  recrossed  to  the  south  side  at  Web 
ber's  Falls. 

The  Federal  loss  at  Greenleaf  Prairie,  as  reported  by 
Colonel  Phillips,  was  seven  men  killed  and  eight  wounded, 
and  the  Confederate  loss  at  seven  men  killed,  number  of 
wounded  not  known. 

With  the  view  of  preventing  the  Federal  commander 
from  sending  out  a  large  force  to  intercept  the  retreat  of 
Colonel  Watie,  General  Cooper  made  a  demonstration  in 
force  in  front  of  Fort  Gibson  by  opening  fire  with  his 
artillery  upon  the  Federal  picket  stations  on  the  Arkan 
sas  and  by  sending  his  men  into  the  river  as  if  he  intended 
crossing  and  attacking  the  Federal  troops  behind  their 
fortifications.  A  few  days  before  this  feint  he  sent  a  re 
connoitring  force  of  about  three  hundred  cavalry  north 
of  the  Arkansas  and  west  of  Grand  River,  within  about 
three  miles  of  the  fort,  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  the 
attention  of  the  Federal  commander  in  that  direction,  so 
that  the  Southern  Indians  under  Watie  might  remain  un 
disturbed  in  the  northern  part  of  the  Territory  until  the 
Federal  train  would  be  due.  This  force  on  the  west  side 
he  also  desired,  if  practicable,  to  raid  the  herds,  which 
were  in  part  sometimes  sent  out  on  the  west  side  of  the 


Q2  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

river  from  the  fort,  for  he  knew  that  the  large  number  of 
horses  and  mules  in  the  Federal  camp  were  rapidly  using 
up  the  grass  for  several  miles  around.  He,  too,  was 
obliged  to  depend  upon  the  wild  grass  of  the  prairies  to 
keep  his  horses  in  condition  for  the  cavalry  service,  and 
about  this  time  the  grass  had  been  grazed  so  short  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  his  camp  that  he  was  compelled  to 
move  back  to  Elk  Creek,  some  fifteen  miles  south.  But 
in  making  this  movement  he  left  heavy  picket  posts  along 
the  Arkansas  in  front  of  Fort  Gibson. 

The  loss  of  some  of  his  stock  in  the  recent  raid,  and  a 
large  number  of  his  horses  having,  on  account  of  insuffi 
cient  forage  and  by  constant  escort  and  scouting  duty,  be 
come  unserviceable,  were  gradually  making  it  more  difficult 
for  Colonel  Phillips  to  mount  a  sufficient  number  of  troops 
to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  situation.  Indeed,  his 
position  was  getting  to  be  a  state  of  siege,  for  the  en 
emy,  strongly  posted  in  his  front,  were  now  constantly 
menacing  his  flanks  and  rear.  Having  only  a  battalion 
of  white  troops,  he  knew  that  he  was  not  strong  enough 
to  cross  the  Arkansas  and  attack  General  Cooper,  who 
had  at  least  two  white  regiments  of  Texans  and  four  or 
five  Indian  regiments,  on  ground  of  his  own  choosing, 
with  a  fair  prospect  of  success.  He  therefore,  in  a  com 
munication,  laid  the  situation  before  Major-General  James 
G.  Blunt,  who  had  recently  been  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  District  of  Kansas  and  the  Indian  Territory, 
and  urged  upon  him  the  importance  of  sending  forward 
reinforcements  at  once,  with  the  view  of  commencing  an 
offensive  campaign  against  the  enemy  from  Fort  Gibson. 
General  Blunt  keenly  appreciated  the  situation,  and 
realized  that  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Gibson  would  be 
ruinous  to  the  Union  cause  in  the  Indian  Territory,  and 
advised  Colonel  Phillips  that  Colonel  Williams,  com 
manding  the  colored  regiment  at  Baxter  Springs,  with  a 
section  of  the  Second  Kansas  Battery,  and  Lieutenant- 


ACTION  AT  CABIN  CREEK.  93 

Colonel  Theodore  H.  Dodd,  commanding  the  Second 
Colorado  Infantry,  had  been  ordered  to  reinforce  him, 
and  would  accompany  the  next  commissary  train  south. 
The  General  also  set  to  work  to  collect  such  cavalry  as 
could  be  spared  from  other  points  in  his  district  to  send 
forward  as  early  as  practicable.  The  investment  and  siege 
of  Vicksburg  by  General  Grant  was  rapidly  approaching 
a  determination,  with  strong  indications  that  the  Con 
federates  would  be  compelled  to  surrender  that  strong 
hold,  and  thus  open  the  Mississippi  from  St.  Paul  to  the 
Gulf.  Of  course  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  would  enable 
General  Grant  to  return  to  the  Department  of  Missouri 
a  large  number  of  troops  which  had  been  drawn  from  it 
to  reinforce  him.  While  his  Department  was  thus  de 
pleted  of  troops,  General  Schofield  was  unable  to  make 
any  aggressive  movements,  but  determined  to  hold  his  ad 
vanced  positions  until  the  fate  of  Vicksburg  was  decided. 
In  the  meantime  Confederate  General  Steele  obtained 
the  promise  of  General  Cabell,  commanding  the  Southern 
forces  in  Western  Arkansas,  to  cooperate  with  him  in 
another  effort  to  capture  or  destroy  the  Federal  train  en 
route  to  Fort  Gibson.  About  the  I2th  of  June,  General 
Cabell,  who  had  been  engaged  the  past  month  in  watch 
ing  the  movements  of  the  Federal  forces  from  the  direc 
tion  of  Springfield,  marched  to  the  vicinity  of  Cincinnati, 
a  small  place  on  the  western  line  of  Arkansas,  with  about 
fifteen  hundred  men  and  three  pieces  of  artillery,  that  he 
might  be  in  position  to  cooperate  with  General  Steele's 
forces  under  General  Cooper,  the  main  division  of  which 
was  to  march  north  on  the  west  side  of  Grand  River  to 
meet  and  attack  the  Federal  train.  The  presence  of  this 
large  force  on  the  line  of  the  Territory  caused  some  ex 
citement  among  the  loyal  Indian  families  of  the  neighbor 
hood,  and  several  Indian  women  mounted  their  ponies 
and  hastened  to  Fort  Gibson  and  informed  the  Federal 
officers  what  they  had  seen. 


94  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Information  also  received  through  his  scouts  convinced 
Colonel  Phillips  that  General  Cabell  was  preparing  to  join 
the  forces  of  General  Cooper  in  an  attack  on  the  Federal 
train  at  some  point  perhaps  forty  to  fifty  miles  north  of 
Fort  Gibson.  From  the  reports  of  his  scouts  and  from 
the  statements  of  recently  arrived  deserters  from  the  Con 
federate  camp  in  his  front  of  the  preparations  the  Confed 
erate  generals  were  making  to  capture  his  train,  the 
Colonel  determined  to  send  six  hundred  men,  all  that  he 
could  mount,  and  one  howitzer,  under  Major  Foreman, 
as  far  north  as  Baxter  Springs  to  meet  it  and  reinforce 
the  escort  from  that  point  en  route.  On  June  2oth,  at 
the  time  of  sending  out  this  reinforcement  for  his  train, 
his  troops  were  on  short  rations,  and  a  few  days  afterwards 
the  ration  was  reduced  to  fresh  beef,  salt,  rice,  and  wheat, 
which  was  obtained  from  the  farms  of  the  Indians  in  that 
section,  it  then  being  harvested.  This  radical  change  of 
diet  caused  some  sickness  in  his  camp,  and  there  were 
even  a  few  deaths  from  sporadic  cases  of  cholera. 

The  sanitary  condition  of  the  troops  was  looked  after 
by  the  medical  officers,  but  it  was  impossible  to  enforce 
cleanliness  and  sanitary  rules  among  the  large  number  of 
Indian  families  encamped  around  the  fort,  for  scanty  pro 
visions  and  few  conveniences  imposed  severe  hardships 
upon  these  people.  These  families  were  mostly  Creeks 
and  Seminoles,  whose  country  was  occupied  by  the 
Southern  forces  south  of  the  Arkansas,  many  of  the 
Cherokee  families  living  north  of  that  river  having  re 
turned  to  their  homes  during  the  spring. 

The  detachment  sent  out  under  Major  Foreman  to  re 
inforce  the  train  escort  met  it  at  Baxter  Springs,  but, 
moving  fifteen  miles  south  to  Neosho  River,  a  detention 
of  three  days  at  that  point  was  caused  by  high  water  in 
that  stream  intersecting  the  line  of  march.  The  escort  to 
the  train  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Theo 
dore  H.  Dodd,  Second  Colorado  Infantry,  and  on  leaving 


ACTION  AT  CABIN  CREEK.  95 

Baxter  Springs,  June  25th,  consisted  of  six  companies  of 
his  own  regiment,  one  company  Third  Wisconsin  Cavalry, 
one  company  each  from  the  Ninth  and  Fourteenth  Regi 
ments  Kansas  Cavalry,  one  section  of  the  Second  Kansas 
Battery,  under  Lieutenant  A.  Wilson,  and  the  detach 
ment  of  Indians  and  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry,  under  Major 
Foreman,  from  Fort  Gibson. 

Having  received  information  that  a  large  Confederate 
force  was  being  concentrated  to  attack  the  train  en  route, 
Colonel  Williams,  commanding  the  colored  regiment  and 
a  section  of  artillery,  under  Captain  Jack  Armstrong, 
manned  by  men  detailed  from  different  companies  of  the 
regiment,  concluded  to  accompany  the  train  down  and 
offer  his  assistance  should  it  be  attacked ;  he  left  Baxter 
Springs,  June  26th,  and  overtook  it  the  same  day  at 
Neosho  River.  After  crossing  the  Neosho  a  fresh  trail 
was  discovered  in  the  prairie  grass,  and  Major  Foreman 
detached  Lieutenant  L.  F.  Parsons,  Third  Indian  Regi 
ment,  with  twenty  Cherokees,  to  follow  the  trail  and  as 
certain  what  made  it,  which  he  did  after  following  it  for 
four  miles.  He  then  came  upon  thirty  men  of  Stand 
Watie's  advanced  picket,  and  vigorously  attacking  them, 
killed  four  and  took  three  men  prisoners,  the  balance  of 
them  falling  back  upon  the  main  command.  Information 
was  obtained  from  these  prisoners  that  Colonel  Watie 
was  in  command  of  the  expedition  sent  out  by  General 
Cooper,  and  was  strongly  posted  on  the  south  bank  of 
Cabin  Creek,  completely  commanding  the  ford ;  that  his 
force  of  about  sixteen  hundred  men  consisted  of  two 
Indian  regiments  and  parts  of  two  Texas  regiments;  that 
General  Cooper  had  sent  another  large  force  up  the  east 
side  of  Grand  River  that  was  to  be  joined  by  General 
Cabell  from  Arkansas  with  fifteen  hundred  white  troops 
and  three  pieces  of  artillery  to  cooperate  in  the  attack 
on  the  train,  and  that  General  Cabell  had  arrived  on  the 
east  bank  of  Grand  River,  but  was  unable  to  cross  that 


g6  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

stream  on  account  of  high  water.  The  Confederate 
picket,  upon  being  attacked,  retired  upon  their  command, 
and  informed  Colonel  Watie  that  the  approaching  Fed 
eral  train  would  shortly  be  in  sight,  and  every  preparation 
was  made  for  attacking  it  when  it  came  up.  A  line  of 
rifle-pits  was  thrown  up  along  the  sloping  bank  on  the 
south  side  and  covered  with  the  boughs  of  willows  so 
that  it  could  not  be  seen  from  the  north  bank. 

About  noon,  on  July  1st,  the  Federal  train  and  escort 
arrived  upon  the  heights  on  the  north  side  of  Cabin 
Creek;  the  train  was  corralled  on  the  prairie  a  mile  or  so 
back  from  the  ford,  and  a  skirmish  line  thrown  forward, 
under  Major  Foreman,  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  road 
up  to  the  ford  to  develop  the  position  of  the  enemy. 
This  reconnoissance,  which  was  supported  by  artillery 
and  the  First  Kansas  Colored  Infantry,  had  the  effect  of 
satisfying  Colonel  Williams,  the  ranking  officer  present, 
that  Colonel  Watie  had  no  force  north  of  the  creek  ex 
cept  his  picket,  which  had  retired  to  the  south  side  with 
the  loss  of  several  men  killed  and  captured;  that  his 
troops  were  posted  in  the  thick  woods  along  the  south 
bank  of  the  creek,  and  that  his  plan  was  to  attack  the 
escort  and  train  while  crossing  the  creek,  which  was  then 
very  high  from  the  recent  heavy  rains.  The  soundings 
of  the  creek  having  been  taken  under  the  fire  of  shell  and 
canister  from  the  Federal  artillery,  and  being  found  too 
deep  at  the  ford  to  cross  the  train,  the  Federal  troops 
without  further  operations  were  ordered  into  camp  in 
the  edge  of  the  timber  until  the  next  morning  to  await 
the  falling  of  the  stream.  That  evening,  after  the  troops 
had  gone  into  camp,  Colonel  Williams  had  a  consultation 
with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dodd  and  Major  Foreman,  and 
it  was  determined,  as  soon  as  the  creek  should  become 
fordable,  to  unite  under  him  all  the  troops  that  could  be 
spared  from  the  immediate  defence  of  the  train  in  an 
attack  on  the  Confederate  position,  under  cover  of  the 


ACTION  AT  CABIN  CREEK.  97 

artillery,  to  force  a  crossing.  To  guard  against  a  surprise 
during  the  night,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dodd  had  his 
pickets  posted  so  as  to  watch  the  movements  of  the 
enemy  and  to  cover  all  the  approaches  to  the  train. 

When  Colonel  Watie  saw  that  the  Federal  commander 
was  not  going  to  be  satisfied  with  simply  defending  his 
train,  but  had  come  prepared  and  with  the  determination 
to  fight  his  way  through,  he  then  desired  to  hold  the 
Federal  forces  until  he  could  get  the  assistance  of  General 
Cabell,  who  was  held  with  his  command  by  high  water  on 
the  east  bank  of  Grand  River  only  a  few  miles  distant. 
During  the  night  the  creek  had  fallen  sufficient  to  allow  the 
Federal  troops  and  train  to  cross,  and  Colonel  Williams 
having  formed  a  plan  of  attack  to  dislodge  the  Confederates 
from  their  position,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dodd  ordered  to 
his  support  all  the  troops  that  could  be  spared  from  the 
immediate  defence  of  the  train.  In  making  disposition 
of  his  troops  and  artillery  for  the  attack,  Colonel  Williams 
ordered  Lieutenant  Wilson,  commanding  a  section  of  the 
Second  Kansas  Battery,  to  place  his  two  guns  on  an  ele 
vated  position  on  the  extreme  left ;  Captain  Armstrong, 
with  a  section  of  artillery,  was  directed  to  take  position 
in  the  centre  and  within  perhaps  two  hundred  yards  of 
the  position  occupied  by  the  Confederates,  and  Lieuten 
ant  J.  C.  Cayot,  with  one  mountain  howitzer,  was  placed 
in  position  on  the  right.  Major  Foreman,  commanding 
a  mounted  company  of  the  Third  Indian  Regiment,  was 
assigned  to  the  advance  to  lead  in  the  attack,  the  bal 
ance  of  his  Indian  detachment  being  posted  to  guard  the 
creek  above  and  below  the  ford.  Directly  in  the  rear  of 
Major  Foreman  was  the  First  Kansas  Colored  Infantry, 
commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  John  Bowles.  Next 
in  the  column  was  a  battalion  of  the  Second  Colorado 
Infantry,  under  Major  J.  Nelson  Smith.  Last  in  the 
formation  was  a  battalion  of  three  companies  of  cavalry 
under  Captain  John  E.  Stewart,  Ninth  Kansas  Cavalry. 

VOL.  II.— 7 


98  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE   BORDER. 

At  eight  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  everything 
being  in  readiness,  Colonel  Williams  directed  his  artillery 
officers  to  open  fire  with  their  guns  upon  the  Confeder 
ate  position,  which  they  did,  using  shell  and  canister  for 
about  forty  minutes.  Reports  then  came  to  him  from 
his  signal  stations  that  the  storm  of  shell  and  canister 
from  his  batteries  was  making  some  confusion  in  the 
Confederate  line.  He  then  gave  orders  for  his  batteries 
to  cease  firing,  and  for  his  column  to  move  forward  to  the 
attack.  When  the  advance,  led  by  Major  Foreman,  was 
nearing  the  opposite  shore  of  the  creek,  the  Confederates, 
who  were  lying  down  in  a  ditch  behind  a  breastwork  which 
they  had  thrown  up  along  the  sloping  side  of  the  creek 
bank  and  covered  with  the  boughs  of  willows,  only  a  few 
rods  from  where  the  Federal  force  would  be  obliged  to 
pass,  rose  up  and  delivered  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry 
into  them,  wounding  Major  Foreman  and  several  of  his 
men.  This  sudden  fire  of  the  enemy  from  their  concealed 
position,  and  the  wounding  of  their  leader,  who  was 
obliged  to  be  borne  to  the  rear,  caused  some  confusion 
in  the  advance,  and  the  men  fell  back  to  the  north  side 
of  the  creek. 

The  Federal  soldiers  had  not  seen  the  breastworks  on 
the  opposite  shore  or  any  indications  of  an  enemy  at  that 
point  until  they  saw  the  smoke  rise  from  it  in  the  volley 
that  wounded  Major  Foreman.  They  had  been  firing 
over  the  breastwork  into  the  brush  along  the  bank,  as 
they  could  hear  the  Confederates  talking  over  there,  but 
could  not  see  them.  The  colored  infantry  along  the 
north  bank  of  the  creek  commenced  a  hot  fire  at  an  easy 
range  upon  the  Confederates  behind  their  breastwork  the 
moment  the  smoke  from  their  small-arms  disclosed  their 
concealed  position,  and  soon  drove  them  out.  When 
the  Confederates  delivered  their  volley  into  the  cavalry 
advance,  the  head  of  the  column  of  the  colored  infantry 
had  just  reached  the  water's  edge,  and  Colonel  Williams 


ACTION  AT  CABIN  CREEK.  99 

directed  that  the  three  leading  companies  file  to  the  right 
and  left  along  the  bank,  which  brought  them  into  line 
facing  the  Confederate  position  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  creek.  His  artillery  also  played  again  upon  the  Con 
federate  position,  and  kept  it  up  for  about  twenty  min 
utes,  when  he  directed  that  the  section  on  his  left  cease 
firing. 

He  then  brought  up  a  company  of  the  Ninth  Kan 
sas  Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant  R.  C.  Philbrick,  to  take 
the  place  of  the  Indian  company  in  the  advance,  and 
ordered  the  Lieutenant  to  move  forward  at  a  double- 
quick,  which  he  did  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  the  artillery 
on  the  right  and  of  the  three  infantry  companies  on  the 
bank,  until  he  secured  a  footing  on  the  south  side  of  the 
creek.  This  gallant  movement,  however,  was  not  accom 
plished  without  drawing  a  hot  but  ineffectual  fire  from 
the  Confederates — ineffectual,  because  the  moment  they 
showed  themselves  they  were  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
Federal  artillery  and  small-arms  of  the  infantry  companies 
along  the  north  bank  of  the  creek.  His  cavalry  advance, 
having  successfully  crossed,  formed  on  the  south  side  of 
the  stream,  and  Colonel  Williams  at  once  pushed  forward 
his  infantry  and  cavalry  and  crossed  over,  his  infantry  wad 
ing  in  the  water  up  to  their  waist  belts,  and  formed  in  line 
on  the  bank  in  front  of  the  enemy.  He  then  soon  drove 
the  Confederates  from  their  position  in  the  brush,  but 
they  formed  in  line  again  in  the  edge  of  the  prairie  about 
a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  advance.  The  Colonel  now  saw  that 
he  must  make  preparation  for  decisive  action.  That  a 
weak  point  might  not  be  left  unguarded,  he  ordered  Cap 
tain  Stewart,  with  two  companies  of  cavalry,  to  take  posi 
tion  on  his  right  to  prevent  a  flank  movement  of  the 
Confederate  cavalry  in  that  direction.  Lieutenant  Phil- 
brick  was  then  ordered  to  move  forward  with  his  company 
and  charge  the  front  line  of  the  Confederates  and  break 
through  it  and  endeavor  to  ascertain  their  strength  and 


100  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

position.  The  Lieutenant  gallantly  executed  this  move 
ment,  charging  upon  the  Confederate  front,  breaking  it 
and  throwing  them  into  disorder.  This  feeble  resistance 
offered  by  the  Southern  forces  induced  Colonel  Williams 
to  order  all  his  cavalry  to  the  front,  under  Captain  Stew 
art,  to  follow  up  the  success  already  achieved.  After  the 
Confederate  line  was  broken,  Colonel  Watie  seems  to 
have  made  very  little  effort  to  rally  his  men,  so  that  Cap 
tain  Stewart  continued  the  pursuit  about  five  miles  south, 
killing  and  wounding  a  good  many  and  dispersing  the 
others,  who  took  to  the  timber  and  brush  along  Grand 
River  and  on  other  streams  intersecting  their  line  of 
retreat. 

It  was  not  considered  advisable  by  Colonel  Williams  to 
use  the  troops  who  had  been  sent  to  his  support  in  a  pur 
suit  that  would  take  them  too  great  a  distance  from  the 
escort,  for  by  so  doing  he  might  endanger  the  safety  of 
the  train.  He  therefore  recalled  his  cavalry  and  sent 
them  back  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dodd,  commanding  the 
escort,  that  afternoon,  and  the  train  at  once  moved  out 
and  arrived  at  Fort  Gibson  without  any  further  trouble. 

The  Federal  loss,  according  to  the  official  reports,  was 
three  men  killed  and  thirty  wounded.  Colonel  Williams 
reported  that  from  the  best  information  he  could  obtain, 
he  thought  that  the  Confederate  loss  was  about  fifty  men 
killed  and  nine  prisoners. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

ACTION   AT    STOCKTON,    AND    DEATH    OF    MAJOR 
LIVINGSTON. 

THE  action  at  Stockton,  in  Cedar  County,  Missouri, 
July  n,  1863,  deserves  mention  trom  the"  fact'  t ft al  \\ 
was  an  event  that  closed  the  career  of  Major  Thomas  R. 
Livingston,  whose  name  was  familiar  to  the  Unionists  of 
Southwest  Missouri  on  account  of  his  numerous  depreda 
tions  in  that  section,  having  commanded  a  battalion  of 
Confederate  Partisan  Rangers  from  the  beginning  of  the 
war  up  to  his  death.  Although  he  appears  to  have  been 
commissioned  by  the  Confederate  Government  as  a  Major 
of  Partisan  Rangers,  his  command  was  known  to  the 
loyal  people  of  that  section  as  "  bushwhackers,"  or  gue 
rillas.  He  lived  in  the  western  part  of  Jasper  County  up 
to  the  war,  and  was  a  man  of  some  local  prominence  and 
influence.  His  business  relations  had  made  him  thor 
oughly  acquainted  with  the  people  of  his  section.  He 
was  not  considered  a  bad  man  as  men  were  then  ac 
counted  bad.  As  the  leader  of  his  band,  his  name  be 
came  associated  with  transactions  that  could  not  by  any 
means  be  sanctioned  by  legitimate  war.  His  knowledge 
of  men  and  affairs  made  him  the  natural  leader  of  those 
around  him  who  determined  to  cast  their  fortunes  with 
the  South.  His  thorough  knowledge  of  the  country,  and 
his  ability  to  obtain  through  the  secessionists  information 
of  the  movements  of  Federal  detachments  and  trains,  en- 


102  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

abled  him  to  give  the  Federal  officers  operating  in  that 
section  a  good  deal  of  trouble.  When  least  expected  he 
had  in  a  number  of  instances  dashed  down  upon  some 
station  or  train  and  escort  and  carried  off  stock  or  supplies 
or  prisoners  in  spite  of  the  vigilance  of  the  Federal  officers. 
His  men  were  well  mounted  and  equipped,  so  that  when 
he  undertook  to  make  a  dash  upon  a  place,  his  move 
ments  were  quickly  executed.  His  attack  on  Stockton, 
in  July,  1863,  where  he  was  killed  leading  his  men,  was 
witnessed  by  James  M.  Traverse,  of  Dade  County,  who 
was  a  member  of  Captain  Alexander  Simmons'  company, 
Seventh  Regiment  Missouri  Provisional  Militia,  who  par 
ticipated  in  the  affair  on  the  Federal  side,  and  from  whom 
the; par.tivu.jars  of.. the  action  were  drawn. 

The  companies  of  Captains  Simmons  and  Walker  were 
stationed  at  Stockton  that  month,  engaged  in  scouting 
and  keeping  the  peace  of  the  country.  The  officers  and 
men  of  the  militia  were  not  only  acquainted  with  the 
methods  of  guerilla  fighting  in  that  section,  but  they 
generally  knew  personally  most  of  the  men  of  the  gue 
rilla  bands  against  whom  they  were  operating.  There 
were  upwards  of  sixty  men  in  each  of  the  companies 
stationed  at  Stockton,  mounted  upon  their  own  private 
horses.  Captain  Simmons'  company  was  quartered  in 
tents  about  one  hundred  yards  southwest  of  the  court 
house,  which  was  located  in  the  centre  of  court-house 
square. 

On  the  day  of  the  attack  there  was  public  speaking  in 
Stockton,  the  previous  announcement  of  which  had  at 
tracted  a  few  citizens  from  the  country.  W.  C.  Mont 
gomery  and  Orville  Welch  were  candidates  for  the 
Legislature  and  were  there  in  joint  debate  presenting 
their  respective  claims  to  the  people  for  political  prefer 
ment.  It  was  warm  weather,  and  the  soldiers  were 
lounging  around,  exhibiting  no  particular  interest  in  the 
discussion,  and  there  were  not  perhaps  more  than  one 


ACTION  AT  STOCKTON.  103 

half  of  the  men  in  the  brick  court-house  when  the  enemy 
made  the  attack.  Most  of  the  militia  generally  wore 
their  side-arms  when  off  duty.  As  it  was  warm  weather 
there  probably  would  have  been  fewer  men  in  the  court 
house  at  that  time  of  the  day  than  there  were,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  public  speaking  attracting  them  there.  Of 
course  there  were  a  few  citizens  present  in  the  court 
house,  and  who  dispersed  when  the  firing  commenced. 

Livingston  had  been  frequently  heard  of  south  of  Cedar 
County,  operating  in  the  counties  of  Jasper,  Newton,  and 
McDonald,  but  had  not  prior  to  the  day  of  the  attack 
made  a  raid  as  far  north  as  Stockton,  and  there  had  been 
no  rumor  of  his  approach  or  of  a  hostile  demonstration 
from  any  quarter.  Captain  Lafayette  Roberts'  company 
of  guerillas  had  been  operating  in  the  county,  generally 
on  Horse  and  Cedar  creeks,  so  that  Captain  Simmons, 
the  senior  captain,  always  kept  picket  guards  on  the  four 
principal  roads  leading  into  town  to  guard  against  a  sur 
prise.  It  was  such  a  smoky  day,  which  was  unusual  for 
the  season  of  the  year,  that  mounted  men  could  not  be 
distinctly  seen  more  than  two  or  three  hundred  yards 
off,  so  that  the  guerillas  approached  so  near  the  picket 
stationed  on  the  Greenfield  and  Stockton  road,  a  short 
distance  south  of  town,  that  he  was  unable  to  reach 
camp,  but  was  obliged  to  take  to  the  brush  to  save  him 
self.  In  his  flight  he  did  not  even  think  of  discharging 
his  gun  to  give  the  alarm  to  his  comrades. 

Hence  the  guerillas  were  able  to  move  rapidly  into 
town  and  open  fire  upon  the  militia  on  the  street  and 
around  the  court-house  without  any  warning  whatever. 
Immediately  after  the  enemy  opened  fire  the  militia  in 
camp  and  on  the  street  sought  safety  in  the  brush  north 
of  town  and  in  houses  in  town.  Only  about  twenty  men 
remained  in  the  court-house  and  did  the  fighting.  Lieu 
tenants  Alexander  C.  Montgomery  and  William  A.  Mc- 
Minn  were  among  the  officers  of  the  militia  who  stayed 


104  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

in  the  court-house  and  participated  in  the  fight  from  that 
point.  The  guerillas,  estimated  at  three  hundred  strong, 
after  the  militia  on  the  street  had  dispersed,  surrounded 
the  court-house,  and  most  of  them,  dismounting  upon  the 
court-house  square,  opened  fire  on  the  men  within  from 
every  side.  As  the  arms  of  Captain  Walker's  company 
were  in  the  court-house,  the  men  inside  had  plenty  of 
arms  and  ammunition,  and  from  every  window  kept  up  a 
hot  fire  on  their  assailants  on  the  outside  until  they  with 
drew.  After  the  first  volley  from  the  guerillas  the  militia 
in  the  court-house  firmly  barred  the  two  down-stairs  doors 
with  heavy  hewn  timbers  and  then  retreated  up-stairs, 
from  whence  they  did  their  fighting  until  the  enemy  were 
repulsed. 

The  attack  commenced  about  three  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon  and  lasted  fifteen  to  twenty  minutes  with  almost  con 
stant  flashes  of  fire  and  puffs  of  smoke  from  every  window, 
when  the  guerillas,  having  lost  two  of  their  principal  offi 
cers,  Major  Livingston  and  Captain  Vaughn,  the  latter 
of  Osceola,  and  two  enlisted  men,  killed,  withdrew,  leav 
ing  their  dead  on  the  ground.  Lieutenant  McMinn  and 
one  of  his  men  were  severely  wounded  in  the  court-house, 
and  one  man,  Gould  Kington,  was  captured  and  killed, 
and  one  or  two  militiamen  were  mortally  wounded  on  the 
street.  The  guerillas  left  fifteen  of  their  wounded  at 
Whitehair,  ten  miles  southwest  of  Stockton,  that  day. 

As  soon  as  the  enemy  withdrew  from  town,  Captains 
Simmons  and  Walker  rallied  their  men  in  the  court-house, 
and  fearing  another  attack  that  evening  commenced 
preparations  to  resist  it.  They  set  their  men  to  carrying 
water  and  filling  tubs  in  the  court-house  for  use  in  the 
event  they  should  be  surrounded  and  attacked  again. 
But  the  enemy  were  too  severely  punished  and  too  much 
demoralized  to  renew  the  attack,  and  retreated  southwest 
in  the  direction  of  Barton  County. 

The  report  of  the  fight  spread  through  the  country  by 


ACTION  AT  STOCKTON.  10$ 

some  of  the  militia  who  were  cut  off  from  their  command, 
and  a  company  of  State  militia  came  in  from  Greenfield 
the  next  morning  under  Captain  James  J.  Akard,  Eighth 
Missouri  Militia  Cavalry,  to  reinforce  Captains  Simmons 
and  Walker.  The  court-house  made  a  strong  position 
against  an  attack  by  small-arms,  and  after  the  loyal 
militia  rallied  it  would  have  taken  a  stronger  force  than 
that  which  made  the  attack  to  have  dislodged  them  with 
out  the  use  of  artillery. 

Captain  Akard  received  information  of  the  fight  just  as 
the  sun  was  sinking  below  the  horizon  that  day,  and  left 
Greenfield  at  once,  marching  all  that  night,  and  when 
within  a  few  miles  of  Stockton  met  a  man  on  the  road, 
mounted  and  in  Federal  uniform,  who  represented  him 
self  as  a  Federal  soldier.  Believing  that  he  was  in  the 
immediate  presence  of  the  enemy,  the  Captain  con 
cluded  to  hold  his  captive  stranger  to  obtain  from  him 
such  information  as  was  possible,  and  to  prevent  him,  if 
he  was  an  enemy,  from  giving  the  bandits  any  informa 
tion  of  the  movements  of  the  reinforcing  detachment. 
In  the  darkness  none  of  Captain  Akard 's  men  recognized 
the  prisoner,  and  he  represented  in  reply  to  questions 
that  the  guerillas  were  still  holding  the  town,  having 
driven  the  militia  out  in  the  fight.  This  statement  caused 
the  Captain  to  halt  his  command  for  a  while  and  to  ap 
proach  the  town  cautiously  by  daylight.  When  daylight 
came  the  Captain  and  his  guide,  Robert  Underwood, 
dropped  back  to  the  rear  of  the  column  to  have  another 
talk  with  the  prisoner  in  regard  to  the  situation  in  town. 
On  coming  up  to  him  the  guide  instantly  knew  him, 
having  captured  him  in  a  fight  in  that  section  some 
months  prior  to  this  second  capture.  He  finally  admitted 
his  identity,  recollected  the  incidents  connected  with  his 
exchange,  and  on  being  further  questioned  about  the  fight 
at  Stockton,  admitted  that  the  militia  had  driven  the 
guerillas  off  with  some  loss  and  were  still  holding  the  town. 


IO6  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Captain  Akard  then  marched  into  town,  having  first 
taken  precaution  to  ascertain  that  the  loyal  militia  really 
were  in  possession.  After  a  halt  of  a  few  hours  to  break 
fast  and  to  rest  and  feed  his  horses,  the  Captain  started 
out  on  the  trail  of  the  guerillas  and  pursued  them  into 
the  southern  part  of  Barton  County,  but  without  being 
able  to  come  up  with  the  main  body  of  them. 

The  death  of  their  leader  had  the  effect  of  breaking 
Livingston's  band  up  into  smaller  bands,  and  his  name 
did  not  figure  in  guerilla  operations  in  Southwest  Mis 
souri  any  more  during  the  war.  After  many  successful 
contests  with  the  Regular  Federal  forces,  he  met  his  de 
feat  and  death  at  the  hands  of  the  Enrolled  Militia,  whom 
he  had  affected  to  despise  on  account  of  their  inferior 
arms  and  equipments  and  generally  unsoldierly  appear 
ance. 

When  planning  this,  his  last  fight,  Major  Livingston 
knew  that  the  year  before,  in  July,  1862,  Colonel  John 
T.  Coffee  had  surprised  and  captured  a  company  of  En 
rolled  Militia  at  Greenfield  in  the  adjoining  county  with 
out  the  loss  of  a  man,  and  did  not  doubt  but  that  he 
should  be  equally  successful  in  making  a  dash  upon  the 
militia  at  Stockton.  Colonel  Coffee  was  a  lawyer  living 
at  Greenfield  up  to  the  war,  and,  then  espousing  the  cause 
of  the  South,  raised  a  regiment  for  Price's  army.  He 
was  therefore  perfectly  familiar  with  the  country,  and  had 
accurate  information  of  the  strength  of  the  Union  force 
occupying  the  town.  The  Union  force  in  town  on  the 
day  of  the  Confederate  advance  was  a  company  of  En 
rolled  Militia  under  Captain  Nathan  McClure,  which  had 
that  day  just  completed  its  organization.  Captain  Mc 
Clure  had  not  made  any  preparation  for  defence,  nor  put 
out  any  scouts  or  pickets  to  give  notice  of  an  approaching 
foe,  so  that  the  Southern  forces  were  in  sight  of  town 
before  the  Unionists  knew  they  were  in  the  country. 
When  Colonel  Coffee  came  up  in  sight  of  town,  he  divided 


ACTION  AT  STOCKTON.  107 

his  command,  which  was  mounted,  into  two  wings,  and 
then  moved  forward  rapidly  to  encircle  the  town,  and 
before  the  militia  could  escape  therefrom  they  were  sur 
rounded  on  all  sides.  The  militia  and  Union  citizens, 
probably  numbering  about  one  hundred,  were  in  the 
court-house  square  when  the  Southern  troops  closed  up 
their  lines.  Knowing  that  he  was  in  no  condition  to 
make  a  fight,  Captain  McClure  allowed  the  enemy,  esti 
mated  at  one  thousand  strong,  to  approach  within  easy 
range  of  small-arms  without  offering  resistance. 

On  seeing  that  the  militia  were  not  displaying  a  bellig 
erent  attitude,  Colonel  Coffee  rode  up  and  told  the  men 
in  the  court-house  square  that  they  were  his  prisoners. 
He  then  told  them  to  go  up-stairs  in  the  court-house  and 
remain  there  for  further  instructions.  He  put  a  guard 
around  them  and  kept  them  there  until  after  midnight  that 
night,  when  he  paroled  them.  That  night,  after  the  men 
were  captured,  he  went  up  to  see  them  and  made  a  lit 
tle  speech,  telling  them  that  they  should  be  treated  as 
prisoners  of  war,  and  that  they  should  not  be  hurt.  He 
advised  them  not  to  leave  before  daylight,  as  some  of  his 
men  might  attempt  to  do  them  harm  if  they  left  earlier. 
His  advice  was  followed,  and  the  Unionists  retired  to 
their  homes  without  disturbance.  Captain  McClure  and 
his  men  lost  all  their  private  horses  and  equipments  and 
such  arms  as  they  had.  They  had  not  drawn  any  cloth 
ing  or  other  Government  property.  He  had  one  man, 
Mr.  -  -  Willett,  who  was  slightly  wounded,  having  got  a 
cut  over  the  head  in  a  rather  laughable  manner.  When 
the  militia  saw  the  Confederates  coming  in  on  a  charge, 
Mr.  Willett  mounted  his  ass,  which  he  had  ridden  to  town 
that  day,  and  started  home,  urging  it  forward  with  all 
his  might.  As  soon,  however,  as  the  Confederates  got 
within  hailing  distance  they  called  to  him  to  halt.  The 
ass  was  hard-mouthed,  but  slow  of  speed,  and  hearing  the 
uproar  in  the  rear,  Mr.  Willett  could  not  check  it,  and 


IO8  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

one  of  the  Confederates  galloped  up  and  cut  him  over 
the  head  with  a  sabre.  The  wound,  however,  was  not 
serious. 

The  Confederates  captured  the  town  late  in  the  after 
noon  and  left  early  the  next  morning  for  Stockton  and 
points  north,  increasing  their  numbers  by  each  day's 
march.  In  this  raid,  Colonel  Coffee's  movements  were 
frequently  so  rapid  that  they  were  not  always  known  to 
the  officers  of  the  regularly  organized  Federal  forces  in 
the  State.  It  was  not  therefore  strange  that  the  militia 
officers  who  had  not  yet  seen  any  service  should  have 
been  surprised  and  taken  in. 

After  the  death  of  Major  Livingston,  Captain  Kinch 
West,  a  citizen  of  Bade  County  up  to  the  war,  became 
the  leader  of  the  guerilla  bands  in  the  section  where 
Livingston  had  been  operating.  Captain  West,  being 
perfectly  familiar  with  the  country  in  Southwest  Missouri, 
had  given  the  militia  and  Federal  officers  commanding 
stations  and  escorts  to  trains  a  good  deal  of  trouble. 
When  he  made  a  raid  into  the  open  sections  of  Dade, 
Lawrence,  or  Barton  County,  he  would,  if  pursued  by  a 
superior  Federal  force,  make  for  the  rough  and  moun 
tainous  regions  of  McDonald  or  Barry  County.  He  and 
his  men  appear  to  have  been  more  interested  in  robbing 
and  plundering  than  in  assisting  the  Confederate  cause. 
They  shot  down  and  killed  in  cold  blood  a  good  many 
Union  citizens  in  the  section  where  he  operated,  and  he 
invariably  shot  down  the  Union  soldiers  that  he  cap 
tured.  In  some  of  his  contests  with  the  militia  he  got 
badly  punished,  even  if  he  did  have  the  advantage  of 
choosing  the  time,  place,  and  disposition  of  his  force  in 
making  an  attack. 

In  the  fall  of  1864,  while  the  Price  Raid  was  exciting 
very  great  interest  all  over  the  State,  he  collected  the  in 
dependent  bands  of  guerillas  in  Southwest  Missouri  to 
the  number  of  about  three  hundred  men,  most  of  whom 


ACTION  AT  STOCKTON.  109 

were  well  mounted  and  armed,  and  aimed  at  the  capture 
of  Greenfield.  There  were  about  fifty  men  under  Captain 
James  Kirby,  of  the  Enrolled  Militia,  stationed  at  Green 
field  at  the  time  of  the  attack.  Captain  Kirby  had  taken 
the  precaution  to  keep  out  a  picket  in  the  direction  from 
which  the  enemy  approached,  but  it  was  too  near  camp 
to  be  of  much  advantage  in  warning  his  men  to  arms  in 
the  event  of  a  sudden  attack.  The  court-house  had  been 
burnt  by  Shelby's  Southern  forces  on  his  raid  north  in 
the  fall  of  1863,  but  the  Wells  House,  a  good  strong  brick 
building  on  the  southeast  corner  of  the  public  square, 
which  had  been  used  as  a  hotel  up  to  the  war,  was  used 
as  quarters  for  all  the  soldiers  who  did  not  sleep  in  houses 
around  town,  and  was  selected  as  the  rallying  point  in  the 
event  of  attack.  At  this  time,  however,  only  twelve  men, 
under  Sergeant  Stubblefield,  of  the  Sixth  Missouri  State 
Militia  Cavalry,  slept  in  the  Wells  House,  Captain  Kirby 
and  his  men  occupying  quarters  around  town. 

The  first  warning  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy  was 
just  at  daylight,  before  most  of  the  militia  had  awakened 
from  their  peaceful  slumbers.  The  yell  of  the  guerillas 
and  the  discharge  of  small-arms  were  then  heard  as  they 
came  charging  into  town,  all  well  mounted.  All  the 
militia  who  were  not  cut  off,  on  hearing  the  firing,  started 
for  the  Wells  House,  and  most  of  them  succeeded  in  get 
ting  there.  Some  few  of  the  Unionists,  however,  who 
found  that  they  were  cut  off  from  their  comrades,  took 
positions  in  houses  and  fired  upon  the  guerillas  when 
they  came  within  range. 

The  bandits  came  into  town  from  three  different  direc 
tions,  and  as  soon  as  they  came  to  the  public  square  they 
received  a  heavy  fire  from  the  militia  in  the  Wells  House, 
which  caused  them  to  quickly  fall  back  and  take  positions 
behind  houses.  It  was  soon  discovered  that  they  were 
endeavoring  to  get  the  horses  belonging  to  the  militia 
out  of  the  stables  on  the  south  side  of  the  public  square. 


1 10  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER, 

When  this  information  reached  the  Wells  House,  Ser 
geant  Stubblefield  took  his  twelve  men  and  some  of  the 
Enrolled  Militia  who  had  joined  him,  and  opened  fire  on 
the  guerillas  and  drove  them  out  of  the  stable,  after 
which  they  soon  commenced  to  retreat,  and  kept  it  up 
until  they  were  out  of  sight.  The  militia  lost  three  men 
killed.  The  guerillas  had  several  men  wounded  in  the 
affair,  but  their  exact  casualties  were  not  known,  as  they 
took  their  wounded  along  with  them.  The  three  militia 
men  killed  were  Morgan,  Acuff,  and  Isaac  Owens.  These 
men  were  cut  off  from  joining  their  comrades  and  sur 
rounded  and  captured,  and  killed  after  their  capture. 
A  comrade,  Jesse  Cartwright,  who  was  cut  off  from  his 
command  with  them,  ran,  and  in  jumping  a  fence  fell  on 
the  opposite  side ;  knowing  that  the  enemy  were  right  at 
his  heels,  he  lay  on  the  ground  as  if  dead,  for  they  were 
firing  at  him  as  he  ran,  and  by  thus  feigning  death  saved 
his  life.  While  lying  on  the  ground  he  saw  his  comrades 
shot  down  and  their  pockets  rifled  not  more  than  thirty 
yards  distant. 

It  was  supposed  to  be  the  purpose  of  the  guerillas  to 
pillage  the  town  and  to  do  it  with  as  little  fighting  as 
possible.  It  was  the  almost  universal  verdict  of  the  loyal 
people  of  Southwest  Missouri  that  Captain  West  got  to 
be  a  hard  character  during  the  war.  As  an  illustration 
of  his  character  it  was  known  that  on  one  occasion  he 
captured  his  uncle,  Jacob  Cox,  a  well-to-do  farmer,  living 
in  the  south  part  of  Bade  County,  but  a  Union  man,  and 
demanded  of  him  his  money.  At  first  Mr.  Cox  refused 
to  give  up  his  money,  and  then  West  put  a  rope  around 
his  neck  and  fastened  it  to  the  horn  of  his  saddle  and 
dragged  him  up  and  down  the  road  until  he  consented  to 
give  up  all  the  money  he  had  with  him.  The  greater  part 
of  his  money  Mr.  Cox  had  deposited  in  Greenfield,  and  it 
was  this  balance  that  West  was  trying  to  force  him  to 
give  up.  When  West  and  his  men  found  that  they  could 


ACTION  AT  STOCKTON. 


Ill 


not  get  all  of  Mr.  Cox's  money,  they  stripped  him  to 
his  shirt  and  drawers  and  turned  him  loose,  and  when 
he  came  into  Greenfield  in  this  condition  his  neck  was 
badly  bruised  and  skinned  from  the  hard  treatment  he 
had  received. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

BATTLE   OF   HONEY   SPRINGS,    CREEK   NATION. 

ON  July  3d  several  Cherokee  women  from  near  Grand 
Saline  arrived  at  Fort  Gibson  and  reported  that  the  day 
before  they  heard  heavy  artillery  firing  in  the  direction  of 
Cabin  Creek  on  the  west  side  of  Grand  River.  Of  course, 
until  some  definite  information  was  received  of  the  result 
of  the  action,  the  troops  at  Fort  Gibson  felt  a  good  deal  of 
anxiety  for  the  safety  of  their  supply  train.  But  at  that 
time  Grand  River  had  been  very  high  at  Fort  Gibson  for 
three  or  four  days,  and  Colonel  Phillips  was  satisfied  that 
the  force  General  Cooper  had  sent  up  on  the  east  side  of 
that  stream,  and  the  force  under  General  Cabell  from 
Arkansas,  would  be  unable  to  cross  to  the  west  side  to 
form  a  junction  with  the  troops  which  had  been  sent  up 
on  the  west  side  under  Colonel  Watie. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th,  the  arrival  of  the  Federal 
commissary  train  not  only  ended  the  suspense  and  anx 
iety  of  the  troops  at  that  post,  but  also  the  long  fast 
which  had  been  imposed  upon  them  by  most  of  their 
rations  having  been  exhausted  for  a  week  or  so.  The 
arrival  of  reinforcements  of  infantry  and  artillery  also  had 
a  good  effect  upon  the  loyal  Indian  troops,  who  had  been 
exerting  every  effort  to  hold  their  position  against  su 
perior  numbers  and  under  very  trying  conditions. 

After  the  failure  of  General  Cooper's  expeditions  to 
capture  the  Federal  train  at  Cabin  Creek,  the  Confederate 

112 


BATTLE   OF  HONEY  SPRINGS. 


forces  in  the  Indian  Territory  were  gradually  pushed  south 
in  the  direction  of  Red  River.  They  were  soon  after 
that  action  employed  in  protecting  their  own  supplies. 


tt 


3 WC.   2IND.    lK.Co.\\^CoLO.    IINO.      6KC 


HONLY  [SPRINGS   DEPOT 


FLDELRAL 
CONTLDERATE. 


MAP  OF  BATTLE  OF  HONEY  SPRINGS  OR   ELK  CREEK,  CREEK  NATION. 

Having  received  information  that  General  Cooper  was 
constantly  sending  out  strong  expeditions  of  cavalry  on 


114  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE  BORDER. 

the  flanks  and  in  the  rear  of  Colonel  Phillips'  position  at 
Fort  Gibson,  and  knowing  that  most  of  the  available 
troops  of  that  post  were  guarding  the  Federal  supply 
line,  General  Blunt  collected  such  cavalry  and  light  artil 
lery  as  could  be  spared  from  Southern  Kansas,  consisting 
of  a  battalion  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry  and  two 
mountain  howitzers  and  a  section  of  Captain  E.  A. 
Smith's  Second  Kansas  Battery,  and,  leaving  Fort  Scott 
July  6th,  by  rapid  marching  arrived  at  Fort  Gibson  on 
the  nth. 

The  defeat  of  General  Lee's  army  at  Gettysburg  on  the 
3d  and  the  surrender  by  General  Pemberton  of  Vicksburg 
to  General  Grant  on  the  4th,  with  upwards  of  thirty 
thousand  prisoners  and  nearly  two  hundred  cannon,  all 
pointed  to  the  conclusion  that  Federal  operations  in  the 
Department  of  the  Missouri  would  in  a  short  time  assume 
an  aggressiveness  that  had  not  been  displayed  in  the 
earlier  part  of  the  season.  General  Grant  would  soon  be 
able  to  return  to  the  Department  of  the  Missouri  the 
troops  which  had  been  drawn  from  it  to  reinforce  him  in 
the  siege  of  Vicksburg.  General  Schofield  determined, 
as  soon  as  these  troops  should  come  under  his  command, 
to  push  forward  his  forces  and  occupy  the  country  north 
of  the  Arkansas  from  Fort  Gibson  to  its  mouth,  and  so 
dispose  his  troops  as  to  control  the  navigation  of  that 
river  for  transporting  supplies  to  his  army. 

On  the  4th  of  July  the  Confederate  forces,  under  Gen 
erals  Holmes  and  Price,  about  eight  thousand  strong,  at 
tacked  the  Federal  forces  at  Helena,  Arkansas,  under 
General  Prentiss,  about  four  thousand  strong,  and  were 
defeated,  after  desperate  fighting,  with  the  loss  of  upwards 
of  sixteen  hundred  men  killed,  wounded,  and  captured. 
This  battle  had  an  important  bearing  upon  the  military 
operations  on  the  Border,  for  the  reason  that  the  Confed 
erate  troops  engaged  in  it  were  almost  the  only  troops 
the  Confederate  authorities  had  to  defend  the  line  of  the 


BATTLE   OF  HONEY  SPRINGS.  115 

Arkansas  from  Little  Rock  to  Fort  Smith.  Directly  after 
this  battle,  General  Holmes,  commanding  the  Southern 
forces  in  the  District  of  Arkansas,  commenced  fortifying 
Little  Rock  and  concentrating  his  troops  in  the  vicinity 
for  the  defence  of  that  place. 

On  the  Federal  side,  Major-General  Frederick  Steele 
arrived  at  Helena  on  the  3ist  of  July,  with  instructions 
from  General  Grant  to  fit  out  an  expedition  from  that 
point  against  Little  Rock.  The  troops  assigned  to  him 
for  the  expedition  were  at  once  organized  and  furnished 
with  the  necessary  supplies,  and  on  the  iyth  bf  August 
commenced  crossing  White  River  at  Clarendon.  At  this 
time  General  Price  had  recently  been  temporarily  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  District 
of  Arkansas,  and  he  saw  that  he  was  being  pressed  so 
closely  by  the  Federal  forces  advancing  from  Helena  and 
from  Southeast  Missouri  that  he  could  not  spare  from 
the  defence  of  Little  Rock,  the  capital  of  the  State,  any 
troops  to  reinforce  Generals  Cabell  and  Steele  in  the  west 
ern  part  of  the  State  and  Indian  Territory.  Hence,  Con 
federate  General  Steele  was  obliged  to  rely  on  the  troops 
which  he  then  had  in  the  Indian  Territory  to  meet  the 
troops  of  General  Blunt,  who  were  ordered  on  his  arrival 
at  Fort  Gibson  to  make  preparations  for  crossing  the 
Arkansas  at  once  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  General 
Cooper  in  his  position  on  Elk  Creek,  twenty-five  miles 
south  of  that  post  on  the  Texas  road. 

After  his  failure  to  form  a  junction  with  Colonel  Watie 
in  an  attack  on  the  Federal  train  at  Cabin  Creek,  General 
Cabell  marched  back  into  Arkansas,  and  in  a  few  days 
afterwards  was  ordered  to  join  General  Cooper  at  Honey 
Springs,  south  of  the  Arkansas,  in  a  combined  movement 
against  the  Federal  forces  at  Fort  Gibson.  On  his  arrival 
at  that  post,  General  Blunt  received  information  of  this 
proposed  movement  of  the  Confederate  leaders,  and  de 
termined  to  cross  the  Arkansas  and  attack  General  Cooper 


Il6  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

before  the  reinforcements  under  General  Cabell  could 
arrive.  As  the  Arkansas  was  not  fordable  at  any  point 
below  the  mouth  of  the  Verdigris,  he  had  flatboats  con 
structed  for  taking  over  some  of  his  troops  and  ammuni 
tion.  In  a  day  or  so  the  river  commenced  falling,  and  on 
the  1 5th  of  July  he  ascertained  from  his  scouts  that  the 
Arkansas  was  fordable  a  short  distance  above  the  mouth 
of  the  Verdigris.  Shortly  after  midnight  of  the  i6th,  he 
took  the  battalion  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry,  with  two 
howitzers  and  a  section  of  the  Second  Kansas  Battery, 
and  crossed  the  Verdigris  and  Arkansas  about  twelve 
miles  above  Fort  Gibson  without  serious  opposition,  and, 
marching  down  the  south  side  of  the  Arkansas,  was  de 
sirous  of  capturing  the  Confederate  pickets  guarding  the 
different  fords  on  that  river.  The  Confederate  pickets 
on  the  river,  however,  heard  of  his  advance  in  time  to 
escape  to  General  Cooper's  main  outpost,  several  miles 
north  of  Elk  Creek.  General  Blunt's  other  troops  for 
the  expedition  crossed  the  Arkansas  near  the  mouth  of 
Grand  River  in  the  evening  and  night  of  the  i6th,  some 
of  the  troops  not  getting  over  until  about  eleven  o'clock. 
The  General  organized  his  troops  for  the  attack  into 
two  brigades.  The  First  Brigade,  consisting  of  the  First 
Kansas  Colored  Infantry,  under  Colonel  James  M.  Wil 
liams;  the  Second  Indian  Regiment,  dismounted  as  in 
fantry,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fred.  W.  Schaurte;  a 
battalion  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry  and  two  howitz 
ers  ;  a  battalion  of  the  Third  Wisconsin  and  two  howitzers, 
under  Captain  E.  R.  Stevens,  and  four  guns  of  the  Second 
Kansas  Battery,  under  Captain  E.  A.  Smith,  was  com 
manded  by  Colonel  William  R.  Judson,  Sixth  Kansas 
Cavalry.  The  Second  Brigade,  consisting  of  six  com 
panies  of  the  Second  Colorado  Infantry,  under  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Theodore  H.  Dodd ;  the  First  Indian  Regi 
ment,  dismounted  as  infantry,  under  Colonel  Stephen  H. 
Wattles,  and  Hopkins'  Kansas  Battery,  four  guns,  under 


BATTLE   OF  HONEY  SPRINGS.  \\J 

Captain  Henry  Hopkins,  was  commanded  by  Colonel 
William  A.  Phillips,  Third  Indian  Regiment. 

Immediately  after  the  troops  had  all  crossed  over  the 
river  in  boats,  the  march  south  was  resumed,  and  at  day 
light  the  Federal  advance  under  Captain  William  Gordon, 
Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry,  came  upon  the  Confederates'  out 
post  about  five  miles  north  of  Elk  Creek,  and  at  once 
formed  to  attack  them.  The  Captain,  however,  was  soon 
obliged  to  fall  back  before  superior  numbers  until  he  was 
reinforced  by  the  other  three  companies  of  the  regiment, 
which  were  brought  up  at  a  gallop.  The  Confederates 
were  then  driven  from  their  position  and  fell  back  upon 
their  main  force  posted  in  the  timber  on  the  north  side 
of  Elk  Creek.  As  there  was  a  large  force  of  Choctaws 
and  Texans  at  this  outpost,  General  Blunt  did  not  feel 
certain  but  that  General  Cooper  had  determined  to 
meet  him  at  that  point,  and  commenced  to  form  line  of 
battle. 

On  moving  forward  again  and  finding  the  enemy 
strongly  posted  in  the  timber  north  of  Elk  Creek,  the 
battalion  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry  halted,  and  a  com 
pany  was  thrown  forward  to  reconnoitre,  and  soon  found 
that  their  line  was  formed  on  the  right  and  left  of  the 
road  for  some  distance.  General  Blunt,  with  some  mem 
bers  of  his  staff  and  escort,  rode  forward  with  this  advance 
cavalry  to  examine  the  Confederate  position  and  to  ascer 
tain  where  General  Cooper's  battery  was  posted.  He 
then  left  the  companies  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  on  the  skir 
mish  line  to  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  rode 
back  and  halted  the  head  of  his  column  and  all  his  troops 
as  they  came  up,  behind  a  ridge  in  the  prairie  about  half 
a  mile  in  front  of  the  Confederate  line,  to  rest  and  lunch 
and  prepare  for  action. 

The  troops  had  been  marching  all  night  and  all  the 
morning  up  to  eight  o'clock,  and  the  infantry  in  particu 
lar  felt  the  need  of  a  little  rest  and  of  an  opportunity  of 


Il8  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

eating  a  lunch  from  their  haversacks  before  going  into 
action. 

Just  before  the  column  halted,  a  hard  shower  of  rain 
came  up,  lasting  about  a  quarter  of  an  hour  and  filling  all 
the  little  depressions  along  the  road  with  water,  from 
which  a  good  many  of  the  soldiers  filled  their  canteens, 
having  exhausted  during  the  night's  march  the  water 
they  had  obtained  from  the  Arkansas. 

Having  rested  his  troops  on  the  prairie  for  about  two 
hours,  General  Blunt  then  formed  them  into  two  columns, 
the  First  Brigade,  under  Colonel  Judson,  on  the  right  of 
the  road,  and  the  Second  Brigade,  under  Colonel  Phillips, 
on  the  left  of  the  road,  and  moved  forward,  the  infantry 
in  close  columns  of  companies,  the  cavalry  by  platoons, 
and  the  artillery  by  sections.  He  desired  in  coming  on 
the  field  in  this  order  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  his 
strength.  When  he  arrived  within  a  quarter  of  a  mile  of 
the  Confederate  line,  his  two  columns  suddenly  deployed 
to  the  right  and  left  into  line  of  battle,  covering  the  Con 
federate  line,  which  appeared  to  be  a  mile  and  a  quarter 
in  length.  As  the  troops  came  into  line,  the  First  Kan 
sas  Colored  Infantry  formed  on  the  left  of  the  First 
Brigade  on  the  right  of  the  road;  the  Second  Indian 
Regiment  formed  on  the  right  of  the  colored  infantry, 
and  the  battalion  of  the  Third  Wisconsin  Cavalry,  with 
two  howitzers,  formed  on  the  right  of  the  Second  Indian 
Regiment. 

In  the  Second  Brigade,  the  Second  Colorado  Infantry 
formed  on  the  right  on  the  left  of  the  road,  and  on  the 
left  of  the  colored  infantry.  The  First  Indian  Regi 
ment  formed  on  the  left  of  the  Second  Colorado,  and  the 
battalion  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry  formed  on  the  le^t 
of  the  First  Indian  Regiment,  having  been  assigned  to 
this  position  in  the  Second  Brigade  after  the  troops 
came  on  the  field.  General  Blunt  wished  to  have  white 
troops  on  his  extreme  flanks.  The  First  Kansas  Colored 


BATTLE   OF  HONEY  SPRINGS.  119 

Infantry  formed  the  left  centre,  and  the  Second  Colorado 
Infantry  formed  the  right  centre  of  the  Federal  line. 
Captain  Smith's  guns  came  into  battery  in  front  of  the 
colored  infantry,  and  Captain  Hopkins'  guns  came  into 
battery  just  in  front  of  the  Colorado  infantry. 

On  the  Confederate  side,  General  Cooper  had  his  line 
formed  on  both  sides  of  the  road  along  the  edge  of  the 
timber  on  the  north  side  of  Elk  Creek  when  the  Federal 
forces  came  in  sight.  The  Twentieth  Texas,  dismounted 
cavalry,  under  Colonel  Thomas  C.  Bass,  formed  his  left 
centre.  The  Twenty-ninth  Texas  Cavalry,  under  Colonel 
Charles  De  Morse,  and  Fifth  Texas  Partisan  Rangers, 
under  Colonel  L.  M.  Martin,  formed  his  right  centre. 
His  right  wing  was  composed  of  the  First  and  Second 
Cherokee  regiments,  commanded  by  Colonel  Stand 
Watie,  and  his  left  wing  was  composed  of  the  First  and 
Second  Creek  regiments,  commanded  by  Colonel  D.  N. 
Mclntosh.  His  reserve  consisted  of  the  Choctaw  and 
Chickasaw  regiment,  commanded  by  Colonel  Tandy 
Walker,  and  two  squadrons  of  Texas  cavalry,  com 
manded  by  Captains  John  Scanland  and  L.  E.  Gillett, 
posted  near  his  headquarters  at  Honey  Springs,  about 
two  miles  in  the  rear  of  his  line  of  battle.  His  battery, 
under  Captain  R.  W.  Lee,  was  posted  in  front  of  the 
Twentieth  Texas,  and  supported  by  that  regiment. 

These  dispositions  having  been  made  on  both  sides, 
General  Blunt,  after  his  troops  came  into  line,  and  after 
throwing  out  a  skirmish  line,  moved  forward  until  he 
drew  the  fire  of  the  Confederate  artillery.  He  then 
halted  his  line,  and  Captain  Smith's  guns  on  the  right 
and  Captain  Hopkins'  guns  on  the  left  commenced  play 
ing  upon  the  Confederate  position  and  battery  with  shot 
and  shell  and  canister,  which  was  continued  for  upwards 
of  an  hour,  dismounting  one  of  their  guns  near  the  corn 
field  and  silencing  the  other  pieces.  But  up  to  this  time 
the  guns  of  the  Confederate  battery  had  not  been  idle; 


I2O  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER". 

they  had  been  throwing  a  storm  of  shot  and  shell  and 
canister  into  the  Federal  position,  killing  and  wounding 
several  men  of  the  Federal  batteries.  A  single  shell  from 
one  of  Captain  Hopkins'  guns  burst,  killing  and  wound 
ing  every  horse  of  one  of  the  Confederate  guns,  besides 
killing  and  wounding  most  of  the  men  of  that  gun. 

Meanwhile  the  Federal  cavalry  on  the  right  and  left  of 
General  Blunt's  line  had  dismounted  and  were  skirmish 
ing  in  the  timber  with  the  Southern  Indians  and  Texans, 
who  were  making  efforts  to  flank  the  Federal  position. 

When  the  artillery  ceased  firing,  the  Federal  infantry 
were  ordered  forward  to  attack  the  Confederate  line, 
which  was  concealed  from  view  in  the  brush  and  timber. 
On  coming  up  to  within  forty  to  fifty  yards  of  the  Con 
federate  line,  which  had  until  this  moment  been  hidden 
from  view  by  the  thick  brush,  Colonel  Williams,  of  the 
colored  regiment,  and  Colonel  De  Morse,  of  the  Twenty- 
ninth  Texas,  dismounted,  gave  the  order  to  fire  almost  at 
the  same  instant,  and  immediately  there  burst  forth  from 
the  hostile  forces  two  lines  of  smoke  and  flame,  and  a 
terrific  roar  of  small-arms.  In  this  volley  from  the  Con 
federates,  Colonel  Williams  had  his  horse  killed,  and  also 
fell  himself  at  the  same  time,  severely  wounded  in  the 
breast  and  face.  On  the  Confederate  side,  Colonel  De 
Morse  was  also  wounded  in  the  arm.  Colonel  Williams 
was  obliged  to  be  taken  to  the  rear,  but  a  continuous  fire 
was  kept  up  for  some  time  between  the  opposing  lines, 
the  colored  infantry  loading  and  firing  lying  down  on 
the  ground.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bowles  assumed  com 
mand  of  the  colored  regiment  after  Colonel  Williams 
was  wounded.  He  was  on  the  right  of  his  regiment  at 
the  time,  and  noticing  some  of  the  mounted  Indians  of 
Colonel  Schaurte's  command  on  his  right  riding  between 
him  and  the  Confederate  line,  ordered  them  back  out  of 
the  line  of  fire. 

The   commander   of   the  Texas  regiment    directly  in 


BATTLE   OF  HONEY  SPRINGS.  121 

front,  hearing  the  order  of  Colonel  Bowles,  supposed  it 
was  an  order  for  the  colored  regiment  to  retire,  and  at 
once  ordered  his  own  regiment  to  advance.  They  came 
up  within  twenty-five  yards  of  the  colored  regiment,  who 
gave  them  a  volley  of  musketry,  shooting  down  their 
color-bearer,  besides  killing  and  wounding  a  number  of 
other  men  and  quickly  sending  the  others  back  in  con 
siderable  confusion.  Their  colors  were  again  raised,  but 
in  a  few  moments  were  shot  down  again  by  the  volleys 
from  the  colored  infantry  and  left  to  fall  into  the  hands 
of  the  Federal  forces  by  the  retreating  Texans.  The  cen 
tre  of  the  Confederate  line  was  now  broken  and  obliged 
to  retire  some  distance. 

While  the  colored  infantry  were  thus  employed,  the 
Second  Indian  Regiment,  on  the  right  of  them,  under 
Colonel  Schaurte,  was  deployed  as  skirmishers,  and,  en 
tering  the  timber,  soon  compelled  the  Southern  Indians 
to  retire  across  Elk  Creek.  Captain  Stevens,  command 
ing  the  battalion  of  the  Third  Wisconsin  Cavalry,  who 
was  posted  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Federal  line,  dis 
mounted  part  of  his  men  to  skirmish  the  woods,  and 
with  the  assistance  of  his  howitzers  forced  the  left  of  the 
Confederate  line  back  upon  their  centre. 

Early  in  the  action,  before  the  Confederate  line  had 
commenced  to  yield,  three  companies  of  the  right  wing 
of  the  Second  Colorado  Infantry,  on  the  left  of  the  colored 
infantry,  came  near  being  cut  off  and  captured. 

While  the  Federal  line  was  advancing  through  the 
brush,  which  was  thick  enough  in  places  with  the  leaves 
and  heavy  foliage  to  hide  from  view  a  foe  a  few  yards  in 
advance,  these  companies  had  got  out  of  alignment- 
had  got  as  much,  perhaps,  as  twenty  paces  in  advance  of 
the  left  of  the  line  of  the  colored  infantry — and  coming 
to  an  impassable  ditch  or  washout  directly  in  their  front, 
filed  to  the  right  and  crossed  it  just  in  front  of  the  left  of 
the  line  of  the  colored  infantry.  When  the  Colorado 


122  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

men  got  over  the  ditch,  they  filed  to  the  left  again  and 
came  into  line,  but  still  in  advance  of  the  colored  infantry 
on  their  right.  At  this  moment  a  Confederate  force 
which  had  been  lying  down  concealed  in  the  brush  behind 
the  ditch  or  gully,  but  now  between  the  Colorado  men 
and  ditch,  rose  up  to  cut  them  off.  The  colored  regi 
ment  was  almost  instantly  ordered  to  oblique  to  the  left, 
and  coming  up  within  less  than  fifty  yards  of  the  Confed 
erates  poured  several  well-directed  volleys  of  musketry 
into  them,  which  caused  them  to  break,  and  they  ran 
back  in  the  direction  of  the  Colorado  men,  who,  now 
realizing  the  situation  and  seeing  the  enemy  in  con 
fusion,  turned  and  opened  fire  upon  them  only  a  few 
yards  distant,  killing  and  wounding  a  good  many  and 
capturing  a  few. 

While  these  movements  were  taking  place  in  the  centre 
of  the  Federal  line,  the  First  Indian  Regiment,  under 
Colonel  Wattles,  on  the  left  of  the  Second  Colorado  In 
fantry,  and  the  battalion  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry,  on 
the  left  of  the  First  Indian,  had  entered  the  timber  and 
were  driving  the  Southern  Indians,  under  Colonel  Watie, 
and  the  Texans  supporting  him,  back  upon  Elk  Creek, 
and  soon  compelled  them  to  cross  to  the  south  side  at 
the  lower  ford.  The  Confederate  line  had  now  been 
forced  to  retire  to  the  south  side  of  Elk  Creek  in  a  good 
deal  of  confusion,  leaving  one  of  their  guns,  which  had 
been  dismounted,  and  the  tents  and  camp  equipage  of 
one  regiment  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Federal  troops. 

A  feeble  effort,  however,  was  made  to  hold  the  bridge 
over  Elk  Creek  and  some  of  the  fords,  but  the  troops 
defending  them  were  speedily  driven  from  these  positions 
by  the  Federal  infantry  and  the  guns  of  Captain  Hopkins' 
battery,  which  had  moved  forward  and  taken  up  the 
position  which  had  just  been  occupied  by  the  guns  of  the 
Confederate  battery,  one  of  which,  the  dismounted  piece, 
was  lying  on  the  ground  near  the  corner  of  the  field. 


BATTLE   OF  HONEY  SPRINGS.  123 

After  the  Southern  troops  had  been  driven  from  all 
their  positions  on  Elk  Creek,  the  Federal  forces  crossed 
to  the  south  side  and  pursued  them  about  three  miles 
south,  or  a  mile  or  so  south  of  Honey  Springs  depot, 
which  they  had  set  fire  to,  consuming  a  large  part  of  their 
supplies,  being  pressed  so  closely  that  they  were  barely 
able  to  get  their  baggage  trains  out  of  the  way.  One  of 
their  commissary  buildings,  however,  was  captured  by 
the  Federal  troops  before  it  had  burned,  containing  large 
quantities  of  bacon,  flour,  salt,  and  dried  beef,  from  which 
the  tired  and  hungry  Federal  soldiers  made  a  bountiful 
supper. 

The  soldiers  of  the  colored  regiment  inspected  with  a 
good  deal  of  curiosity  three  or  four  hundred  handcuffs, 
which  were  captured  in  the  depot  buildings  at  Honey 
Springs,  which  the  Southern  troops  had  there  for  the 
purpose  of  putting  on  colored  soldiers  they  expected  to 
capture.  David  Griffith,  a  colored  man,  who  was  waiting 
on  Major  J.  A.  Carroll,  of  one  of  General  Cooper's  Texas 
regiments  at  the  time  of  the  battle,  and  who  left  him  and 
came  to  the  colored  regiment  at  Fort  Smith  in  Septem 
ber  and  enlisted  in  Company  G  of  that  regiment  and 
served  his  time  out,  stated  that  he  frequently  heard 
Southern  officers  say  that  the  handcuffs  were  brought 
there  to  be  put  on  colored  soldiers  they  expected  to  cap 
ture.  He  also  said  that  he  frequently  heard  the  Southern 
officers,  talking  with  each  other,  say  that  they  did  not  be 
lieve  colored  soldiers  would  fight,  and  that  all  the  South 
ern  troops  would  have  to  do  would  be  to  march  up  to  the 
colored  men  and  take  them  in.  The  belief  that  colored 
soldiers  would  not  fight  was  not  at  that  time  confined  to 
Southern  officers,  but  a  good  many  Federal  officers  and 
people  in  the  North  expressed  the  same  sentiment,  par 
ticularly  those  who  were  opposed  to  enlisting  colored  men 
for  soldiers  in  the  Union  army. 

Colonel  Williams,  who  was  familiar  with  the  disparag- 


124  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

ing  comments  in  regard  to  enlisting  colored  soldiers,  and 
who  had  great  faith  that  they  would  acquit  themselves 
creditably  if  given  a  fair  opportunity,  when  the  battle 
was  over  and  the  troops  recalled  from  the  pursuit,  sent 
for  General  Blunt  to  come  and  see  him  in  the  field  hos 
pital,  where  he  was  suffering  from  his  wounds.  The 
Colonel  always  talked  as  if  he  was  grinding  his  molars  or 
gritting  his  teeth.  When  the  General  came  in,  the  first 
thing  the  Colonel  said  to  him  was,  "  General,  how  did 
my  regiment  fight?"  The  General  replied,  "Like 
veterans,  most  gallantly."  And  the  Colonel  added, 
"  I  am  ready  to  die,  then."  After  that  the  Colonel  was 
proud  of  his  regiment,  and  he  stayed  away  from  it  no 
longer  than  he  was  kept  away  by  his  wounds.  And  after 
that  battle  no  one  on  either  side  in  that  section  could  be 
heard  to  say,  "  Colored  soldiers  will  not  fight."  Thus 
was  a  prejudice  of  long  standing  wiped  out  in  a  few 
hours. 

It  was  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  when  General 
Blunt  recalled  his  troops  from  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy. 
His  men  then  went  into  camp  on  the  battle-field,  where 
they  remained  until  the  next  evening,  collecting  the 
wounded  and  burying  the  dead  of  both  sides.  He  then 
returned  to  Fort  Gibson,  having  destroyed  fifteen  wagons, 
the  tents  and  camp  equipage  of  one  regiment,  and  all  the 
depot  buildings  and  supplies  in  them  at  Honey  Springs 
which  he  could  not  use.  He  reported  his  loss  at  17  men 
killed  and  60  wounded.  He  also  reported  that  his  troops 
buried  150  of  the  Confederate  dead  on  the  field,  that  they 
had  400  wounded,  and  that  he  took  77  prisoners,  I  piece 
of  artillery,  I  stand  of  colors,  and  200  stands  of  arms. 

General  Cooper  reported  his  loss  at  134  killed  and 
wounded.  He  attributed  his  defeat  to  the  worthless  con 
dition  of  the  powder  his  troops  used,  stating  that  on  a 
damp  morning  or  in  damp  weather  it  became  paste-like 
and  would  not  ignite.  He  had  eight  regiments  and  two 


BATTLE    OF  HONEY  SPRINGS.  12$ 

squadrons  to  General  Blunt's  three  regiments  and  three 
battalions.  To  make  up  for  inferiority  of  numbers,  Gen 
eral  Blunt  had  eight  field-pieces  and  four  howitzers  to 
General  Cooper's  one  four-gun  battery. 

General  Cabell,  with  a  brigade  of  Arkansas  cavalry  and 
four  pieces  of  artillery,  who  was  en  route  to  reinforce 
General  Cooper,  and  who  was  within  hearing  of  the  roar 
of  the  artillery  during  the  battle,  joined  General  Cooper 
about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  scarcely  two  hours 
after  the  conflict  had  ended,  and  in  sight  of  Honey 
Springs.  But  even  with  this  reinforcement  of  upwards 
of  two  thousand  men,  General  Cooper's  troops  were  too 
scattered  and  demoralized  to  be  again  brought  into  action 
at  once,  and  the  united  forces  retired  south  of  the  Cana 
dian  River,  where  they  encamped  until  July  22d.  From 
that  point  General  Steele  ordered  them  to  take  up  a  posi 
tion  at  Prairie  Springs,  fifteen  miles  southeast  of  Fort 
Gibson,  where  he  expected  in  a  few  days  to  receive  a  re 
inforcement  of  a  brigade  of  Texans,  under  General  Bank- 
head.  On  the  arrival  of  this  brigade  he  determined  to 
take  up  a  position  still  nearer  Fort  Gibson  and  endeavor 
to  prevent  any  reinforcements  or  supplies  from  coming 
in  to  General  Blunt.  But  General  Bankhead's  brigade 
did  not  arrive  at  the  time  expected,  and  the  desertions 
from  General  Cabell's  Arkansas  brigade  became  so  alarm 
ing — as  many  as  two  hundred  men  leaving  in  a  single 
night — that  General  Steele  felt  obliged  to  retire  again  to 
the  south  side  of  the  Canadian.  Nearly  all  these  de 
serters  were  Union  men  who  had  been  conscripted  into 
the  Confederate  service,  and  who  determined  to  desert 
at  the  first  opportunity  rather  than  fight  against  their  flag 
and  country.  They  were,  perhaps,  without  exception, 
men  who  did  not  own  slaves  and  who  did  not  desire  to 
own  them,  and  as  they  could  not  see  how  they  would  be 
benefited  by  the  success  of  the  Confederate  cause,  they 
did  not  propose  to  make  themselves  targets  to  sustain  a 


126  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

principle  with  which  they  had  no  sympathy  or  interest, 
and  which  they  believed  tended  to  degrade  their  man 
hood.  They  had  evaded  the  Confederate  conscripting 
officers  as  long  as  possible  by  hiding  out  in  the  woods 
and  mountains,  and  were  then  hunted  down  like  criminals 
or  runaway  slaves,  arrested,  taken  off  and  put  into  the 
service.  All  this  tended  to  intensify  their  resentment 
against  a  cause  which  they  believed  discriminated  against 
them  because  they  were  poor  men  or  men  of  only  moder 
ate  means,  for  they  knew  that  the  Confederate  Congress 
had  passed  a  law  exempting  from  military  service  all  men 
in  the  South  who  owned  as  many  as  twenty  slaves. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE    LAWRENCE    MASSACRE. 

IN  the  latter  part  of  the  fall  of  1862  a  good  many  of  the 
guerillas  who  followed  the  leadership  of  Ouantrill  went 
south  and  participated  with  the  Confederate  forces  under 
General  Hindman  in  the  Prairie  Grove  campaign.  When 
the  Confederate  army  was  driven  south  of  the  Arkansas 
River  and  from  Western  Arkansas,  these  bandits  com 
menced  drifting  back  to  the  Missouri  River  counties  in 
small  parties,  and  by  the  early  part  of  February,  1863, 
had  become  so  numerous  in  Jackson  County  that  they 
were  able  to  concentrate  in  a  short  time  a  force  of  up 
wards  of  a  hundred  strong.  During  the  winter  the  Fifth 
Regiment  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  under  Colonel 
W.  R.  Pertick,  was  stationed  at  Independence,  Pleasant 
Hill,  and  Harrisonville,  and  detachments  from  those  points 
were  busy  scouting  in  those  counties,  now  and  then  com 
ing  in  sight  of  and  chasing  two  or  three  bandits  from  the 
house  of  a  Southern  family.  But  in  February,  after 
these  knights  of  the  brush  had  for  some  time  been  drift 
ing  back  from  the  South  in  small  parties,  they  commenced 
to  concentrate  in  larger  bodies  for  the  purpose  of  doing 
mischief  on  a  larger  scale.  Colonel  Penick  received  in 
formation  of  their  movements  and  of  the  position  of  their 
camp,  and  immediately  sent  out  from  Independence  fifty 
men,  under  Lieutenant  D.  A.  Colvin,  who  came  upon 
them  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  February  8th, 


128  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

and  attacked  them  vigorously,  and  in  the  running  fight, 
which  lasted  about  half  an  hour,  killed  eight  men, wounded 
two,  and  captured  all  the  horses  and  most  of  the  arms 
of  the  bandits,  and  sustained  a  loss  of  one  man  in  the 
skirmish. 

The  President's  emancipation  proclamation  had  re 
cently  liberated  a  good  many  slaves  in  the  slave  States, 
and  there  was  a  great  deal  of  discussion  as  to  whether  the 
negro,  or  "  contraband,"  would  fight  as  a  soldier.  Colo 
nel  Penick  determined  to  try  the  experiment  and  sent 
along  a  colored  man,  at  his  own  request,  with  Lieuten 
ant  Colvin's  detachment,  and  the  officers  and  men  of 
the  detachment  reported  that  he  acquitted  himself  in  the 
most  creditable  manner,  receiving  a  severe  wound  in  the 
shoulder. 

As  spring  advanced,  the  bandits  increased  in  numbers 
and  boldness,  and  it  was  not  always  easy  for  the  Federal 
scouts  to  locate  their  camps,  or  to  ascertain  the  number 
of  men  they  had  in  any  neighborhood.  Reports  coming 
to  Colonel  Penick  that  a  considerable  force  of  guerillas 
were  concentrating  in  the  vicinity  of  Blue  Springs,  about 
twelve  miles  east  of  Independence,  on  the  22d  of  March 
he  sent  out  a  detachment  of  fifty  men  and  one  piece  of 
artillery,  under  Captain  H.  B.  Johnson,  First  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry,  who  attacked  a  superior  force  of 
the  bandits,  and  after  a  desperate  fight  with  them  was 
driven  back  with  a  loss  of  nine  men  killed  and  three 
wounded.  The  loss  of  the  enemy  in  the  action  was  not 
ascertained.  They  scattered  immediately  after  the  fight 
into  the  thick-wooded  section  along  the  brake  of  Little 
Blue  River  and  the  Sni  Hills,  where  they  concealed  them 
selves  until  they  were  ready  for  another  movement,  and 
until  they  were  joined  by  their  old  leader,  Quantrill,  from 
the  South. 

When  General  Schofield  determined  to  advance  his 
lines  south  to  the  Arkansas  River,  he  was  obliged  to  take 


THE  LAWRENCE  MASSACRE.  1 29 

troops  from  different  points  in  Missouri  and  send  them  to 
the  front  to  reinforce  Steele  and  Blunt  in  their  move 
ments  against  Little  Rock  and  Fort  Smith.  As  his  forces 
advanced,  the  territory  to  be  occupied  increased,  with  a 
decreasing  number  of  troops  to  occupy  it,  thus  giving 
guerilla  bands  better  opportunities  to  increase  and  con 
centrate  for  any  movements  they  desired  to  make.  Most 
of  General  Price's  troops  in  Arkansas  were  from  Missouri, 
and  after  his  defeat  at  the  battle  of  Helena  and  he  was 
put  upon  the  defensive  and  there  was  no  longer  a  pros 
pect  that  he  would  be  able  to  make  a  movement  north 
for  some  time,  a  large  number  of  his  men  were  permitted 
on  some  pretext  or  other  to  return  to  their  homes  in  Mis 
souri.  They  were  generally  in  small  parties  of  three  or 
four  to  half  a  dozen  men  together;  they  knew  the  towns 
in  Missouri  in  which  the  militia  were  stationed ;  they 
knew  the  roads  on  which  there  was  little  travel  through 
desolated  sections,  and  by  travelling  at  night  and  going 
around  the  camps  or  the  towns  where  the  militia  were 
stationed  were  able  to  reach  points  a  hundred  miles  or 
so  in  the  interior  of  the  State  without  detection.  They 
could  not  stay  at  their  homes  or  in  any  neighborhood  very 
long  without  their  presence  being  known  to  either  the 
militia  or  the  guerillas,  and  they  naturally  fell  in  with  the 
guerillas,  with  whom  they  operated  in  many  instances. 
Not  only  enlisted  men  of  the  Confederate  army  returned 
thus  clandestinely  into  the  State,  but  officers  even  up  to 
the  rank  of  colonel.  These  hardy  veterans,  who  were 
inured  to  the  service,  and  who  had  lost  very  little  of 
their  bitterness  towards  Union  men,  after  a  little  rest 
were  ready  to  join  the  guerillas  in  the  most  daring  ad 
ventures. 

All  over  Missouri,  and  in  the  western  counties  of  the 
State  in  particular,  the  humane  policy  of  the  Government 
was  shamefully  abused  by  the  Southern  people  in  harbor 
ing  guerillas  and  in  encouraging  guerilla  warfare.  In 

VOL.  II.— Q 


130  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER, 

those  counties  the  people  were  almost  equally  divided  on 
the  issues  of  the  war,  but  as  that  section  was  almost  con 
stantly  overrun  by  the  Southern  forces  until  Price  was 
driven  out  of  the  State  at  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  nearly 
all  the  Union  men  fled  to  Kansas  for  safety  and  enlisted 
in  Kansas  regiments.  Indeed,  in  some  Kansas  regiments 
whole  companies  were  raised  from  Missourians,  and  in 
several  regiments  perhaps  nearly  one  half  of  the  men 
were  from  that  State.  Besides  the  men  who  enlisted  in 
Kansas  regiments,  those  counties  furnished  thousands  of 
men  for  Missouri  regiments  in  the  Federal  service.  There 
were  many  influential  men  in  Kansas  who  had  a  large 
following,  and  who  asserted  that  there  was  no  loyalty  in 
Missouri,  and  were  in  favor  of  cleaning  out  everything 
over  there.  So  strong  was  this  feeling  of  cleaning  out 
everything  in  Missouri  manifested  in  one  Kansas  regi 
ment  that  General  Halleck  ordered  it  into  the  field  east 
of  the  Mississippi.  Unquestionably,  officers  with  these 
views  were  unfit  for  conducting  military  operations  in 
Missouri. 

After  the  Southern  forces  were  driven  from  the  State, 
there  was  now  and  then  a  suggestion  in  regard  to  adopt 
ing  a  rational  policy  for  dealing  with  the  guerillas,  but 
nothing  was  done  in  that  direction.  The  policy  suggested 
was  to  remove  all  Southern  families  in  Western  Missouri 
south  of  the  Federal  lines.  In  a  number  of  cases  loyal 
militia  officers  had  suggested  to  Southern  families  who 
were  known  to  harbor  guerillas  that  it  would  be  better 
for  them  to  move  south,  and  they  generally  acted  upon 
the  suggestion,  for  they  knew  that  non-compliance  meant 
the  destruction  of  their  property.  It  would  not  have 
been  difficult  to  have  ascertained  the  political  status  of 
all  families,  and  it  would  have  been  less  expense  to  the 
Government  to  have  removed  all  Southern  families  south 
than  to  maintain  the  large  force  that  was  required  to  deal 
with  the  guerillas;  besides,  it  would  have  saved  hundreds 


THE  LAWRENCE  MASSACRE.  131 

of  lives  on  both  sides.  If  the  Southern  families  had  been 
removed,  the  guerillas  could  not  have  subsisted  in  the 
country.  Of  course  such  a  policy  would  have  entailed 
many  hardships  upon  the  families  sent  south,  but  the 
Confederate  authorities  would  have  been  obliged  to  pro 
vide  for  them,  and  this  fact  would  probably  have  brought 
General  Price  to  a  sense  of  his  folly  in  inaugurating  gue 
rilla  warfare,  and  led  him  to  have  discouraged  it  in  other 
parts  of  the  State.  Union  men  from  the  Southern  States 
who  had  left  their  homes  to  join  the  Federal  army  would 
have  been  very  thankful  if  the  Confederate  authorities 
had  allowed  or  assisted  their  families  to  move  within  the 
Federal  lines.  In  some  of  the  counties  of  Western  Mis 
souri  the  Southern  women  were  so  active  in  aiding  the 
guerillas  that  they  stood  guard  or  picket  for  them  while 
eating  in  their  houses.  While  the  bandits  received  such 
encouragement  as  this  from  the  women  it  was  almost  im 
possible  to  drive  them  out  of  a  section  well  adapted  by 
nature  for  their  operations.  As  a  rule,  the  loyal  militia 
of  the  State  were  better  qualified  and  more  successful  in 
hunting  down  the  bandits  than  the  troops  from  other 
States,  and  had  they  been  armed  with  a  pair  of  revolvers 
and  the  best  repeating  rifles,  as  some  of  the  cavalry  regi 
ments  of  some  of  the  States  were,  they  would  have  been 
much  more  successful.  Every  one  knew  that  the  gueril 
las  were  armed  with  two  or  three  revolvers  and  a  rifle  or 
carbine  each.  More  than  once  complaints  were  made  by 
militia  officers  to  their  superiors  of  the  inefficiency  of 
their  long,  muzzle-loading  guns;  that  after  discharging 
a  round  they  were  left  almost  helpless  in  the  presence 
of  a  foe  heavily  armed  with  revolvers  and  carbines  or 
rifles  of  the  newest  models.  In  several  instances  guerilla 
leaders  had  managed  to  draw  the  fire  of  the  militia  at 
long  range,  and  then  turned  and  charged  them  before 
they  had  time  to  reload,  inflicting  severe  loss  upon  them. 
Knowing  their  disadvantages  in  this  respect,  many  of  the 


132  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

militia  officers  and  men  purchased  their  own  revolvers  for 
use  in  the  service. 

Early  in  June  Brigadier-General  Thomas  Ewing,  Jr., 
of  Kansas,  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  District 
of  the  Border,  with  headquarters  at  Kansas  City,  Jackson 
County,  a  county  in  which  Quantrill,  the  leader  of  the 
guerillas  in  that  section,  had  made  his  rendezvous  most 
of  the  time  when  in  Missouri.  General  Ewing  was  a 
man  whose  associations  and  training,  and  whose  familiar 
ity  with  the  principal  recent  events  on  the  Border,  made 
him  a  very  competent  officer  to  administer  the  affairs  of 
the  new  district,  and  he  was  probably  as  free  from  bias 
towards  Missouri  as  any  man  who  could  have  been  selected 
from  Kansas.  He  was  selected  for  this  important  posi 
tion  because  it  was  believed  that  he  would  feel  a  special 
interest  in  protecting  the  Border  counties  of  Kansas  from 
guerilla  incursions  from  Missouri,  of  which  there  had 
been  frequent  threats.  His  district  embraced  the  Border 
counties  of  Missouri  and  Kansas,  extending  about  ninety 
miles  south  of  Kansas  City. 

It  was  generally  known  in  the  northern  part  of  General 
Ewing's  district  that  Quantrill  and  most  of  his  men  had 
spent  the  winter  south  with  Price's  army,  but  early  in 
May,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Walter  King,  Fourth  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry,  commanding  at  Lexington,  ascer 
tained  through  a  spy  that  the  noted  guerilla  leader  had 
returned  to  his  old  haunts  on  the  Sni  in  the  eastern  part 
of  Jackson  County,  with  forty  men,  and  intended  to 
spend  the  summer  in  Western  Missouri,  conscripting  and 
recruiting;  that  with  the  men  of  four  or  five  other  gue 
rilla  leaders  in  that  and  adjoining  counties  he  could  raise 
about  150  men. 

In  the  latter  part  of  May,  Major  W.  C.  Ransom,  Sixth 
Kansas  Cavalry,  made  a  scout  from  Westport  to  Big 
Creek,  near  Pleasant  Hill,  and  reported  that  he  had 
several  skirmishes  with  small  parties  of  Quantrill's  men 


THE  LAWRENCE  MASSACRE.  133 

in  which  he  killed  twelve  of  the  bandits  and  lost  one  man 
killed  ;  that  he  pursued  the  other  bandits  until  they  joined 
the  main  force  under  Quantrill,  150  strong,  posted  in  a 
good  position  in  the  Sni  Hills;  that  after  receiving  a  re 
inforcement  he  drove  the  guerillas  from  their  position, 
but  was  unable  to  pursue  them  on  account  of  high  waters. 
He  also  reported  that  he  was  convinced  that  the  guerillas 
could  concentrate  a  force  several  hundred  strong  on  any 
point  in  that  section  within  a  few  hours.  That  he  had 
not  overestimated  the  strength  of  the  bandits  was  shown 
in  the  fact  that  on  the  evening  of  the  i/th  of  June  Cap 
tain  Henry  Flesher,  Ninth  Kansas  Cavalry,  with  part  of 
his  company,  was  attacked  in  the  edge  of  the  timber 
about  a  mile  south  of  Westport  by  a  force  of  upwards  of 
two  hundred  guerillas,  who  killed  fourteen  and  wounded 
four  of  his  men.  In  that  neighborhood  the  farms  were 
inclosed  with  stone  fences,  and  the  bandits  got  behind 
the  stone  walls  and  delivered  their  fire  with  deadly  effect, 
and  as  Captain  Flesher  was  in  a  lane  with  a  stone  fence 
on  each  side  he  was  unable  to  form  his  men  until  he  got  to 
the  end  of  the  lane,  in  the  meantime  suffering  heavy  loss. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Bazel  F.  Lazear,  First  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry,  commanding  at  Lexington,  adopted 
a  plan  of  dealing  with  the  bandits  of  his  section  which 
produced  good  results.  This  plan  was  to  fight  the  gue 
rillas  according  to  their  own  tactics.  He  knew  the 
neighborhoods  where  they  had  friends,  and  which  were 
frequented  by  them.  It  was  known  that  small  parties  of 
the  bandits  were  in  the  neighborhood  of  Wellington,  a 
little  town  on  the  south  side  of  the  Missouri  River,  above 
Lexington,  and  Colonel  Lazear  sent  out  fifty  men,  under 
Lieutenant  J.  H.  Smith,  of  his  regiment,  to  watch  the 
roads  for  the  guerillas.  About  one  o'clock  in  the  morn 
ing  the  bandits  came  along,  having  just  robbed  a  store  in 
Wellington,  and  Lieutenant  Smith's  detachment  fired 
upon  them,  killing  three. 


134  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

In  the  early  part  of  July  General  Ewing  received  in 
formation  from  every  part  of  his  district  in  Missouri  of 
the  activity  of  the  guerillas,  and  that  they  were  increas 
ing  in  numbers,  some  of  his  officers  estimating  that  as 
many  as  one  thousand  had  passed  through  Bates  County, 
going  north,  during  the  last  three  months.  Colonel  Ed 
ward  Lynde,  Ninth  Kansas  Cavalry,  commanding  at  Pa- 
ola,  Kansas,  made  a  scout  into  Bates  County,  Missouri, 
and  burnt  eleven  houses  belonging  to  Southern  families, 
ordered  the  families  out  of  the  country,  and  drove  off 
nearly  all  of  their  cattle,  horses,  and  sheep.  Shortly 
afterwards,  Butler,  the  county  town,  was  evacuated  by 
the  Federal  troops,  and  the  guerillas,  in  retaliation,  burnt 
a  large  part  of  the  place,  particularly  the  property  of 
Union  men. 

It  was  an  unfortunate  policy  that  permitted  Kansas 
troops  stationed  in  Kansas  to  go  into  Missouri  and 
burn  the  property  of  Southern  people  and  drive  off  their 
stock,  for  it  was  certain  to  arouse  the  resentment  of  those 
against  whom  such  severe  measures  were  taken.  If  there 
was  a  necessity  for  the  destruction  or  confiscation  of  the 
property  of  these  people,  it  should  have  been  done  by 
the  loyal  militia  of  some  other  section  of  the  State,  or  by 
troops  who  were  not  their  neighbors.  To  have  removed 
these  families  south  of  the  Federal  lines  and  left  them 
among  their  friends  could  not  justly  have  caused  com 
plaint  ;  but  to  destroy  and  take  away  their  property  and 
leave  them  in  the  midst  of  their  ruin,  where  they  would 
probably  have  an  opportunity  of  avenging  their  griev 
ances,  was  certainly  a  bad  policy. 

So  strong  was  the  feeling  of  a  considerable  number  of 
Kansas  officers  and  troops  that  there  was  no  loyalty  in 
Missouri,  that  in  the  latter  part  of  November,  1862, 
Colonel  C.  W.  Adams,  Twelfth  Kansas  Infantry,  entered 
the  State  at  Kansas  City,  and  marching  down  through 
Jackson  County  without  calling  on  Colonel  W.  R.  Penick 


THE  LAWRENCE  MASSACRE.  135 

at  Independence,  commenced  taking  the  property  of  the 
loyal  militia  and  Union  men,  as  well  as  that  of  the  seces 
sionists.  Complaints  immediately  came  pouring  in  to 
Colonel  Penick  of  the  depredations  that  were  being  com 
mitted  by  the  Kansas  men,  and  he  communicated  the 
facts  to  his  superiors  and  asked  for  instructions.  General 
Richard  C.  Vaughan,  commanding  that  military  district, 
was  at  once  authorized  to  disperse  the  Kansas  troops  and 
recover  the  property  which  they  had  taken  from  citi 
zens  of  Missouri,  and  collecting  a  force  of  about  four 
hundred  loyal  militia  and  two  pieces  of  artillery,  came  up 
with  Colonel  Adams  formed  in  line  of  battle  across  the 
road  with  his  artillery  in  position.  After  some  corre 
spondence,  the  Kansas  troops  stacked  their  arms,  Colonels 
Adams  and  Hays  were  arrested,  the  property  which  they 
had  taken  given  up,  and  their  men  escorted  to  the  State 
line  by  the  militia.  Such  incursions  as  this  by  Kansas 
troops  intensified  the  resentment  of  the  secessionists,  and 
General  Ewing  had  not  been  in  command  of  his  district 
many  weeks  when  he  commenced  receiving  information 
through  his  scouts  and  spies  that  the  guerillas  were 
threatening  to  sack  and  destroy  Olathe,  Paola,  Mound 
City,  and  other  towns  along  the  eastern  border  of  Kan 
sas.  They  had  already  threatened  Lexington,  Independ 
ence,  and  Harrisonville,  Missouri,  and  after  Colonel 
Penick's  Fifth  Regiment  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry 
was  withdrawn  from  his  district  in  June  and  mustered 
out,  Ewing's  force  was  so  much  weakened  that  he  was 
obliged  to  have  his  troops  evacuate  several  towns  in  the 
Border  counties  of  Missouri  to  strengthen  his  stations 
along  the  State  line  to  prevent  the  guerillas  from  making 
incursions  into  Kansas. 

Part  of  Pleasant  Hill  was  burnt  by  the  bandits  only  a 
few  days  after  it  was  evacuated  by  the  Federal  soldiers, 
and  the  latter  part  of  July  the  General  received  informa 
tion  that  they  were  concentrating  in  the  Sni  region,  in 


136  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

the  western  part  of  Lafayette  County,  for  the  purpose  of 
making  a  raid  on  Lawrence,  Kansas.  He  at  once  ordered 
Colonel  James  McFerran,  First  Missouri  State  Militia 
Cavalry,  commanding  at  Lexington,  to  take  a  sufficient 
force  and  march  into  the  locality  where  the  guerillas 
were  reported  to  be  concentrating,  and  disperse  them. 
Leaving  Lexington  late  in  the  night  of  August  6th,  with 
150  men  and  three  pieces  of  artillery,  Colonel  McFerran 
arrived  at  the  designated  locality  the  next  day,  having 
on  the  march  come  in  sight  of  several  small  parties  of 
the  bandits,  who  fled  on  his  approach.  He  ascertained 
that  the  guerillas  had  not  concentrated,  and  thought 
that  the  heavy  rain-storm  of  his  first  night's  march  and 
his  presence  in  the  neighborhood  had  prevented  their 
concentration  at  that  time.  When  General  Ewing  first 
heard  of  QuantrnTs  intention  of  making  a  raid  on  Law 
rence,  he  had  a  company  of  infantry  stop  there  for  about 
a  week  and  until  his  troops  had  dispersed  the  bandits. 
He  was  constantly  advised  of  their  movements  and  plans 
after  they  were  dispersed,  but  could  not  hear  that  they 
were  making  any  preparations  for  a  raid  into  Kansas. 

The  Federal  officers  were  thoroughly  impressed  with 
the  notion  that  the  concentration  of  the  guerillas,  several 
hundred  strong,  meant  mischief — meant  that  they  had 
determined  to  strike  a  severe  blow  at  some  point.  On 
the  morning  of  August  2oth,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lazear, 
who  was  at  Warrensburg  with  parts  of  three  companies 
of  the  First  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  received  in 
formation  that  Quantrill,  with  250  bandits,  had  passed 
twelve  miles  north  of  that  place  on  the  iQth,  moving 
west.  Colonel  Lazear  at  once  despatched  couriers  to 
Lexington  and  Harrisonville,  asking  that  all  the  troops 
that  could  be  spared  from  those  places  meet  him  at 
Chapel  Hill  the  next  morning  at  daylight,  and  with  one 
hundred  men  immediately  started  for  that  point.  He 
formed  a  junction  next  morning  near  Chapel  Hill  with 


THE  LAWRENCE  MASSACRE.  137 

Major  A.  W.  Mullins,  First  Missouri  State  Militia  Cav 
alry,  who  had  126  men,  but  was  delayed  until  evening 
waiting  for  a  detachment  from  Lexington,  having  in  the 
meantime  ascertained  that  Quantrill  had  the  day  before 
passed  that  point  going  in  the  direction  of  Kansas.  On 
the  morning  of  the  2Oth,  Quantrill  was  joined  by  fifty 
men  from  the  Osage,  about  ten  miles  west  of  Pleasant 
Hill,  on  the  headwaters  of  Grand  River,  and  at  noon 
that  day  set  out  on  his  raid  into  Kansas,  entering  the 
State  five  miles  south  of  Aubrey  just  before  sunset,  with 
three  hundred  men,  heavily  armed  and  well  mounted. 
There  were  two  companies  of  the  Ninth  Kansas  Cavalry 
stationed  at  Aubrey,  Kansas,  a  mile  or  so  from  the  State 
line,  under  Captain  J.  A.  Pike ;  two  companies  of  the  same 
regiment  at  New  Santa  Fe",  Missouri,  on  the  State  line 
twelve  miles  north,  under  Captain  Charles  F.  Coleman ; 
and  parts  of  two  or  three  companies  at  Coldwater  Grove, 
Kansas,  about  twelve  miles  south  of  Aubrey,  near  the 
State  line,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Charles  S.  Clark, 
Ninth  Kansas  Cavalry,  commanding  troops  on  the  Bor 
der.  These  troops  were  required  to  keep  up  a  constant 
patrol  along  the  Border,  besides  scouting  in  the  Border 
counties  of  Missouri,  to  obtain  information  in  regard  to 
the  movements  of  guerilla  bands. 

At  half-past  five  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  2Oth, 
Captain  Pike,  at  Aubrey,  received  information  of  the 
presence  of  Quantrill  on  Grand  River,  about  eight  miles 
east,  with  a  large  force  of  guerillas,  estimated  as  high  as 
seven  hundred  men,  and  he  at  once  despatched  messen 
gers  notifying  Colonel  Clark  at  Coldwater  Grove,  Captain 
Coleman  at  New  Santa  Fe,  Major  L.  K.  Thatcher  at 
Westport,  and  General  Ewing  at  Kansas  City.  An  hour 
and  a  half  later  Captain  Pike  received  additional  informa 
tion  that  Quantrill  had  just  crossed  the  line  into  Kansas 
five  miles  south  of  Aubrey,  with  a  large  force,  moving 
west,  and  again  immediately  despatched  messengers  to 


138  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Colonel  Clark  and  Captain  Coleman  to  report  the  fact, 
and  called  in  his  scouting  parties.  Instead  of  pursuing 
the  guerillas  at  once  and  harassing  their  rear,  Captain 
Pike  waited  for  Captain  Coleman  to  arrive  from  New 
Santa  Fe,  which  caused  a  delay  of  about  five  hours  in 
commencing  the  pursuit.  Captain  Coleman  arrived  at 
Aubrey  about  eleven  o'clock  that  night,  and  with  180  men 
immediately  started  in  pursuit  of  the  marauders,  striking 
their  trail  about  five  miles  south  of  the  station.  He  fol 
lowed  their  trail  about  three  miles  and  then  lost  it  in  the 
darkness,  and  lost  about  two  hours'  time  before  finding 
it  again.  On  his  arrival  at  Gardner  he  ascertained  that 
they  had  passed  that  place  about  midnight,  six  hours 
ahead  of  him,  marching  in  the  direction  of  Lawrence, 
eighteen  miles  distant.  He  urged  the  citizens  to  speed 
the  information  west  and  south,  and  then  pressed  forward 
as  fast  as  the  tired  condition  of  his  horses  would  permit, 
and  in  a  short  time  saw  the  smoke  from  the  burning  of 
Lawrence. 

In  preparing  for  the  expedition,  Quantrill  had  his  men 
mounted  upon  the  best  horses  in  the  country,  and  so 
timed  his  movements  that  he  could  reach  Lawrence  from 
the  point  where  he  crossed  the  State  line  into  Kansas 
near  Aubrey  in  a  single  night's  march.  He  met  with  no 
opposition  or  delay,  and  though  the  country  through 
which  he  marched  a  distance  of  about  fifty  miles  was 
mostly  settled  up,  only  a  single  effort  was  made  to  alarm 
the  people  in  his  front  and  at  Lawrence  of  his  approach, 
and  he  reached  that  place  at  daylight  on  the  2 1st  and 
commenced  his  fiendish  work  of  murdering  the  citizens 
and  plundering  and  burning  the  city.  Having  received 
no  warning  of  impending  danger,  the  people  at  that  early 
hour  were  mostly  in  their  beds  asleep,  and  as  the  bandits 
on  entering  the  town  scattered  out  to  the  different  houses, 
it  was  impossible  for  the  citizens  to  concentrate  in  any 
considerable  numbers  for  defence.  In  this  defenceless 


THE  LAWRENCE   MASSACRE.  139 

condition,  on  being  called  to  their  doors,  or  in  their  flights 
to  escape,  they  were  shot  down  in  the  most  fiend-like 
manner.  No  pleading  of  wives  to  spare  their  husbands, 
or  of  mothers  to  spare  their  sons,  had  any  effect  upon 
the  wicked  hearts  of  the  desperate  outlaws,  and  they  con 
tinued  their  carnival  of  murder,  robbery,  and  burning  of 
property  until  ten  o'clock,  when  they  left  town,  march 
ing  southeast  in  the  direction  of  Brooklyn,  having  killed 
140  men,  burned  185  buildings,  and  robbed  most  of  the 
stores  and  banks  of  the  city.  Senator  J.  H.  Lane,  who 
resided  in  Lawrence,  and  whom  the  bandits  would  like 
to  have  caught,  received  notice  of  their  presence  in  the 
city  in  time  to  escape,  and,  after  a  few  hours,  rallying 
about  one  hundred  citizens,  attacked  their  rear  near 
Brooklyn. 

In  the  meantime,  Captain  Coleman  had  reached  a 
point  six  miles  southeast  of  Lawrence,  and  was  over 
taken  and  relieved  from  command  by  Major  P.  B. 
Plumb,  General  Ewing's  Chief-of-Staff,  who  had  just 
arrived  from  Kansas  City  with  about  fifty  men,  who  had 
been  hastily  collected  by  Captain  Cyrus  Leland,  Jr., 
Tenth  Kansas  Infantry.  This  force  was  in  a  short  time 
joined  by  about  150  militia  or  citizens,  who  had  been 
collected  by  Senator  Lane  for  the  pursuit  of  the  bandits. 

On  taking  command,  Major  Plumb  turned  south  in  the 
direction  of  Baldwin  City,  and  when  near  that  place  saw 
from  the  smoke  that  the  bandits  were  burning  Brooklyn. 
He  knew  from  the  reports  of  his  scouts  and  from  the 
dust  and  smoke  left  in  the  wake  of  the  outlaws  that  they 
were  moving  south  on  the  Lawrence  and  Fort  Scott 
road,  and  at  once  moved  rapidly  in  a  southwest  direc 
tion  to  intercept  them  on  that  road.  He  came  up  with 
their  rear  near  Brooklyn,  formed  in  line  before  twelve 
o'clock,  and  after  a  skirmish  in  which  both  sides  fired 
several  rounds,  the  bandits  broke  into  column  and  joined 
the  main  force.  In  this  skirmish  Major  Plumb  was  able 


140  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

to  bring  up  only  a  part  of  his  force,  on  account  of  the 
exhausted  condition  of  his  horses,  most  of  them  having 
been  continually  in  motion  since  nine  o'clock  the  night 
before,  and  the  last  three  miles  urged  forward  on  a  charge 
to  come  up  with  the  bandits. 

His  march  to  Lawrence  and  the  four  or  five  hours  he 
was  in  the  city  enabled  Quantrill  to  obtain  nearly  enough 
good  horses  to  remount  his  men,  and  remounted  upon 
fresh  horses  they  had  a  decided  advantage  over  the  Fed 
eral  detachments,  whose  horses  were  nearly,  and  in  many 
cases  completely,  exhausted  from  long  and  constant 
marching.  After  the  first  skirmish  near  Brooklyn,  one 
company  of  the  Ninth  Kansas  Cavalry  and  the  citizen 
militia,  under  Captain  Leland,  had  a  running  fight  all 
the  afternoon  with  the  guerillas  until  they  reached  the 
edge  of  the  timber  on  Bull  Creek,  two  or  three  miles  west 
of  Paola,  about  sunset,  where  the  latter  formed  line  of 
battle.  During  this  chase  most  of  Major  Plumb's  cavalry 
were  two  or  three  miles  in  the  rear  of  his  advance,  their 
horses  being  so  nearly  exhausted  as  to  be  unable  to  keep 
up.  In  this  last  stand  made  by  the  guerillas,  they 
charged  upon  Major  Plumb's  advance,  composed  of  vol 
unteer  militia,  and  drove  it  back  upon  a  company  of 
cavalry,  which  was  coming  up  and  which  quickly  formed 
in  line  to  receive  them.  They  approached  near  enough 
to  exchange  a  few  shots  with  the  Federal  cavalry  and 
militia,  and  then  retired,  and  as  darkness  was  coming  on 
their  trail  was  lost  and  was  not  found  until  two  o'clock 
the  next  morning. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Clark,  commanding  troops  on  the 
Border,  who,  on  hearing  that  Quantrill  had  gone  in  the 
direction  of  Lawrence,  sent  out  men  to  arouse  the  citi 
zens  in  all  the  towns  in  that  section  and  in  the  country 
and  to  call  them  out,  received  information  about  five 
o'clock  through  a  scout  which  he  had  sent  out  that  Quan 
trill  was  advancing  from  the  northwest  on  the  road  lead- 


THE  LAWRENCE  MASSACRE.  141 

ing  into  Paola.  He  immediately  made  arrangements  to 
attack  the  bandits  at  the  ford  on  Bull  Creek,  west  of 
town,  but  as  his  men  remained  in  position  until  some 
time  after  dark  without  hearing  anything  further  from 
the  outlaws,  he  sent  out  Lieutenant  J.  E.  Parsons  to  as 
certain  if  possible  their  position  and  movements.  Lieu 
tenant  Parsons  soon  found  Major  Plumb  with  the  troops 
and  militia  who  had  been  in  pursuit  of  the  guerillas 
during  the  day,  and  who  had  lost  their  trail,  and  were 
speculating  as  to  what  direction  they  had  taken.  After 
some  discussion  it  was  decided  to  go  into  Paola  and  feed 
and  rest  until  the  trail  of  the  bandits  should  be  discovered 
by  scouts  or  troops  mounted  upon  fresher  horses.  Ap 
proaching  within  a  few  miles  of  Paola,  Ouantrill  turned  di 
rectly  north,  and,  eluding  his  pursuers,  stopped  to  rest  five 
miles  northeast  of  that  place.  His  camp  was  alarmed  by 
some  Linn  County  militia  searching  for  his  trail  shortly 
after  midnight,  and  he  moved  on  and  soon  met  the  ad 
vance  of  150  men  of  the  Fourth  Missouri  State  Militia 
Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant -Colonel  Walter  King,  who 
had  been  ordered  down  the  line  to  intercept  him.  Colo 
nel  King  ordered  skirmishers  thrown  out  to  ascertain 
what  troops  were  in  his  front,  but  the  darkness  and  rough 
nature  of  the  ground  enabled  the  guerillas  to  escape,  and 
their  trail  was  not  found  by  the  Federal  detachment  that 
night.  On  his  arrival  at  Paola  at  daybreak  on  the  22d, 
Colonel  King  found  Colonel  Clark  preparing  to  renew  the 
pursuit  with  the  troops  and  militia  of  Major  Plumb's  and 
Captain  Leland's  forces  which  had  come  in  and  rested 
there  during  the  night,  the  trail  of  the  guerillas  in  the 
meantime  having  been  found.  They  had  crossed  Bull 
Creek,  four  miles  north  of  Paola,  and,  continuing  their 
march  north  and  east,  passed  out  of  Kansas  only  a  short 
distance  from  the  point  where  they  entered  the  State. 

As  it  seemed  probable  that  Quantrill  was  endeavoring 
to  get  back  to  his  old  haunts  in  the  brakes  and  thickly 


142  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE   BORDER. 

wooded  regions  on  the  Big  and  Little  Blue  rivers  in 
Jackson  County,  Missouri,  to  disperse  his  men,  Colonel 
King  returned  as  rapidly  as  practicable  to  take  up  a  posi 
tion  to  cut  him  off  from  that  section.  But  the  guerillas, 
after  passing  out  of  Kansas  into  Missouri,  turned  east  to 
Grand  River,  where  there  was  an  extensive  and  thickly 
wooded  region,  and  where  they  had  their  rendezvous 
before  setting  out  on  their  raid  into  Kansas,  and  there, 
about  noon  on  the  22d,  broke  up  into  several  bands,  part 
going  down  Grand  River,  part  going  north  and  east,  and 
many,  nearly  exhausted  from  constant  marching  and  ex 
ertion  the  last  two  or  three  days,  left  their  horses  and 
took  it  afoot  to  conceal  themselves  in  the  thick  brush  in 
that  section,  until  they  could  rest  and  recuperate. 

After  striking  the  trail  of  the  guerillas  north  of  Paola, 
Colonel  Clark  continued  the  pursuit  to  Grand  River,  Mis 
souri,  near  the  point  where  he  ascertained  that  they  had 
broken  up  into  several  bands;  there  he  halted  to  rest 
his  men  and  horses  the  balance  of  the  day,  and  then  di 
vided  his  command  to  continue  the  pursuit  and  pick  up 
stragglers. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Lazear,  who  promptly  started  in 
pursuit  of  the  guerillas  the  moment  he  heard  of  their 
movement  west,  but  who  met  with  some  delay  in  concen 
trating  his  detachments  near  Chapel  Hill  from  such  dis 
tant  points  as  Lexington,  Warrensburg,  and  Harrisonville, 
struck  Quantrill's  trail  and  followed  it  to  a  point  on  Big 
Creek,  five  miles  west  of  Pleasant  Hill.  As  his  advance 
was  emerging  from  the  timber  or  brush  on  the  west  side 
of  the  creek,  about  two  o'clock  on  the  22d,  they  noticed 
a  large  force  of  men  advancing  over  the  prairie,  perhaps 
not  more  than  half  a  mile  off  in  front.  Colonel  Lazear 
immediately  sent  forward  parties  to  ascertain  who  they 
were,  and  they  replied  that  they  were  "  Federal  troops," 
but  declined  to  state  to  whose  command  they  belonged. 
The  Colonel  then  ordered  his  men  up  and  into  line  and 


THE   LAWRENCE   MASSACRE.  143 

rode  forward  and  satisfied  himself  that  the  force  in  his 
front  were  guerillas,  and  about  that  time  they  com 
menced  forming  line  of  battle  behind  a  fence  on  a  ridge. 
When  he  dismounted  a  company  to  take  the  advance, 
they  retreated  about  three  quarters  of  a  mile,  and  again 
formed  behind  a  ridge.  He  moved  forward  again  and 
attacked  them  vigorously,  but  after  several  rounds  they 
broke  for  the  brush  and  soon  commenced  to  scatter.  In 
this  action  Colonel  Lazear  reported  that  he  killed  five  of 
the  guerillas  and  wounded  several,  the  whole  force,  two 
hundred  strong,  being  under  command  of  Quantrill.  The 
Federal  detachment  were  armed  with  long,  muzzle-loading 
guns,  and  Colonel  Lazear  stated  that  if  his  men  had  been 
armed  with  good  carbines  and  revolvers  he  could  have 
made  a  charge  and  killed  and  captured  almost  the  entire 
force  of  guerillas.  When  the  bandits  commenced  to 
scatter  he  divided  his  force,  and  one  detachment,  under 
Captain  H.  F.  Peery,  came  up  with  them  late  in  the 
evening,  and  after  a  sharp  conflict  in  the  brush  killed  five 
more.  The  ground  over  which  the  first  action  took  place 
was  strewn  with  goods  of  every  description  which  the 
bandits  had  brought  from  Lawrence.  Colonel  Lazear 
reported  that  his  men  while  out  on  that  scout  killed  six 
teen  of  the  guerillas,  brought  in  eight  male  and  two 
female  prisoners,  besides  twenty-five  captured  horses  and 
a  number  of  guns  and  pistols.  Colonel  Clark  reported 
that  his  scouting  parties  after  entering  Missouri  captured 
and  killed  twenty-one  of  the  outlaws,  and  four  were  killed 
in  the  pursuit  by  the  troops  and  militia  from  Lawrence 
to  Paola.  In  the  casualties  on  the  Federal  side  Colonel 
Lazear  had  one  man  killed  and  one  wounded. 

When  the  despatches  came  into  General  Ewing's  head 
quarters  at  Kansas  City,  announcing  that  Quantrill  had 
passed  into  Kansas  with  a  large  force,  the  General  was  in 
Leavenworth,  having  gone  up  there  that  day  on  official 
business.  The  information  was  at  once  telegraphed  to 


144  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE   BORDER. 

him,  but  as  the  telegraph  offices  at  Leavenworth  City 
and  Fort  Leavenworth  closed  at  eleven  at  night  for  want 
of  relief  operators,  he  did  not  receive  the  despatch  until 
after  ten  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  2ist.  He 
hastily  collected  about  three  hundred  men  of  the  Elev 
enth  Ohio  Cavalry,  who  were  being  equipped  at  the  fort 
for  service  on  the  plains,  and  started  to  join  his  troops  to 
direct  in  person  their  operations  against  the  bandits. 
He  was  delayed  several  hours  at  De  Soto  in  crossing 
the  Kaw  River,  and  soon  after,  receiving  information 
of  the  movements  of  his  troops,  pushed  on  to  overtake 
them,  and  at  dark  on  the  22d  reached  a  point  on  Grand 
River,  Missouri,  near  where  the  guerillas  had  that  day 
divided  into  several  bands. 

A  combination  of  circumstances  made  it  possible  for 
Quantrill  to  march  nearly  fifty  miles  through  Kansas, 
reach  Lawrence,  surprise  the  people,  murder  the  citizens, 
burn  the  city,  and  return  to  Missouri  without  serious 
loss.  The  first  fatal  blunder  was  Captain  Pike's  failure 
to  pursue  the  bandits  and  keep  in  sight  of  them  the  mo 
ment  he  heard  of  their  entering  Kansas  near  his  station, 
instead  of  waiting  for  Captain  Coleman  to  arrive  from 
New  Santa  F6,  thus  losing  the  time  required  to  march 
twenty-four  miles.  In  the  next  place,  the  people  along 
the  route  traversed  by  the  guerillas  displayed  an  unac 
countable  indifference,  with  one  or  two  exceptions,  as  to 
the  fate  of  Lawrence  and  of  the  people  on  the  road 
to  that  city.  The  people  along  the  route  could  easily 
have  warned  the  people  of  Lawrence  of  the  approach  of 
the  bandits,  but  only  one  man,  a  Mr.  J.  Reed,  living  near 
Eudora,  made  an  attempt  to  do  so,  and  his  horse,  while 
he  was  riding  it  at  full  speed  in  front  of  the  guerillas, 
fell,  and  was  killed,  and  he  himself  injured  so  severely 
that  he  died  the  next  day.  Everybody  in  Kansas  knew 
of  the  desperate  character  of  Quantrill  and  his  band,  and 
it  was  expected  that  if  he  entered  the  State  he  would 


THE  LAWRENCE  MASSACRE.  145 

leave  a  path  of  desolation  unless  he  should  be  closely 
pursued  by  the  Federal  troops. 

The  murdering  of  the  citizens  of  Lawrence  and  the 
burning  and  sacking  of  the  city  by  Quantrill  and  his 
desperate  outlaws  caused  intense  excitement  all  over  the 
State,  and  indeed  was  a  shock  to  the  entire  loyal  section 
of  the  country.  Hundreds  of  loyal  men  in  different 
localities  in  Missouri  had  been  robbed  and  murdered 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war  without  causing  any  un 
usual  excitement  outside  of  the  State,  but  the  Southern 
bandits  had  not,  before  the  Lawrence  massacre,  entered  a 
loyal  State  and  made  an  indiscriminate  slaughter  of  the 
citizens.  In  the  excitement  of  the  moment  such  influen 
tial  men  as  Governor  Carney  declared  that  Missouri  must 
be  held  responsible  for  the  acts  of  the  outlaws;  that  "  no 
body  of  men  as  large  as  that  commanded  by  Quantrill 
could  have  been  got  together  without  the  people  residing 
in  Western  Missouri  knowing  all  about  it  "  ;  that  "  such 
people  cannot  be  considered  loyal,  and  should  not  be 
treated  as  loyal  citizens,  for  while  they  conceal  the  move 
ments  of  desperadoes  like  Quantrill  and  his  followers, 
they  are,  in  the  worst  sense  of  the  word,  their  aiders  and 
abettors,  and  should  be  held  equally  guilty." 

Senator  Lane  and  other  popular  leaders  in  Kansas  used 
more  violent  and  inflammatory  language  than  Governor 
Carney,  and  were  in  favor  of  the  people  of  Kansas  rising 
en  masse  for  the  purpose  of  marching  into  Missouri  to 
burn  and  destroy  everything  for  a  distance  of  forty  miles 
from  the  Kansas  border,  and  to  avenge  the  outrages  com 
mitted  by  Quantrill  and  his  band  at  Lawrence.  At  a 
mass  meeting  held  in  Leavenworth  City,  on  the  26th  of 
August,  which  was  attended  by  many  of  the  leading  men 
of  the  State,  it  was  resolved  that  the  people  should  meet 
on  the  8th  of  September  at  Paola  prepared  for  a  cam 
paign  of  fifteen  days,  for  the  purpose  of  going  into  Mis 
souri  to  search  for  the  stolen  property  that  Quantrill 


VOL.  ii.— 10 


146  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

had  taken  from  Lawrence,  and  to  retaliate  upon  the  peo 
ple  of  Western  Missouri  for  the  acts  committed  by  the 
bandits. 

Probably  no  one  deplored  the  atrocious  acts  of  the 
guerillas  at  Lawrence  more  than  General  Schofield,  com 
manding  the  Department,  but  from  his  large  experience 
in  Missouri  affairs  from  the  opening  of  the  first  cam 
paign  under  General  Lyon,  he  knew  that  there  was  a 
vast  amount  of  loyalty  in  that  State,  and  even  in  the 
western  counties  of  the  State,  and  saw  that  it  would  not 
do  to  allow  the  enraged  people  of  Kansas  to  enter  those 
counties,  ostensibly  for  the  purpose  of  recovering  their 
stolen  property,  but  really  to  retaliate  indiscriminately 
upon  the  Unionists  as  well  as  the  secessionists  for  the 
slaughter  of  the  citizens  of  Lawrence.  So  imminent  was 
the  danger  of  Missouri  being  invaded  by  a  large  number 
of  the  citizens  of  Kansas  that  General  Schofield  con 
sidered  it  advisable  to  issue  a  general  order  prohibiting 
the  militia  of  Kansas  and  Missouri,  not  in  the  service  of 
the  United  States,  from  passing  from  one  State  into  the 
other,  without  express  orders  from  the  district  com 
mander.  This  order,  which  was  immediately  published 
extensively  in  the  newspapers  in  Missouri  and  Kansas, 
also  prohibited  armed  bodies  of  men  not  in  the  United 
States  service,  or  not  belonging  to  the  militia  of  Kansas 
and  Missouri,  which  had  been  placed  under  the  orders  of 
the  Department  commanded  by  the  Governors  of  those 
States,  from  passing  from  one  State  into  the  other,  under 
any  pretext  whatever.  As  an  evidence  of  his  earnestness 
in  the  matter,  troops  were  stationed  along  the  State  line 
to  enforce  the  order  against  any  parties  who  might  under 
take  to  disregard  it. 

The  great  mass  meeting  to  be  held  at  Paola,  on  the  8th 
of  September,  was  the  absorbing  subject  of  conversation 
along  the  Border  for  several  weeks  after  Quantrill's  raid. 
General  Lane,  Colonel  C.  R.  Jennison,  and  Colonel  George 


THE  LAWRENCE  MASSACRE.  147 

H.  Hoyt  made  speeches  in  nearly  all  the  counties  of 
Eastern  Kansas  to  arouse  the  people  to  come  out  and 
attend  the  meeting  at  Paola,  at  which  it  was  expected 
that  eight  to  ten  thousand  men  would  assemble.  Some 
able-bodied  citizens  who  had  ample  opportunity  to  enlist 
in  the  United  States  service,  but  who  did  not  do  so, 
went  so  far  as  to  assert  that  any  one  who  was  opposed  to 
an  irresponsible  mob  of  citizens  going  into  Missouri  for 
the  purpose  of  indiscriminate  retaliation  and  plunder 
was  not  truly  loyal  to  the  Government.  But  the  discus 
sion  of  the  impropriety  of  the  movement,  the  probability 
that  those  who  engaged  in  it  would  be  opposed  by  United 
States  troops,  and  unfavorable  weather  had  the  effect  of 
making  the  Paola  meeting  a  tame  affair,  only  a  few  hun 
dred  people  assembling  to  listen  to  the  speeches  and 
resolutions  of  the  promoters  of  the  scheme. 

Immediately  after  the  Lawrence  massacre,  General 
Ewing  issued  his  famous  Order  Number  Eleven,  depopu 
lating  Jackson,  Cass,  and  Bates  Counties  and  the  north 
part  of  Vernon  County,  Missouri,  with  certain  specified 
exceptions  near  military  stations.  This  order  required 
the  people  living  within  the  limits  of  those  parts  of 
the  district  to  which  it  applied  to  remove  from  their 
places  of  residence  within  fifteen  days  from  the  date  of 
the  order.  Those  who  could  satisfactorily  prove  their 
loyalty  were  "  allowed  to  move  out  of  the  district,  or  to 
any  military  station  in  it,  or  to  any  part  of  Kansas  west 
of  the  Border  counties."  The  secessionists  and  Southern 
sympathizers  were  all  required  to  move  out  of  the  district 
within  the  time  specified.  General  Schofield  did  not  ap 
prove  that  part  of  this  celebrated  order  which  directed 
the  burning  of  property,  and  it  was  modified  in  that  re 
spect.  But  before  the  order  was  modified  in  regard  to 
destruction  of  property,  any  one  from  a  high  point  in  the 
prairie  region  of  Cass  and  Bates  Counties  might  have  seen 
the  smoke  arising  from  numerous  farms,  which  was  from 


148  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

burning  stacks  of  grain  or  buildings  that  had  been  fired. 
In  the  early  part  of  September  a  good  many  Southern 
families  commenced  moving  south  and  to  other  parts  of 
the  State,  and  the  few  loyal  families  who  lived  in  those 
parts  of  the  district  to  which  the  order  applied  moved 
into  the  garrisoned  towns  and  military  stations  that  were 
able  to  afford  accommodations  for  them.  It  was  gener 
ally  believed  that  if  the  loyal  people  were  permitted  to 
remain  on  their  farms  the  guerillas  would  in  retaliation 
have  driven  them  off.  Two  years'  experience  had  shown 
that  the  only  way  to  stop  the  guerilla  war  in  that  section 
was  to  remove  all  Southern  families  from  it.  The  numer 
ous  atrocious  acts  committed  by  the  guerillas  in  Western 
Missouri  were  gradually  forcing  many  of  the  militia  officers 
to  recommend  to  their  superiors  the  removal  of  Southern 
families  from  certain  localities. 

After  the  Lawrence  disaster,  everybody  in  Kansas, 
from  the  Governor  down,  was  anxious  that  measures 
should  be  adopted  that  would  prevent  the  recurrence  of 
such  a  calamity.  General  Schofield  suggested  to  Governor 
Carney  that  the  militia  of  the  State  should  be  organized 
for  home  defence,  and  that  the  principal  towns  of  the 
eastern  border  counties  should  be  garrisoned  by  the  mili 
tia.  His  suggestion  was  acted  upon;  the  Kansas  militia 
was  organized,  and  a  few  men  stationed  in  each  of  the 
towns  along  the  eastern  border,  and  all  subject  to  call  at 
a  moment's  notice,  as  soon  as  arms  were  furnished. 


CHAPTER  XL 

THE   FEDERAL   OCCUPATION   OF   FORT    SMITH. 

ABOUT  the  middle  of  July,  Brigadier-General  John  Mc 
Neil  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  District  of 
Southwest  Missouri,  relieving  Colonel  Cloud,  who  desired 
to  go  into  the  field  with  such  troops  as  could  be  spared 
from  that  district,  to  participate  in  the  general  advance 
then  being  made  by  General  Schofield's  forces  in  the 
Department  of  the  Missouri.  He  arrived  at  Cassville  the 
latter  part  of  July,  where  he  spent  a  few  days  in  preparing 
his  command  to  move  south  in  the  direction  of  Fayette- 
ville  and  Van  Buren,  Arkansas.  On  leaving  Cassville, 
his  brigade  consisted  of  the  Second  Kansas  Cavalry,  the 
First  Arkansas  Union  Infantry,  and  two  sections  of 
Rabb's  Second  Indiana  Battery.  While  at  Bentonville 
the  Colonel  received  an  order  from  General  McNeil  to 
report  to  General  Blunt  at  Fort  Gibson  and  cooperate 
with  him  in  a  movement  against  General  Cooper,  who, 
after  the  battle  of  Honey  Springs,  had  been  reinforced 
by  General  Cabell  with  upwards  of  two  thousand  men, 
and  who  was  daily  expecting  an  additional  reinforcement 
of  a  brigade  under  General  Bankhead  from  Texas.  From 
Bentonville  Colonel  Cloud  marched  to  Fort  Gibson,  ar 
riving  at  that  place  on  the  2 1st  of  August,  and  the  next 
day,  with  General  Blunt's  forces,  crossed  the  Arkansas 
River  and  advanced  to  attack  General  Cooper. 

A  few  days  before  Colonel  Cloud  left  Cassville,  Lieu- 


ISO 


THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 


tenant  John  E.  Phelps,  Third  United  States  Cavalry, 
with  a  detachment  of  twenty-eight  men  of  the  Second 
Arkansas  Cavalry,  made  a  scout  into  Arkansas  as  far 


COL.THOMPSON 


FEDERAL 
CONFEDERATE 


COL.  CLOUD 

SKIRMISH  ON  THE  POTEAU  NEAR  FORT  SMITH,  AUG.  31.  1863. 

south  as  Fayetteville,  where,  after  a  skirmish  with  the 
rear-guard   of   a  small   Confederate  force,   in   which  one 


THE   FEDERAL    OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  SMITH.       151 

Confederate  was  killed  and  four  wounded,  a  few  miles 
south  of  Elm  Springs,  he  joined  Major  T.  J.  Hunt,  com 
manding  a  detachment  of  the  First  Arkansas  Union  Cav 
alry,  who  had  been  scouting  east  of  the  wire  road.  The 
two  detachments  returned  to  Elm  Springs  and  encamped 
that  night.  The  next  morning  Major  Hunt  marched 
north,  and  Lieutenant  Phelps  took  the  road  in  a  north 
west  direction  to  Maysville.  After  marching  on  this 
road  about  eight  miles  he  came  upon  a  Confederate  de 
tachment  of  twenty-five  men,  and  attacked  them  vigor 
ously,  killing  four  and  wounding  five  of  the  party.  He 
then  marched  to  Maysville,  where  he  obtained  informa 
tion  that  Colonel  Coffee  was  encamped  between  that  place 
and  Pineville,  Missouri,  on  Butler  Creek,  with  about  five 
hundred  men.  Not  having  a  force  strong  enough  to  at 
tack  Coffee,  Lieutenant  Phelps  marched  around  him  via 
Neosho  and  returned  to  Springfield  and  reported  to  Gen 
eral  McNeil. 

Only  a  few  days  after  the  report  of  Lieutenant  Phelps 
was  received,  Captain  C.  B.  McAfee,  commanding  a  bat 
talion  of  the  Sixth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  at 
Newtonia,  reported  to  General  McNeil  that  he  had  in 
formation,  received  through  one  of  his  officers,  Lieutenant 
Riggs,  that  Coffee  was  encamped  near  Pineville  with  from 
three  hundred  to  five  hundred  men.  General  McNeil  at 
once  sent  a  force  of  four  hundred  or  five  hundred  men 
and  two  howitzers,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  E.  C. 
Catherwood,  Sixth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  con 
sisting  of  detachments  from  that  regiment  and  from  the 
First  Arkansas  Cavalry,  to  attack  Coffee  and  break  up  his 
camp.  Colonel  Catherwood  left  Springfield  on  August 
9th,  and  by  marching  day  and  night  for  three  days,  with 
short  intervals  to  rest  and  feed,  came  up  with  Coffee  at 
Pineville,  and  after  a  spirited  attack  completely  routed 
him,  killing,  wounding,  and  capturing  sixty  to  seventy 
of  his  men,  besides  capturing  and  destroying  his  trains. 


152  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

At  White  Rock  Prairie,  near  Pineville,  he  received  a  re 
inforcement  of  a  battalion  of  the  Eighth  Missouri  State 
Militia  Cavalry,  under  command  of  Major  E.  B.  Eno, 
and  instructions  from  General  McNeil  to  report  to  Colonel 
Cloud  at  Bentonville,  Arkansas.  On  his  arrival  at  Ben- 
tonville,  he  found  that  Colonel  Cloud  had  marched  in 
the  direction  of  Fort  Gibson,  and  had  left  instructions 
for  him  to  report  to  him  at  that  place.  Although  he  was 
without  tents  and  unprepared  for  such  a  long  expedition, 
he  moved  forward  and  arrived  at  Fort  Gibson  to  find 
that  General  Blunt  and  the  troops  which  had  joined  him 
under  Colonel  Cloud  had  already  crossed  the  Arkansas 
and  were  marching  south  to  attack  General  Cooper.  He 
pushed  out  from  Fort  Gibson  and  overtook  the  Federal 
forces  at  Honey  Springs,  and  reporting  to  Colonel  Cloud 
served  in  his  brigade  during  that  decisive  campaign. 

When  the  forces  from  Southwest  Missouri,  under 
Colonel  Cloud,  joined  him,  General  Blunt  had  an  effective 
strength  of  about  forty-five  hundred  men  south  of  the 
Arkansas,  and  General  Steele's  effective  strength,  count 
ing  General  Bankhead's  brigade,  which  was  in  supporting 
distance,  was  certainly  nearly  nine  thousand  men.  But 
about  this  time  the  Southern  forces  in  the  Indian  Terri 
tory  were  becoming  demoralized — the  troops  of  Cabell's 
Arkansas  brigade,  in  particular,  from  desertions,  and  the 
Indians  in  Cooper's  brigade  from  lack  of  interest  in 
promptly  executing  the  parts  of  the  service  assigned  to 
them.  And  then  there  appears  to  have  been  a  want  of 
harmony  among  the  general  officers. 

General  Steele  had  recently  challenged  the  Federal 
forces  at  Fort  Gibson  to  battle  by  moving  his  entire  force 
up  to  within  fifteen  to  twenty  miles  of  that  post,  and  now 
General  Blunt  determined  to  attack  him  again,  and  if 
possible  make  the  result  more  decisive  than  the  battle  at 
Elk  Creek.  With  his  forces  thus  united,  he  moved  for 
ward  rapidly  to  attack  General  Steele,  who  had  concen- 


THE   FEDERAL    OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  SMITH.       153 

trated  all  his  troops  on  the  south  side  of  the  Canadian, 
sixty  miles  south  of  Fort  Gibson.  On  arriving  near  the 
place  where  he  supposed  General  Steele  would  be  in  posi 
tion  to  give  him  battle,  he  found  that  the  Confederate 
commander  had  retreated  and  divided  his  force ;  that  he 
had  ordered  General  Cabell,  with  his  brigade,  in  the 
direction  of  Fort  Smith ;  that  Steele  had  himself  retired, 
with  Cooper's  command  of  about  five  thousand  men, 
southwest  on  the  Texas  road  in  the  direction  of  Perry- 
ville,  and  was  then  encamped  about  twenty  miles  distant. 
Although  his  troops  and  animals  were  very  much  ex 
hausted  by  two  days  of  almost  constant  marching,  Gen 
eral  Blunt  determined,  if  practicable,  to  strike  the  force 
under  Steele  and  Cooper  and  disperse  it  before  it  got 
beyond  his  reach  and  before  they  could  remove  their 
supplies  from  their  depot  at  Perryville,  and  then  turn 
upon  Cabell  and  capture  Fort  Smith.  After  a  few  hours' 
rest  he  moved  forward  again  at  three  o'clock  in  the 
morning  of  August  25th,  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  on  the 
Texas  road,  and  about  ten  o'clock  his  advance  met  a 
company  of  Choctaws  in  the  timber  who  had  been  de 
tached  to  watch  the  movements  of  the  Federal  forces. 
In  the  skirmish  that  took  place  four  of  the  Southern 
Indians  were  killed  and  their  captain  captured,  from 
whom  General  Blunt  obtained  important  information  in 
regard  to  the  strength  and  disposition  of  the  Confederate 
forces  in  his  front. 

Several  times  during  the  afternoon  the  Federal  advance 
came  up  with  General  Steele's  rear-guard  and  exchanged 
shots  with  them.  He  made  very  little  effort  to  contest 
the  advance  of  the  Federal  troops  until  about  eight 
o'clock  that  night,  when  they  arrived  before  the  little 
town  of  Perryville.  At  that  place  he  posted  a  consider 
able  part  of  his  force  and  two  howitzers  in  the  timber 
commanding  the  road  upon  which  the  Federal  troops 
were  advancing,  with  the  view  of  holding  them  until  his 


154  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

trains  could  get  away.  His  howitzers  were  charged  with 
canister,  and  when  the  Federal  advance  came  up,  they 
opened  fire  upon  it,  wounding  four  men.  General  Blunt 
then  brought  up  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry  and  dis 
mounted  them,  and  deploying  them  to  the  right  and 
left  of  the  road,  they  advanced  up  to  within  three  hun 
dred  yards  of  the  barricades  which  the  Confederates  had 
hastily  constructed,  and  opened  fire  upon  them  with 
their  Sharp's  carbines  by  moonlight.  The  two  howitzers 
of  this  regiment  were  also  brought  into  action,  and  after 
throwing  about  a  dozen  shells  into  the  position  of  the 
Confederates  the  latter  retreated,  leaving  a  large  amount 
of  commissary  and  quartermaster  stores  to  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  Federal  forces. 

After  saving  such  of  the  stores  as  his  troops  could 
use,  General  Blunt  ordered  the  other  captured  property 
burned  in  the  buildings  in  which  it  was  stored.  His 
troops  and  stock  had  marched  about  forty  miles  that 
day,  and  they  were  too  much  exhausted  as  they  came 
up  to  continue  the  pursuit  during  the  night  over  a 
rough  timber  country  with  advantage.  He  had,  how 
ever,  by  the  destruction  of  the  Confederate  supply 
depots  at  Northfork  and  Perryville,  crippled  his  ad 
versary  almost  as  much  as  if  he  had  defeated  him  again 
in  a  pitched  battle. 

Having  pursued  the  Southern  forces  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Steele  into  the  southern  part  of  the 
Indian  Territory,  and  having  destroyed  his  supply  depots 
in  that  section,  General  Blunt  determined  to  lose  no  time 
in  marching  against  General  Cabell  in  the  vicinity  of  Fort 
Smith  before  he  could  get  reinforcements.  He  also  as 
certained  that  General  Steele  had  with  him  at  Perryville 
only  a  small  part  of  the  two  regiments  of  Cherokees,  and 
that  nearly  all  of  the  two  Creek  regiments  were  under 
Colonel  Mclntosh  on  the  Upper  Canadian  in  the  western 
part  of  the  Creek  Nation.  He  sent  Colonel  Judson  with 


THE  FEDERAL    OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  SMITH.       155 

the  troops  and  artillery  of  his  own  district,  which  he  had 
brought  from  Fort  Gibson,  in  pursuit  of  the  Southern 
Indians  under  Mclntosh,  and  took  the  troops  of  Colonel 
Cloud's  brigade  from  Southwest  Missouri  and  started  to 
Fort  Smith  to  attack  General  Cabell,  who  had  three  regi 
ments  and  three  battalions  of  cavalry  and  one  regiment 
of  infantry  and  one  battery  of  artillery  under  his  com 
mand  for  the  defence  of  his  position  on  the  Poteau  River, 
nine  miles  southwest  of  Fort  Smith. 

In  the  march  from  Perryville  to  the  vicinity  of  Fort 
Smith,  a  distance  of  upwards  of  one  hundred  miles  in 
four  days,  the  men  and  horses  of  Colonel  Cloud's  brigade 
were  put  to  the  severest  test  of  physical  endurance,  for 
they  had  been  constantly  marching  for  three  weeks,  and 
a  good  deal  of  the  time  day  and  night.  Anticipating 
that  the  Federal  forces  would  probably  turn  upon  Fort 
Smith  after  giving  up  the  pursuit  of  Steele,  General 
Cabell  kept  out  scouts  as  far  west  as  the  Sans  Boise  on 
the  roads  leading  to  Perryville  and  Fort  Gibson.  He 
also,  by  felling  trees,  blocked  up  the  roads  and  fords 
above  his  position,  and  the  Poteau  bottom  road,  leading 
to  Fort  Smith.  He  placed  Colonel  L.  L.  Thompson's 
regiment  of  cavalry  in  advance  of  Scullyville  to  picket 
the  road  the  Federal  troops  would  probably  advance 
upon.  He  then  ordered  the  public  property  at  Fort 
Smith  to  be  loaded  into  a  wagon  train  and  sent  to  the 
rear  of  his  position  on  the  Poteau.  On  the  3<Dth  of 
August  General  Blunt's  advance  came  upon  and  ex 
changed  a  few  shots  with  the  Confederate  scouts  a  few 
miles  west  of  the  Sans  Boise,  and  kept  in  sight  of  them 
at  intervals  during  the  day  until  he  went  into  camp  that 
evening,  twelve  miles  west  of  Scullyville.  He  rested  his 
men  and  animals  until  about  midnight,  when  he  moved 
forward  again,  and  about  two  o'clock  in  the  morning 
struck  the  Confederate  pickets,  who,  after  a  short  resist 
ance,  were  obliged  to  fall  back  upon  the  regiment  under 


156  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Colonel  Thompson  near  Scullyville,  with  the  loss  of  one 
man  killed  and  several  wounded. 

Colonel  Cloud's  cavalry  pushed  forward,  and  after  some 
skirmishing  forced  Colonel  Thompson  to  retire  from  his 
position  in  the  direction  of  the  main  force  under  com 
mand  of  General  Cabell,  at  the  crossing  of  the  Poteau 
River.  In  falling  back  he  formed  his  men  in  line  several 
times  during  the  day ;  but  they  did  not  stand  until  the 
Federal  cavalry  approached  within  easy  range.  That 
evening  General  Blunt's  force  arrived  within  three  miles 
of  General  Cabell's  position  and  encamped.  It  was  too 
late  to  attack  that  day,  and  he  knew  that  after  a  night's 
rest  his  troops  and  stock  would  be  more  efficient  on  go 
ing  into  action.  He  also  desired,  before  attacking,  to  re 
connoitre  the  Confederate  position,  so  that  about  dark 
Colonel  Cloud  took  a  small  force,  and  driving  in  General 
Cabell's  outpost,  captured  one  prisoner,  and  advanced 
nearly  to  the  river  and  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  his 
battery,  when  he  received  a  volley  from  the  small-arms 
and  artillery  in  his  front.  The  rapid  movements  of  the 
Federal  troops,  their  audacity  and  uncertain  numbers, 
determined  General  Cabell  to  abandon  his  position  with 
out  a  fight,  and  his  troops  commenced  to  retire  that  night 
shortly  after  nine  oclock,  almost  as  soon  as  the  skirmish 
with  Colonel  Cloud  had  ended.  Having  received  no  in 
formation  of  the  movements  of  his  adversary  during  the 
night,  at  daylight  General  Blunt  advanced  to  attack  his 
position,  but  soon  found  that  he  had  retreated,  giving 
him  a  bloodless  victory. 

After  crossing  the  river  the  Federal  troops  soon  struck 
the  trail  of  the  Confederates,  and  found  that  after  re 
treating  a  short  distance  in  the  direction  of  Fort  Smith 
they  had  turned  southeast  and  taken  the  road  on  which 
General  Cabell  had  sent  his  train  to  Waldron,  in  Scott 
County.  General  Blunt  now  detached  Colonel  Cloud, 
with  the  Second  Kansas  and  Sixth  Missouri  State  Militia 


THE   FEDERAL    OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  SMITH.      157 

Cavalry  and  two  sections  of  Rabb's  Second  Indiana  Bat 
tery,  in  pursuit  of  the  retreating  Confederate  forces,  and 
with  his  escort  and  the  First  Arkansas  Infantry7 marched 
to  Fort  Smith  and  occupied  the  fort  and  city  without 
opposition  on  the  evening  of  the  1st  of  September. 

Meanwhile  Colonel  Cloud  had  overtaken  General  Ca- 
bell's  rear-guard  in  ambush  at  the  foot  of  Backbone 
Mountain  and  had  a  fierce  engagement  with  it.  The 
country  was  rough  and  mountainous,  and  at  the  foot 
of  the  mountain  there  was  timber  and  brush,  in  which 
a  large  force  could  be  placed  near  the  road  without 
being  seen  from  it.  Finding  that  he  was  being  pursued 
by  the  Federal  troops,  General  Cabell  formed  almost  his 
entire  force  on  the  side  of  the  mountain  near  the  road 
and  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain  to  repel  the  attack.  His 
battery  was  placed  in  position  to  command  the  road,  and 
Monroe's  regiment  was  posted  in  ambush  at  the  foot  of 
the  mountain.  When  the  Federal  advance  came  up,  this 
concealed  regiment  fired  a  volley  into  them  with  disastrous 
effect.  Colonel  Cloud  now  brought  up  his  cavalry  and 
artillery,  and  in  a  few  moments  a  fierce  artillery  contest 
was  in  progress,  which  lasted  for  upwards  of  three  hours. 
He  dismounted  part  of  his  cavalry  and,  with  the  assistance 
of  his  howitzers,  drove  Monroe's  regiment  from  their  posi 
tion  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain  and  up  the  mountain 
side  back  upon  Cabell's  line  of  battle.  Directly  after 
this,  one  battalion  and  three  regiments  of  General  Cabell's 
command  broke,  and  in  running  ran  through  his  provost 
guard,  and  carried  off  with  them  eighty  prisoners,  most 
of  whom  were  Union  men,  whom  he  was  holding  under 
sentence  for  treason  and  desertion.  It  was  not  because 
the  men  of  those  regiments  were  frightened  at  the  sound 
of  battle  that  they  ran,  but  because  they  did  not  wish  to 
fire  upon  their  friends  or  be  placed  in  position  to  be  shot 
down  by  them,  for  General  Cabell  stated  that  those  regi 
ments  were  composed  of  men  who  were  deserters  from 


158  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

other  regiments,  and  men  who  had  been  conscripted  and 
forced  into  the  service. 

General  Cabell  continued  his  retreat  to  Waldron,  arriv 
ing  there  the  next  day.  He  reported  his  loss  in  action 
at  Backbone  Mountain  at  five  men  killed  and  twelve 
wounded  and  an  unknown  number  of  missing.  Colonel 
Cloud  at  once  occupied  the  field,  extended  his  picket, 
and  collected  his  killed  and  wounded.  He  reported  his 
entire  loss  as  two  men  killed,  including  Captain  E.  C. 
D.  Lines,  Second  Kansas  Cavalry,  and  twelve  wounded. 
He  also  took  thirty  prisoners,  and  while  occupying  the 
field  that  evening  a  good  many  deserters  from  the  Con 
federate  service  came  in  and  accompanied  him  to  Fort 
Smith  the  next  morning.  On  arriving  at  that  place, 
General  Blunt  was  sick,  and  ordered  him  to  assume  com 
mand.  In  a  few  days  Union  men  and  deserters  from  the 
Confederate  service  came  flocking  in  in  large  numbers 
from  fifty  to  seventy-five  miles  south  of  the  Arkansas 
River,  many  of  whom  enlisted  at  once  in  the  Arkansas 
regiments  that  were  then  being  recruited  for  the  Federal 
service.  Mountain  "  Feds  "  was  a  name  given  to  Union 
men  who  collected  in  the  mountains  in  considerable  num 
bers  to  resist  conscripting  officers  who  were  hunting  them 
down  to  take  them  and  put  them  into  the  Confederate 
service.  It  was  not  therefore  surprising  that  Confeder 
ate  officers  met  with  much  trouble  in  making  such  men 
fight  to  establish  a  form  of  government  whose  corner 
stone  was  slavery,  an  institution  in  which  they  had  no 
interest.  These  same  men,  these  hardy  mountaineers, 
when  they  enlisted  in  the  Federal  service,  made  excellent 
soldiers.  No  charge  of  cowardice  was  brought  against 
them,  for  they  felt  that  they  were  fighting  for  a  cause 
and  a  government  that  recognized  equal  manhood  among 
men. 

If  not  a  majority,  at  least  a  large  minority  of  the  people 
of  Western  Arkansas  rejoiced  at  the  Federal  occupation, 


THE  FEDERAL    OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  SMITH.       159 

their  only  fear  being  that  the  Federal  troops  would  be 
unable  to  permanently  hold  the  country. 

Colonel  Catherwood  and  Major  Eno,  with  their  detach 
ments  of  the  Sixth  and  Eighth  Regiments  Missouri  State 
Militia  Cavalry,  remained  at  Fort  Smith  until  September 
8th,  when,  reinforcements  having  arrived  from  Fort  Gib 
son,  they  were  ordered  to  return  to  Southwest  Missouri. 
These  gallant  men,  who  were  State  troops  and  not 
obliged  to  leave  the  State  for  regular  service  elsewhere, 
had  been  out  four  weeks  without  tents  or  change  of 
clothing,  had  marched  upwards  of  four  hundred  miles, 
and  participated  in  all  the  operations  which  closed  that 
short  but  brilliant  campaign. 

For  a  week  after  his  arrival  at  Fort  Smith,  Colonel 
Cloud's  office  was  thronged  every  day  with  Union  men 
and  deserters  from  the  Confederate  army  from  every 
direction  in  that  section,  who  came  in  to  express  their 
devotion  and  loyalty  to  the  Government,  and  who  wished 
to  inform  him  what  was  taking  place  in  their  respective 
neighborhoods.  From  these  people  he  ascertained  that 
there  was  a  Confederate  force,  several  hundred  strong, 
at  Dardanelle,  one  hundred  miles  down  the  Arkansas. 
He  desired  to  cut  off  or  disperse  this  force,  and  besides, 
his  information  led  him  to  believe  that  an  expedition  into 
that  section  would  do  much  good  in  encouraging  the 
Union  men  to  organize  for  their  own  defence.  A  rein 
forcement  of  part  of  the  Second  Colorado  Infantry  having 
arrived  to  strengthen  the  force  at  Fort  Smith,  he  took 
two  hundred  men,  under  Captain  J.  M.  Mcntzcr,  Second 
Kansas  Cavalry,  and  a  section  of  Rabb's  Second  Indiana 
Battery,  under  Lieutenant  Haines,  and  on  the  morning 
of  September  gth  started  out  on  the  march  to  Dardanelle. 

On  the  march  down  he  was  joined  by  about  three 
hundred  Union  men,  who  were  assembled  on  one  day's 
notice,  cheering  and  enthusiastic  for  the  Union.  Several 
officers  and  about  one  hundred  of  these  men  had  fought 


l6o  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

him  at  Backbone  Mountain,  under  Cabell,  only  a  few 
days  before,  and  some  of  them  were  still  wearing  the 
Confederate  uniform.  With  this  reinforcement  he  con 
tinued  his  march  to  Dardanelle,  and  on  arriving  there 
found  a  Confederate  brigade  under  Colonel  Stirman, 
estimated  at  one  thousand  strong,  with  four  pieces  of 
artillery.  He  made  a  vigorous  attack  upon  this  force, 
and  after  about  three  hours'  fighting  the  Confederates 
retreated  down  the  river,  leaving  two  hundred  cattle,  a 
large  amount  of  wheat  and  flour  and  other  commissary 
stores  to  fall  into  his  hands,  besides  one  captain  and 
twenty  privates  as  prisoners.  He  stayed  at  that  place 
three  days,  and  during  that  time  received  many  assur 
ances  that  hundreds  of  men  on  both  sides  of  the  river 
stood  ready  to  take  up  arms  for  the  Union.  While  at 
Dardanelle  he  heard  of  General  Steele's  capture  of  Little 
Rock,  and  at  once  started  down  with  one  hundred  men 
to  open  up  the  river  to  that  place.  On  the  way  down  he 
captured  two  steamboats  and  took  obligations  from  the 
officers  to  report  them  to  Little  Rock  as  soon  as  the  river 
became  navigable  to  that  point.  This  gallant  officer 
marched  two  hundred  miles  through  the  country  held  by 
the  Confederate  forces  with  his  small  command ;  fought 
and  defeated  a  force  of  the  enemy  much  larger  than  his 
own,  and  arrived  at  Little  Rock  on  the  iSth,  and  informed 
General  Steele  of  the  success  of  the  Federal  arms  on  the 
Upper  Arkansas,  resulting  in  the  occupation  of  Fort 
Smith,  and  the  driving  of  the  Confederate  forces  of  Gen 
eral  Cabell  into  Southwestern  Arkansas,  and  those  of 
Confederate  Generals  Steele  and  Cooper  into  the  southern 
part  of  the  Indian  Territory. 

Colonel  Judson,  who  was  sent  with  his  brigade  from 
Perryville  in  pursuit  of  the  two  Creek  regiments,  under 
Colonel  Mclntosh,  on  the  waters  of  the  Upper  Canadian, 
ascertained  on  marching  into  the  Creek  country  that  all 
of  the  men  of  those  two  regiments,  except  about  150, 


THE   FEDERAL    OCCUPATION  OF  FORT  SMITH.       l6l 

had  deserted,  and  were  hiding  out  in  the  timber  along 
the  streams  near  their  homes.  Shortly  after  this  ex 
pedition  a  good  many  of  these  Creeks  came  into  Fort 
Gibson  to  enlist  in  the  Indian  regiments  stationed  at 
that  place,  and  others  came  in  and  pledged  their  alle 
giance  to  the  Government,  and  asked  for  protection. 
They  saw  that  General  Cooper  had  utterly  failed  to  keep 
his  promise  to  prevent  the  Federal  forces  from  coming 
into  their  country,  and  the  battle  of  Honey  Springs,  or 
Elk  Creek,  and  recent  operations  convinced  them  that 
they  had  been  misled  by  the  Confederate  authorities  in 
regard  to  the  p^wer  and  purposes  of  the  Federal  Govern 
ment  in  its  dealings  with  them. 

If  Confederate  General  Steele  had  formed  a  plan  of  de 
fensive  campaign,  he  either  exercised  a  loose  discipline  or 
displayed  a  wonderful  lack  of  ability  to  coordinate  the 
movements  of  his  troops  to  accomplish  a  given  purpose. 
He  admitted  that  he  had  timely  notice  of  the  advance  of 
General  Blunt  from  Fort  Gibson,  but  stated  that  he  was 
unable  to  bring  up  the  Cherokee  regiments  and  the  Creek 
regiments  before  the  Federal  forces  were  upon  him.  In 
a  day  or  two  after  he  was  driven  south  of  Perryville  he 
met  General  Bankhead's  brigade  of  Texans,  and  ordered 
the  commander  of  these  troops  to  hurry  forward  and  re 
inforce  General  Cabell  in  the  defence  of  Fort  Smith.  But 
when  General  Bankhead  arrived  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Fort  Smith  he  found  the  place  occupied  by  the  Federal 
forces,  and  that  General  Cabell  had  retreated  southeast 
in  the  direction  of  Waldron,  instead  of  retiring  on  the 
Texas  road  so  that  they  might  unite  their  forces.  It  is 
needless  to  speculate  what  the  Confederates  might  have 
accomplished  had  these  two  brigades  united,  without 
taking  into  account  what  General  Blunt  might  have  done, 
knowing  that  they  were  going  to  unite.  In  the  first 
place,  General  Blunt  had  information  which  convinced 
him  that  if  he  could  make  a  given  movement  in  a  given 


VOL.    II.  — II 


1 62  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

time,  he  could  prevent  the  cooperation  of  the  Confeder 
ate  forces.  His  success  was  not  due  to  chance,  but  to 
the  successful  coordination  of  movements  which  he 
marked  out  in  his  plan  of  the  campaign. 

Having  driven  the  regular  Confederate  forces  beyond 
the  Arkansas  Valley,  the  Federal  commander  at  Fort 
Smith  was  very  soon  called  upon  to  give  his  attention  to 
the  Southern  partisan  bandits,  who  had  increased  in  such 
numbers  and  boldness  in  Northwest  Arkansas  as  to  make 
communication  with  Springfield  very  uncertain  except 
under  heavy  escorts.  Lieutenant  E.  A.  Barker,  Second 
Kansas  Cavalry,  with  twenty  men  of  his  company,  while 
en  route  from  Springfield  to  join  his  regiment  under 
Colonel  Cloud,  was  attacked  at  Fayetteville  by  Captain 
Buck  Brown,  with  150  partisan  bandits,  and  after  a  short 
skirmish  was  surrounded  and  captured  with  five  of  his 
men,  and  taken  to  Fort  Smith  and  paroled  only  three 
days  before  the  arrival  of  the  Federal  forces.  A  short 
time  after  the  capture  of  Lieutenant  Barker,  Captain 
John  Gardner,  of  the  same  regiment,  while  bearing  de 
spatches  from  General  McNeil  to  Colonel  Cloud  in  the 
field,  was  attacked,  with  his  escort  of  seventy-five  men  of 
the  First  Arkansas  Cavalry,  southwest  of  Bentonville  on 
the  State  line  road  by  Captain  Brown,  with  about  three 
hundred  men,  and  after  some  fighting  and  retreating,  in 
which  he  lost  one  man  killed  and  two  wounded  and  his 
own  horse  shot  under  him,  he  was  flanked  and  surrounded 
and  obliged  to  surrender  with  twenty-two  men. 

Captain  John  J.  Worthington,  commanding  the  escort 
in  the  retreating  fight,  in  endeavoring  to  rally  his  men 
became  separated  from  Captain  Gardner,  and  was  un 
able  to  come  to  his  assistance  after  his  horse  was  killed. 
The  remnant  of  Colonel  Coffee's  command,  which  had 
been  dispersed  by  Colonel  Catherwood  at  Pineville  in  the 
early  part  of  August,  and  some  of  the  men  who  had 
served  in  Livingston's  band  up  to  his  death  and  who 


THE  FEDERAL    OCCUPATION   OF  FORT  SMITH.       163 

had  been  driven  out  of  Jasper  County,  Missouri,  were 
in  Northwest  Arkansas,  so  that  with  these  men  and 
the  members  of  his  own  band  Captain  Brown  was  able 
to  assemble  in  a  very  short  time  three  or  four  hundred 
men  to  attack  a  Federal  detachment  passing  through  the 
country.  On  hearing  of  the  affair  in  which  Captain 
Gardner  and  part  of  his  escort  were  captured,  General 
McNeil  ordered  Colonel  Harrison,  First  Arkansas  Cav 
alry,  to  take  three  hundred  men  and  a  section  of  Starks* 
First  Arkansas  Light  Artillery  and  march  into  North 
west  Arkansas  and  break  up  the  commands  of  Coffee, 
Brown,  and  Hunter  in  that  section. 

Leaving  Cassville,  Colonel  Harrison  marched  to  Pine- 
ville,  where  he  halted  and  sent  out  scouts  to  obtain  in 
formation  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy.  His  scouts 
reported  that  the  Southern  forces  of  Brown  and  other 
partisan  leaders  in  Northwest  Arkansas  were  concentrat 
ing  under  Colonel  Coffee  at  Elk  Mills  in  the  western  part 
of  McDonald  County,  Missouri.  It  was  late  in  the  day, 
but  he  moved  forward  promptly,  marching  all  night,  and 
while  crossing  Cowskin  Prairie  the  next  morning  met  a 
Union  woman,  from  whom  he  ascertained  that  Coffee 
had  been  reinforced  the  day  before,  and  had  moved  to 
Enterprise,  four  miles  beyond  Elk  Mills.  He  pushed  on, 
and  encountering  the  Confederate  picket  near  Elk  Mills 
killed  one  and  drove  in  the  others  upon  the  main  force 
posted  in  the  thick  brush  a  short  distance  west  of  Enter 
prise.  Here  he  dismounted  a  part  of  his  command  as 
skirmishers  and  commenced  shelling  the  position  of  the 
enemy.  After  this  had  continued  for  about  an  hour,  a 
strong  Confederate  force  attacked  his  right  and  rear,  but 
were  soon  driven  off,  and  then  in  a  few  moments  the  en 
tire  force  retreated  south  on  the  State  line  road.  When 
he  had  rested  his  men  and  animals  a  while,  he  commenced 
the  pursuit  of  the  broken  Confederate  forces  and  followed 
them  about  twenty  miles  south  of  Maysville,  when  they 


164  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE  BORDER. 

appeared  to  have  scattered  so  much  that  further  pursuit 
was  deemed  useless.  He  then  marched  to  Elkhorn, 
where  General  McNeil  proposed  to  establish  a  station. 

When  General  McNeil  heard  of  the  occupation  of  Fort 
Smith  by  his  troops  under  Colonel  Cloud,  he  saw  that 
the  occupation  of  Fayetteville  was  of  such  importance 
that  a  force  should  be  ordered  to  that  place  with  the  least 
possible  delay.  It  was  a  half-way  point  between  Fort 
Smith  and  Cassville,  and  was  also  a  central  position  from 
which  movements  could  easily  be  made  against  the  gue 
rilla  bands  of  that  section. 


CHAPTER   XII. 
SHELBY'S  RAID  IN  MISSOURI  IN  1863. 

IN  a  short  time  after  the  Southern  forces  were  driven 
from  Little  Rock  back  upon  Arkadelphia  and  Camden, 
in  the  southern  part  of  the  State,  General  Price  became 
satisfied  that  General  Steele  would  not  immediately  en 
deavor  to  advance  his  line  south  of  the  Arkansas  River 
farther  than  was  necessary  to  keep  that  river  open  to 
navigation.  In  the  early  part  of  the  campaign,  before 
the  fall  of  Little  Rock  seemed  probable,  the  Missouri 
troops  of  Price's  army  were  led  to  believe  from  the  gen 
eral  situation  that  their  chief  would  very  soon  invade 
Missouri  and  give  them  an  opportunity  to  visit  their 
families  and  friends,  instead  of  falling  back  south  of  the 
Arkansas  River.  He  determined,  inasmuch  as  many  of 
his  Missouri  troops  were  disappointed  in  being  obliged 
to  retire  farther  from  their  homes,  to  send  an  expedition 
into  the  State  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  public  prop 
erty  and  crippling  Federal  operations,  which  would  give 
many  of  the  men  thus  detached  an  opportunity  of  visit 
ing  their  families.  An  expedition  that  promised  to  give 
the  men  engaged  in  it  a  chance  of  visiting  their  friends 
and  homes  was  certain  to  be  popular  with  as  many  of  the 
Missouri  Confederate  troops  as  were  able  to  equip  them 
selves  for  such  a  long  and  perilous  march  as  would  lie  be 
fore  them.  A  veteran  cavalry  officer,  Colonel  Joseph  O. 
Shelby,  Fifth  Missouri  Confederate  Cavalry,  who  had 

165 


1 66  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

made  a  raid  to  the  Missouri  River  in  the  summer  of 
1862,  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  expedition, 
and  received  his  orders  from  General  Price,  at  Arkadel- 
phia,  on  the  2ist  of  September.  On  starting  out  on  his 
march  northward  on  the  22d,  his  command  consisted  of 
detachments  from  the  three  regiments  of  his  brigade, 
Major  Elliott's  battalion  of  scouts,  and  a  section  of  artil 
lery  of  Bledsoe's  battery,  under  Lieutenant  David  Harris, 
the  whole  force  numbering  six  hundred  men,  all  hardy 
veterans.  In  his  march  north  to  the  Arkansas  River, 
and  through  the  mountainous  regions  of  Northern  Arkan 
sas,  he  met  with  very  little  opposition,  for  the  country 
between  Fort  Smith  and  Little  Rock,  a  distance  of  nearly 
1 80  miles,  was  unoccupied  by  Federal  troops. 

While  the  recent  Federal  movements  against  Fort 
Smith  and  Little  Rock  had  forced  the  Southern  army 
under  Price  some  distance  south  of  the  Arkansas  River, 
the  territory  in  Arkansas  north  of  that  river,  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  detachments,  was  still  unoccupied  by 
the  Federal  forces.  Several  companies  of  Union  Home 
Guards  had  organized  for  home  protection  against  the 
operations  of  the  Southern  bandits,  but  these  Unionists 
were  not  prepared  to  engage  and  resist  with  much  deter 
mination  a  well-organized  force  of  veterans  supplied  with 
artillery  like  that  commanded  by  Colonel  Shelby.  The 
raiding  force  was  therefore  able  to  cross  the  Arkansas 
River  and  enter  Missouri  before  its  movements  were 
known  to  the  Federal  commanders  of  the  Districts  of 
Western  Arkansas  and  Southwest  Missouri. 

Near  Bentonville,  Northwest  Arkansas,  Colonel  Shelby 
was  reinforced  by  Colonel  D.  C.  Hunter,  of  Vernon 
County,  Missouri,  with  two  hundred  men,  and  a  day  or 
two  afterwards  he  was  reinforced  at  Pineville,  Missouri, 
by  Colonel  John  T.  Coffee,  with  four  hundred  men.  His 
force  was  also  strengthened  by  some  guerilla  bands  join 
ing  him  in  the  counties  through  which  he  marched.  And 


SHELBY'S  RAID  IN  MISSOURI  IN  l86j.  1 67 

as  he  reported  that  he  gained  eight  hundred  recruits, 
he  had  a  force  of  at  least  two  thousand  men  in  his  raid 
through  Missouri.  Colonel  Coffee  had  been  in  South 
west  Missouri  for  two  months  prior  to  Shelby's  arrival, 
and  was  well  informed  in  regard  to  the  strength  and  posi 
tion  of  the  Union  militia  in  that  section. 

Having  been  informed  that  there  were  several  com 
panies  of  Federal  militia  stationed  at  Neosho,  Colonel 
Shelby  left  Pineville  early  on  the  morning  of  October 
4th,  with  his  command  increased  to  upwards  of  twelve 
hundred  men,  determined  to  surprise  and  capture  the 
Federal  force  at  Neosho,  if  practicable.  His  march  had 
been  so  rapid  through  the  mountainous  regions  of  Ar 
kansas,  and  there  being  no  Federal  troops  on  the  line  of 
his  march  to  oppose  him,  he  arrived  at  Pineville  without 
his  presence  being  known  to  the  Federal  officers  in  South 
west  Missouri.  Colonel  Coffee's  command  had  been  dis 
persed  near  Pineville  in  August  by  a  Federal  detachment 
under  Colonel  Catherwood,  and  near  Elk  Mills,  in  Mc 
Donald  County,  in  September,  by  Colonel  Harrison,  and 
about  the  1st  of  October  information  reached  the  com 
manding  officers  at  Newtonia  and  Neosho  that  Coffee 
was  again  concentrating  his  men  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Pineville.  For  the  purpose  of  again  dispersing  Coffee's 
force,  Major  Austin  A.  King,  Jr.,  was  sent  out  with  a 
battalion  of  the  Sixth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry, 
which  was  to  be  reinforced  by  three  companies  of  the 
same  regiment,  under  Captain  C.  B.  McAfee,  from  New 
tonia. 

On  the  morning  of  October  4th,  Captain  McAfee 
marched  with  his  three  troops  from  Newtonia  to  Neosho 
on  his  way  to  join  Major  King;  but  being  unable  to  ob 
tain  at  Neosho  any  definite  information  in  regard  to  the 
Major's  movements,  he  started  out  on  the  Buffalo  road 
to  Elk  Mills  in  search  of  him.  After  marching  out  about 
two  miles  on  that  road  he  met  Coffee's  command,  and 


1 68  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

both  sides  at  once  commenced  to  prepare  for  action.  In 
n  few  moments  the  Confederates  retired  a  short  distance 
and  then  commenced  to  move  through  the  woods  around 
Captain  McAfee's  left  flank  in  the  direction  of  Neosho. 
On  observing  this  movement,  Captain  McAfee  immedi 
ately  sent  a  messenger  back  to  town  to  notify  the  detach 
ment  left  in  charge  of  his  baggage  and  commissary  stores 
of  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  returned  with  his 
command  as  rapidly  as  practicable  by  another  route,  and 
entered  the  town  about  the  same  time  as  the  Confeder 
ates,  but  on  a  different  road.  He  immediately  formed 
his  men  in  line  and  opened  fire  on  the  Confederates  and 
drove  them  out  of  town.  But  they  quickly  rallied  and 
renewed  the  attack,  when  he  noticed  the  Confederates 
approaching  on  nearly  all  the  roads  leading  into  town. 
He  then  ordered  his  men  into  the  brick  court-house,  the 
walls  of  which  had  been  pierced  with  holes  for  small- 
arms,  in  the  event  of  attack,  and  again  soon  drove  the 
enemy  out  of  town.  His  men  fought  the  Confederates 
from  the  position  in  the  court-house  for  an  hour  and  a 
half,  when  Colonel  Shelby  brought  up  his  artillery  and 
opened  fire  upon  it,  sending  four  cannon-balls  through  its 
walls,  and  then  sent  forward  a  white  flag  demanding  the 
unconditional  surrender  of  the  Federal  detachment. 

On  going  into  the  court-house  with  his  men,  Captain 
McAfee  had  no  thought  of  the  Confederates  having 
artillery,  and  when  they  opened  upon  him  with  their 
rifled  guns  he  knew  that  he  could  not  hold  out  long,  for 
it  was  a  question  of  only  half  an  hour  or  so  when  the 
building  could  be  knocked  down  by  shot  and  shell.  A 
number  of  Union  citizens  and  some  of  the  men  of  the 
Enrolled  Missouri  Militia  of  that  county  had  taken  refuge 
in  the  court-house  with  Captain  McAfee's  command,  and 
as  the  atrocious  acts  of  Quantrill  at  Lawrence  were  fresh 
in  the  minds  of  the  besieged  militia  and  citizens,  the 
Captain  was  desirous  of  knowing  whether  all  the  militia 


SHELBY'S  RAID   IN  MISSOURI  IN  l86j.  169 

would  be  treated  as  prisoners  of  war  and  the  Union  citi 
zens  unmolested,  if  he  surrendered.  Colonel  Shelby 
finally  agreed  to  these  propositions,  and  Captain  McAfee 
surrendered  180  men,  including  the  Enrolled  Militia  and 
citizens  with  his  command.  His  men  were  paroled  on 
the  ground  and  kept  under  guard  for  several  hours.  He 
reported  his  loss  to  have  been  two  men  killed,  two 
wounded  in  the  fight,  and  that  two  of  the  Enrolled 
Militia,  including  Lieutenant  Elijah  Waters,  were  killed 
by  Coffee's  men  after  they  were  paroled.  He  also  re 
ported  that  the  Confederate  loss  was  five  men  killed  and 
nine  wounded. 

Captain  Henry  V.  Stall,  Sixth  Missouri  State  Militia 
Cavalry,  who  had  been  stationed  at  Neosho  with  a  de 
tachment  of  his  regiment,  had  just  started  for  Newtonia 
when  the  advance  of  Shelby's  column  on  the  Pineville 
road  came  up,  and  he  had  two  men  wounded  in  getting 
his  train  out.  This,  however,  was  before  Captain  McAfee 
returned  to  town  and  opened  the  fight. 

After  distributing  the  captured  arms  and  public  prop 
erty  among  his  troops,  and  burning  the  court-house, 
Shelby  left  Neosho  about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
and  resumed  his  march  northeast  in  the  direction  of 
Sarcoxie  and  Greenfield,  the  last-named  place  being  the 
home  of  Colonel  Coffee. 

On  the  march  to  Newtonia  Captain  Stall  heard  the 
sound  of  artillery  in  the  attack  on  Captain  McAfee,  at 
Neosho,  and  immediately  sent  a  despatch  to  General  John 
McNeil,  commanding  the  District  of  Southwest  Missouri, 
at  Springfield,  announcing  the  fact,  and  that  from  the  best 
information  he  could  obtain  he  believed  that  the  forces 
making  the  attack  were  under  Shelby  and  Coffee.  This 
was  the  first  information  that  the  district  commander 
had  that  Shelby  had  entered  Missouri.  But  about  the 
1st  of  October,  Colonel  John  Edwards,  Eighteenth  Iowa 
Infantry,  who  was  temporarily  in  command  of  the  dis- 


170  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

trict  in  the  absence  of  General  McNeil,  was  informed  that 
Shelby  and  Coffee  were  at  Huntsville,  Arkansas,  with 
a  Confederate  force,  and  immediately  advised  General 
Schofield,  commanding  the  Department,  by  telegraph. 
Colonel  Edwards  was  then  ordered  to  concentrate  the 
troops  of  his  district  at  several  points  as  rapidly  as  pos 
sible.  He  ordered  Major  E.  B.  Eno,  with  a  battalion  of 
the  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  to  Cassville, 
and  Major  Austin  A.  King,  Jr.,  Sixth  Missouri  State  Mi 
litia  Cavalry,  was  directed  to  concentrate  all  the  troops 
on  the  southwestern  border  of  the  district  at  Newtonia, 
twelve  miles  east  of  Neosho.  But  Major  King  was  out 
on  a  scout  with  his  command,  and  the  messenger  who  was 
sent  with  the  despatch  to  him  was  captured,  which  caused 
a  delay  in  the  concentration  at  Newtonia  and  prevented 
an  immediate  pursuit  of  Shelby  from  that  point.  An 
hour  before  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  the  com 
mands  of  Majors  Eno  and  King  and  Colonel  John  D. 
Allen,  Seventh  Provisional  Regiment  Enrolled  Missouri 
Militia,  arrived  at  Newtonia,  and  after  waiting  until  even 
ing  for  their  commissary  stores  to  come  over  from  Cass 
ville  started  out  on  a  night's  march  for  Greenfield  in 
pursuit  of  Shelby  and  Coffee,  who  were  twenty-four 
hours  ahead  of  them. 

The  telegraph  line  had  recently  been  constructed  from 
Springfield  to  Cassville  and  Elkhorn,  so  that  General 
Schofield  at  St.  Louis  was  immediately  advised  of  the 
movements  of  the  raiders.  The  General  was  satisfied 
that  Shelby's  destination  was  Central  Missouri,  and  at 
once  telegraphed  General  E.  B.  Brown,  commanding  that 
district,  that  it  might  be  necessary  to  concentrate  his 
troops  to  operate  against  the  invaders;  also  that  the  co 
operation  of  the  troops  of  General  Ewing,  commanding 
the  District  of  the  Border,  might  become  necessary. 

On  receipt  of  information  that  after  Shelby  left  Neosho 
he  had  marched  northeast  in  the  direction  of  Greenfield, 


SHELBY'S  RAID  IN  MISSOURI  IN  l86j.  I /I 

Colonel  Edwards  left  Springfield,  with  150  men  and  three 
pieces  of  artillery,  to  intercept  the  enemy,  and  sent  orders 
to  Majors  King  and  Eno  and  General  C.  B.  Holland, 
commanding  the  Enrolled  Missouri  Militia  in  that  dis 
trict,  to  join  him  with  their  respective  commands  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Greenfield  as  early  as  practicable.  These 
officers  marched  promptly  with  their  commands,  day  and 
night,  and  formed  a  junction  with  Colonel  Edwards  at 
Greenfield  on  the  /th,  about  twenty-four  hours  after 
Shelby  had  burnt  the  court-house,  sacked  the  town,  and 
marched  north  in  the  direction  of  Stockton.  With  Majors 
King's  and  Eno's  battalions  of  five  hundred  men  and 
General  Holland's  Enrolled  Militia  of  six  hundred  men, 
Colonel  Edwards  had  a  force  of  1250  men  and  three 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  at  once  pushed  on  in  pursuit  of 
the  raiders,  following  them  as  far  as  Quincy,  in  Hickory 
County,  where  he  received  a  despatch  from  General 
Schofield  ordering  him  to  keep  south  of  the  Osage,  as 
Shelby  would  likely  soon  be  driven  back  from  Central 
Missouri.  He  then  directed  General  Holland  to  move 
his  command  to  Osceola  to  watch  the  movements  of 
the  enemy  in  that  direction,  and  marched  himself  with 
the  rest  of  his  command  to  Buffalo,  in  Dallas  County, 
as  his  scouts  reported  that  the  raiders  had  turned  east 
and  would  probably  endeavor  to  go  out  of  the  State 
via  Linn  Creek  and  Lebanon,  or  even  east  of  the  last- 
named  place. 

At  Buffalo,  on  the  I2th,  Colonel  Edwards  was  relieved 
of  command  of  the  troops  in  the  field  in  Southwest  Mis 
souri  by  General  McNeil  on  his  arrival  from  St.  Louis. 
On  the  I4th,  after  his  arrival  at  Buffalo,  General  Mc 
Neil  received  information  from  General  Brown  which  led 
him  to  believe  that  the  raiding  force  would  endeavor  to 
pass  out  of  the  State  west  of  Buffalo  and  probably  west 
of  Bolivar.  He  therefore  commenced  at  once  to  con 
centrate  his  troops  to  renew  the  pursuit  of  Shelby's  forces 


1/2  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

as  soon  as  they  crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  Osage 
River  in  their  retreat  south. 

In  his  march  north  from  Neosho,  Shelby  moved  so 
rapidly  that  he  met  very  little  opposition  until  he  arrived 
at  Warsaw,  where  Captain  Abraham  Darst,  Seventh 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  was  stationed  with  his 
company.  The  town  of  Warsaw  was  on  a  bluff  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Osage  River,  the  bluff  being  almost 
precipitous  to  the  water's  edge,  and  when  the  Confeder 
ates  came  up  on  the  opposite  side  and  attempted  to  cross 
at  the  ford,  Captain  Darst  formed  his  men  along  the 
bank,  opened  fire  upon  them,  drove  them  back,  and  held 
them  in  check  for  half  an  hour.  But  before  coming  up 
in  sight  of  the  Federal  station,  Colonel  Shelby  sent  a 
regiment  around  to  cross  the  river  several  miles  below 
Warsaw  to  gain  the  rear  of  the  Federal  detachment  and 
cut  them  off  from  the  road  to  Osceola.  This  movement 
against  his  flanks  and  rear  was  discovered  by  Captain 
Darst  before  he  was  completely  surrounded,  and  he 
hastily  retired  in  a  northeast  direction,  his  men  getting 
into  the  brush  and  timber,  where  it  was  difficult  for  the 
Confederates  to  pursue  them.  In  his  manoeuvring  he 
had  ten  men  captured ;  besides  he  lost  all  his  transporta 
tion  and  supplies,  except  one  ambulance. 

General  Brown  was  at  Clinton,  Henry  County,  on  a 
tour  of  inspection  of  his  district,  when  he  received  from 
Major  J.  H.  Steger,  his  Assistant  Adjutant-General  at 
Jefferson  City,  General  Schofield's  despatch  stating  that 
Shelby  was  advancing  north  in  the  direction  of  Central 
Missouri  with  fourteen  hundred  men  and  two  pieces  of 
artillery,  and  at  once  issued  orders  for  his  troops  to  con 
centrate  at  Warrensburg,  Clinton,  Sedalia,  and  Warsaw, 
and  called  into  active  service  two  thousand  Enrolled 
Militia. 

As  the  raiding  force  was  moving  almost  as  rapidly  as  a 
mounted  messenger,  General  Brown  was  unable  to  obtain 


SHELBY'S  RAID   IN  MISSOURI  IN  lS6j.  173 

any  definite  information  as  to  its  position  or  what  point 
it  was  marching  upon  in  time  to  make  proper  disposition 
of  his  troops  for  striking  an  effective  blow.  While  wait 
ing  at  Clinton  for  the  arrival  of  troops  that  he  had  ordered 
to  that  point,  he  received  information  that  Shelby  had 
advanced  as  far  north  as  Stockton,  indicating  that  he 
would  cross  the  Osage  at  Osceola,  or  above  that  place. 
But  after  dispersing  a  detachment  of  militia  and  burning 
the  court-house  at  Stockton,  Shelby  turned  northeast, 
and  passing  through  Humansville  and  Quincy  arrived  at 
Warsaw  on  the  morning  of  the  8th.  Acting  on  the  in 
formation  that  Shelby  was  advancing  north  from  Stock 
ton  and  would  cross  the  Osage  at  Osceola,  or  in  that 
vicinity,  General  Brown  left  Clinton  on  the  morning  of 
the  8th  and  marched  to  Osceola,  a  distance  of  thirty 
miles,  with  about  eight  hundred  men,  under  Colonel 
John  F.  Philips,  Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry, 
and  a  section  of  the  First  Battery  Missouri  State  Militia 
Light  Artillery,  under  Captain  Charles  H.  Thurbur.  That 
night,  after  his  troops  had  gone  into  camp  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Osage  River,  the  General  received  information 
that  Shelby  had  that  morning  taken  Warsaw  and  was 
moving  north  in  the  direction  of  the  railroad.  He  then 
directed  Colonel  Philips  to  send  two  hundred  men  under 
a  competent  officer  to  Warsaw  that  night  to  follow  up 
the  Confederates  and  keep  him  advised  of  their  move 
ments.  Major  Emory  S.  Foster,  Seventh  Missouri  State 
Militia  Cavalry,  was  detached  for  this  important  duty,  and 
started  out  immediately  to  strike  the  trail  of  the  enemy. 
On  arriving  at  Warsaw  the  next  morning  after  sunrise, 
Major  Foster  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had  marched 
north  on  the  Sedalia  road  the  day  before,  and  he  at  once 
started  in  pursuit  on  that  road.  When  within  four  miles 
of  Cole  Camp,  at  a  point  where  the  road  from  that  village 
intersected  the  Sedalia  and  Warsaw  road,  he  encountered 
and  drove  in  Shelby's  pickets,  and  directly  afterwards,  in 


174  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

a  skirmish  with  a  Confederate  scouting  party  who  had 
been  out  gathering  up  fresh  horses  taken  from  the  Union 
ists,  wounded  two  men  and  captured  three  prisoners. 
From  the  prisoners  he  ascertained  that  Shelby  had  fifteen 
hundred  well-armed  men  and  two  pieces  of  artillery,  and 
that  he  was  marching  to  Sedalia  or  Boonville.  As  Sedalia 
appeared  to  be  threatened,  Major  Foster  hastened  on  to 
that  place,  arriving  there  at  five  o'clock  that  evening,  and 
reported  to  Colonel  George  H.  Hall,  Fourth  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry,  commanding  the  post.  Colonel 
Hall  had  arrived  at  Sedalia  from  Marshall  on  the  evening 
of  the  7th,  with  four  companies  of  his  regiment  and  a  sec 
tion  of  the  First  Battery  Missouri  State  Militia  Light  Ar 
tillery,  under  Lieutenant  Bennett  P.  Newgent,  and  the 
next  day  about  noon  received  information  that  Shelby  had 
captured  Warsaw,  dispersed  the  small  Federal  force  sta 
tioned  at  that  post,  and  was  advancing  north.  As  it  was 
extremely  desirable  to  ascertain  what  point  Shelby  would 
strike  after  leaving  Warsaw,  Colonel  Hall  at  once  sent 
out  detachments  of  cavalry  to  the  southeast  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Warsaw,  and  to  the  southwest,  to  observe  the 
movements  of  the  enemy.  He  also  called  out  the  citi 
zens,  and  with  the  assistance  of  about  sixty  men  of  the 
Fifth  Provisional  Regiment  Enrolled  Missouri  Militia, 
under  Major  William  Gentry,  constructed  breastworks 
out  of  railroad  ties  and  bales  of  hay.  His  scouts  reported 
to  him  several  times  on  the  Qth  that  the  Confederates 
were  advancing,  and  late  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day 
that  the  enemy  had  passed  Cole  Camp  and  were  march 
ing  in  the  direction  of  Syracuse,  which  was  confirmed  on 
the  arrival  of  Major  Foster. 

Colonel  Hall  telegraphed  and  also  sent  messengers  to 
all  commanding  officers  of  cooperating  troops  in  the  dis 
trict  of  the  latest  positions  and  movements  of  the  raiders, 
so  that  the  Federal  forces  might  concentrate  at  once  for 
effective  operations. 


SHELBY'S  RAID  IN  MISSOURI  IN  lS6j,  175 

When  General  Brown,  at  Osceola,  on  the  night  of  the 
8th,  heard  of  Shelby  passing  Warsaw,  he  immediately 
despatched  an  order  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lazear,  who 
had  arrived  at  Clinton  with  the  First  Regiment  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry,  to  move  east  until  he  struck  the 
trail  of  the  enemy,  and  then  to  follow  them  up.  The 
General  rested  his  men  and  horses  at  Osceola  that  night, 
and  the  next  morning  started  on  the  march  to  Sedalia,  and 
arrived  there  on  the  following  morning,  the  loth,  having 
marched  a  distance  of  sixty-five  miles  in  less  than  twenty- 
four  hours.  Meanwhile  Colonel  Lazear  marched  promptly 
from  Clinton,  and  on  the  Qth  struck  the  trail  of  the  enemy 
at  Cole  Camp,  four  hours  after  they  had  passed  through 
that  place.  He  pushed  on  in  the  pursuit,  and  when 
nearing  Tipton  found  that  he  would  have  to  cross  a 
prairie  of  about  four  miles,  which  would  expose  to  the 
view  of  the  Confederates  the  number  of  men  he  had  in 
his  command.  As  he  had  only  670  men,  less  than  half 
of  the  strength  of  the  Confederate  force,  he  determined 
to  send  forward  two  companies  to  reconnoitre,  and  then, 
with  the  rest  of  his  command,  took  up  a  good  position  in 
line  of  battle  in  the  timber  near  the  edge  of  the  prairie. 

The  reconnoitring  detachment  found  only  a  few  strag 
glers  of  the  raiders  in  town,  and  killed  two  and  took  one 
prisoner.  As  soon  as  he  ascertained  that  the  enemy 
had  left  Tipton,  Colonel  Lazear  moved  up  with  his  main 
column,  but  remained  in  town  only  a  few  moments,  when, 
leaving  two  troops  of  cavalry  to  guard  his  train,  he  moved 
with  the  balance  of  his  command  up  the  railroad  to  at 
tack  the  Confederates,  who  were  reported  to  be  drawn 
up  in  line  of  battle  about  three  miles  out  on  the  road  to 
Syracuse.  He  had  heard  some  artillery  firing  in  the 
direction  of  the  position  where  the  Confederates  were 
supposed  to  be  formed,  but  did  not  know  what  troops 
had  been  doing  the  firing.  He  arrived  on  the  ground 
where  the  enemy  had  formed  shortly  after  four  o'clock 


176  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

in  the  afternoon  to  find  that  they  had  marched  off  in  the 
direction  of  Boonville.  On  returning  to  Tipton  he  found 
the  companies  left  there  with  his  train  skirmishing  with 
a  body  of  men  who  were  approaching  from  the  east,  but 
who  proved  to  be  a  detachment  of  Enrolled  Militia  from 
California,  under  an  officer  who  was  careless  about  ascer 
taining  whom  he  was  firing  upon.  Night  coming  on,  and 
being  dark  and  rainy,  Colonel  Lazear's  troops  bivouacked 
in  line  of  battle  at  Tipton  until  the  next  morning. 

Colonel  Shelby  had  captured  the  town  that  morning, 
and  had  sent  part  of  his  command  up  the  railroad  in  the 
direction  of  Sedalia  to  burn  bridges,  tear  up  the  railroad 
track,  and  take  down  the  telegraph  wire.  This  work 
kept  him  in  the  vicinity  of  Tipton  and  Syracuse  until 
nearly  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  loth,  when  he 
marched  for  Boonville.  While  on  the  march  to  Tipton 
on  the  night  of  the  Qth,  he  detached  Captain  James 
Wood,  with  one  hundred  men,  to  destroy  the  Pacific 
Railroad  Bridge  over  the  Lamine  River,  fifteen  miles 
east  of  Sedalia.  A  detachment  of  twenty-eight  men, 
under  Captain  M.  D.  Berry,  of  the  Fifth  Regiment  Mis 
souri  Enrolled  Militia,  was  stationed  in  a  blockhouse  at 
the  bridge  as  a  guard.  But,  procuring  a  guide,  Captain 
Wood  approached  the  station  cautiously  through  the 
darkness,  surprised  the  sentinel,  and  charged  upon  and 
captured  Captain  Berry  and  seventeen  of  his  men  before 
they  were  in  position  to  fire  a  shot.  In  the  darkness 
ten  of  his  men  made  their  escape.  The  Confederates 
burned  the  bridge,  blockhouse,  tents,  wagons,  and  other 
public  property,  and  after  paroling  Captain  Berry  and 
his  men  marched  east  through  Syracuse  to  Tipton,  where 
they  joined  the  main  column  under  Shelby. 

On  his  arrival  at  Sedalia,  at  daybreak  on  the  loth, 
General  Brown  ordered  Major  G.  W.  Kelly,  Fourth  Mis 
souri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  and  Major  William  Gentry, 
Fifth  Provisional  Regiment  Missouri  Enrolled  Militia, 


SHELBY'S  RAID  IN  MISSOURI  IN  1 863.  Iff 

with  about  four  hundred  men,  to  move  east  along  the 
railroad  until  they  struck  the  enemy,  and  then  harass  him 
as  much  as  possible;  also  to  form  a  junction,  if  practica 
ble,  with  Colonel  Lazear,  who  was  supposed  to  be  close 
in  the  rear  and  in  pursuit  of  the  raiders.  Major  Kelly 
marched  promptly,  and  about  three  o'clock  encountered 
the  Confederate  pickets  at  Syracuse,  about  120  strong, 
drove  them  out  of  town,  and  skirmished  with  them  until 
they  fell  back  upon  the  main  force  four  miles  east,  when 
Shelby  opened  upon  him  with  his  artillery.  As  his  object 
was  to  make  such  display  of  his  troops  as  to  force  the 
Confederates  to  a  stand,  Major  Kelly  retired  to  Syracuse 
without  loss  after  a  short  skirmish  in  which  the  raiders 
formed  line  of  battle,  opened  fire  on  him  with  their  artil 
lery,  and  prepared  to  charge  him.  Colonel  Shelby  be 
lieved  that  this  force  under  Major  Kelly  was  much  larger 
than  it  really  was,  and  that  it  was  under  command  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Thomas  T.  Crittenden,  Seventh  Mis 
souri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  who  had  early  that  morning 
made  a  reconnoissance  from  Tipton  up  the  railroad  in  the 
direction  of  Sedalia  on  an  unattached  locomotive  to  as 
certain  if  the  raiders  had  destroyed  the  Lamine  Bridge, 
and  barely  escaped  capture.  The  artillery  firing  heard 
by  Colonel  Lazear  on  approaching  Tipton  was  Shelby's 
attack  on  Major  Kelly,  who,  on  retiring  to  Syracuse, 
made  a  circuitous  march  from  that  place  to  the  south  and 
southwest  and  joined  Colonel  Lazear  at  Tipton  that  night 
about  eleven  o'clock.  The  night  was  so  dark  and  rainy 
that  Colonel  Lazear  was  unable  to  follow  up  the  enemy 
with  his  entire  command  and  train,  but  sent  out  Lieuten 
ant  James  Daily,  with  fifty  men,  to  follow  up  their  trail, 
harass  and  annoy  their  rear,  and  give  them  no  rest  during 
the  night. 

The  Lieutenant  marched  out  only  four  miles  and  then 
returned,  but  did  not  report  until  six  o'clock  the  next 
With  the  addition  of  Major  Kelly's  command, 

VOL.    II.  — 12 


178  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

Colonel  Lazear  had  a  force  of  about  one  thousand  men, 
and  early  on  the  morning  of  the  nth  pushed  on  in  pur 
suit  of  the  Confederates,  and  came  to  Shelby's  picket- 
guard  just  at  dark,  four  miles  south  of  Boonville,  and 
drove  them  in.  The  evening  was  rainy,  and  it  soon  be 
came  very  dark,  and  Colonel  Lazear  again  had  his  men 
rest  on  their  arms  in  line  of  battle  during  the  night  with 
out  food  or  fire.  He  was  reinforced  that  evening  by 
Captain  W.  D.  Wear,  with  120  men  of  the  Ninth  Pro 
visional  Regiment  Enrolled  Militia.  Early  the  next 
morning  he  moved  forward  again,  and  on  approaching 
Boonville  found  that  the  enemy  had  marched  out  during 
the  night  on  the  road  to  Marshall.  Colonel  Lazear's 
advance,  under  Major  A.  W.  Mullins,  came  in  sight  of 
Shelby's  rear-guard  as  it  was  leaving  camp,  about  four 
miles  east  of  Boonville.  In  a  short  time  Major  Mullins 
came  up  with  the  Confederate  rear-guard,  and  skirmished 
with  it  at  intervals  until  he  came  to  the  Dug  Ford  on 
the  Lamine.  At  this  place  Colonel  Shelby  prepared  an 
ambush  for  the  advancing  Federal  column.  He  posted 
Major  G.  P.  Gordon  with  his  regiment,  dismounted,  on 
the  west  side  of  the  river  near  the  ford,  and  left  two  com 
panies  on  the  east  side  to  fire  on  the  Federal  advance  and 
then  retreat. 

Finding  that  the  enemy  were  defending  the  ford,  Major 
Mullins  ordered  Captain  Joseph  H.  Little  to  charge  their 
position,  which  he  did  in  gallant  style,  dashing  across 
the  river  and  receiving  a  heavy  volley  from  the  concealed 
foe  at  short  range.  He  soon  succeeded,  however,  in 
driving  the  raiders  from  their  position,  with  the  loss  of 
five  or  six  men  mortally  and  badly  wounded,  and  one 
prisoner,  and  sustained  a  loss  himself  of  two  men  killed 
and  one  mortally,  two  severely,  and  two  slightly,  wounded. 
Colonel  Lazear's  command  then  came  up  and  crossed  the 
river  and  continued  the  pursuit  until  General  Brown 
arrived  from  Sedalia  with  the  Seventh  Missouri  State 


SHELBY'S  RAID   IN  MISSOURI  IN  l86j.  179 

Militia  Cavalry,  under  Colonel  Philips,  and  two  sections 
of  Captain  Thurbur's  battery,  Missouri  State  Militia  Light 
Artillery,  and  took  the  advance.  In  a  short  time  Colonel 
Philips'  advance,  under  Major  Suess,  came  up  with  Shel 
by's  rear-guard,  and  skirmishing  with  them  killed  one  man. 
Major  Foster  was  then  given  the  advance  with  four  com 
panies,  and  pressed  the  Confederates  so  closely  that  they 
made  a  stand  and  determined  to  fight  at  Salt  Fork  of 
the  Lamine  River,  about  nine  miles  from  Marshall.  In 
making  disposition  of  his  troops  for  action,  Colonel  Shelby 
crossed  to  the  north  side  of  the  creek  with  his  artillery 
and  the  main  part  of  his  command,  leaving  on  the  south 
side  a  line  of  skirmishers,  and  in  the  rear  of  the  skirmish 
ers  a  regiment  dismounted  in  line  and  posted  behind  a 
fence  in  thick  brush,  so  as  to  cover  the  ford. 

On  coming  up  almost  within  range  of  the  Confederate 
skirmish-line,  Major  Foster  formed  his  men  in  line  in  the 
timber  on  high  ground  overlooking  the  creek,  and  in  a 
few  moments  a  severe  conflict  with  small-arms  took  place 
between  the  opposing  forces.  A  section  of  Thurbur's 
battery  was  ordered  up,  and  an  artillery  contest  with 
Shelby's  two  guns  took  place,  lasting  perhaps  for  a  quar 
ter  of  an  hour,  in  which  one  of  Captain  Thurbur's  men 
had  both  of  his  legs  taken  off  above  the  knees  by  a  can 
non-ball,  and  bled  to  death  in  a  few  minutes.*  Colonel 
Philips  ordered  the  other  companies  of  his  regiment  for 
ward  to  support  Major  Foster,  and  dismounting  part  of 
his  men  drove  back  the  Confederate  skirmishers  and  the 
dismounted  line  in  front  of  the  ford.  The  fighting  was 
in  the  midst  of  a  hard  rain,  and  darkness  coming  on  the 
Federal  troops  bivouacked  in  line  on  their  arms,  leaving 
the  struggle  undecided.  Colonel  Shelby,  however,  after 
the  firing  ceased  and  darkness  set  in,  moved  out  and 
halted  for  the  night  six  miles  from  Marshall,  leaving  a 

*  Paper  read   before  Loyal  Legion  by   Captain  George  S.  Grover,    St. 
Louis,  Missouri. 


I  SO  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

strong  force  on  the  north  side  of  the  creek  to  hold  the 
fords. 

With  his  forces  now  united,  General  Brown  had  about 
sixteen  hundred  men  and  four  pieces  of  artillery,  and  he 
determined  to  make  every  effort  possible  to  force  Shelby 
into  an  action  that  would  result  in  dispersing  his  com 
mand,  or  so  cripple  him  that  he  would  be  unable  to  get 
out  of  the  State  with  the  large  amount  of  plunder  he  had 
secured.  To  compel  the  Confederate  leader  into  a  deci 
sive  action,  it  would  be  necessary  to  get  a  strong  force 
in  his  front,  for  he  had  already  shown  that  by  choosing 
strong  positions  he  could  with  a  small  part  of  his  com 
mand  hold  in  check  a  large  pursuing  force  long  enough 
to  enable  the  main  part  of  his  troops  and  trains  to  move 
many  miles  to  the  front. 

As  the  night  was  dark  and  rainy  and  the  roads  muddy, 
General  Brown  was  satisfied  from  the  information  he  re 
ceived  that  the  Confederates  had  bivouacked  in  his  front 
on  the  road  to  Marshall.  He  therefore  sent  one  of  his 
aides-de-camp,  Lieutenant  George  S.  Grover,  shortly  be 
fore  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  I3th,  to  Colonel 
Lazear,  requesting  him  to  come  over  to  General  Brown's 
headquarters  at  once.  On  his  arrival  there  and  after  ex 
changing  a  few  words  in  regard  to  the  situation,  Colonel 
Lazear  was  directed  to  move  his  command  of  one 
thousand  men  and  a  section  of  Thurbur's  battery  on  a 
left-hand  road,  and  march  around  the  left  flank  of  the  Con 
federates  in  the  darkness  and  head  them  off  at  Marshall. 
Jn  cooperation  with  this  movement,  General  Brown  pro 
posed  to  march  at  daylight  with  Colonel  Philips'  command 
and  follow  up  the  trail  of  the  enemy  and  attack  them  in 
the  rear.  Colonel  Lazear  started  out  with  his  command 
about  five  o'clock,  and  reached  Marshall  at  seven  o'clock 
that  morning,  placed  pickets  on  the  different  roads  lead 
ing  into  town,  and  allowed  his  men  to  feed  their  horses 
and  get  breakfast.  His  men  had  hardly  finished  their 


SHELBY'S  RAID  IN  MISSOURI  IN  1863.  l8l 

breakfasts  when  his  pickets  on  the  Arrow  Rock  road  east 
of  town  came  in  and  reported  about  eight  o'clock  that 
the  Confederates  were  in  sight,  advancing  in  strong  force. 
He  ordered  his  men  called  to  arms,  and  then  directed 
Major  Kelly  to  move  out  with  his  battalion  of  the  Fourth 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry  and  hold  the  enemy  in 
check  while  dispositions  were  being  made  of  the  other 
troops  to  meet  the  attack  of  the  advancing  foe.  Major 
Kelly  marched  out  a  short  distance,  and  then  directed 
Captain  Joe  Park  to  move  down  the  road  and  skirmish 
with  the  enemy,  which  he  did  until  the  Major  came  to 
his  support  with  the  other  three  companies  of  the  bat 
talion.  In  a  few  moments  the  Confederates  came  up 
in  force  and  commenced  forming  line  of  battle  with  a 
determination  to  make  a  desperate  effort  to  break  and 
crush  the  Federal  line  in  their  front. 

In  preparing  for  the  attack,  Colonel  Shelby  placed 
Hooper's  regiment  on  his  left,  Gordon's  regiment  and 
Elliott's  battalion  in  the  centre,  and  Hunter's  and  Cof 
fee's  regiments  on  his  right.  His  men  were  all  dismounted, 
and  his  two  pieces  of  artillery  posted  in  the  centre,  with 
his  train  a  short  distance  in  the  rear.  Meanwhile  Colonel 
Lazear  was  occupied  in  forming  his  line.  He  posted 
Major  J.  H.  McGhee's  Second  Battalion  First  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry  and  Captain  Wear's  company, 
Ninth  Provisional  Regiment  Missouri  Enrolled  Militia, 
on  his  extreme  right  on  a  hill  southeast  of  town,  with 
instructions  to  hold  that  position  at  all  hazards.  In  his 
centre  he  placed  Major  Mullins,  with  three  troops  of  the 
First  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  and  Troop  L  of  the 
same  regiment  on  the  left  of  Major  Mullins  in  town. 
Major  Gentry's  battalion,  Fifth  Provisional  Regiment 
Missouri  Enrolled  Militia,  was  posted  on  the  Federal 
left.  The  troops  in  the  line  thus  formed  were  all  dis 
mounted.  As  soon  as  Colonel  Lazear  had  completed  his 
line,  Major  Kelly's  battalion  and  one  company  of  the  First 


1 82  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry  were  held  in  reserve  in  the 
rear  of  the  two  guns  of  Thurbur's  battery. 

When  Colonel  Shelby  got  his  men  in  position,  he 
opened  with  his  artillery  on  Major  McGhee's  battalion 
while  marching  in  column  to  its  position  on  the  hill.  In 
a  few  moments,  however,  Major  McGhee  got  his  men  in 
position,  dismounted,  and  repulsed  Colonel  Hooper's 
regiment,  which  advanced  against  him  to  take  the  hill. 
In  front  of  Major  McGhee's  position  there  was  a  deep 
ravine  which  the  Confederates  would  be  obliged  to  cross 
to  reach  him.  When,  therefore,  they  made  a  charge  and 
attempted  to  cross  this  ravine  they  met  a  destructive  fire 
from  the  Federal  riflemen,  and  were  driven  back  with 
heavy  loss.  Finding  that  he  could  not  dislodge  the 
Federal  right,  Colonel  Shelby  next  directed  his  attack 
against  the  Federal  centre,  held  by  Major  Mullins,  making 
three  desperate  charges,  in  each  of  which  his  men  were 
repulsed.  To  meet  this  assault  on  his  centre,  Colonel 
Lazear  ordered  his  two  small  guns  of  Thurbur's  battery 
into  action,  but  as  he  only  had  canister  for  them  he  was 
unable  to  reach  the  enemy.  He  then  ordered  these  guns 
into  a  new  position  within  250  yards  of  the  Confederate 
line,  and  opened  fire  upon  it;  but  before  they  fired  many 
rounds,  Hunter's  and  Coffee's  regiments  on  Shelby's 
right  made  a  furious  charge  and  attempted  to  take  them, 
and  as  Major  Gentry's  command  on  the  Federal  left  gave 
way  about  this  time  the  guns  were  withdrawn  to  a  posi 
tion  near  the  edge  of  town.  Major  Gentry  soon  rallied 
his  men  and  placed  them  in  a  better  position,  and  they 
held  it  against  several  charges  and  until  the  Confederates 
began  to  give  way.  Having  reestablished  his  line  on 
his  left,  Colonel  Lazear  ordered  Major  Kelly  with  his 
battalion  north  and  on  his  extreme  left  to  guard  against 
a  flanking  movement  of  the  Confederates  in  that  direc 
tion. 

After  the  fight  at  Marshall  had  lasted  upwards  of  two 


SHELBY'S  RAID  IN  MISSOURI  IN  l86j.  183 

hours,  the  thundering  of  General  Brown's  artillery  was 
heard  in  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  forces,  and  then  in 
a  short  time  the  General  came  up,  forming  a  junction 
with  Colonel  Lazear.  Knowing  that  General  Brown  was 
pursuing  him,  and  believing  that  the  Federal  advance 
would  soon  be  in  sight,  Colonel  Shelby  left  Shanks' 
regiment  to  destroy  the  bridge  over  the  Salt  Fork  a  few 
miles  east  of  Marshall  and  to  hold  the  crossing  as  long  as 
practicable.  On  coming  up  and  finding  the  crossing  over 
the  bridge  disputed  by  the  Confederates,  General  Brown 
directed  Colonel  Philips  to  leave  three  companies  of  his 
regiment  and  a  section  of  Thurbur's  battery,  under  Major 
Houts,  to  engage  them,  while  with  the  rest  of  his  regi 
ment  the  Colonel  crossed  the  creek  three  quarters  of  a 
mile  below  the  bridge,  which  made  Shanks'  position  un 
tenable,  and  he  was  soon  obliged  to  retire.  Major  Houts 
then  crossed  the  creek  over  the  bridge  with  his  command 
and  attacked  Shanks  again,  compelling  him  to  fall  back 
on  Shelby's  main  force  near  Marshall. 

After  crossing  to  the  west  side  of  the  creek  and  encoun 
tering  many  difficulties  in  marching  over  deep  ravines, 
rugged  hills,  and  through  thick  brush,  Colonel  Philips 
succeeded  in  getting  into  position  on  the  left  flank  of  the 
Confederates,  and  soon  drew  the  fire  from  their  two  guns, 
without,  however,  doing  any  damage.  As  the  ground  in 
his  front  was  rough  and  broken  and  brushy  and  unfavor 
able  for  the  movement  of  cavalry,  and  as  the  Confederate 
line  was  too  great  a  distance  off  for  his  small-arms  to  be 
effective,  he  dismounted  his  men  and  moved  forward  in 
line  to  attack  the  enemy.  But  before  his  men  advanced 
fairly  within  range  of  the  Confederates,  they  commenced 
moving  off  north  to  escape.  Seeing  the  determination  of 
the  enemy  to  get  away,  Colonel  Philips  mounted  his  men 
as  quickly  as  possible,  led  them  at  a  gallop  to  the  northwest 
of  Marshall,  in  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  right,  and 
dismounting  them  again  placed  them  in  position,  and 


1 84  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

they  went  into  action  on  the  left  of  Major  Kelly's  bat 
talion,  Fourth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry.  His  sec 
tion  of  artillery  he  also  placed  in  position,  supported  by 
several  companies  of  his  regiment,  and  the  guns  did  good 
service  during  the  action,  which  lasted  nearly  an  hour  on 
that  part  of  the  field. 

Both  sides  now  prepared  for  decisive  action.  Colonel 
Shelby  mounted  his  whole  force,  and  seeing  that  he  was 
nearly  surrounded  determined  to  break  through  the 
Federal  left  and  escape  to  the  northwest.  He  encoun 
tered  some  difficulty,  however,  in  getting  his  command 
formed  so  as  to  save  his  train  and  artillery,  for  in  his  front 
there  was  a  deep  ravine,  or  ditch,  to  be  crossed,  and  be 
yond  that  thick  brush  to  be  passed  through.  A  tempo 
rary  bridge  was  thrown  over  the  ditch,  but  before  he 
could  complete  his  other  movements  Major  Kelly,  with 
his  battalion,  Fourth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry, 
charged  his  centre,  cutting  his  line  in  two  and  detaching 
the  commands  of  Colonels  Hunter,  Hooper,  and  Shanks, 
with  the  brass  field-piece,  the  other  gun,  a  ten-pounder 
Parrott,  having  become  disabled  and  captured.  In  the 
capture  of  this  gun,  Captain  R.  M.  Box,  of  Major  Foster's 
battalion,  displayed  a  coolness  and  courage  rarely  wit 
nessed  on  the  battle-field,  and  that  elicited  the  warmest 
praise  from  the  officers  and  men  of  his  regiment.  After 
pressing  the  enemy  closely  for  some  time  that  morning, 
Major  Foster  noticed  quite  a  number  of  Confederates 
around  one  of  their  guns,  and  suspecting  that  it  was  dis 
abled  ordered  Captain  Box  to  dismount  his  company, 
deploy  it  through  a  wooded  tract  of  scrub-oak,  and 
charge  the  gun,  drive  off  the  support,  and  take  it.  In  a 
moment  the  Captain  had  his  company  dismounted  and 
deployed,  leaving  the  usual  number  of  men  to  hold  horses, 
and  then  moved  forward  in  the  face  of  a  hot  fire  from  the 
enemy  with  as  much  steadiness  as  if  he  were  on  the  parade 
ground.  Halting  a  moment  to  dress  his  company,  he 


SHELBY'S  RAID  IN  MISSOURI  IN  l86j.  1 8$ 

then  shouted  in  a  voice  easily  heard  by  his  men,  "Mark 
time,  left,  left,  left,  charge!  "  and  advancing  to  the  front 
and  "waving  his  sabre  in  the  air,"  led  them  in  the  charge 
that  quickly  swept  away  the  support  and  captured  the 
gun  and  brought  it  off  the  field,  proud  of  the  trophy  won 
by  his  gallantry.* 

Before  General  Brown  could  mount  his  troops  and  close 
up  his  lines,  Shelby  with  the  commands  of  Coffee  and 
Gordon  and  Elliott's  battalion  and  his  train  of  ammuni 
tion  and  plunder  escaped  to  the  northwest  through  the 
thick  brush  and  timber  on  Salt  Fork. 

After  this  separation  of  the  Confederate  forces,  Colonel 
Hunter  turned  to  the  right  and  retreated  down  the  Arrow 
Rock  road  about  eight  miles  and  then  marched  southeast, 
crossing  the  Pacific  Railroad  near  Syracuse  and  the  Osage 
River  at  Duroc. 

When  he  saw  that  the  line  of  the  Confederates  had 
been  broken,  and  that  part  of  them  were  endeavoring  to 
escape  north  through  the  brush  and  timber  on  Salt  Fork, 
Colonel  Philips  immediately  mounted  nine  companies  of 
his  regiment,  and  with  the  battalions  of  Majors  Kelly  and 
Gentry  and  the  two  guns  of  Thurbur's  battery  started  in 
hot  pursuit.  His  advance  came  upon  the  Confederate 
rear-guard  just  as  they  commenced  tearing  up  the  bridge 
over  the  creek,  but  they  were  driven  off  and  pursued  be 
fore  rendering  it  impassable.  As  soon  as  Colonel  Philips 
got  his  command  over  the  bridge  and  struck  the  prairie 
he  pressed  the  Confederates  vigorously  for  about  ten 
miles  as  they  retreated  toward  Waverly,  his  troops  mov 
ing  at  a  gallop  a  good  deal  of  the  time,  firing  upon  the 
rear-guard  of  the  enemy  continually.  Shortly  before 
sunset  that  evening  the  Federal  cavalry  came  up  and 
attacked  Shelby's  rear-guard  with  such  energy  that  he 
halted  and  threw  his  command  into  line  of  battle.  Colo- 

*  See  paper  by  Captain  George  S.  Grover,  St.  Louis,  Missouri,  read  before 
the  Loyal  Legion. 


1 86  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

nel  Philips  ordered  his  two  guns  into  action  and  formed 
his  cavalry  in  line,  and  after  a  few  rounds  from  his  artil 
lery  led  his  cavalry  in  a  charge  against  the  Confederates, 
causing  them  to  retire  hastily  with  the  loss  of  one  man 
killed  and  several  wounded.  An  exciting  chase  of  several 
miles  then  took  place  with  the  view  of  forcing  Shelby  to 
a  stand  or  to  abandon  his  train,  when  darkness  came  on, 
making  further  pursuit  impracticable  during  the  night, 
for  the  Confederates  had  abandoned  the  main  road  and 
were  retreating  upon  a  dim  path  through  the  country. 

When  darkness  overtook  him,  Colonel  Philips  ordered 
his  command  to  bivouac  upon  the  dim  trail  of  the  enemy, 
his  men  having  been  fighting  and  marching  since  day 
light,  and  the  last  ten  or  twelve  miles  moving  almost  at 
a  charge.  About  four  o'clock  the  next  morning  he 
started  in  pursuit  of  the  demoralized  and  retreating  foe. 
On  starting  out  he  sent  the  battalions  of  Majors  Kelly 
and  Gentry  back  to  Marshall,  and  was  joined  that  morn 
ing  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  John  D.  Brutsche,  with  two 
hundred  men  of  the  Ninth  Provisional  Regiment  Mis 
souri  Enrolled  Militia,  and  soon  struck  the  trail  of  the 
Confederates,  which  showed  signs  of  great  demoraliza 
tion,  for  it  was  strewn  with  hats,  clothing,  and  a  variety 
of  goods  they  had  taken  since  entering  the  State. 

Continuing  the  pursuit,  Colonel  Philips  soon  came  to 
where  Shelby  had  abandoned  his  train,  about  five  miles 
east  of  Waverly,  leaving  five  Government  wagons,  forty 
head  of  team  mules,  and  two  ambulances.  It  was  ascer 
tained  that  three  of  the  wagons  were  laden  with  artillery 
and  small-arms  ammunition,  and  the  others  with  clothing 
and  plunder  which  had  been  taken  by  the  raiders  on  the 
march.  Finding  his  wagons  constantly  impeding  his 
movements  in  his  hasty  flight,  Colonel  Shelby  ran  them 
over  a  steep  bank  into  the  Missouri  River,  and  when 
Colonel  Philips  came  up  he  did  not  take  the  time  to 
draw  them  out,  but  took  with  him  the  ambulances.  He 


SHELBY'S  RAID   IN  MISSOURI  IX   l86j.  l8/ 

continued  the  pursuit  twelve  miles  south  of  Waverly, 
when  Colonel  William  Weer,  Tenth  Kansas  Infantry,  of 
General  Ewing's  command,  passed  in  his  front  and  took 
up  the  trail  and  followed  it  a  few  miles,  when  Colonel 
Lazear,  who  was  on  the  march  from  Marshall  with  his 
command,  and  who  had  heard  of  Shelby's  flight  south 
from  Waverly,  took  up  the  pursuit  in  advance  of  the 
Kansas  troops.  After  striking  the  trail  of  the  Confeder 
ates,  Colonel  Lazear  pressed  forward  closely  upon  their 
rear  all  day,  moving  at  a  trot  and  a  gallop  nearly  all  the 
afternoon,  but  was  unable  to  get  near  enough  to  them  to 
bring  them  to  a  stand.  He  left  the  trail  of  the  raiders 
about  sunset  several  miles  northwest  of  Warrensburg  and 
took  the  road  direct  to  that  place,  arriving  there  about 
nine  o'clock  that  night  with  his  men  and  horses  nearly 
worn  out  from  constant  marching  the  last  eight  days, 
and  from  being  on  short  rations  most  of  the  time.  In 
his  retreat  Colonel  Shelby  had  nearly  all  day  moved  in 
the  direction  of  Warrensburg,  but  in  the  evening  he 
changed  his  course  and  passed  to  the  west  of  that  place 
during  the  night. 

On  the  morning  of  the  I5th,  General  Ewing  arrived  at 
Warrensburg  from  Sedalia,  and  moved  to  the  southwest 
of  that  place  and  struck  Shelby's  trail;  and  Colonel  La 
zear  marched  with  his  command  to  the  northwest  near 
Rose  Hill  in  search  of  the  enemy,  and  finding  that  they 
had  passed  Holden  at  two  o'clock  that  morning  gave  up 
the  pursuit,  for  General  Ewing  was  several  miles  in  ad 
vance  of  him  on  the  trail.  When  General  Ewing  struck 
the  trail  of  the  Confederates  near  Chilhowee  he  was 
several  hours  behind  them,  but  that  evening  near  sunset 
he  overtook  their  rear-guard  in  the  timber  near  Johns 
town,  in  Bates  County,  and  skirmishing  with  them  killed 
one  and  captured  several  men.  After  halting  a  few  hours 
to  give  his  men  and  animals  food  and  rest,  he  took  up 
the  pursuit  again  early  the  next  morning,  but  was  unable 


1 88  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

to  overtake  Shelby.  At  Carthage,  however,  he  captured 
Major  J.  F.  Pickler,  with  thirty  men,  who  had  been  left 
by  Colonel  Shelby  at  that  place  to  obtain  flour  from  the 
mills  and  to  collect  stragglers.  From  Carthage  Colonel 
Shelby  turned  southeast,  passing  through  Sarcoxie, 
thence  south,  crossing  the  wire  road,  or  Springfield  and 
Fayetteville  road,  a  few  miles  south  of  Cassville,  and  on 
the  2Oth  formed  a  junction  with  the  separated  forces  of 
Hunter,  Hooper,  and  Shanks  on  the  Little  Osage,  in 
Arkansas.  General  Ewing  continued  the  pursuit  ma 
Neosho  to  the  southern  line  of  the  State,  when  he  re 
turned  to  Fort  Scott  with  his  command,  having  received 
a  despatch  from  General  McNeil,  to  whom  he  had  offered 
the  cooperation  of  his  forces,  that  he  had  struck  the  trail 
of  Shelby  at  Sarcoxie,  and  was  strong  enough  without 
the  proffered  aid. 

When  Shelby's  command  was  divided  at  Marshall, 
General  Brown  ordered  Major  T.  W.  Houts,  with  three 
troops  of  the  Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  to 
pursue  that  part  of  the  Confederate  force  which  retreated 
southeast  under  Colonel  Hunter,  with  one  piece  of  artil 
lery.  Major  Houts  pursued  the  enemy  to  the  vicinity 
of  Florence,  when  he  gave  up  the  chase,  Colonel  Hall, 
Fourth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  having  passed  in 
his  front  with  fresh  troops  and  horses.  But  when  Colo 
nel  Hall  struck  the  trail  of  the  Confederates  they  were 
twenty-four  hours  ahead  of  him,  and  he  abandoned  the 
pursuit  at  Duroc,  on  the  Osage  River,  and  returned  to 
Sedalia.  Very  soon  after  Colonel  Hunter  crossed  to  the 
south  side  of  the  Osage,  he  was  vigorously  pursued  by 
Major  Austin  A.  King,  Jr.,  commanding  detachments  of 
the  Sixth  and  Eighth  Regiments  Missouri  State  Militia 
Cavalry.  Major  King  had  been  watching  the  fords  of  the 
Osage  in  the  vicinity  of  Warsaw,  and  when  he  ascertained 
that  the  Confederates  had  crossed  the  river  below  him 
he  marched  rapidly  and  overtook  their  rear-guard  and  had 


SHELBY'S  RAID  IN  MISSOURI  IN  l86j.  189 

a  running  fight  with  them  to  Humansville,  where  he 
captured  their  last  piece  of  artillery  that  they  brought 
into  the  State,  with  forty  rounds  of  ammunition.  He 
continued  the  pursuit  twelve  miles  southwest  in  the  di 
rection  of  Stockton,  when  it  became  too  dark  to  follow 
them.  Brigadier-General  C.  B.  Holland,  commanding 
the  Enrolled  Militia  in  Southwest  Missouri,  struck  the 
trail  of  the  Confederates  near  Quincy  only  an  hour  or  so 
in  the  rear  of  Major  King,  and  by  marching  all  night  got 
in  the  advance  of  Hunter  at  Greenfield.  On  coming  up 
near  that  place  and  finding  it  occupied  by  the  militia, 
Colonel  Hunter  marched  around  it  through  the  woods, 
and  continued  his  retreat  south,  passing  a  few  miles  east 
of  Mount  Vernon.  He  was  attacked  northeast  of  Mount 
Vernon  by  Major  R.  K.  Hart,  commanding  a  detach 
ment  of  General  Holland's  militia;  but  as  the  militia 
were  not  strong  enough  to  hold  him  very  long  he  got 
out  of  the  State  without  further  opposition. 

When  he  heard  of  the  breaking  up  of  the  Confederate 
force  at  Marshall,  General  McNeil  was  at  Buffalo,  and 
he  moved  at  once  to  Bolivar  with  260  men  and  a  section 
of  Rabb's  Second  Indiana  Battery,  where  he  found  Gen 
eral  Holland  with  five  hundred  Enrolled  Militia.  His 
latest  information  led  him  to  believe  that  the  Southern 
force  under  Hunter  would  cross  the  Osage  at  or  in  the 
vicinity  of  Warsaw,  and  that  the  force  under  Shelby 
would  retreat  south  through  Lamar  and  Carthage. 
Hoping  to  intercept  the  force  under  Shelby,  General  Mc 
Neil  marched  rapidly  from  Bolivar  to  Humansville  and 
Stockton,  leaving  instructions  for  General  Holland  to  in 
tercept  the  force  under  Hunter.  On  his  arrival  at  Stock 
ton  the  next  morning,  he  was  informed  of  Major  King's 
fight  with  the  Confederates  at  Humansville,  of  his  cap 
ture  of  their  remaining  piece  of  artillery,  and  that  they 
had  passed  ten  miles  east  of  Stockton  at  one  o'clock  that 
morning.  He  therefore  marched  immediately  for  Green- 


IQO  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

field,  and  on  arriving  at  that  place  found  that  General 
Holland  was  ahead  of  him  several  hours  in  pursuit  of  the 
force  under  Hunter.  Major  King  having  joined  him  with 
375  men,  he  then  marched  to  Sarcoxie,  where  he  struck 
the  trail  of  the  force  under  Shelby,  about  twelve  hours 
after  it  had  passed.  He  pressed  on  from  this  place,  pass 
ing  through  Cassvilleon  the  evening  of  the  iQth,  and  the 
next  evening  reached  Huntsville,  Arkansas,  where  his 
cavalry  dashed  into  town  and  captured  part  of  Colonel 
Brooks'  command,  which  had  for  some  time  been  operat 
ing  in  that  section. 

After  the  recently  separated  parts  of  his  command  had 
united,  Colonel  Shelby  commenced  to  march  leisurely 
towards  the  Arkansas  River.  The  hardships  of  the  ex 
pedition  had  been  a  severe  strain  upon  the  power  and 
endurance  of  his  men  and  animals,  and  they  needed  rest. 
After  striking  the  mountainous  regions  of  Arkansas, 
General  McNeil  was  unable  to  make  as  rapid  progress 
as  he  had  made  in  Missouri,  for  he  was  several  times  de 
layed  by  the  breaking  down  of  wagons,  caissons,  and 
gun  carriages,  making  it  very  difficult  to  gain  on  the 
enemy.  At  Huntsville  he  was  reinforced  by  Colonel 
Edwards,  with  three  hundred  infantry,  and  by  Major 
T.  J.  Hunt,  First  Arkansas  Union  Cavalry,  with  175  men 
of  that  regiment,  and  two  howitzers,  giving  him  a  total 
force  of  six  hundred  cavalry,  three  hundred  infantry,  two 
field-pieces,  and  two  howitzers.  The  men  of  the  First 
Arkansas  Cavalry  were  well  acquainted  with  the  country 
and  given  the  advance,  and  McNeil  pushed  on  and  over 
took  the  united  forces  of  Shelby  and  Brooks  near  sunset 
on  the  24th  at  the  foot  of  Buffalo  Mountain,  where  they 
were  encamped  in  a  valley,  and  attacking  with  his  cavalry 
and  artillery  drove  them  from  their  position.  It  soon 
became  too  dark  to  continue  the  pursuit  through  the 
narrow  passes  of  the  mountains,  and  he  bivouacked  until 
daylight  the  next  morning,  when  he  moved  forward  again. 


SHELBY'S  RAID  IN  MISSOURI  IN  l86j.  19! 

His  advance  under  Major  Hunt  skirmished  with  the 
Confederate  rear-guard  the  next  two  days,  and  in  an  at 
tack  on  the  enemy  on  the  26th  Lieutenant  J.  G.  Robin 
son,  First  Arkansas  Cavalry,  was  mortally  wounded. 
General  McNeil  arrived  at  Clarksville  on  the  2/th,  and 
ascertained  that  Shelby  had  crossed  to  the  south  side  of 
the  Arkansas  River,  and  that  Brooks  was  still  on  the 
north  side  for  the  purpose  of  picking  up  stragglers  from 
the  Confederate  army  and  to  capture  any  train  that 
might  be  in  the  rear  of  the  Federal  force.  At  Clarks 
ville,  General  McNeil  gave  up  the  pursuit,  and  near 
Ozark  sent  the  detachments  of  the  Sixth  and  Eighth 
Regiments  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  under  Colonel 
Catherwood,  back  to  Springfield,  and  the  men  under 
Major  Hunt,  of  the  First  Arkansas  Cavalry,  back  to 
Fayetteville,  and  with  the  balance  of  his  force,  under 
Colonel  Edwards,  marched  to  Fort  Smith  and  assumed 
command  of  the  District  of  the  Frontier,  to  which  he 
had  recently  been  assigned  by  General  Schofield. 

After  crossing  the  Arkansas  River,  Colonel  Shelby 
marched  without  interruption,  and  joined  his  division 
under  Marmaduke  on  November  3d,  near  Washington, 
in  Hempstead  County,  having  towards  the  end  of  his  ex 
pedition  encountered  a  severe  storm  of  rain  and  snow. 
His  expedition  to  the  Missouri  River  and  return  had 
taken  about  forty  days,  and  as  his  men  were  fighting  and 
marching  most  of  the  time,  day  and  night,  they  were 
badly  worn  out  on  his  return.  He  reported  that  his 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  on  the  expedition  would  not 
exceed  150  men.  He  admits  that  he  had  1200  men  at 
Neosho,  and  gained  800  recruits,  making  a  total  force  of 
2000  men,  but  does  not  state  how  many  men  he  lost  by 
capture.  After  his  force  was  divided  at  Marshall,  a  good 
many  of  the  men  left  the  separated  parts  to  go  to  their 
homes  to  see  their  families,  and  were  mostly  picked  up 
as  stragglers  by  the  cavalry  of  Generals  Brown,  Ewing, 


192  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

and  McNeil.  The  raiders  captured  and  destroyed  a  large 
amount  of  public  and  private  property,  but  did  not  get 
out  of  the  State  with  any  of  the  captured  property,  ex 
cept  some  horses  taken  from  citizens.  They  captured 
1 80  militia  and  citizens  at  Neosho,  17  at  Lamine,  and 
10  men  at  Warsaw.  Colonel  Shelby  made  no  other  im 
portant  captures  of  Federal  troops  or  militia.  His 
fighting  was  all  with  the  Missouri  militia,  except  the 
skirmish  that  General  Ewing  had  with  his  rear-guard 
near  Johnstown. 

General  Brown  reported  his  loss,  covering  the  opera 
tions  in  his  district,  where  nearly  all  the  fighting  was 
done,  at  5  men  killed,  26  wounded,  and  II  missing.  In 
the  fight  at  Marshall  Colonel  Lazear's  men  did  most  of 
their  firing  lying  down  on  the  ground,  which  accounts  for 
the  casualties  in  his  command  being  so  small. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  pursuit  of  the  raiders  by  Gen 
eral  Ewing,  a  tragic  and  in  some  respects  amusing  inci 
dent  came  under  the  notice  of  his  Chief  Quartermaster, 
Colonel  Theodore  S.  Case,  when  his  command  halted  at 
Neosho.  On  the  expedition  Ewing's  forces  picked  up 
quite  a  number  of  Shelby's  men  who  were  pressed  so 
closely  that  they  were  cut  off,  or  who,  by  the  hardships 
of  marching  day  and  night,  had  fallen  out  of  the  ranks 
near  the  road  to  get  a  little  rest  and  sleep.  Among  the 
men  captured,  three  or  four  asked  permission  to  enlist  in 
one  of  the  companies  of  Ewing's  command,  claiming  that 
they  had  been  pressed  into  the  Confederate  service.  Gen 
eral  Ewing  allowed  them  to  enlist,  and  when  he  stopped 
at  Neosho  for  a  short  time,  some  of  the  Union  citizens, 
while  mixing  with  his  soldiers,  saw  one  of  the  new  re 
cruits,  and  knew  him  to  be  a  notorious  bandit  of  that 
section,  who  was  guilty  of  many  crimes.  One  of  the 
citizens  came  to  General  Ewing,  and  complained  that 
the  recruit  was  a  noted  bandit,  and  the  General  asked  the 
citizen  a  few  questions  in  regard  to  what  he  knew  about 


SHELBY'S  RAID  IN  MISSOURI  IN  l86j.  193 


the  recruit,  and  the  citizen  replied,  "  Know  him!  He  's 
got  on  my  brother's  clothing  now,  whom  he  recently 
murdered."  The  General  turned  the  recruit  over  to  the 
sheriff,  or  quasi-civil  authority,  and  he  was  taken  out  and 
shot  after  some  form  of  trial.  After  he  was  captured  he 
enlisted  for  the  purpose  of  deserting  at  the  first  opportu 
nity,  for  he  knew  that  if  he  was  held  as  prisoner  and  his 


COffff        HUNTER    CBA     '   COAOO/V      HOOPER 


PHILLIPS         KCLLY  6£f/r/t)\\ 
^0  PO.  3°p0. 

«£ur^l>•a^. 

V&&**' 

MARSHALL 
ACTION  AT  MARSHALL,   MO.,   OCTOBER  13,   1863. 

antecedents  inquired  into,  he  would  be  tried  and  probably 
shot  for  his  crimes.  The  other  recruits  who  were  picked 
up,  knowing  the  fate  of  their  comrade,  deserted  at  the  first 
opportunity  in  a  day  or  so,  whether  they  were  guilty  of 
any  particular  crimes  or  not.  They,  too,  enlisted  for  the 
purpose  of  getting  away  instead  of  being  held  as  prisoners. 

VOL.   II.— 13 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

GUERILLA   WAR   IN   SOUTHWEST   MISSOURI. 

AFTER  the  defeat  of  General  Cooper  at  Elk  Creek,  the 
Federal  occupation  of  the  Indian  Territory  was  extended 
from  the  Arkansas  to  the  Canadian  River.  But  while 
Northwestern  Arkansas  was  occupied  by  the  Confeder 
ate  forces,  the  Federal  supply  line  from  Fort  Gibson  to 
Fort  Scott  would  be  constantly  menaced  and  in  danger. 
Knowing  that  a  considerable  reinforcement  of  infantry  and 
artillery  had  arrived  at  Fort  Gibson  with  the  train  that  had 
been  attacked  at  Cabin  Creek,  and  having  been  informed 
that  General  Blunt  had  gone  down  to  take  command  of 
his  troops,  Confederate  General  Steele  determined  to 
order  General  Cabell  from  Northwest  Arkansas,  with  his 
brigade,  to  reinforce  General  Cooper,  and  then  to  move 
up  so  near  Gibson  as  to  effectually  prevent  any  further 
reinforcements  or  supplies  from  going  in.  When  Gen 
eral  Cabell  was  withdrawn  from  Northwest  Arkansas, 
he  left  nearly  every  part  of  that  section  infested  with 
partisan  bands.  Just  before  leaving  Fayetteville  he  fired 
a  number  of  guns  celebrating  the  victory  at  Helena, 
which  turned  out  to  be  a  Confederate  defeat.  His  oc 
cupation  of  Northwest  Arkansas,  after  the  Federal  forces 
had  been  withdrawn  from  Fayetteville,  had  been  barren 
of  any  beneficial  results.  His  march  to  Grand  River  to 
reinforce  Colonel  Watie  in  an  attack  on  the  Federal  train 
was  a  march  up  the  hill  and  a  march  down  again.  His 

194 


GUERILLA    WAR  IN  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.       195 

recent  scout  from  Grand  River  into  Southwest  Missouri 
had  not  accomplished  any  good  for  the  Confederate 
cause.  On  his  return  to  Arkansas,  a  detachment  of  his 
command,  under  Captain  Maghan,  had  a  skirmish  near 
Cross  Hollow,  Arkansas,  on  the  I2th  of  July,  with  a 
small  force,  under  Captain  J.  S.  Robb,  First  Arkansas 
Union  Cavalry,  from  Cassville,  Missouri,  in  which  Captain 
Maghan  and  six  of  his  men  were  killed. 

On  July  1 7th,  Major  T.  W.  Houts,  Seventh  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry,  commanding  the  post  at  Neosho, 
while  scouting  with  a  detachment  of  one  hundred  of  his 
men  on  Spring  River,  in  the  vicinity  of  Carthage,  at 
tacked  part  of  Livingston's  men  who  had  just  returned 
from  the  Stockton  raid,  where  their  leader  was  killed,  and 
killed  four  of  the  marauders  and  got  one  of  his  own  men 
wounded.  A  day  or  so  after  this  skirmish  part  of  the 
bandits  started  south,  but  the  greater  part  of  them  re 
mained  and  continued  their  operations  in  small  squads 
along  Spring  River  and  Centre  Creek.  The  vicinity  of 
Carthage  and  the  lower  Spring  River  had,  during  the  last 
year,  been  the  worst  section  in  Southwest  Missouri  in 
maintaining  guerilla  operations.  No  Regular  Federal 
force  had  been  stationed  at  Carthage,  and  if  a  Federal 
scout  came  into  the  neighborhood  and  chased  the  gueril 
las  they  got  out  of  the  way,  but  returned  as  soon  as  the 
scout  had  left.  It  was  well  known  to  the  Federal  officers 
serving  in  that  section  that  the  Southern  bandits  had  not 
been  in  the  habit  of  stopping  very  long  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  posts  where  Federal  troops  or  the  loyal  militia 
were  stationed.  Colonel  Cloud,  commanding  the  district, 
therefore  determined  to  station  a  force  at  Carthage  strong 
enough  to  check  guerilla  operations  in  that  section. 
Major  Milton  Burch,  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cav 
alry,  with  a  battalion  consisting  of  the  companies  of  Cap 
tains  Lindsay,  Moore,  Ruark,  and  Kelso,  of  that  regiment, 
was  ordered  to  that  place,  and  arrived  there  July  22d, 


196  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

from  Newtonia,  to  find  that  the  guerillas  had  burned  the 
court-house  and  academy,  the  only  two  brick  buildings 
in  town  suitable  for  defensive  purposes.  At  points  where 
it  was  considered  desirable  to  establish  stations  for  the 
troops  to  operate  from,  if  a  strong  brick  building  could 
not  be  obtained,  a  stockade,  or  blockhouse,  was  some 
times  constructed  for  defensive  purposes,  for  at  these 
small  stations  most  of  the  men  were  generally  absent  on 
scouting  duty,  leaving  only  a  few  men  to  guard  their 
supplies  and  camp  equipage.  There  were,  however, 
several  buildings  in  Carthage  which  Captain  Burch  could 
use  to  quarter  his  men  in,  and  he  at  once  commenced 
operations  against  the  bandits  of  that  section.  He  as 
certained  from  the  secessionists  about  town  that  Colonel 
John  T.  Coffee,  who  had  figured  prominently  in  what  was 
known  as  the  "  Coffee  Raid,"  in  the  summer  of  1862, 
was  to  take  command  of  Livingston's  men  since  the 
death  of  that  noted  partisan  leader.  He  also  had  in 
formation  that  Coffee,  with  three  or  four  hundred  men, 
was  at  that  time  in  the  southwest  corner  of  McDonald 
County,  or  in  the  vicinity  of  Maysville,  Arkansas,  and 
that  some  of  Livingston's  old  command  had  left  Jasper 
County  to  join  him.  But  they  did  not  all  go. 

Those  who  remained  in  the  country  had  defied  the 
Federal  authorities  so  long  that  they  thought  they  might 
continue  to  defy  them  with  impunity.  Skirmishes  be 
tween  these  bandits  and  Major  Burch's  men  were  of  fre 
quent  occurrence.  On  one  occasion  he  sent  Captain 
Kelso  out  on  a  scout  with  a  small  detachment  of  men 
into  the  western  part  of  Jasper  County,  along  Centre 
Creek  and  Spring  River,  to  a  neighborhood  where  a  party 
of  the  bandits  had  been  reported  to  have  been  seen.  On 
nearing  the  locality,  the  Captain  ascertained  that  there 
were  several  of  the  bandits  in  a  certain  house,  under  a 
leader  named  Finney,  and  as  he  charged  up  with  his  men, 
Finney  and  his  men  ran  out  of  the  house  to  their  horses. 


GUERILLA    WAR  IN  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.       IQ/ 

In  the  excitement  and  discharge  of  small-arms  that  took 
place,  Finney  mounted  his  horse  without  untying  it  from 
the  post  where  it  was  hitched.  Captain  Kelso,  who  had 
dismounted  from  his  horse  a  short  distance  back,  ran  up 
and  pulled  the  bandit  off  his  horse  before  he  could  loose 
it,  shot  him,  and  took  his  horse  and  brace  of  revolvers 
from  him.  A  short  time  after  this  affair,  the  Major  sent 
his  scout,  Joel  P.  Hood,  and  four  men  of  his  battalion 
to  Fort  Scott  on  business.  On  the  return  of  the  party 
from  that  post  they  overtook  four  wagons  loaded  with 
dry  goods  and  groceries  for  Carthage,  and  when  within 
eight  miles  of  that  place  the  party  of  soldiers  and  team 
sters  were  attacked  by  a  superior  force  of  guerillas,  and 
one  of  the  soldiers  killed,  one  taken  prisoner,  and  two  of 
the  citizens  captured.  One  of  the  soldiers  hastened  to 
Carthage  for  reinforcements,  which  arrived  upon  the 
scene  of  the  skirmish  in  a  short  time,  gave  chase  to  the 
marauders,  and  overtaking  them  about  sundown  killed 
three,  including  the  leader,  Captain  Turk,  and  recaptured 
the  two  citizens  whom  they  had  taken  and  two  of  the 
wagons. 

After  the  Shelby  Raid  in  October  through  South 
west  and  Central  Missouri,  Major  Burch  returned  with 
his  battalion  to  Neosho,  where  he  was  stationed  during 
the  winter,  and  kept  busy  in  breaking  up  small  parties  of 
bandits  who  had  drifted  back  into  the  State  during  the 
raid.  The  winter  of  1863-64  was  regarded  by  the  oldest 
settlers  in  Western  Missouri  and  Arkansas  as  the  coldest 
within  their  recollection.  The  cold  set  in  early  in  No 
vember,  and  was  so  severe  that  the  Arkansas  River  at 
Fort  Smith  was  not  only  frozen  over,  but  the  ice  was 
thick  enough  for  the  Federal  troops  and  trains  to  cross 
over  for  a  week  or  so  in  the  early  part  of  January.  This 
severe  weather  entailed  many  sufferings  and  hardships 
upon  the  men  engaged  in  the  great  conflict,  on  both  sides. 
And  the  stress  of  winter  seemed  to  make  the  bandits  like 


198  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

hungry  wolves,  more  daring  and  persistent  in  their  depre 
dations  and  acts  of  violence.  At  small  posts,  like  Neosho, 
therefore,  the  Federal  troops  were  not  allowed  to  spend 
much  of  their  time  in  idle  winter  quarters,  but  were  kept 
constantly  scouting,  not  only  a  few  miles  from  the  post, 
but  sometimes  fifty  to  sixty  miles  away,  requiring  almost 
continuous  marching  for  nearly  a  week.  If  the  command 
ing  officer  of  the  post  obtained  reliable  information  of  a 
camp  of  bandits  at  some  distant  point,  he  lost  no  time  in 
sending  a  force  to  capture  or  disperse  them.  In  the 
latter  part  of  the  month  of  November,  Major  Burch  re 
ceived  information  that  a  small  party  of  bandits  were 
encamped  in  a  tent  in  the  brush  on  the  waters  of  Shoal 
Creek,  ten  or  twelve  miles  north  of  that  post,  and  that 
there  were  one  or  two  other  small  parties  of  the  maraud 
ers  at  a  house  or  two  on  Turkey  Creek,  five  or  six  miles 
farther  north. 

The  weather  was  very  cold,  and  the  outlaws  thought 
that  Burch  and  Kelso  would  hardly  venture  out  to  dis 
turb  them  in  their  secluded  quarters.  But  the  weather 
was  never  too  cold  or  too  stormy  for  those  energetic  offi 
cers  to  go  out  if  they  felt  certain  of  locating  the  enemy. 
Major  Burch,  therefore,  took  Captain  Kelso  and  twenty 
men,  and  leaving  the  post  after  dark  arrived  near  the 
place  where  the  party  of  bandits  were  reported  to  be  en 
camped  in  a  tent,  and  sent  Captain  Kelso  forward  to 
reconnoitre.  In  a  little  while  the  Captain  discovered  a 
dim  light  through  the  brush  and  in  a  direction  in  which 
he  knew  there  was  no  house.  He  advanced  afoot,  cau 
tiously,  near  enough  to  ascertain  that  the  light  was  in  a 
tent.  He  then  approached  near  enough  to  hear  the  men 
talking,  and  thought  there  were  three  in  the  party.  They 
were  discussing  as  to  whether  they  could  not  safely  go  to 
a  house  in  the  vicinity  where  they  could  have  the  com 
forts  of  a  fire ;  that  it  was  so  cold  and  stormy  that  Kelso 
would  hardly  venture  out  such  a  night.  The  Captain 


GUERILLA    WAR  IN  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.       199 

then  returned  and  reported.  Major  Burch  took  Captain 
Kelso  and  three  men,  leaving  the  rest  of  the  detachment 
to  fall  back  upon  if  the  bandits  should  prove  to  be  more 
numerous  than  had  been  estimated,  and  cautiously  ap 
proaching  near  the  tent,  at  a  signal  fired,  killing  the  two 
men  who  were  in  it.  Each  of  the  bandits  was  fully 
armed  with  a  gun  and  Colt's  revolvers,  but  they  were  so 
completely  surprised  by  their  dreaded  foe  that  before 
they  recovered  their  senses  they  were  feeling  the  effects 
of  that  method  of  war  which  they  and  their  kind  had 
initiated.  They  were  both  men  of  desperate  character, 
and  had  given  a  good  deal  of  trouble  in  that  section  by 
firing  from  the  brush  upon  Union  citizens  and  passing 
detachments  of  Federal  soldiers.  They  had,  before  pay 
ing  the  penalty  of  their  misdeeds,  boasted  of  the  militia 
and  Union  men  they  had  killed.  It  was  in  this  very 
neighborhood  that  Moses  Carver,  a  Union  man,  had  coals 
of  fire  put  to  the  soles  of  his  feet  by  such  desperate  char 
acters  to  make  him  disclose  and  give  up  his  money. 
After  killing  the  two  bandits  in  the  tent,  Major  Burch 
proceeded  to  Turkey  Creek,  where  he  dismounted  a  part 
of  his  men  a  short  distance  back,  and  took  them  and  sur 
rounded  two  houses,  capturing  two  bandits  from  one  and 
three  from  the  other.  He  also  at  the  last  house  re 
captured  a  Federal  soldier  who  had  been  captured  by  the 
bandits  and  was  being  held  by  them,  and  then  returned 
to  Neosho  with  his  prisoners,  nearly  all  of  whom  were 
desperate  characters,  and  who  were  charged  with  killing 
and  robbing  Union  men.  It  was  only  by  a  night  scout 
of  the  kind  which  Major  Burch  adopted  that  such  bandits 
could  be  captured.  As  the  houses  in  that  section  were 
at  that  time  mostly  log  houses,  and  therefore  bullet-proof 
against  an  assault  from  the  outside,  except  through  the 
chinks  or  openings  between  the  logs,  men  of  less  daring 
than  Burch  and  Kelso  would  hardly  have  ventured  to 
surround  the  houses  as  thev  did  with  so  few  men  and 


200  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

demand  the  surrender  of  desperate  bandits  who  were 
thoroughly  armed. 

A  short  time  before  this  scout,  a  Union  man  and  one 
or  two  sons  in  Lawrence  County  were  attacked  one  night 
by  a  party  of  secessionists,  who  were  finally  driven  off 
after  a  desperate  conflict,  with  the  loss  of  four  or  five 
men  killed  and  wounded.  But  in  the  numerous  contests 
between  the  loyal  militia  and  the  Southern  guerillas,  the 
militia  were  sometimes  taken  at  a  disadvantage  and  sus 
tained  serious  losses,  for  it  was  impossible  for  the  small 
force  usually  stationed  at  Neosho  to  so  thoroughly  patrol 
that  section  as  to  discover  a  small  party  of  bandits  the 
moment  they  came  into  it. 

On  the  3d  of  June,  1864,  Sergeant  Josiah  Ruark  and 
Private  Robert  C.  Poag,  of  Major  Burch's  command  at 
Neosho,  were  sent  out  north  into  the  country  a  few  miles 
on  some  business,  and  on  their  return  stopped  about  a 
mile  north  of  town  to  bathe  in  the  clear,  limpid  waters  of 
Shoal  Creek.  They  had  been  in  bathing  only  a  few  mo 
ments,  when  a  party  of  eight  to  ten  Southern  bandits 
came  upon  them  and  shot  and  killed  Poag  while  he  was 
trying  to  escape  to  the  opposite  shore,  and  captured 
Ruark  and  started  off  with  him  on  the  road  up  Shoal 
Creek.  They  had  not  gone  far  with  their  prisoner  when 
they  met  a  colored  man,  named  Henry  Simpson,  who 
was  returning  to  Neosho  from  Plummer's  Mill,  and  took 
him  prisoner  also  and  told  him  that  they  intended  to  kill 
him  that  day.  In  a  very  short  time  the  news  of  the 
death  of  Poag  and  the  capture  of  Ruark  reached  Neosho, 
and  Captains  Ruark  and  Kelso  at  once  took  about  a 
dozen  mounted  men  and  started  in  hot  pursuit  of  the 
bandits.  They  soon  struck  their  trail  and  followed  it 
until  the  guerillas  left  the  main  road,  and  then  Kelso 
dismounted  and  followed  it  a  foot  along  a  dim  path  for 
some  distance  and  came  upon  the  enemy  in  an  opening 
in  the  woods  where  they  stopped  to  get  dinner  and  to 


GUERILLA    WAR  IN  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.       2OI 

let  their  horses  graze  and  rest.  He  moved  up  cautiously 
until  within  easy  range  and  then  fired  the  loads  of  his 
double-barrelled  shotgun  at  them,  felling  one  or  two  of 
the  party  to  the  ground  before  they  had  any  intimation 
of  his  presence.  The  discharge  of  his  gun  was  a  signal 
for  his  men,  who  were  following  a  short  distance  in  his 
rear,  to  come  to  his  assistance  as  quickly  as  possible, 
which  they  did,  coming  up  at  a  gallop.  But  when  they 
came  up,  the  bandits  had  scattered  into  the  brush,  some 
of  them  mounting  their  horses  and  some  of  them  taking 
to  the  brush  afoot.  As  Kelso's  detachment  came  up, 
under  Lieutenant  John  Smith,  a  hot  fire  was  opened  on 
the  enemy,  who  returned  it  as  they  retreated  through  the 
brush,  killing  Lieutenant  Smith,  the  fatal  ball  entering 
his  forehead.  The  moment  Kelso  fired  on  the  bandits, 
Sergeant  Ruark  and  the  colored  man,  Simpson,  broke 
away  from  their  captors,  who  were  busy  looking  to  their 
own  safety.  The  colored  man,  who  was  terribly  fright 
ened  on  account  of  the  threats  of  the  bandits,  declared 
he  saw  Kelso's  eyes  before  he  opened  fire. 

Captains  Ruark  and  Kelso  and  their  men  pursued  the 
fugitives  through  the  brush  and  woods  until  they  killed 
six  of  their  number,  and  then  returned  to  Neosho  with 
the  remains  of  Lieutenant  Smith,  and  seven  or  eight 
captured  horses  and  several  revolvers. 

In  the  above  affair  Captain  Kelso  displayed  his  usual 
tact,  daring,  and  coolness.  In  fact,  it  was  asserted  by 
those  who  had  served  with  him  from  the  beginning  of  the 
war  that  he  never  became  disconcerted  under  the  most 
trying  situations.  While  stationed  at  Ozark,  in  Christian 
County,  he  made  a  scout  with  his  company  into  the 
White  River  Mountains  of  Taney  County,  near  the  Ar 
kansas  line,  and  encamped  for  the  night  in  the  vicinity 
where  a  small  party  of  bandits  had  their  retreat.  After 
supper  he  started  out  afoot  to  reconnoitre  for  information 
as  to  whether  there  really  were  any  Southern  bandits  in 


202  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

the  neighborhood.  He  returned  to  his  camp  about  dark, 
and  told  his  men  that  he  had  found  where  the  marauders 
were  camped,  and  that  he  intended  to  visit  them  that 
night.  He  offered  to  let  any  of  his  men  accompany  him 
who  desired  to  do  so,  but  the  night  was  dark,  and  they 
knew  that  some  desperate  plot  was  in  his  mind,  and  no  one 
volunteered.  He  started  out  alone,  prepared  for  bloody 
work,  and  returned  the  next  morning  with  six  horses, 
saddled  and  bridled.  His  account  of  his  night's  adven 
ture,  as  he  related  it  to  his  men  on  his  return,  was  thrilling 
in  the  extreme.  It  is  not  necessary  to  follow  him  over 
each  devious  step  after  he  left  his  camp,  for  the  adventure 
itself  shows  him  moving  along  cautiously  over  the  dim 
path  through  the  darkness  to  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
the  camp  of  the  bandits,  carefully  scanning  every  object 
in  front,  with  revolver  in  hand  and  ears  alert  to  the 
slightest  sound  in  any  direction.  After  he  gets  up  near 
to  the  marauders'  camp,  who  can  follow  him  through  his 
careful  reconnoitring  of  it  on  up  to  the  commencement 
of  his  terrible  slaughter,  without  his  heart  beating  audibly? 
He  finds  three  bandits  sleeping  under  their  crude  shelter, 
and  as  he  has  already  found  six  horses  saddled  near  at 
hand,  the  thought  comes  up  in  his  mind,  Where  are  the 
comrades  of  the  three  sleeping  bandits  ?  He  ascertains 
that  the  sleeping  bandits  are  covered  with  a  beautiful 
quilt,  which  he  desires  to  take  unstained  with  blood  as  a 
trophy,  and  carefully  draws  it  off  them,  and  in  another 
moment  like  a  tiger  springs  on  his  victims  and  shoots 
them  to  death  before  they  are  conscious  of  danger.  In 
the  short  and  desperate  struggle  of  the  slaughter  the 
comrades  of  the  victims  do  not  come  to  their  rescue,  and 
Kelso  mounts  one  of  the  horses  standing  saddled  and 
rides  it  into  camp,  leading  the  other  five  as  trophies  of 
his  bloody  adventure. 

Captain  Kelso  did  not  always  stalk  his  victims,  but  fre 
quently  exposed  himself  in  the  most  perilous  situations 


GUERILLA    WAR   IN  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.       203 

without  any  outward  signs  of  fear  or  excitement.  He 
was  always  equal  to  the  emergency.  When  in  a  fight  or 
dangerous  situation,  no  interposing  obstacle  disconcerted 
him  at  the  critical  moment.  On  another  occasion,  when 
scouting  in  the  southern  part  of  Taney  County  with  a 
detachment  of  his  company,  he  heard  of  three  or  four 
Southern  bandits  who  had  just  come  into  the  neighbor 
hood,  or  who  were  passing  through  the  country,  and  were 
stopping  with  several  Southern  families  for  the  night. 
After  some  investigation  he  decided  not  to  attack  the 
bandits  until  the  next  morning,  and  posted  some  of  his 
men  to  watch  the  houses  unobserved  during  the  night  so 
that  the  men  in  them  might  not  escape.  Early  the  next 
morning  he  surrounded  one  of  the  houses  in  which  some 
of  the  bandits  'were  known  to  have  spent  the  night, 
taking  himself  the  most  dangerous  position.  Coming  up 
in  front  of  the  house,  he  saw  three  bandits  within,  and 
keeping  his  eyes  on  them  and  his  hands  on  his  shotgun 
in  the  position  of  "  ready,"  crossed  the  fence  and  started 
for  the  door.  In  a  moment  after  crossing  the  fence,  a 
big  dog  came  snarling  and  growling  at  him  and  seized 
him  by  the  calf  of  the  leg.  Not  in  the  least  disconcerted 
by  this  unexpected  attack  of  the  dog,  he  stopped,  and 
keeping  his  eyes  on  the  bandits  took  with  his  right  hand 
his  revolver  from  the  scabbard,  and  feeling  for  the  dog's 
neck  shot  the  beast  dead.  He  proceeded  as  if  nothing 
had  happened,  and  entering  the  door  found  that  the 
bandits  had  escaped  through  the  opposite  door.  His 
daring  conduct  amazed  them  so  that  they  fled  without 
firing  a  single  shot  at  him.  In  this  affair  he  shot  the  man 
of  the  house  and  severely  wounded  his  son,  both  of  whom 
started  to  run  with  the  bandits,  holding  that  those  who 
gave  aid  and  comfort  to  the  bandits  were  as  deserving  of 
punishment  as  the  bandits  themselves. 

For  centuries  upon  centuries  the  admirers  of  Homer 
have  read  in  the  Tenth  Book  of  the  Iliad,  with  bated 


204  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

breath,  the  description  of  the  daring  acts  of  Diomede  and 
Ulysses  in  entering  the  Trojan  camp  by  night  and  slaugh 
tering  Rhesus  and  his  companions  and  bringing  back  into 
the  Grecian  camp  as  trophies  the  arms,  chariot,  and  snow- 
white  steeds  of  the  Thracian  King,  the  recently  arrived 
ally  of  the  Trojans.  But  this  grandest  of  scenes  in  the 
description  of  individual  heroism  in  war  scarcely  surpasses 
some  of  the  daring  acts  of  Kelso,  the  student,  teacher, 
and  soldier. 

As  his  name  was  connected  with  so  many  acts  of  daring 
adventure  in  Southern  and  Southwest  Missouri  during 
the  war,  and  as  he  was  so  much  talked  about  by  the 
Unionists  and  secessionists  in  that  section  the  latter  part 
of  the  war  on  account  of  the  numerous  victims  upon 
whom  his  avenging  hands  had  fallen,  it  will  be  useful  to 
briefly  delineate  the  rnan  as  he  appeared  to  those  who 
knew  him  best  during  that  period  of  blood  and  strife.  Of 
course  he  was  popular  with  and  liked  by  the  Unionists, 
and  sincerely  hated  by  the  Southern  people.  He  was  a 
commissioned  officer  of  the  State  during  the  war  except  a 
month  or  so  that  he  acted  as  scout  for  the  Federal  forces 
in  the  Southwest  in  the  fall  of  1861.  He  was  about 
twenty-seven  years  of  age  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
He  was  about  six  feet  high ;  muscular,  without  an  ounce 
of  surplus  flesh;  dark  complexion,  with  black,  straight 
hair,  which  indicated  the  Indian  blood  which  he  claimed 
flowed  in  his  veins.  He  was  mild  and  courteous  in  his 
manners  and  conversation,  and  his  words  were  always 
spoken  with  precision  and  deliberation.  When  grown  to 
manhood  he  became  an  itinerant  Methodist  preacher,  but 
after  a  year  or  so,  because  it  was  unremunerative  or  not 
suited  to  his  tastes,  he  gave  up  preaching  and  adopted 
school-teaching  for  a  living  in  Dallas  County,  Missouri. 
His  thoroughness  as  a  teacher,  in  enforcing  discipline  and 
in  producing  noticeable  results  in  the  advancement  of  his 
pupils,  was  satisfactory  to  the  patrons  of  his  school.  He 


GUERILLA    WAR  IN  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.       2O$ 

was  truly  in  earnest  in  everything  he  undertook,  and  he 
devoted  his  energies  to  every  undertaking  with  the  ear 
nestness  of  an  enthusiast  without  displaying  any  of  the 
outward  signs  of  enthusiasm.  He  was  strictly  temperate 
in  his  habits  of  life,  and  he  prided  himself  in  asserting 
that  he  had  never  taken  a  chew  of  tobacco,  nor  used  the 
weed  in  any  form ;  nor  touched  a  drop  of  intoxicants  of 
any  kind.  No  language  ever  escaped  his  lips  that  was 
not  fit  for  the  most  refined  and  cultured  ears.  He  was 
always  and  everywhere  a  student  of  books  and  of  nature. 
When  teaching  in  Dallas  County  before  the  war,  he  was 
attending  school  at  Ozark,  Christian  County,  where  one 
of  the  best  schools  in  the  Southwest  had  been  established. 
Here  he  studied  mathematics,  as  algebra  and  geometry-, 
Greek  and  Latin  and  philosophy.  He  had  an  insatiable 
thirst  for  knowledge — knowledge,  too,  of  the  profoundest 
depths.  He  always  carried  a  book  with  him,  and  was 
always  poring  over  its  pages  when  he  was  not  occupied 
in  attending  to  his  regular  duties.  No  matter  whether 
he  was  teaching  or  attending  school,  at  the  close  of  the 
day  when  he  left  the  schoolroom,  as  teacher  or  student, 
he  took  up  his  book  treating  of  philosophy  or  language 
and  perused  its  pages  until  he  became  familiar  with  its 
contents.  While  attending  school  at  Ozark  he  had  no 
cronies  or  chums,  and  never  participated  in  the  sports  of 
the  other  students.  But  he  did  not  neglect  physical  exer 
cise,  for  out  of  school-hours  he  devoted  much  time  to 
walking,  but  never  forgetting  to  take  his  book  along  with 
him  in  his  rambles.  After  the  most  fatiguing  scout  or 
march,  on  halting  his  command  to  rest  and  feed,  he  soon 
stretched  himself  upon  the  ground  on  his  blanket  with 
his  head  slightly  elevated  against  a  tree  or  on  his  saddle, 
with  his  book  in  his  hands,  earnestly  perusing  its  pages 
until  the  bugle-call  sounded  the  march.  Indeed,  it  was 
the  verdict  of  his  men  that  after  the  most  violent  hand- 
to-hand  conflicts  with  some  of  the  characters  with  whom 


2O6  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

he  had  to  deal,  and  in  which  he  killed  two  or  three  men, 
he  never  showed  the  slightest  perturbation  of  mind,  and 
on  returning  to  camp  or  halting  to  rest  for  a  few  moments, 
resumed  the  study  of  his  book.  As  far  as  outward  signs 
were  concerned,  he  seems  to  have  been  absolutely  without 
fear.  Most  of  the  hotels  in  the  towns  in  the  section  over 
which  his  operations  extended  had  porticos  or  verandas 
extending  the  entire  length  of  the  front  of  the  buildings, 
and  when  a  company  was  stationed  in  any  of  the  towns 
the  officers  generally  stopped  at  the  hotels.  While  sta 
tioned  at  Ozark  or  Neosho,  Captain  Kelso  had  quarters 
at  the  hotels,  and  might  have  been  seen  any  day,  when 
just  in  from  a  scout  or  off  duty,  pacing  up  and  down  the 
veranda  of  his  hotel  with  his  book  in  his  hands,  gener 
ally  studying  aloud.  When  in  camp  he  paced  back  and 
forth  in  front  of  his  tent  with  his  book  in  his  hand. 

When  the  agitation  growing  out  of  the  slavery  question 
culminated  in  the  secession  of  the  Southern  States  and  in 
the  war  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  every  man  in 
Missouri  of  decided  political  convictions  was  obliged  to 
determine  with  which  side  he  would  cast  his  fortunes. 
At  this  exciting  period,  Kelso,  the  teacher  and  student, 
espoused  the  Union  cause,  and  he  was  as  much  in  earnest 
for  its  success  as  he  had  been  for  every  other  undertaking 
with  which  he  had  been  connected.  In  the  organization 
of  the  State  forces,  Governor  Jackson,  who  was  a  seces 
sionist,  had  organized  and  officered  them  in  the  interest 
of  the  secessionists,  thus  putting  the  Unionists  through 
out  the  State  at  a  disadvantage  until  authority  was  ob 
tained  through  Frank  Blair  and  General  Lyon  to  organize 
the  Home  Guards.  Early  in  the  summer  of  1861,  there 
fore,  Kelso,  the  teacher  and  student,  was  among  the  first 
men  in  his  county  to  commence  the  organization  of  the 
Union  Home  Guards,  and  he  was  elected  Major  of  the 
Dallas  County  Battalion.  But  after  the  battle  of  Wilson 
Creek  and  the  death  of  General  Lyon,  the  Union  army 


GUERILLA    WAR   AV  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.       2O/ 

of  the  Southwest  was  obliged  to  retreat  to  Rolla,  and  the 
Home  Guards  were  soon  disbanded.  Directly  after  they 
were  disbanded,  Kelso  joined  Colonel  Sempronius  H. 
Boyd's  Twenty-fourth  Regiment  Missouri  Infantry,  then 
being  organized  in  that  district.  His  service  in  this  regi 
ment  was  in  the  capacity  of  scout  until  he  was  given  a 
recruiting  commission  in  the  Fourteenth  Regiment  Mis 
souri  State  Militia  Cavalry.  As  a  scout  he  was  considered 
eccentric,  for,  instead  of  going  out  well  mounted,  he  took 
it  afoot,  and  in  disguise  visited  the  camps  of  the  Southern 
forces  in  Southwest  Missouri,  under  Price  and  McCulloch. 
He  thus  had  ample  opportunity  of  seeing  for  himself  the 
ill  treatment  the  Unionists  received  at  the  hands  of  their 
captors  in  the  camps  of  the  secessionists.  Old,  white- 
haired  men,  past  the  military  age,  were  torn  from  their 
families  and  homes  and  dragged  into  the  camps  and 
treated  with  all  sorts  of  indignities  by  an  undisciplined 
soldiery,  made  up  mostly  of  men  who,  long  before  the 
war,  had  been  conspicuous  for  their  domineering  conduct 
towards  political  opponents.  Thus  it  is  easy  to  see  that 
such  scenes  in  the  early  days  of  the  war  must  have  pro 
duced  a  deep  impression  on  the  mind  of  such  a  man  as 
Kelso  is  shown  to  have  been.  He  heard  secessionists 
who  never  entertained  a  thought  that  there  might  be  a 
turn  in  the  tide  of  success  boast  of  the  Federal  soldiers 
and  Union  men  they  had  killed  and  the  trifling  causes  for 
which  they  had  been  killed.  He  had  by  his  own  efforts 
succeeded  in  solving  difficult  problems  in  mathematics, 
mastering  two  or  three  languages,  and  in  comprehending 
abstract  questions  of  philosophy,  and  now,  if  mutual 
destruction  of  men  was  to  be  the  chief  occupation  as  a 
proof  of  manhood  until  the  issues  of  the  war  were  settled, 
could  he  not  succeed  in  that  business  as  well  as  his  op 
ponents  ?  If  they  practised  deception,  could  he  not  do 
it  also  ?  He  took  to  this  new  occupation  with  his  char 
acteristic  earnestness,  and  if  he  heard  of  a  foe  within  the 


208 


THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 


territory  of  his  operations,  he  was  restless  until  he  could 
get  at  him.  He  admitted  that  he  was  not  ambitious  of 
attaining  to  higher  rank  than  that  of  commanding  officer 
of  a  company,  for  the  reason  that  if  he  attained  to  a 
higher  rank  than  that,  he  would  not  have  the  opportunity 
of  participating  in  the  personal  conflicts  with  the  enemy, 
which  appears  to  have  been  almost  a  burning  desire  with 
him. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE    BAXTER    SPRINGS    MASSACRE. 

GENERAL  BLUNT,  having  closed  a  brilliant  campaign 
in  which  he  defeated  the  forces  of  Generals  Steele  and 
Cooper  at  the  battle  of  Honey  Springs  and  drove  them 
into  the  southern  part  of  the  Indian  Territory,  and  in 
which  he  captured  Fort  Smith  and  dispersed  the  forces 
of  General  Cabell,  returned  to  Fort  Scott,  September 
23d,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  the  affairs  of  his  dis 
trict  so  that  he  could  remove  his  headquarters  to  Fort 
Smith  in  a  short  time.  Reports  of  his  successful  opera 
tions  had  already  reached  Kansas,  and  the  energy  he  had 
uniformly  displayed  had  made  him  very  popular  with 
the  people  of  the  State,  so  that  he  was  given  a  warm 
reception  by  the  citizens  and  soldiers  of  Fort  Scott  on 
his  arrival  at  that  place.  Before  leaving  Fort  Smith  he 
made  such  disposition  of  his  troops  at  that  post,  Web 
ber's  Falls,  and  Fort  Gibson  as  would,  by  proper  vigilance 
of  the  commanding  officers  of  these  stations,  secure  the 
tranquillity  of  the  section  which  had  recently  been 
wrested  from  Southern  domination.  He  believed  that  it 
would  be  several  weeks  before  the  demoralized  forces  of 
Steele,  Cooper,  and  Cabell  could  be  reorganized  effec 
tively  to  take  the  field  again,  on  account  of  the  great  loss 
of  supplies  they  had  sustained  in  the  recent  campaign. 
When  he  arrived  at  Fort  Scott  he  found  that  the  excite- 

VOL.   II. — 14 

209 


210  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

ment  in  regard  to  the  Lawrence  massacre  and  the  inva 
sion  of  Missouri  by  General  Lane,  with  the  armed  citizens 
of  Kansas,  to  search  for  stolen  property  taken  by  Quan- 
trill  during  his  raid,  had  not  entirely  subsided.  The 
carrying  into  effect  of  General  Ewing's  Order  Number 
Eleven,  depopulating  the  Border  counties  of  Missouri  in 
his  district  as  far  south  as  Vernon  County ;  the  destruc 
tion  of  property  in  those  counties;  the  moving  south  of 
Southern  families  from  those  counties,  and  the  daily  re 
ports  of  conflicts  with  guerilla  bands  were  subjects  of 
general  interest  and  discussion.  Of  course  that  order 
was  almost  universally  approved  in  Kansas,  and  though 
it  did  not  contemplate  the  wholesale  destruction  of  prop 
erty,  yet  most  of  the  farmhouses  and  barns  were  burned 
and  destroyed  in  those  counties.  The  atrocious  acts  of 
the  Southern  guerillas  in  Missouri  made  many  conserva 
tive  Union  men  and  Federal  officers  in  that  State  in  favor 
of  adopting  severe  measures  against  the  outlaws  and 
their  allies.  The  loss  of  life  and  property  at  Lawrence 
were  small  in  comparison  with  the  loss  of  life  and  prop 
erty  to  the  Unionists  in  Missouri,  for  in  nearly  every 
neighborhood  in  that  State  Union  men  were  murdered 
and  their  property  taken  and  destroyed  by  the  guerillas. 
Reports  now  and  then  came  to  Colonel  C.  W.  Blair, 
commanding  the  post  of  Fort  Scott,  of  intended  raids  by 
guerillas  from  Missouri  on  that  post,  but  by  his  vigilance 
they  were  always  averted.  That  place  being  the  base 
of  supplies  for  the  Federal  troops  operating  in  the  Indian 
Territory  and  Western  Arkansas,  it  was  a  point  of  spe 
cial  importance,  on  account  of  the  large  quantities  of 
Government  stores  kept  there.  At  times  there  were 
serious  apprehensions  felt  for  the  safety  of  the  place,  for 
the  demands  for  troops  as  escorts  to  trains  and  for  scout 
ing  purposes  frequently  reduced  the  force  at  that  post 
to  only  a  few  hundred  men.  As  there  were  Southern 
sympathizers  from  Missouri  trading  in  Fort  Scott  nearly 


THE   BAXTER   SPRINGS  MASSACRE.  211 

every  day,  they  had  no  difficulty  in  ascertaining  the  fact 
when  there  was  a  marked  depletion  of  the  troops  at  that 
post,  and  it  was  frequently  asserted  that  these  people, 
who  were  generally  women,  not  only  carried  information 
of  Federal  movements,  but  even  supplies  to  the  gue 
rillas.  Captain  Henry  Taylor  had  a  company  of  Southern 
men  in  Vernon  County,  Missouri,  and  on  one  occasion 
came  one  night  within  a  few  miles  of  Fort  Scott  and 
captured  a  Federal  scout,  Thomas  Whitesides,  and  took 
him  off  and  killed  him. 

Colonel  Blair  had  kept  a  station  or  outpost  of  two 
companies  of  the  Third  Wisconsin  Cavalry  at  Dry  Wood, 
twelve  miles  southeast  of  Fort  Scott,  during  the  summer, 
and  as  part  of  this  force  was  kept  almost  constantly 
scouting  in  Missouri,  intended  guerilla  movements  were 
discovered  in  time  to  disconcert  them  and  prevent  a  raid. 
For  several  months  a  Confederate  force,  estimated  at 
five  hundred  to  a  thousand  men,  under  Colonels  Hunter 
and  Coffee,  had  been  in  Southwest  Missouri,  Northwest 
Arkansas,  and  along  the  eastern  line  of  the  Cherokee 
Nation,  threatening  the  supply  line  between  Fort  Scott 
and  Fort  Gibson ;  and  though  this  force  had  been  several 
times  dispersed  by  the  Missouri  militia  from  Springfield 
and  Neosho,  the  leaders  soon  rallied  their  men  again, 
and  it  was  frequently  reported  that  they  intended  to 
make  a  raid  north  through  Missouri,  and  if  possible  enter 
the  Border  counties  of  Kansas,  for  the  purpose  of  plun 
dering  the  people  and  destroying  their  property.  As 
nearly  all  the  Union  families  had  moved  out  of  the 
southwestern  counties  of  Missouri,  or  into  the  military 
stations  in  those  counties,  a  Southern  force  could  easily 
march  from  the  Arkansas  line  to  within  a  few  miles  of 
Fort  Scott  without  causing  any  alarm.  Most  of  the 
farmhouses  along  the  roads  in  those  counties  had  been 
destroyed,  and  the  few  that  remained  were  generally 
occupied  by  Southern  families  who  did  not  care  to  give 


212  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

information  concerning  the  movements  of  Southern 
troops. 

Several  companies  of  Missouri  State  Militia  were 
stationed  at  Neosho  and  Carthage,  and  by  their  activity 
made  that  section  an  unsafe  retreat  for  guerilla  bands. 
But  there  were  no  Federal  troops  or  militia  stationed  in 
Vernon  and  Barton  Counties,  east  and  southeast  of  Fort 
Scott,  and  it  was  generally  known  that  the  bandits  of 
Quantrill  and  Jackman  passed  through  those  counties  in 
going  south  from  the  Missouri  River  counties,  or  in  re 
turning  from  the  south  to  the  Missouri  River  counties. 
When  the  bandits  were  passing  through  the  country  by 
rapid  marches,  it  was  by  mere  accident  if  they  were  met 
by  Federal  scouting  detachments.  It  was  possible,  there 
fore,  for  a  force  of  several  hundred  of  the  outlaws  to  come 
upon  a  small  Federal  detachment  without  any  warning 
whatever.  At  Dry  Wood  the  Federal  detachment  had 
a  stockade  which  would  enable  them  to  hold  the  place  if 
suddenly  attacked  by  a  superior  force. 

After  the  First  Kansas  Colored  Regiment,  under 
Colonel  Williams,  which  had  been  encamped  at  Baxter 
Springs  during  the  spring,  left  that  place  the  latter  part 
of  June,  there  was  a  month  or  so  that  there  were  no 
troops  encamped  there.  The  constant  passing  of  supply 
trains,  escorts,  and  messengers  over  the  military  road 
between  Fort  Scott  and  Fort  Gibson,  a  distance  of  160 
miles,  through  a  country  almost  uninhabited  at  that 
time,  made  it  very  important  that  there  should  be  estab 
lished  a  military  station  at  Baxter  Springs.  So  strongly 
was  Colonel  Blair,  commanding  the  District  of  Southern 
Kansas,  and  the  post  of  Fort  Scott,  impressed  that  there 
should  be  a  station  at  Baxter,  that  on  the  i/th  of  August 
he  ordered  Lieutenant  John  Crites,  with  his  company  of 
the  Third  Wisconsin  Cavalry,  to  that  place,  and  a  short 
time  afterwards  Lieutenant  R.  E.  Cook,  with  a  company 
of  colored  recruits  for  the  Second  Kansas  Colored  In- 


THE   BAXTER   SPRINGS  MASSACRE.  21$ 

fantry,  was  ordered  to  reinforce  him.  From  the  early 
days  of  the  war,  Baxter  Springs  had  been  a  noted  camp 
ing  ground  for  the  Federal  forces  operating  in  Southern 
Kansas  and  the  Indian  Territory.  It  was  a  beautiful  site 
for  a  camping  ground,  and  was  convenient  to  wood  and 
water.  The  spring  near  which  the  troops  generally  en 
camped  was  about  half  a  mile  north  of  the  State  line, 
about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  west  of  Spring  River,  and  a  few 
rods  east  of  the  military  road  from  Fort  Scott  to  Fort 
Gibson.  The  timber  along  Spring  River  at  this  point 
extended  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  west  of  that  stream, 
so  that  the  spring  was  almost  in  the  edge  of  the  prairie, 
near  the  head  of  a  hollow  that  gradually  deepened  and 
widened  until  the  Spring  Branch  fell  into  Spring  River, 
that  flowed  nearly  due  south  at  that  point.  In  a  short 
time  after  Lieutenants  Crites  and  Cook  arrived  with  their 
commands,  they  constructed  a  blockhouse  a  hundred 
yards  or  so  southeast  of  the  spring  on  high  ground ;  but 
for  some  reason  or  other  they  removed  this  blockhouse 
to  the  north  side  of  the  Spring  Branch,  a  hundred  yards 
perhaps  northeast  of  the  spring  on  the  sloping  side  of  the 
hollow.  They  had  a  line  of  breastworks  constructed  of 
logs  and  earth  about  four  feet  high,  extending  around  the 
north,  east,  and  south  sides  of  the  blockhouse,  the  west 
side  being  unfinished  and  open.  There  was  room  enough 
inside  the  breastworks  for  the  troops,  their  tents  and 
supplies,  and  animals. 

Recent  reports  of  unusual  activity  of  the  Southern 
partisan  bands  in  Northwestern  Arkansas  and  Southwest 
Missouri  induced  Colonel  Blair  to  order  Lieutenant  James 
B.  Pond,  Third  Wisconsin  Cavalry,  to  march  with  his 
company  and  one  twelve-pounder  mountain  howitzer 
from  Dry  Wood  to  strengthen  the  station  at  Baxter 
Springs.  On  arrival  at  Baxter,  October  5th,  the  Lieu 
tenant,  being  the  senior  officer  present,  at  once  put  part 
of  his  men  at  work  to  strengthen  his  position,  and  to 


214  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

extend  the  breastworks  on  the  north  and  south  sides  so 
as  to  accommodate  the  reinforcement  which  he  had 
brought  down. 

In  a  day  or  so  after  starting  out  on  his  expedition  to 
Missouri  from  Arkadelphia,  Colonel  Shelby  came  into  col 
lision  with  a  detachment  of  the  First  Arkansas  Union 
Infantry  from  Fort  Smith,  south  of  Ozark,  and  in  the 
skirmish  that  took  place  several  of  the  Federal  detach 
ment  were  killed,  wounded,  and  captured.  The  com 
manding  officer  of  the  detachment,  in  reporting  the  affair 
to  the  commanding  officer  at  Fort  Smith,  was  led  to  be 
lieve  that  Shelby's  force  was  much  larger  than  it  really 
was,  and  thought  it  was  a  movement  of  part  of  Price's 
army  against  Fort  Smith.  As  General  Steele  did  not 
show  a  disposition,  or  was  not  prepared,  to  follow  up 
Price  after  the  capture  of  Little  Rock,  the  Federal  officers 
at  Fort  Smith  thought  it  very  likely  that  Price  would 
take  part  of  the  troops  he  had  with  him  about  Arkadel 
phia,  and  such  of  the  troops  of  Cooper  and  Cabell  as 
could  be  rallied,  for  immediate  and  active  operations 
against  the  Federal  forces  in  Western  Arkansas.  In 
view  of  Shelby's  rapid  movement  north  with  artillery, 
and  of  other  reported  Confederate  movements  in  front, 
the  commanding  officer  at  Fort  Smith  despatched  mes 
sengers  to  General  Blunt,  detailing  the  situation  to  him 
as  it  then  appeared  from  the  best  information  to  be  ob 
tained.  The  couriers  arrived  at  Fort  Scott  with  the 
despatches  on  October  3d,  and  General  Blunt  at  once 
commenced  preparations  to  return  to  Fort  Smith  with 
the  headquarters  of  his  district  for  the  purpose  of  con 
centrating  and  making  such  disposition  of  his  troops  as 
might  seem  necessary  to  meet  the  threatened  attack. 
No  report  of  Shelby's  movement  north  of  the  Arkansas 
River  had  yet  reached  General  Blunt,  although  Shelby 
was  at  that  moment  in  Southwest  Missouri. 

Information  was  received  at  Fort  Scott  from  Kansas 


THE   BAXTER   SPRINGS  MASSACRE. 

City  almost  daily  of  operations  in  General  Ewing's  Dis 
trict  of  the  Border,  and  there  had  been  no  recent  reports 
of  unusual  activity  displayed  by  Quantrill's  guerillas  in 
that  district. 

It  was  known  in  a  general  way  that  Quantrill  had  not 
yet  gone  south,  and  that  his  men  were  scattered  in  small 
bands  over  the  district  and  in  the  counties  east  of  Gen 
eral  Ewing's  district.  Quantrill  had  not  up  to  that  time 
given  the  Federal  troops  any  trouble  in  Southwest  Mis 
souri  or  Southern  Kansas,  and  small  detachments  had 
since  the  Federal  occupation  of  Fort  Gibson  been  con 
stantly  passing  over  the  military  road  between  that  point 
and  Fort  Scott  without  any  apprehension  of  meeting 
with  his  desperate  outlaws.  Since  the  Lawrence  mas 
sacre,  and  after  his  bands  had  scattered  into  the  thickly 
wooded  regions  of  Western  Missouri,  they  had  not  shown 
much  aggressiveness,  and  only  occupied  themselves  in 
keeping  out  of  the  way  of  the  Federal  troops.  About 
the  last  of  September  instructions  were  sent  by  him  to 
the  leaders  of  different  bands  of  his  command  to  concen 
trate  at  a  given  place  in  Lafayette  County  on  the  1st 
of  October.  When  the  leaders  of  his  different  bands 
brought  their  men  together,  it  was  decided  to  march 
south,  and  at  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  October  2d 
Colonel  Quantrill,  as  he  signed  himself,  at  the  head  of 
his  men,  between  three  and  four  hundred  strong,  took 
up  the  line  of  march  south.  The  counties  through  which 
he  passed  were  almost  depopulated,  and  he  marched  up 
wards  of  four  days  without  his  movements  becoming 
known  to  the  Federal  officers  at  any  of  the  stations  along 
the  Border.  If  any  Federal  soldier  or  Union  citizen  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  outlaws  on  their  line  of  march,  he 
did  not  live  to  report  the  fact,  for  they  boasted  that  they 
did  not  take  any  prisoners.  Two  soldiers  of  the  Four 
teenth  Kansas  Cavalry,  stationed  with  their  company  at 
Fort  Scott,  who  were  permitted  to  go  home  to  visit  their 


2l6  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE   BORDER. 

families  in  Vernon  County,  Missouri,  for  a  few  days,  be 
fore  going  south  with  the  next  supply  train,  were  cap- 
tured  and  killed  on  the  night  of  October  4th  by  a  force 
of  bandits  a  hundred  or  so  strong,  supposed  to  have  be 
longed  to  Quantrill's  command.  The  presence  of  such  a 
large  force  of  the  enemy  near  Fort  Scott,  and  their 
threatening  attitude  as  seen  by  several  parties  who  were 
near  them,  but  who  escaped  from  them  and  came  in  to 
the  post  and  reported  what  they  had  seen,  caused  an 
alarm  that  night  and  the  calling  out  of  the  troops  and 
the  strengthening  of  the  pickets  on  all  the  roads  leading 
into  the  post  from  the  east. 

Having  made  the  necessary  preparations  for  returning 
to  Fort  Smith,  General  Blunt  left  Fort  Scott  about  four 
o'clock  Sunday  afternoon,  October  4th,  with  an  escort 
of  one  hundred  men,  composed  of  part  of  a  company  of 
the  Third  Wisconsin  Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant  J.  G. 
Cavert,  and  part  of  a  company  of  the  Fourteenth  Kansas 
Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant  R.  H.  Pierce,  and  his  brigade 
band  and  clerks  and  orderlies.  His  brigade  band  played 
in  front  of  his  headquarters  on  the  plaza  for  perhaps  half 
an  hour  before  leaving,  and  a  good  many  citizens  and 
soldiers  turned  out  to  see  the  General  off.  It  was  a 
clear,  lovely  afternoon,  and  many  of  the  people  said  that 
they  had  never  before  heard  music  sound  so  sweetly. 
The  General, -with  the  members  of  his  staff,  band,  escort, 
and  train,  marched  out  that  evening  six  miles  south 
of  Fort  Scott  and  encamped  until  the  next  morning. 
Starting  early  the  next  morning  he  marched  to  Cow 
Creek  and  encamped.  Resuming  the  march  the  next 
morning,  he  arrived  about  twelve  o'clock  that  day  within 
a  quarter  of  a  mile  of  Lieutenant  Pond's  camp  at  Baxter 
Springs,  but  not  in  sight  of  it  on  account  of  intervening 
higher  ground,  and  being  some  distance  in  advance  of 
his  train  and  escort,  halted  for  a  few  moments  for  them 
to  come  up.  As  his  escort  came  up,  and  while  waiting 


THE  BAXTER   SPRINGS  MASSACRE.  2 1/ 

a  few  moments  for  his  wagons  to  close  up,  his  attention 
was  called  to  about  150  mounted  men,  some  three  hun 
dred  yards  to  his  left,  forming  in  line  and  advancing  from 
the  timber  on  Spring  River.  Though  the  actions  of  the 
men  and  officers  were  such  as  to  arouse  the  suspicion  that 
they  were  not  friends,  the  General  and  members  of  his 
staff  at  first  thought  that  they  were  Lieutenant  Pond's 
men  out  on  drill,  returning  from  a  scout,  or  out  to  give 
him  a  reception.  Captain  W.  S.  Tough,  his  chief  of 
scouts,  rode  forward  a  hundred  yards  or  so  to  ascertain 
who  the  men  were,  but  returned  in  a  moment  and  re 
ported  to  the  General  that  the  men  were  rebels,  and  that 
a  fight  was  going  on  at  Lieutenant  Pond's  camp. 

In  the  meantime  General  Blunt  had  himself  ridden 
forward  far  enough  to  hear  a  brisk  firing  at  Lieutenant 
Pond's  camp  and  to  satisfy  himself  that  the  men  on  his 
left  were  enemies,  although  they  were  all  dressed  in 
Federal  uniforms.  Facing  the  enemy,  his  escort  had 
been  ordered  into  line  of  battle,  under  the  immediate 
direction  of  Major  H.  Z.  Curtis,  his  Assistant  Adjutant- 
General,  with  the  wagons  and  band  in  the  rear.  The 
force  of  men  on  General  Blunt 's  left  was  three  companies 
of  the  bandits  under  the  immediate  command  of  Quan- 
trill,  who  had  charged  on  Lieutenant  Pond's  camp,  part 
of  the  tents  of  which  were  west  of  and  outside  of  the 
fortifications,  and  who  had  been  driven  off  and  had  ral 
lied  and  re-formed  on  the  edge  of  the  prairie  about  two 
hundred  yards  north  of  the  camp.  Quantrill  had  scarcely 
re-formed  his  three  companies  in  line  when  he  observed 
General  Blunt's  escort  advancing  on  the  military  road 
from  the  direction  of  Fort  Scott,  and  at  the  same  time 
heard  sharp  firing  around  the  Federal  camp,  where  the 
other  half  of  his  command,  which  had  gone  around  on 
the  south  side  of  it,  were  hotly  engaged.  He  immedi 
ately  ordered  that  part  of  his  command  which  was  still 
engaging  Lieutenant  Pond's  camp  to  join  him,  which 


2l8  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

they  did  on  the  double-quick.  He  then  advanced  upon 
General  Blunt's  escort,  and  seeing  from  the  length  of  the 
line  that  there  were  less  than  one  hundred  men  in  it, 
ordered  his  men  to  fire  a  volley  and  then  to  charge. 
When  the  bandits  had  approached  within  sixty  yards, 
the  escort  fired  a  volley  into  them,  and  then  seeing  that 
in  another  moment  they  would  be  surrounded  by  a  force 
which  they  estimated  at  not  less  than  six  hundred  men, 
turned  and  fled  over  the  prairie. 

General  Blunt  and  his  Assistant  Adjutant-General, 
Major  Curtis,  endeavored  to  rally  the  men  ;  but  it  was  im 
possible  to  rally  them  against  greatly  superior  numbers  in 
an  open  prairie,  and  the  bandits  closed  in  upon  them,  and 
in  the  pursuit  of  two  or  three  miles,  shot  down  and  killed 
all  the  men  overtaken,  wounded,  or  captured,  except 
about  half  a  dozen  who  feigned  death  after  they  were 
terribly  wounded.  In  the  pursuit  and  slaughter,  the 
men  of  the  Federal  detachment  became  a  good  deal 
scattered,  but  after  a  flight  of  about  a  mile  and  a  half 
General  Blunt  succeeded  in  rallying  fifteen  men  with 
whom  he  kept  off  at  a  distance  the  bandits  who  were 
pursuing  him,  and  even  turned  upon  them,  causing  them 
to  retire  upon  their  main  force.  He  then  sent  Lieutenant 
J.  E.  Tappan,  one  of  his  aides-de-camp,  with  five  men, 
back  to  Fort  Scott,  with  instructions  for  Colonel  Blair  to 
send  forward  at  once  a  reinforcement  of  all  the  men  who 
could  be  spared  from  that  post,  and  with  the  other  nine 
men  he  watched  the  movements  of  the  bandits  until  they 
left  the  field  and  moved  off  south  on  the  military  road 
about  five  o'clock.  Major  Curtis,  who  had  become  sepa 
rated  from  General  Blunt  after  the  escort  broke,  had  his 
horse  shot  in  the  hip  while  riding  beside  Lieutenant 
Pierce,  which  so  excited  or  disabled  the  animal  that  in 
jumping  a  ravine,  it  fell,  throwing  the  Major  over  its 
head,  when  he  was  captured  and  shot.  His  new  uniform 
made  him  a  conspicuous  mark  for  the  bandits.  Part  of 


THE  BAXTER   SPRINGS  MASSACRE.  2\g 

the   bandits    turned    their   attention   to    murdering   the 


n 

8; 
I* 


FEDERAL  mam 

CONFEDERATE,     nan 

THE  BAXTER  SPRINGS  MASSACRE. 


teamsters  with   the  wagons,   and    the    members   of   the 
band.     In  the  midst  of   the  excitement   of   the  bloody 


22O  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

unequal  conflict,  the  driver  of  the  band  wagon,  with  the 
members  of  the  band  in  it,  endeavored  to  escape  in  a 
direction  different  to  that  taken  by  the  escort ;  but  after 
getting  about  half  a  mile  away  one  of  the  wheels  came 
off  the  wagon,  and  it  was  soon  overtaken  by  the  bandits 
and  all  the  members  of  the  band,  fourteen  in  number, 
and  the  driver,  and  James  O'Neal,  special  artist  for 
Frank  Leslie 's  Illustrated  Newspaper,  were  murdered. 
After  they  were  shot,  their  bodies  were  thrown  into  or 
under  the  wagon  and  the  wagon  fired,  so  that  some  of 
them  were  found  to  be  horribly  burned  and  disfigured 
when  picked  up  by  their  comrades.  In  many  instances 
where  the  soldiers  were  closely  pursued,  they  were  told 
that  if  they  would  surrender  they  would  be  treated  as 
prisoners  of  war;  but  in  every  case  the  moment  they 
surrendered  and  were  disarmed,  they  were  shot  down, 
sometimes  even  with  their  own  arms  in  the  hands  of  the 
bandits. 

Most  of  the  soldiers,  not  thinking  of  Quantrill  being  in 
that  section,  and  supposing  that  the  bandits  were  a  regu 
lar  Confederate  force,  believed  that  the  promises  of  fair 
treatment  would  be  respected  ;  otherwise  they  would  have 
sold  their  lives  as  dearly  as  possible,  and  the  bandits 
would  have  had  a  heavier  list  of  casualties  than  they  had 
at  the  end  of  their  bloody  and  fiendish  work. 

While  Quantrill  was  being  reinforced  by  that  part  of 
his  command  which  had  attacked  Lieutenant  Pond's 
camp  on  the  south  and  southwest  sides,  Major  Henning, 
Provost-Marshal  on  General  Blunt's  staff,  rode  forward  a 
few  yards  in  advance  of  the  General  until  he  came  in 
sight  of  the  camp,  to  reconnoitre,  so  that  when  the  ban 
dits  opened  fire  and  advanced  on  a  charge,  he  and  Cap 
tain  Tough  were  so  far  on  the  right  of  the  Federal  line 
that  the  difficulty  of  reaching  Lieutenant  Pond's  camp 
seemed  less  than  rejoining  the  escort.  They  therefore 
dashed  forward,  and  in  a  few  moments  arrived  at  the 


THE  BAXTER   SPRINGS  MASSACRE.  221 

camp  in  safety,  having  passed  near  several  bandits  who 
had  not  reached  their  line  in  time  to  participate  in  the 
charge,  and  exchanged  shots  with  them.  They  hoped  to 
get  Lieutenant  Pond's  cavalry  to  go  to  the  assistance  of 
the  General  and  his  escort;  but,  unfortunately,  all  the 
available  mounted  men  at  the  station  had  that  morning 
been  sent  out  with  a  forage  train,  and  had  not  returned. 
Finding  that  the  cavalry  were  nearly  all  absent  from  the 
station,  and  that  there  were  not  enough  of  the  colored 
infantry,  being  less  than  a  full  company,  to  engage  on 
the  open  prairie  the  superior  force  of  the  bandits  with 
any  prospect  of  success,  Major  Henning  took  half  a 
dozen  mounted  men  from  the  camp,  and  with  Captain 
Tough  returned  to  the  high  ground  on  the  prairie  near 
where  the  escort  had  first  formed,  in  time  to  witness  the 
last  scenes  of  the  bloody  tragedy,  the  murdering  of  the 
members  of  the  band,  and  the  plundering  of  the  train  of 
the  valuable  effects  of  the  officers  and  men. 

The  alarm  in  Fort  Scott  the  night  after  General  Blunt 
left  was  caused  by  Quantrill's  force  passing  some  fifteen 
miles  east  of  that  post  that  night,  and  the  belief  of  the 
parties  who  saw  them  that  they  intended  to  attack  that 
place.  Instead  of  going  to  Fort  Scott,  however,  he  con 
tinued  his  march  nearly  south,  bearing  a  little  west  all 
the  time,  and  marching  almost  on  a  parallel  line  with 
General  Blunt,  the  lines  of  march  of  the  two  forces  con 
verging  to  a  point  at  Baxter  Springs.  On  arriving  near 
Baxter  Springs,  about  twelve  o'clock,  Captain  Brinker, 
commanding  Quantrill's  advance,  reported  a  train  ahead. 
The  Captain  was  ordered  to  press  on  and  ascertain  to 
whom  the  train  belonged  and  what  troops  were  with  it. 
He  soon  came  in  sight  of  Lieutenant  Pond's  camp,  which 
he  supposed  was  the  camp  of  the  train,  and,  finding  that 
he  was  not  discovered,  fell  back  a  hundred  yards  or  so 
until  the  main  command  arrived.  At  the  time  Quan 
trill's  advance  came  up  in  sight  of  the  Federal  camp, 


222  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

most  of  Lieutenant  Pond's  men  were  at  dinner,  and 
others  were  strolling  about  camp  or  in  the  woods  near 
camp.  There  was  no  picket  or  camp  guard  out  to  give 
any  warning  of  an  approaching  foe,  so  that  when  Quan- 
trill  came  up  with  his  main  force  to  where  his  advance 
halted,  he  formed  his  men  by  fours  and  ordered  them  to 
charge  the  camp,  leading  the  head  of  the  column  himself. 
Some  of  the  Federal  soldiers  who  were  between  the  camp 
and  the  river  were  fired  upon  and  shot  down  by  the 
bandits  as  they  approached  the  camp.  These  scattering 
shots  attracted  the  attention  of  some  of  the  soldiers  in 
camp ;  but  before  they  could  get  inside  the  fortifications 
and  to  their  arms,  the  outlaws  were  all  around  and  in 
camp. 

First  Sergeant  W.  L.  McKenzie,  of  Lieutenant  Pond's 
company,  being  among  the  first  men  to  hear  the  shots  in 
the  direction  of  the  river,  hastened  to  the  Lieutenant's 
tent  to  arouse  him  and  to  give  the  alarm  in  camp.  The 
colored  soldiers,  who  were  eating  their  dinner  under  a 
shed  or  an  arbor  a  few  yards  south  of  the  breastworks  on 
the  outside  of  them,  started  for  their  quarters  in  the 
blockhouse,  where  they  had  their  arms  and  ammunition, 
the  moment  they  saw  and  heard  the  bandits  coming  up 
on  a  charge.  Lieutenant  Pond  and  some  of  his  men 
who  were  in  the  western  part  and  on  the  outskirts  of 
the  camp  were  obliged  to  pass  through  the  ranks  of  the 
bandits  to  get  to  their  arms,  and  four  of  his  men  were 
shot  down  in  endeavoring  to  accomplish  the  task.  In 
a  few  moments,  however,  the  white  and  colored  sol 
diers  were  rallied  and  succeeded  in  driving  the  bandits 
out  of  the  breastworks  and  out  of  camp.  Lieutenant 
Pond  then  got  his  twelve-pounder  howitzer  to  work, 
which  was  outside  the  rifle-pits  on  the  north  side,  and 
after  a  few  rounds  drove  the  bandits  beyond  range  on 
that  side.  When  the  colored  soldiers  got  into  the  block 
house  they  kept  up  such  a  hot  fire  that  they  drove  the 


THE  BAXTER   SPRINGS  MASSACRE.  22$ 

bandits  beyond  range  or  to  seek  shelter  behind  trees.  A 
desultory  and  sometimes  sharp  firing  was  kept  up  be 
tween  Lieutenant  Pond's  men  and  the  bandits  until 
Quantrill  ordered  that  part  of  his  command  south  and 
southwest  of  the  camp  to  join  him  where  he  had  formed 
line  in  the  edge  of  the  prairie  north  of  the  camp  to  attack 
General  Blunt.  When  the  Lieutenant  and  his  men  saw 
this  movement  of  the  bandits,  as  the  latter  passed  around 
the  west  side  of  the  camp  to  the  north  side,  they  sup 
posed  that  the  enemy  were  preparing  for  a  more  deter 
mined  attack,  and  a  few  moments  later  when  they  heard 
the  firing  from  the  attack  on  General  Blunt's  escort  they 
did  not  know  what  it  meant  until  Major  Henning  and 
Captain  Tough  dashed  in.  Lieutenant  Cook,  command 
ing  the  company  of  the  Second  Kansas  Colored  Infantry, 
and  several  soldiers  were  killed  east  of  the  camp  before 
they  could  get  to  their  quarters. 

After  the  bandits  had  completed  their  work  of  murder 
ing  all  the  prisoners  and  wounded  Federal  soldiers  who 
had  fallen  into  their  hands,  and  stripping  most  of  them 
of  their  clothing,  and  plundering  the  train,  they  formed 
in  line  of  battle  on  the  prairie  west  of  the  camp,  and 
Captain  Todd  was  sent  by  Quantrill  to  demand  the  sur 
render  of  the  station,  which  was,  of  course,  refused  by 
Lieutenant  Pond.  He  also  spoke  about  an  exchange  of 
prisoners;  but  Lieutenant  Pond  had  not  captured  any  of 
the  bandits,  and  those  who  were  wounded  near  camp  were 
carried  away  or  managed  to  get  away  before  the  arrival 
of  the  flag  of  truce.  Quantrill  considered  the  matter  of 
attacking  the  camp  again,  but  finding  that  the  troops 
were  fortified,  that  they  had  one  howitzer,  that  they 
would  be  better  prepared  for  him  than  in  the  first  attack, 
and  that  it  would  be  a  fight  to  the  death  with  them,  he 
concluded  that  it  would  cost  him  too  great  a  sacrifice  of 
life  to  attempt  to  take  the  camp  by  assault,  and  at  once 
marched  off  south,  taking  his  wounded  along. 


224  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

When  the  bandits  had  moved  off,  the  work  of  collect 
ing  the  dead  and  wounded  was  undertaken.  They  were 
scattered  over  the  prairie  for  nearly  two  miles  from  the 
scene  of  the  first  attack.  Lieutenant  A.  W.  Farr,  Third 
Wisconsin  Cavalry,  Judge- Advocate  on  General  Blunt 's 
staff,  was  killed  near  where  the  escort  first  formed.  The 
Federal  loss  in  the  disaster  was  three  officers,  sixty-seven 
enlisted  men,  and  ten  citizens  killed,  and  eighteen  enlisted 
men  wounded,  including  the  killed  and  wounded  in  the 
fight  at  the  camp.  Lieutenant  Pond  reported  that  the 
bandits  left  eleven  men  killed  on  the  field — number  of 
wounded  not  known.  Nearly  all  of  the  soldiers  and  citi 
zens  of  the  escort  who  were  killed  were  found  to  have 
been  shot  through  the  head,  and  most  of  them  had  been 
shot  five  or  six  times,  thus  showing  the  fiendish  character 
of  the  desperate  outlaws. 

With  the  few  men  whom  he  had  rallied,  General  Blunt 
followed  the  bandits,  keeping  in  sight  of  them  until  they 
crossed  the  Neosho  River  twelve  miles  south,  when  he 
returned  to  Lieutenant  Pond's  camp  at  Baxter  that  even 
ing  and  awaited  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Blair  with  troops 
from  Fort  Scott.  He  at  once  put  scouts  on  the  trail  of 
the  bandits,  and  despatched  messengers  to  Forts  Gibson 
and  Smith  directing  the  commanding  officers  at  those 
stations  to  be  on  the  lookout  for  and  if  possible  to  inter 
cept  the  outlaws  at  the  Arkansas  River.  From  Baxter 
Springs  Quantrill  marched  south,  crossed  the  Arkansas 
River  eighteen  miles  above  Fort  Gibson,  and  joined  Gen 
eral  Cooper's  command  south  of  the  Canadian  River  in 
the  Choctaw  Nation. 

Near  the  crossing  of  the  Arkansas  River  the  bandits 
captured  a  scout  of  twelve  Indian  soldiers  of  the  First 
Indian  Regiment  from  Fort  Gibson  and  murdered  them 
all,  shooting  them  down  in  cold  blood.  A  colored  boy 
who  accompanied  the  outlaws  from  Lafayette  County, 
Missouri,  escaped  from  them  at  Cabin  Creek,  Indian 


THE  BAXTER   SPRINGS  MASSACRE. 


225 


Territory,  and  came  to  the  Federal  troops  at  Baxter,  and 
was  able  to  give  an  account  of  the  movements  of  the 
bandits  up  to  the  time  he  left  them.  General  Blunt, 
with  the  troops  under  Colonel  Blair,  returned  at  once  to 
Fort  Scott  to  look  after  the  safety  of  that  post,  as  Shelby 
was  then  making  his  raid  north  through  Missouri,  and  it 
was  thought  that  he  might  send  a  part  of  his  force  to  at 
tack  the  Federal  stations  along  the  line  of  Missouri  and 
Kansas. 

VOL.   II. — 15 


CHAPTER  XV. 

OPERATIONS   IN  SOUTHERN  AND   SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI 
AND   NORTHWESTERN  ARKANSAS. 

FOR  a  period  of  a  month  or  so  after  the  Shelby  raid 
and  the  Baxter  Springs  massacre  there  was  less  disturb 
ance  along  the  Border  from  Kansas  City  to  Fort  Smith 
than  had  been  known  to  the  people  of  that  section  since 
the  beginning  of  the  war.  In  marching  south  from  the 
Missouri  River,  Quantrill  took  along  with  him  most  of 
the  desperate  characters  of  partisan  bandits  who  had  long 
infested  the  Border  counties  of  Missouri,  particularly 
those  who  had  acted  with  him  in  his  barbarous  opera 
tions;  and  General  Ewing's  Order  Number  Eleven,  re 
moving  the  Southern  families  from  and  depopulating 
the  Border  counties  of  Missouri  in  his  district,  had  the 
effect  of  leaving  those  counties  in  a  condition  to  offer  no 
encouragement  to  the  bandits  to  remain  in  or  return  to 
them.  It  was  known  from  remarks  that  Quantrill  had 
made  before  he  started  south  that  he  would  not  attempt 
to  return  to  Missouri  during  the  winter,  because  the  re 
moval  of  the  Southern  families  from  the  territory  in 
which  he  had  from  the  first  chiefly  confined  his  opera 
tions  would  make  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  him 
to  maintain  a  force  as  large  as  that  which  he  usually  had 
under  him,  during  the  winter  season  in  a  climate  as 
severe  as  that  of  Western  Missouri.  But  there  were 
other  bandit  leaders  than  Quantrill  in  Western  Missouri 

226 


OPERATIONS  IN  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.          22 / 

and  Western  Arkansas,  who  cooperated  with  Shelby 
more  or  less  during  his  raid,  but  who,  after  Shelby  was 
driven  south  of  the  Arkansas  River  in  a  demoralized  con 
dition,  and  with  the  loss  of  his  artillery  and  trains,  re 
turned  to  their  old  haunts  to  continue  their  operations 
of  robbing  and  plundering  and  murdering  Union  citizens. 
After  Shelby's  command  was  broken  up  at  Marshall,  a 
good  many  of  his  men,  singly  and  in  squads  of  two, 
three,  or  more,  endeavored  to  get  to  their  homes  in 
Western  Missouri  to  visit  their  families  clandestinely, 
and  were  chased,  picked  up,  or  mistaken  for  bandits  and 
overtaken  and  shot  by  the  Union  militia.  While  these 
Confederate  soldiers  were  not  generally  active  in  com 
mitting  depredations,  their  presence  in  any  neighbor 
hood,  if  known  to  the  Unionists,  produced  in  them  a 
feeling  of  insecurity,  for  it  was  not  easy  for  Union  citi 
zens,  or  even  Union  militia,  to  distinguish  a  Confederate 
soldier  from  a  bandit,  for  the  reason  that  they  both  wore 
the  Federal  uniform  when  they  could  get  it.  In  fact, 
most  of  the  bandit  leaders  were  commissioned  and  their 
barbarous  acts  sanctioned  by  the  Confederate  authorities. 
In  the  early  part  of  November,  a  small  party  of  bandits 
who  had  formerly  belonged  to  Major  Livingston's  band 
in  Jasper  County,  Missouri,  under  the  leadership  of  Cy 
Gordon,  marched  up  the  Neosho  River  from  near  the 
southern  line  of  Kansas  to  the  neighborhood  of  Humboldt, 
burning  the  property  of  and  committing  depredations 
against  the  citizens  of  that  section.  A  detachment  of 
the  Fourteenth  Kansas  Cavalry,  under  Captain  Charles 
Willetts,  was  sent  out  by  Colonel  Blair  from  Fort  Scott 
to  punish  the  marauders;  but  when  he  arrived  in  the  dis 
turbed  locality,  he  ascertained  that  after  plundering  the 
Osage  Mission  they  left  that  region  and  moved  south 
into  the  Indian  Territory.  After  the  burning  of  Hum 
boldt  in  the  fall  of  1861,  a  small  force  had  been  stationed 
at  that  place  for  the  protection  of  the  citizens  of  that 


228  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

section,  until  the  occupation  of  Fort  Gibson  and  the  Indian 
Territory  by  the  Federal  troops,  when  it  was  withdrawn. 

About  the  time  of  these  disturbances  in  the  Neosho 
Valley,  Lieutenant  W.  A.  Johnson  was  sent  into  that 
section  and  beyond  into  the  Verdigris  Valley,  with  a 
detachment  of  the  Fifteenth  Kansas  Cavalry,  to  thor 
oughly  scout  that  country  for  bandits,  and  found  that 
near  the  southern  line  of  the  State,  and  near  where 
Drum  Creek  empties  into  the  Verdigris  River,  the  Osage 
Indians,  who  were  loyal  to  the  Government,  had  captured 
and  killed  a  party  of  twenty  Confederate  officers  who 
were  en  route  to  Colorado  and  New  Mexico  to  organize 
the  Indians  and  white  men  of  those  Territories  who 
could  be  won  over  to  the  Confederate  cause,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  intercepting  or  destroying  the  Federal  wagon 
trains  hauling  supplies  for  the  Federal  troops  operating 
in  that  region.  Lieutenant  Johnson  found  on  the  scene 
of  the  recent  conflict  the  mutilated  corpses  of  the  Con 
federate  officers,  and  documents  and  papers  giving  their 
names  and  rank,  and  the  service  to  which  they  had  been 
assigned  by  the  Confederate  authorities.  No  report  of 
the  disaster  which  befell  them  is  referred  to  in  contem 
poraneous  records  of  either  side,  for  the  reason  that  not 
one  of  the  party  escaped  to  tell  the  fate  of  his  comrades, 
and  for  the  further  reason  that  Lieutenant  Johnson's 
trunk,  in  which  the  documents  were  kept,  giving  the 
names  and  describing  the  duties  to  which  these  officers 
were  assigned,  was  lost.  The  Lieutenant  had  their 
bodies  buried,  and  stated  that  from  such  information  as 
he  was  able  to  gather  it  appeared  that  these  officers,  in 
attempting  to  pass  through  the  Osage  Reservation  on 
their  way  west,  came  upon  a  party  of  Osages  and  fired 
upon  them,  killing  two  and  putting  the  others  to  flight ; 
that  in  pursuing  the  Indians  the  Confederates  were  drawn 
into  an  ambuscade  and  surrounded  by  the  bands  of 
White  Wing  and  Little  Bear,  and  every  one  killed. 


OPERATIONS  IN  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.         22Q 

Several  of  the  military  stations  in  Southwest  Missouri, 
which  were  evacuated  by  the  State  militia  on  the  near 
approach  of  Shelby  for  the  purpose  of  concentrating 
and  joining  in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  were  not  im 
mediately  reoccupied  by  the  State  troops  when  the  raid 
was  over.  It  was  the  latter  part  of  November  when 
Captain  Milton  Burch  was  sent  to  Neosho  with  two  com 
panies  of  the  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry. 
Captain  James  J.  Akard,  of  the  same  regiment,  however, 
had  entered  the  town  on  the  4th,  and  drove  a  party  of 
bandits  out,  captured  most  of  the  plunder  which  they 
had  taken  from  the  citizens,  and  in  the  skirmish  that 
took  place,  killed  one  of  the  bandits  and  had  one  of  his 
own  men  killed.  A  few  days  after  that  he  made  a  scout 
from  Neosho  to  Butler's  Creek,  in  McDonald  County, 
taking  thirty  men  of  his  own  company,  and  forty  men 
from  Captain  J.  M.  Richey's  company  of  the  Missouri 
Enrolled  Militia,  and  struck  a  force  of  thirty  bandits, 
killing  eight  on  the  ground  and  wounding  some  who 
escaped,  without  any  loss  in  his  command.  He  esti 
mated,  from  the  information  obtained,  that  there  were 
about  two  hundred  bandits,  scattered  in  small  squads 
over  that  section,  who  had  drifted  in  there  after  the  raid, 
and  were  having  a  regular  carnival  of  crime  and  lawless 
ness.  As  Neosho  and  Newtonia  had  been  occupied  as 
regular  military  stations  for  nearly  a  year  prior  to  the 
raid,  a  good  many  Union  citizens  had  returned  to  New 
ton  County  who  had  left  there  the  first  year  of  the 
war,  while  that  section  was  occupied  alternately  by  the 
Southern  and  Union  forces.  These  citizens  had  re- 
fenced  the  farms  and  repaired  the  houses  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  those  stations  and  had  raised  fairly  good  crops 
during  the  past  year,  and  would  be  obliged  to  move  away 
again  unless  the  loyal  militia  returned  in  a  short  time  to 
give  them  protection.  They  were  indeed  gratified  when 
Captains  Burch  and  Ruark  returned  to  Neosho  with 


23O  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

their  companies,  for  these  officers  and  Lieutenant  Kelso 
had  distinguished  themselves  for  the  fearless  and  ener 
getic  manner  in  which  they  had  hunted  down  the  bandits, 
frequently  penetrating  their  most  secret  hiding-places  and 
engaging  them  in  hand-to-hand  conflicts. 

About  the  1st  of  November,  Brigadier-General  John 
B.  Sanborn  arrived  at  Springfield  and  assumed  command 
of  the  District  of  Southwest  Missouri,  relieving  General 
John  McNeil,  who  had  been  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  District  of  the  Frontier  at  Fort  Smith.  In  ad 
ministering  the  affairs  of  his  new  district,  General  San- 
born  soon  displayed  qualities  which  showed  him  to  be  a 
careful  and  prudent  commander,  keenly  alive  to  the  in 
terests  of  the  loyal  people  of  that  section,  and  desirous 
of  affording  them  every  possible  means  of  protection. 
After  making  a  few  new  dispositions  of  the  troops  of  his 
district  he  was  occupied  in  directing  their  movements 
against  the  guerilla  bands  of  that  section  and  in  pro 
tecting  the  supply  trains  between  Springfield  and  Rolla 
and  from  Springfield  to  Fayetteville.  He  was  obliged  to 
furnish  escorts  to  accompany  the  mail  coaches  carrying 
the  mail  between  Springfield  and  Rolla,  for  the  bandits 
were  constantly  making  efforts  to  capture  the  mail  and 
to  rob  the  passengers,  sometimes  making  their  way  to 
that  line  of  communication  through  the  country  from 
Arkansas,  upwards  of  a  hundred  miles,  for  that  purpose. 
To  protect  the  military  telegraph,  which  had  recently 
been  constructed  to  Fayetteville,  required  detachments 
of  his  cavalry  to  constantly  patrol  the  wire  road,  and 
even  then  the  bandits  sometimes  cut  the  wire  and  carried 
off  sections  of  it,  or  blockaded  the  road  with  it  by  stretch 
ing  and  fastening  it  to  trees  on  either  side. 

Mounted  details  of  half  a  dozen  or  so  men,  carrying 
the  mail  between  Springfield  and  Fort  Smith,  were  fre 
quently  fired  upon  by  the  bandits  from  ambush,  the 
shots  sometimes  wounding  and  sometimes  killing  some 


OPERATIONS  IN   SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.          231 

of  the  parties,  so  that  the  cavalry  from  the  different 
stations  on  this  road  were  kept  busy  scouting  the  country 
on  either  side  of  it,  hunting  down  and  bringing  to  pun 
ishment  the  outlaws. 

In  the  early  part  of  November,  Brigadier-General  C. 
B.  Holland,  commanding  the  Enrolled  Militia  in  South 
west  Missouri,  made  an  expedition  with  four  hundred 
men  from  Springfield  to  Southern  Missouri  and  Northern 
Arkansas  for  the  purpose  of  breaking  up  a  camp  of  Con 
federates  that  were  reported  to  be  concentrating  under 
Colonel  Joseph  Love  below  Salem,  in  Fulton  County, 
Arkansas,  with  the  view  of  making  a  raid  into  Missouri. 
General  Holland  met  the  Confederates,  and  in  the  sharp 
skirmish  that  took  place,  routed  them,  killing  fourteen 
and  taking  six  prisoners.  In  those  mountainous  counties 
of  Southern  Missouri  the  Unionists  were  decidedly  in  the 
ascendant  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  had  it  not 
been  for  the  fact  that  nearly  all  the  able-bodied  Union 
men  of  that  section  were  in  the  Federal  army  serving  in 
other  parts  of  the  country,  could  easily  have  held  their 
ground  against  the  Southern  partisan  bands.  The  expe 
dition  of  General  Holland  not  only  had  the  effect  of  dis 
persing  the  Confederates  and  partisan  bands  who  were 
preparing  for  a  move  into  Missouri,  but  it  brought  to  his 
attention  the  advisability  of  leaving  a  company  of  En 
rolled  Militia  at  each  of  several  convenient  points  in 
Ozark  and  Taney  Counties,  Missouri,  for  the  purpose  of 
scouting  and  watching  the  movements  ol  the  enemy  from 
the  direction  of  the  Arkansas  line. 

Captain  J.  H.  Sallee,  of  Ozark  County,  who  had  served 
in  Phelps'  Six  Months  Regiment  in  the  early  part  of  the 
war,  raised  a  company  of  Enrolled  Militia,  and,  knowing 
all  that  region  thoroughly,  rendered  effective  service  for 
the  Union  cause  by  his  untiring  energy  in  scouting  and 
in  chasing  the  bandits  who  came  into  that  section  to 
murder,  rob,  and  plunder  the  Union  people.  But  the 


232  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

bandits  who  made  raids  into  the  southern  counties  of 
Missouri  from  Arkansas  were  not  as  much  dreaded  as 
some  of  the  desperate  characters,  like  Alf.  Bolin,  who 
had  infested  the  mountainous  regions  of  Taney  and 
Ozark  Counties  from  the  early  period  of  the  war.  This 
man  was  not  only  a  Southern  bandit  who  received  aid 
and  comfort  from  the  Southern  sympathizers  of  that 
section,  but  he  was  a  cold-blooded  assassin  who  shot 
from  ambush  the  peaceable  Union  citizen  while  plowing 
in  the  field  or  riding  along  the  road,  going  to  or  from  the 
little  water-power  mill  where  his  corn  was  ground  into 
meal,  with  as  little  concern  as  he  would  shoot  a  deer  or 
wild  turkey.  During  the  greater  part  of  his  bloody 
career  he  seems  to  have  had  no  one  associated  with  him 
in  his  desperate  operations,  and  up  to  the  time  that  he 
was  killed,  in  the  latter  part  of  1863,  the  Union  citizens 
of  that  section  could  count  up  as  many  as  a  dozen  Fed 
eral  soldiers  and  militia  and  citizens  who  had  fallen  vic 
tims  of  his  murderous  hand.  At  last  a  reward  of  several 
thousand  dollars  was  offered  by  the  Federal  authorities 
at  Springfield  for  the  body,  dead  or  alive,  of  the  noted 
bandit,  and  during  very  cold  weather  he  was  decoyed 
into  the  house  of  a  Southern  family  and  betrayed,  and 
slain  by  an  Iowa  soldier  named  Thomas.  Of  course 
there  were  expressions  of  satisfaction  among  the  Union 
people  of  that  section  when  it  was  known  that  Bolin  had 
met  the  death  which  he  so  justly  deserved.  Even 
Southern  families  in  that  section  who  were  opposed  to 
his  methods  were  cautious  about  incurring  his  enmity 
for  fear  of  falling  victims  to  his  revenge. 

In  about  ten  days  after  General  Holland  started  on  his 
scout  into  Southern  Missouri  southeast  of  Springfield, 
Major  Austin  King,  Jr.,  was  sent  out  from  Springfield 
with  two  hundred  men  of  his  own  regiment,  the  Sixth 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  and  of  the  Eleventh 
Missouri  Volunteer  Cavalry,  to  scout  the  country  south 


OPERATIONS  IN  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.         233 

into  Arkansas  and  west  of  the  section  covered  by  General 
Holland's  operations.  In  this  scout  of  eight  days,  Major 
King  marched  through  Forsyth  to  Carrollton,  Berryville, 
Missouri,  and  vicinity  of  Huntsville,  Arkansas,  and  then, 
turning  northwest,  crossed  King's  River  and  White  River 
and  marched  up  Roaring  River,  thence  to  the  military 
or  telegraph  road,  and  to  Cassville  and  Springfield.  He 
dispersed  several  Southern  partisan  bands  in  Arkansas, 
killed  one  bandit  and  captured  six  prisoners  on  this  expe 
dition,  without  the  loss  of  a  man  killed  or  wounded  in  his 
own  command.  His  advance  into  Northern  Arkansas 
had  the  effect  of  causing  Brooks'  Confederate  command, 
which  had  been  on  Rolling  Prairie,  to  move  south  across 
the  mountains  in  the  direction  of  the  Arkansas  River. 

When  a  Federal  scout  passed  through  that  section,  the 
Confederate  partisan  bands  disappeared  in  the  moun 
tainous  regions  of  that  country;  but  almost  as  soon  as 
the  scout  had  left,  they  came  out  from  their  hiding- 
places  and  were  as  bold  as  ever  in  annoying  and  plunder 
ing  the  families  of  Union  men  who  were  in  the  Federal 
service. 

A  few  weeks  after  Major  King's  scout  through  the 
counties  of  Northern  Arkansas,  Captain  John  I.  Worth- 
ington,  First  Arkansas  Union  Cavalry,  was  sent  out  by 
Colonel  Harrison  from  Fayetteville  on  a  scout  through 
the  counties  of  Carroll,  Marion,  and  Searcy  for  the  pur 
pose  of  breaking  up  several  camps  of  secessionists,  who 
were  reported  by  scouts  to  be  collecting  in  considerable 
numbers  in  those  counties,  under  Colonel  Thomas  R. 
Freeman,  Major  Gunning,  and  Captain  Marshall.  Cap 
tain  Worthington  had  112  men  and  one  howitzer,  and 
was  out  nearly  two  weeks,  and  had  several  sharp  skir 
mishes  with  the  enemy,  sustaining  a  loss  during  the  expe 
dition  of  four  men  killed  and  six  wounded.  He  reported 
the  Confederate  loss  in  the  different  actions  with  Major 
Gunning  and  Captain  Marshall  and  partisan  bandits  at 


234  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

thirty-four  men  killed,  and  number  of  wounded  not 
known.  A  good  many  of  the  men  belonging  to  the 
Partisan  Rangers  in  that  section  were  refugees  from  Mis 
souri,  and  it  was  these  men  who  were  charged  with  plun 
dering  the  families  of  the  Union  soldiers  and  causing  so 
much  disquietude.  At  the  commencement  of  the  war 
nearly  one  half  the  people  of  those  counties  were  Union 
ists,  and  the  able-bodied  men  among  them  being  obliged 
to  leave  their  homes,  went  into  Missouri  and  enlisted  into 
the  Federal  army  at  the  first  opportunity.  In  that  part  of 
the  State  the  Department  commander  had  not  been  able 
to  establish  a  post  or  military  station  for  the  protection 
of  the  Unionists,  although  it  was  greatly  needed.  A 
small  Federal  force  was  stationed  at  Yellville  for  a  short 
time,  but  the  place  was  so  isolated  that  it  was  impracti 
cable  to  maintain  troops  there  more  than  a  few  months 
at  a  time.  While  the  country  was  occupied  alternately 
by  the  Federal  and  Confederate  troops  and  partisan 
bands,  the  people  of  both  sides  were  kept  in  a  state 
of  constant  agitation  and  insecurity  as  to  their  lives  and 
property. 

The  latter  part  of  December,  Colonel  Stand  Watie, 
with  a  force  of  about  five  hundred  Southern  Cherokees, 
appeared  in  the  northern  part  of  the  Indian  Territory  and 
in  the  southwest  part  of  McDonald  County,  Missouri, 
causing  some  uneasiness  and  excitement  at  the  military 
stations  in  Southwest  Missouri,  and  as  far  north  as  Fort 
Scott,  in  Kansas.  It  was  at  first  reported  that  Quan- 
trill's  bandits  were  with  Colonel  Watie,  and  that  it  was  the 
intention  of  those  leaders  to  make  a  rapid  march  from 
the  northern  line  of  the  Indian  Territory,  surprise  and 
attack  Fort  Scott,  and  destroy  the  large  quantities  of 
Government  supplies  at  that  post.  Information  of  the 
presence  of  this  force  under  Colonel  Watie  in  the  western 
part  of  McDonald  County  was  immediately  conveyed  to 
Colonel  John  E.  Phelps,  Second  Arkansas  Union  Cav- 


OPERATIONS  IN  SOUTHWEST  MISSOURI.          235 

airy,  commanding  the  post  of  Cassville,  in  Barry  County, 
who  at  once  sent  out  a  scout  of  fifty  men,  under  Lieu 
tenant  A.  J.  Garner  of  his  regiment,  to  reconnoitre  and 
ascertain  the  movements  and  intentions  of  the  enemy. 
When  Lieutenant  Garner  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  Pine- 
ville,  he  found  that  Colonel  Watie  had  left  the  day  before, 
marching  southwest  in  the  direction  of  the  Indian  Terri 
tory.  With  the  view  of  obtaining  more  definite  informa 
tion  about  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  Lieutenant 
Garner  soon  struck  their  trail  and  followed  it  to  the 
western  line  of  the  State,  when  he  gave  up  the  pursuit, 
finding  that  the  Southern  Indians  were  too  far  ahead  of 
him  to  be  overtaken.  Near  the  head  of  Butler's  Creek 
he  found  a  cave  which  had  recently  been  occupied  by 
Southern  bandits,  and  which  had  about  one  hundred 
bushels  of  corn  stored  in  it,  and  also  a  blacksmith  shop,  all 
of  which  he  destroyed.  Continuing  his  march  down  the 
creek,  for  ten  miles,  he  found  another  cave  with  three 
bandits  in  it,  and  in  the  skirmish  that  took  place,  killed 
one  and  wounded  one,  the  other  bandit  making  his 
escape.  The  early  part  of  that  winter  was  unusually 
severe  for  that  section,  and  the  caves  of  that  hilly  region 
made  a  comfortable  abiding-place  for  the  outlaws,  who 
thought  that  their  retreats  \vould  not  likely  be  found  by 
the  Federal  scouts. 

On  his  march  north  through  the  Indian  Territory,  and 
only  a  few  days  before  he  came  into  McDonald  County, 
Colonel  Watie  encountered  on  Barren  Fork,  Cherokee 
Nation,  a  force  of  290  Federal  Indians  and  one  howitzer, 
under  Captain  A.  C.  Spillman,  of  Colonel  Phillips'  com 
mand  at  Fort  Gibson,  and  after  a  fight  of  upwards  of  two 
hours,  was  driven  from  the  field  with  a  loss  of  several 
killed  and  wounded.  In  this  action  Captain  Spillman  re 
ported  Captain  O.  P.  Willetts,  of  his  command,  mortally 
wounded,  and  two  enlisted  men  severely  wounded.  He 
was  unable  to  ascertain  the  exact  loss  of  the  enemy,  but 


236  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

estimated  it  at  twelve  killed  and  as  many  wounded.  His 
command  being  composed  of  dismounted  men  from  the 
three  Indian  regiments,  he  was  unable  to  pursue  with 
any  advantage  the  retreating  Southern  Indians,  who 
were  mounted ;  besides,  he  did  not  deem  it  advisable  to 
pursue  them,  as  he  was  under  instructions  to  reinforce 
a  detachment  of  Colonel  Phillips'  command  at  Rhea's 
Mills,  in  Arkansas,  with  as  little  delay  as  possible.  An 
effort  was  made  by  Colonel  Phillips  to  intercept  the  force 
under  Colonel  Watie  on  its  return  march  south,  but  the 
Confederate  leader  was  too  well  acquainted  with  the 
country  to  allow  himself  to  be  hemmed  up  in  a  position 
from  which  he  could  not  extricate  his  command. 

The  latter  part  of  November,  the  white  and  colored 
troops  were  ordered  down  from  Fort  Gibson  and  Web 
ber's  Falls  to  Fort  Smith,  leaving  the  Indian  Brigade 
under  Colonel  Phillips  to  occupy  Fort  Gibson  and  the 
Indian  Territory  north  of  the  Arkansas  River.  It  was 
considered  advisable  to  keep  about  one  half  of  the  In 
dian  troops  at  Fort  Gibson  to  hold  that  post,  using  the 
balance  of  them  for  scouting  and  affording  protection  to 
the  loyal  Indian  families,  and  escorting  trains.  But  as 
the  Confederates  now  held  no  particular  place  in  the 
Indian  Territory,  the  Southern  Indian  troops  could  be 
used  for  raiding  and  threatening  the  Federal  supply  line, 
and  could  generally  avoid  fighting  when  the  issue  ap 
peared  doubtful. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  INDIAN  TERRITORY— EXPEDITION 
TO  OLD  FORT  ARBUCKLE — ACTION  AT  FLAT  ROCK — 
ACTION  AT  CABIN  CREEK  AND  CAPTURE  OF  FEDERAL 
TRAIN. 

AFTER  the  Southern  Indians  and  Texans  were  driven 
from  the  Arkansas  Valley  to  the  southern  part  of  the 
Indian  Territory,  and  their  depots  of  supplies  were  de 
stroyed  by  the  Federal  forces  under  General  Blunt  in  the 
latter  part  of  the  summer  and  fall  of  1863,  there  was  a 
disposition  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  officers  serving 
under  Confederate  General  Steele,  commanding  the  Con 
federate  forces  in  the  Indian  Territory,  to  blame  him 
for  the  disasters  which  had  befallen  their  cause  in  that 
section.  The  Southern  Indians  had  become  so  demoral 
ized,  and  the  opposition  to  General  Steele  so  pronounced, 
that  he  requested  to  be  relieved  of  his  command,  and 
was  superseded  in  January,  1864,  by  Brigadier-General 
S.  B.  Maxey,  of  Texas.  On  assuming  command  of  his 
new  district,  General  Maxey  at  once  set  about  to  re 
organize  his  Indian  forces  for  more  efficient  service  than 
was  to  be  looked  for  under  the  conditions  in  which  he 
found  them.  He  also  visited  the  Choctaw  Council,  and 
advised  and  urged  that  the  Choctaw  people  remain  at 
home  and  raise  a  crop  the  coming  spring  and  summer, 
promising  them  that  he  would  afford  them  protection 
and  keep  the  Federal  forces  out  of  their  country. 

237 


238  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

In  the  latter  part  of  January,  1864,  Brigadier-General 
John  McNeil,  commanding  the  District  of  the  Frontier 
at  Fort  Smith,  directed  Colonel  W.  A.  Phillips,  com 
manding  the  Federal  Indian  Brigade  at  Fort  Gibson,  to 
take  as  many  of  his  troops  as  could  be  spared  from  that 
point,  and  advance  as  far  in  the  direction  of  Red  River 
as  practicable,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  reorgan 
ization  of  the  Southern  Indians;  to  disperse  such  bodies 
of  them  as  were  still  holding  together;  and  to  distribute 
the  President's  proclamation  offering  peace  and  pardon 
to  those  who  should  immediately  return  to  their  treaty 
obligations. 

After  the  necessary  preparation,  Colonel  Phillips  left 
Fort  Gibson,  on  the  1st  of  February,  on  the  proposed 
expedition,  his  command  consisting  of  part  of  the  First 
Indian  Regiment,  under  Colonel  S.  H.  Wattles;  a  bat 
talion  of  the  Third  Indian,  under  a  field-officer  of  that 
regiment ;  a  battalion  of  the  Fourteenth  Kansas  Cavalry, 
under  Major  Charles  Willetts,  and  a  section  of  mounted 
howitzers,  under  Captain  Sol.  Kaufman — in  all,  about 
one  thousand  men.  The  frost  was  hardly  out  of  the 
ground  from  the  hard  freezing  of  the  past  winter  when 
he  started,  so  that  the  road  was  very  heavy  for  the 
train  which  he  was  obliged  to  take  along  carrying  his 
subsistence  and  ammunition.  He  pushed  forward  in  a 
southwest  direction,  and  from  the  5th  to  the  8th  had 
skirmishes  every  day  with  the  Southern  Indians  and 
Texans  south  of  the  Canadian  River,  dispersing  and 
pursuing  them  until  he  arrived  at  Middle  Boggy.  At 
this  place  the  Confederates  made  a  stand,  and,  attacking 
them  vigorously,  he  routed  them  after  a  sharp  action  of 
less  than  half  an  hour,  and  pursued  them  towards  Red 
River.  In  this  fight  he  reported  forty-nine  of  the  Con 
federate  dead  left  on  the  field.  In  their  flight  towards 
Red  River  after  the  fight,  they  broke  up  into  small  de 
tachments,  and  he  was  unable  to  overtake  them.  He 


OPERATIONS  IN  THE  INDIAN  TERRITORY.        239 

continued  his  march  south,  however,  to  the  vicinity  of 
old  Fort  Arbuckle,  whence,  after  a  short  halt,  he  started 
on  the  return  march  to  Fort  Gibson.  On  this  return 
march,  he  sent  out  his  mounted  force  so  as  to  sweep  the 
country  of  small  parties  of  Southern  Indians  for  a  dis 
tance  of  from  fifty  to  sixty  miles  on  either  flank.  He 
also  improvised  an  ox  train,  and  collected  all  the  corn 
that  could  be  found  in  the  country,  and  brought  it  along 
with  his  other  train,  guarded  by  his  infantry  and  artillery. 
He  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Governor  of  the  Choctaw 
Nation,  and  a  letter  to  each  of  the  head  men  of  the 
Chickasaw  and  Seminole  Nations,  reminding  them  of 
the  terrible  punishment  he  had  just  inflicted  upon  their 
forces;  pointed  out  to  them  the  folly  and  wickedness  of 
their  continued  hostility  to  the  Government,  and  warned 
them  of  the  dire  consequences  that  would  certainly  follow 
if  they  neglected  to  accept  the  President's  offer  of  peace 
and  pardon.  His  expedition  certainly  had  the  effect  of 
producing  consternation  among  the  hostile  Chickasaws, 
Creeks,  and  Seminoles,  and  those  who  did  not  flee  into 
the  Wichita  Mountains  or  to  Red  River  declared  that 
they  would  not  again  take  up  arms  against  the  Federal 
Government.  The  expedition  also  had  the  effect  of  post 
poning  the  reorganization  of  the  Southern  Indian  forces, 
which  General  Maxey  desired  should  take  place  before 
his  troops  advanced  north  from  the  Red  River  Valley  in 
the  opening  of  the  spring  campaign. 

On  returning  to  Fort  Gibson  the  latter  part  of  Febru 
ary,  from  his  expedition  into  the  southern  part  of  the 
Indian  Territory,  Colonel  Phillips  directed  Major  Willetts, 
commanding  a  battalion,  Fourteenth  Kansas  Cavalry, 
to  relieve  Major  M.  B.  C.  Wright,  Third  Indian  Regi 
ment,  at  Rhea's  Mills,  Arkansas,  who  had  been  at  that 
place  the  past  month,  with  a  battalion  of  his  regiment, 
collecting  wheat  and  corn  to  make  into  flour  and  meal 
for  the  Indian  command  at  Fort  Gibson.  The  mounted 


240  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

part  of  Major  Wright's  command  was  also  kept  busy  in 
operating  against  the  Southern  partisan  bands  of  that 
section,  who  had  become  quite  bold  under  a  leader  known 
as  Captain  Buchanan.  After  dashing  into  the  command 
at  Rhea's  Mills  one  night  and  wounding  two  men,  the 
guerillas  were  pursued  by  a  detachment  of  Federal  In 
dians,  under  Sergeant  Scraper,  and  overtaken  on  the 
side  of  a  steep  bluff  in  the  mountains  where  they  had 
halted  to  rest,  and  in  the  fight  that  took  place,  six  of 
them  were  killed,  including  Captain  Buchanan,  and  their 
arms  and  equipments  and  part  of  their  stock  captured 
and  brought  back  to  camp. 

A  part  of  the  Second  Indian  Regiment,  under  Colonel 
John  Ritchie,  was  stationed  at  Mackey's  Salt  Works, 
Cherokee  Nation,  about  thirty  miles  northwest  of  Fort 
Smith  on  the  north  side  of  the  Arkansas  River,  from  the 
early  part  of  March,  1864,  to  the  latter  part  of  the  sum 
mer,  manufacturing  salt  for  the  Indian  Brigade,  and  watch 
ing  the  fords  of  the  Arkansas  River  in  that  vicinity,  to 
prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing  to  the  north  side,  and 
to  protect  the  Cherokee  people  in  making  a  crop.  His 
position  was  not  far  from  Webber's  Falls,  and  his  force 
was  intended  to  guard  the  river  above  and  below  that 
point  for  some  distance. 

On  the  opening  of  spring,  the  Southern  Indians,  under 
the  leadership  of  Colonels  Watie  and  Adair,  commenced 
showing  a  restlessness  to  return  to  their  homes  in  the 
Cherokee  Nation,  and  as  early  as  the  1st  of  April,  Colonel 
Watie  arrived  at  the  Starr  place,  near  Briar  Town,  on  the 
Canadian  River,  with  about  three  hundred  men,  for  the 
purpose  of  crossing  to  the  north  side  of  the  Arkansas  River 
at  the  first  opportunity  to  make  a  raid  to  the  northern 
part  of  the  Cherokee  Nation.  The  Arkansas  River  was 
fordable  at  several  points  between  Fort  Gibson  and  Web 
ber's  Falls,  and  in  a  few  days  he  got  most  of  his  men  over 
to  the  north  side,  under  Colonel  W.  P.  Adair,  and  they 


OPERATIONS  IN  THE  INDIAN  TERRITORY.        24! 

immediately  moved  north  in  the  direction  of  Park  Hill 
and  Maysville.  At  the  same  time  that  Watie's  Southern 
Indians  were  entering  the  Cherokee  Nation  below  Fort 
Gibson,  Colonel  Phillips'  scouts  brought  him  information 
that  eighty  to  one  hundred  white  men,  supposed  to  be 
under  Quantrill,  crossed  the  Arkansas  River  twenty-five 
miles  above  that  place,  killed  five  Union  Indians,  and 
then  continued  their  march  in  the  direction  of  Southwest 
Missouri  and  Southeastern  Kansas. 

As  it  was  believed  from  the  reports  of  deserters  brought 
in  that  Quantrill  was  marching  north  with  this  body  of 
men  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  raid  into  Southern  Kan 
sas,  Colonel  Phillips  immediately  sent  messengers  to  Fort 
Smith,  the  nearest  telegraph  station,  with  despatches  to 
General  Curtis,  commanding  the  Department  of  Kansas, 
and  to  General  Sanborn,  commanding  the  District  of 
Southwest  Missouri,  notifying  them  of  the  movements  of 
the  desperadoes,  and  of  their  probable  intentions,  so  that 
Federal  officers  commanding  detachments  might  be  on 
the  lookout  for  them.  The  force  at  Fort  Gibson  had 
been  much  depleted  by  details  for  bringing  in  forage  for 
the  stock  and  subsistence  for  the  troops  from  distant 
points;  but  Colonel  Phillips  at  once  sent  out  as  many  of 
his  mounted  men  as  could  be  spared  to  march  up  the 
Arkansas  to  watch  the  movements  of  the  bandits;  and 
two  companies  of  infantry  were  sent  up  Grand  River  to 
meet  and  reinforce  the  escort  to  the  train  which  was 
coming  down  from  Fort  Scott  with  supplies  for  the 
army.  As  soon  as  some  of  his  detachments  came  in,  he 
also  sent  out  Captain  Anderson,  of  the  Third  Indian 
Regiment,  with  about  one  hundred  mounted  men,  in 
pursuit  of  the  Southern  Indians,  under  Colonel  Adair, 
who  had  gone  into  the  northern  part  of  the  Cherokee 
Nation,  and  who  had  allowed  a  good  many  of  his  men  to 
return  to  their  homes.  After  three  days'  hard  marching, 
Captain  Anderson  obtained  information  of  the  location  of 

VOL.   II. — 16 


242  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

the  main  body  of  the  Confederate  Indians,  at  Huff's 
Mills,  ten  miles  west  of  Maysville,  and  pushed  forward 
and  attacked  them  vigorously  on  the  8th  of  May,  rout 
ing  them  in  a  few  minutes,  killing  six  men  and  wounding 
as  many  more.  He  reported  that  he  had  two  of  his  men 
badly  wounded  in  the  action.  Immediately  after  this 
affair  most  of  the  Southern  Indians  left  that  section  for 
the  southern  part  of  the  Cherokee  Nation,  and  soon 
crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  Arkansas  River. 

On  the  night  of  the  I3th  of  May,  Major  Milton  Burch, 
with  twenty  men  of  the  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia 
Cavalry,  from  Neosho,  Missouri,  found  a  camp  of  thirty 
men  of  Adair's  Indians  on  Spavinaw  Creek,  south  of  Mays 
ville,  and  surprised  and  attacked  them,  killing  two  men 
and  capturing  their  horses,  arms,  and  equipments.  Ex 
aggerated  accounts  of  the  strength  of  Colonel  Adair's 
force  in  the  vicinity  of  Cowskin  Prairie  and  on  Upper 
Grand  River  reached  General  Sanborn  at  Springfield,  and 
the  scout  sent  out  under  Major  Burch  was  for  the  pur 
pose  of  obtaining  accurate  information  of  the  movements 
and  position  of  the  enemy. 

Near  Mackey's  Salt  Works,  Colonel  Ritchie's  outposts 
captured  seven  Indians  who  claimed  to  be  deserters  from 
Adair's  command,  and  they  stated  that  he  had  upwards 
of  three  hundred  mounted  men,  and  intended  to  march 
through  the  Cherokee  Nation  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Maysville,  thence  into  Benton  County,  Arkansas,  and  as 
far  north  as  Neosho  or  Newtonia.  The  rumors  that  he 
was  coming  to  Neosho  were  so  persistent  that  Major 
Burch's  command  prepared  to  fight  him  at  that  place  a 
week  before  the  Major  started  on  the  scout  to  Spavinaw. 

With  the  small  mounted  force  at  his  disposal,  it  was 
impossible  for  Colonel  Phillips  to  operate  as  effectively 
against  these  Southern  Indians  as  he  desired.  The  latter 
part  of  the  winter  and  early  part  of  the  spring  the  ponies 
of  his  Indian  soldiers  and  their  families  had  become  so 


OPERA  TIONS  IN  THE  INDIAN  TERRITOR  Y.        243 

poor  in  flesh  that  most  of  them  were  unfit  for  service. 
Some  of  the  loyal  Cherokees  had  raised  crops  of  corn  the 
past  year;  but  they  had  not  raised  enough  to  spare  very 
much  for  subsisting  the  troops  and  foraging  the  animals 
at  Fort  Gibson.  Protection  had  been  too  uncertain  to 
warrant  any  one  to  put  up  wild  hay  in  that  country  for 
domestic  use  or  for  the  use  of  the  Federal  troops. 

On  the  8th  of  August  a  train  of  two  hundred  wagons, 
which  had  just  come  down  from  Fort  Scott  with  supplies 
for  the  troops  at  Fort  Smith,  after  unloading,  started 
back  to  Fort  Scott,  escorted  by  the  Second  Kansas  Cav 
alry,  under  Colonel  Cloud,  who  had  recently  been  ordered 
up  from  Clarksville,  Arkansas,  with  his  regiment.  His 
entire  regiment  did  not  go  on  through  with  the  train  to 
Fort  Scott,  but  some  of  the  companies  were  held  at  Fort 
Gibson  in  connection  with  guarding  and  putting  up  hay 
for  the  Government  in  the  vicinity  of  that  place.  A  large 
number  of  Union  refugees,  who  had  come  into  Fort 
Smith  from  different  parts  of  Western  Arkansas,  accom 
panied  the  train  to  Kansas.  These  refugee  families  were 
nearly  all  very  destitute,  and  as  the  Government  had  been 
furnishing  them  with  subsistence,  it  was  desirable  that 
they  should  go  north  so  that  they  could  be  taken  care  of 
without  embarrassing  the  operations  of  the  army  by  con 
suming  the  supplies  which  were  needed  by  the  troops. 

General  Cooper,  commanding  the  Confederate  forces 
in  the  field  in  the  Indian  Territory,  was  kept  advised  of 
the  movements  of  the  Federal  trains  arriving  at  and 
departing  from  Fort  Smith,  and  of  the  strength  of  the 
Federal  detachments  at  the  different  stations  employed 
in  guarding  and  putting  up  hay,  and  he  determined  to 
use  his  large  mounted  force  to  burn  the  hay,  capture 
and  break  up  the  hay  stations,  and  if  possible  capture 
or  destroy  some  of  the  trains  en  route  to  or  from  Fort 
Scott  to  Fort  Smith.  It  was  now  near  the  season  of  the 
year  when  there  was  usually  a  low  stage  of  water  in  the 


244  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

Arkansas  River,  and  it  was  already  fordable  at  several 
points  above  and  below  Fort  Gibson,  so  that  he  could 
send  his  troops  to  the  north  side  to  strike  some  of  the 
Federal  hay  camps  or  trains  en  route  to  or  from  Fort 
Scott.  General  Thayer,  at  Fort  Smith,  knew  of  the  low 
stage  of  water  in  the  river,  and  knew  that  it  was  the  pur 
pose  of  General  Cooper,  with  his  large  mounted  force  of 
Texans  and  Indians,  to  attack  the  Federal  supply  line  be 
tween  Fort  Smith  and  Fort  Scott  and  the  different  hay 
camps  at  Cabin  Creek  and  in  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Gibson, 
and  yet  he  permitted  a  large  part  of  his  infantry  to  be 
scattered  in  detachments  of  a  hundred  or  so  at  the  differ 
ent  hay  camps,  with  no  other  barrier  between  them  and 
the  enemy  than  the  Arkansas  River. 

The  latter  part  of  August,  Captain  John  R.  Graton, 
with  five  companies  of  the  First  Kansas  Colored  Infantry, 
escorted  a  train  from  Fort  Smith  to  Fort  Gibson  en  route 
to  Fort  Scott.  From  Fort  Gibson  detachments  of  the 
Second,  Sixth,  and  Fourteenth  Regiments  Kansas  Cav 
alry,  and  some  Indian  troops,  escorted  the  train  north, 
while  four  companies  of  the  colored  infantry  were  ordered 
to  the  hay  camps  near  Fort  Gibson  and  at  Flat  Rock, 
twelve  miles  above  on  the  west  side  of  Grand  River.  At 
these  hay  camps  the  colored  infantry  were  employed  in 
cutting  and  putting  up  the  hay  as  well  as  in  guarding  it, 
and  during  the  day  were  generally  scattered  over  two  or 
three  miles  of  prairie.  Captain  E.  A.  Barker,  Second 
Kansas  Cavalry,  with  detachments  of  two  companies  of 
that  regiment,  was  in  command  of  the  camp,  and  he  had 
only  125  men  in  his  entire  force,  including  the  colored 
infantry.  His  camp  was  nearly  two  miles  from  Grand 
River  timber,  on  a  prairie  branch  along  which,  every 
hundred  yards  or  so,  there  were  pools  or  lagoons  from  a 
few  yards  to  fifty  yards  long,  and  in  places  perhaps  two 
feet  deep,  and  connected  by  narrow  threads  of  water. 
The  low  banks  of  the  lagoons  were  generally  precipitous 


OPERATIONS  IN  THE  INDIAN  TERRITORY.        24$ 

or  caving,  with  overhanging  boughs  of  small  willows. 
In  some  of  them  there  were  numerous  water-lilies,  with 
their  large  palm-like  leaves  floating  on  the  surface. 

From  his  mounted  detachment,  Captain  Barker  kept 
out  scouting  parties  to  the  southwest,  well  in  the  direc 
tion  of  the  fords  on  the  Verdigris  River.  In  the  after 
noon  of  the  i6th  of  September,  his  scouts  came  in  and 
reported  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  Verdigris  River 
in  large  force,  and  were  advancing  on  his  camp.  As  soon 
as  he  could  collect  his  men  together,  he  formed  them  on 
a  ravine  in  the  rear  of  his  camp,  and,  taking  a  small 
mounted  detachment,  rode  forward  in  the  direction  of 
the  Verdigris  about  two  miles  to  reconnoitre  and  ascer 
tain  the  strength  and  designs  of  the  enemy.  On  reaching 
a  high  ridge  in  the  prairie,  he  saw  the  entire  Confederate 
force  of  Generals  Gano  and  Watie  before  him,  advancing 
with  six  pieces  of  artillery.  But  before  this,  General 
Gano  had  ascended  a  high  hill,  from  which  he  could 
plainly  see  with  his  field-glass  the  Federal  camp,  the  hay 
ricks,  the  mowing-machines,  and  the  men  at  work  upon 
the  vast  prairie.  On  descending  to  the  foot  of  the  hill, 
where  his  command  had  halted,  he  sent  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Welch,  with  two  Texas  regiments,  to  his  right, 
General  Watie,  with  an  Indian  brigade,  to  the  left,  while 
he  brought  up  his  centre  in  his  advance  on  the  Federal 
camp.  In  falling  back  to  his  camp,  Captain  Barker  was 
closely  pursued  by  the  enemy,  and  by  the  time  he  dis 
mounted  his  detachment  and  formed  the  men  on  those 
already  in  line  in  the  ravine,  the  Confederate  Texans  and 
Indians  had  approached  within  two  hundred  yards  and 
commenced  an  attack  from  five  different  points.  After 
fighting  the  Confederate  forces  for  half  an  hour  and  re 
pulsing  three  cavalry  charges,  he  determined  to  mount 
all  his  men  who  had  horses,  make  a  desperate  charge, 
and  break  through  the  weakest  part  of  General  Gano's 
line,  leaving  the  colored  infantry  and  dismounted  cavalry 


246  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

to  fight  their  way  to  the  Grand  River  timber  if  possible. 
He  made  the  charge  through  General  Watie's  line,  and 
got  through  with  fifteen  men,  but  the  balance  of  his 
mounted  detachment  of  about  forty  men  were  cut  off  and 
captured. 

The  colored  soldiers  now  rallied  under  Lieutenant 
Thomas  B.  Sutherland,  First  Kansas  Colored  Infantry, 
and  fought  the  Confederate  forces  for  nearly  two  hours 
from  the  ravine,  finding  some  shelter  under  its  low  caving 
banks.  As  the  Confederates  had  not  been  giving  any 
quarter  to  colored  soldiers,  the  colored  detachment  con 
sidered  it  a  struggle  in  which  they  proposed  to  sell  their 
lives  as  dearly  as  possible.  George  W.  Duval,  an  intelligent 
colored  soldier  of  the  detachment,  stated  that  the  only 
way  he  and  his  comrades  could  hold  the  Confederates  off 
was  to  fire  a  volley  into  them  when  they  came  up  within 
range,  and  then  reload  and  be  prepared  for  them  when 
they  came  up  again.  The  Confederates  were  held  off  in 
this  manner  until  most  of  the  colored  soldiers  expended 
their  ammunition,  and  then  Lieutenant  Sutherland  told 
them  that  they  would  have  to  do  the  best  they  could  to 
save  themselves.  After  this  it  was  simply  a  massacre,  for 
the  colored  soldiers  were  pursued  and  shot  down  without 
any  demand  for  their  surrender.  About  forty  colored 
soldiers  were  killed,  eight  captured,  and  ten  escaped. 

It  was  near  sunset  when  the  fight  ended,  and  to  save 
themselves  some  of  the  colored  soldiers  had  remarkably 
narrow  escapes  from  their  relentless  foe.  After  his  am 
munition  gave  out,  the  soldier  Duval  secreted  himself 
in  a  drift  in  the  prairie  branch,  and  when  the  Confederates 
put  out  their  pickets  that  night,  he  crawled  out  between 
them,  taking  his  gun  with  him.  Another  colored  soldier 
jumped  into  a  lagoon  which  was  deep  enough  to  conceal 
his  body,  and  he  managed  by  lying  on  his  back  to  expose 
enough  of  his  nose  above  the  water  under  the  overhang 
ing  willows  to  breathe  freely.  And  another  colored 


OPERA  TIONS  IN  THE  INDIAN  TERRITOR  Y.        247 

soldier  jumped  into  a  lagoon  deep  enough  to  conceal  his 
body,  and,  lying  on  his  back,  covered  his  nose,  just  out  of 
the  water  enough  to  enable  him  to  breathe,  by  the  broad 
leaves  of  the  water-lily.  These  soldiers  who  thus  secreted 
themselves  heard  the  Confederates'all  around  them,  fre 
quently  only  a  few  yards  distant,  pursuing  and  shooting 
down  their  comrades  in  the  most  heartless  manner.  On 
completing  his  work  of  slaughter  and  burning  the  hay  and 
mowing-machines  at  that  point,  General  Gano  encamped 
that  night  on  the  field,  and  the  next  morning  marched 
north  to  meet  the  Federal  supply  train,  which  he  was 
informed  was  en  route  from  Fort  Scott. 

A  supply  train  of  205  Government  wagons  left  Fort 
Scott  on  the  I2th  of  September,  en  route  for  Fort  Gibson 
and  Fort  Smith,  escorted  by  260  men  of  the  Second, 
Sixth,  and  Fourteenth  Regiments  Kansas  Cavalry,  under 
the  command  of  Major  Henry  Hopkins,  Second  Kansas 
Cavalry.  There  were  also  ninety  wagons  loaded  with 
sutler's  supplies  and  four  or  five  ambulances  in  the  train. 
At  Baxter  Springs  Major  Hopkins  received  a  reinforce 
ment  of  one  hundred  Indians,  under  Lieutenant  Water- 
house,  from  Fort  Gibson.  He  also  received  a  despatch 
from  Colonel  Blair,  commanding  the  post  at  Fort  Scott, 
that  information  had  come  to  him  that  Price  had  crossed 
the  Arkansas  River  at  Dardanelle  and  was  moving  north. 
This  despatch  was  immediately  sent  to  Colonel  Wattles, 
commanding  the  post  at  Fort  Gibson,  with  the  urgent 
request  that  he  send  up  all  the  troops  that  could  be 
spared  from  that  post  to  strengthen  the  escort  to  the 
train,  as  an  attack  from  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  was 
anticipated.  In  the  meantime  Colonel  Wattles  had  heard 
of  General  Cooper's  preparations  for  a  hostile  movement 
north  of  the  Arkansas  River,  and  sent  forward  two  de 
tachments  of  Cherokees,  amounting  to  310  men,  under 
Lieutenants  Whitlow  and  Palmer,  to  reinforce  the  escort 
to  the  train.  On  receiving  further  information  of  the 


248  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

movements  of  the  enemy,  he  sent  a  despatch  to  Major 
Hopkins,  stating  that  the  Confederates,  twelve  hundred 
to  fifteen  hundred  strong,  had  crossed  the  Arkansas 
River  and  were  moving  north  in  the  direction  of  Cabin 
Creek,  and  directing  him  to  move  with  the  train  to  that 
station,  where  there  was  a  stockade,  and  where  he  would 
be  joined  by  the  detachments  which  were  to  reinforce 
him.  The  Major  moved  forward  with  the  train  and 
escort  on  the  military  road  from  the  Neosho  River,  arriv 
ing  at  Cabin  Creek  at  noon  on  the  i8th  of  September, 
where  he  was  joined  by  the  Cherokees,  making  his  entire 
force  670  men  of  white  and  Indian  troops.  He  was  in 
formed  that  he  would  receive  at  this  place  another  re 
inforcement  of  six  companies  of  Indians  and  two  howitzers 
from  Fort  Gibson. 

The  next  day  after  the  action  at  Flat  Rock,  General 
Gano  marched  north  to  Wolf  Creek  and  encamped  for 
the  night,  without  obtaining  any  definite  information  in 
regard  to  the  movements  of  the  Federal  train.  Leaving 
General  Watie  in  charge  of  his  camp,  he  took  four  hun 
dred  men  and  two  pieces  of  artillery  and  moved  north  on 
the  morning  of  the  iSth,  until  he  came  in  sight  of  the 
Federal  train  at  Cabin  Creek.  He  then  secreted  his 
command  in  the  timber  and  sent  a  courier  back  to  Gen 
eral  Watie  to  bring  up  the  balance  of  his  troops  and  the 
other  four  guns  of  his  battery. 

Directly  after  arriving  at  Cabin  Creek  that  day,  Major 
Hopkins  took  twenty-five  men  of  the  Second  Kansas 
Cavalry  and  moved  forward  three  miles  south  of  the 
station  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  if  possible  the  posi 
tion  and  strength  of  the  enemy  in  his  front,  and  came 
upon  the  force  under  Gano,  occupying  a  ravine  in  the 
prairie.  He  returned  at  once  to  the  train ;  had  it  parked 
in  close  order  in  the  rear  of  the  stockade,  strengthened 
his  pickets,  and  formed  his  men  in  line  for  an  attack. 

It  was  nearly  twelve  o'clock  that  night  when  the  bal- 


OPERATIONS  IN  THE  INDIAN  TERRITORY.        249 

ance  of  General  Gano's  force  under  General  Watie  came 
up.  But  the  moon  was  shining  bright,  and  he  moved 
forward  at  once  over  the  prairie  to  attack  the  Federal 
position  in  the  edge  of  the  timber  on  the  south  side  of 
Cabin  Creek.  When  within  half  a  mile  of  the  Federal 
camp,  he  deployed  his  troops  in  line  of  battle,  his  own 
brigade  of  Texans  forming  his  right,  and  General  Watie's 
Indian  Brigade  his  left,  with  Howell's  battery  in  position 
near  his  right  centre,  supported  by  three  companies  of 
Texans.  He  then  advanced  at  two  o'clock  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  iQth  up  to  within  three  hundred  yards  of  the 
Federal  line,  when  the  troops  under  Major  Hopkins 
opened  fire  upon  him.  Almost  instantly  his  own  troops 
replied  with  small-arms,  and  the  six  guns  of  his  battery 
commenced  playing  upon  the  Federal  position  with  shot 
and  shell  with  demoralizing  effects  upon  the  teams  of  the 
large  train,  crowded  as  they  were  in  as  small  a  space  as 
possible.  Up  to  the  opening  of  the  fight,  Major  Hop 
kins  was  led  to  believe,  from  the  information  obtained, 
that  the  Confederate  force  in  his  front  did  not  exceed 
eight  hundred  men,  and  was  without  artillery.  When 
he  found  that  the  Confederates  were  supported  by  a  bat 
tery,  and  saw  their  long  double  lines  and  was  able  to 
form  something  like  a  correct  estimate  of  their  numbers, 
he  was  satisfied  that  he  could  not  hold  his  position  very 
long  after  daylight.  The  firing  was  kept  up  at  intervals 
on  both  sides  until  after  daylight,  when  Gano  moved  a 
section  of  his  battery  to  a  position  on  his  left,  which  en 
abled  him  to  cross-fire  the  Federal  camp  at  a  range  of  less 
than  two  hundred  yards. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  action,  when  the  shot  and 
bursting  shell  from  the  Confederate  battery  came  crash 
ing  through  train  and  timber,  a  good  many  teamsters  and 
wagon-masters  became  frightened,  and  cutting  one  or 
more  mules  loose  from  the  teams,  mounted  them  and  rode 
off.  Finding  that  his  position  was  becoming  untenable, 


250  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Major  Hopkins  endeavored  to  rally  the  teamsters  and 
wagon-masters  to  remove  the  train  to  the  north  side  of 
the  creek  on  the  road  to  Fort  Scott ;  but  before  his  efforts 
were  successful,  General  Gano  ordered  two  Indian  regi 
ments  around  the  Federal  right  and  rear  to  take  posses 
sion  of  the  road  and  prevent  any  of  the  teams  or  Federal 
troops  escaping  on  the  road  to  Fort  Scott.  After  day 
light  an  incessant  storm  of  shot  and  bursting  shell  swept 
through  the  camp  and  train,  killing  and  wounding  many 
of  the  mules,  stampeding  the  teams,  and  causing  inex 
tricable  entanglement  in  the  absence  of  the  teamsters. 
The  bluff  that  rose  almost  abruptly  from  the  creek  in  the 
rear  of  the  camp,  the  stockade,  and  a  narrow  ravine  on 
the  Federal  right  afforded  much  protection  to  the  Federal 
soldiers  during  this  terrible  artillery  fire.  Where  their 
line  was  exposed  to  this  fire  they  were  obliged  to  lie 
down  prone  upon  the  ground  behind  logs  and  felled 
trees,  in  depressions,  or  behind  elevations  of  the  ground, 
for  shelter.  Having  gained  a  position  on  the  Federal 
right  and  rear,  General  Gano  commenced  driving  in  the 
Federal  skirmishers  from  that  quarter,  when  suddenly 
they  came  to  a  stand.  The  General  then  ordered  up 
Colonel  Gurley's  Texas  Regiment,  and  led  it  in  person  in 
a  charge  to  break  the  Federal  line,  which  was  formed 
with  the  ravine  in  its  front,  filled  with  Federal  soldiers 
lying  down.  When  the  charging  column  approached 
within  twenty-five  yards  of  the  ravine,  these  soldiers,  who 
were  lying  down  unseen  by  the  enemy,  arose  from  the 
ground  and  poured  a  terrible  volley  into  the  ranks  of  the 
Confederates,  throwing  them  into  confusion,  and  causing 
them  to  retire. 

At  the  opening  of  the  fight,  the  Federal  line  faced 
nearly  south,  but  now  that  the  right  was  driven  back  it 
faced  nearly  west.  On  being  repulsed  in  front  of  the 
ravine,  General  Gano  ordered  parts  of  three  Texas  regi 
ments  still  farther  to  the  Federal  right,  flanking  this  new 


OPERATIONS  IN  THE  INDIAN  TERRITORY.        2$  I 

position,  and  forcing  Major  Hopkins  to  evacuate  his 
camp  and  retire  through  the  timber  along  the  creek  east 
in  the  direction  of  Grand  River.  He  encouraged  his  men 
to  hold  out  as  long  as  possible,  hoping  that  the  reinforce 
ment  of  six  companies  of  Indians  and  two  howitzers  from 
Fort  Gibson  would  come  up  and  attack  the  enemy  in  the 
rear.  Even  after  evacuating  his  camp,  he  hoped  to  meet 
this  reinforcement  and  to  return  and  recapture  at  least  a 
part  of  the  train.  He  marched  at  once  to  Fort  Gibson, 
fifty  miles  distant,  without  hearing  from  the  reinforce 
ment,  which  was  marching  on  a  road  west  of  his  line  of 
march. 

The  entire  train  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Confederates, 
but  they  were  able  to  get  away  with  only  130  wagons, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  the  teamsters  and  dismounted 
soldiers  had  cut  so  many  mules  out  of  the  teams  to  ride 
off  when  it  became  evident  that  the  train  could  not  be 
saved.  A  large  number  of  mules,  too,  were  killed  and 
wounded  by  the  artillery  fire;  others  were  killed  and 
disabled  in  stampeding  and  running  over  the  bluff.  This 
was  the  most  serious  disaster  the  Federal  forces  met  with 
in  the  Indian  Territory  during  the  war.  All  the  captured 
wagons  and  supplies  that  General  Gano  could  not  take 
away,  he  destroyed  as  far  as  practicable.  He  also  burned 
two  or  three  thousand  tons  of  hay  put  up  in  ten  large  ricks. 
After  fitting  up  as  many  captured  teams  as  possible  to 
take  off  the  supplies,  he  started  south  and  recrossed  the 
Arkansas  River  about  fifteen  miles  above  Fort  Gibson. 
The  evening  after  the  fight,  he  met,  near  Pryor's  Creek, 
Colonel  J.  M.  Williams,  with  a  brigade  consisting  of 
parts  of  the  First  and  Second  Kansas  Colored  and  the 
Eleventh  United  States  Colored  Infantry  and  a  battery 
of  Parrott  guns,  coming  up  from  Fort  Smith,  and  march 
ing  to  the  relief  of  the  train.  Colonel  Williams  fell  back 
a  short  distance  to  a  strong  position  convenient  to  water, 
and  as  soon  as  the  enemy  came  up  within  range,  opened 


252  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

upon  them  with  his  Parrott  guns  and  drove  them  back. 
The  batteries  of  both  sides  kept  up  their  fire  at  long  range 
for  an  hour  or  so  until  nearly  dark,  when  General  Gano 
formed  most  of  his  troops  in  a  long  line  on  a  high  ridge 
in  the  prairie,  making  an  immense  display  of  force,  to 
cover  the  captured  train  while  it  was  being  hurried  for 
ward  to  the  southwest  in  the  direction  of  the  Verdigris. 
Colonel  Williams  had  marched  upwards  of  eighty  miles  in 
less  than  two  days,  and  his  men  were  so  much  worn  out 
that  he  was  unable  to  commence  immediate  pursuit. 
That  night  the  Confederates  built  up  fires  along  the 
ridge  on  which  they  formed,  to  keep  up  the  appearance 
of  their  presence ;  but  when  the  next  morning  came  they 
were  gone.  This  was  the  last  and  only  successful  expe 
dition  the  Confederates  made  north  of  the  Arkansas  River 
in  the  Indian  Territory  after  that  section  was  occupied 
by  the  Federal  forces  in  the  spring  of  1863. 

General  Gano  reported  the  casualties  of  the  Texas 
brigade  at  Cabin  Creek  at  seven  men  killed  and  thirty- 
eight  wounded,  including  four  officers,  one  of  whom  was 
mortally  wounded.  General  Watie  reported  one  officer 
killed  and  four  wounded  in  his  brigade,  but  does  not  state 
how  many  enlisted  men  he  had  killed  and  wounded.  As 
far  as  could  be  ascertained,  Major  Hopkins'  casualties 
were  seven  men  killed,  six  wounded,  and  twenty-four 
missing.  The  number  of  citizen  teamsters  killed  and 
wounded  does  not  appear  to  have  been  reported  by  the 
wagon-masters. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 

THE   CAMDEN   EXPEDITION. 

THE  opening  of  the  Mississippi  River  through  the  dis 
turbed  section,  and  the  occupation  of  Little  Rock  and 
Fort  Smith  by  the  Federal  forces,  with  the  control  of 
the  Arkansas  River  from  the  head  of  navigation  to  its 
mouth,  imposed  upon  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  the  duty  of  deciding  upon  definite  plans  of  further 
operations  for  an  aggressive  campaign  early  in  the  spring. 
In  the  early  part  of  January,  after  obtaining  the  views  of 
general  officers  who  were  familiar  with  military  operations 
in  the  West,  he  determined  to  order  the  concentration  of 
a  large  force  on  Red  River  for  the  defence  of  Northern 
and  Western  Louisiana,  and  for  the  purpose  of  operating 
against  Texas,  using  the  Red  River  as  a  base,  with  the 
cooperation  of  the  navy.  The  troops  selected  for  this 
movement  were  from  the  Department  of  the  Gulf,  under 
General  Banks ;  a  detachment  of  the  Sixteenth  and  Seven 
teenth  Army  Corps,  under  General  A.  J.  Smith,  from 
Vicksburg,  and  from  the  Department  of  Arkansas,  under 
General  F.  Steele.  In  the  plan  of  the  campaign  the 
troops  of  General  Banks  and  General  Smith,  with  the  co 
operation  of  the  Mississippi  Squadron,  under  Admiral 
Porter,  were  to  concentrate  at  Alexandria,  Louisiana,  on 
Red  River,  by  the  middle  of  March,  when  General  Banks 
would  assume  command  of  the  land  forces  of  the  expedi 
tion.  The  next  objective  point  of  the  campaign  was 

253 


254  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

Shreveport,  on  Red  River,  where  the  combined  forces, 
including  the  troops  under  General  Steele,  from  Little 
Rock,  were  to  concentrate  by  the  1st  of  May.  On  the 
loth  of  March,  the  force  of  9,200  men,  under  General 
Smith,  left  Vicksburg  in  a  fleet  of  transports,  and  arrived 
at  Alexandria  on  the  i6th  and  iQth,  being  convoyed  by 
Admiral  Porter's  fleet  from  the  mouth  of  Red  River.  A 
day  or  so  afterwards,  General  Banks'  troops,  under  the  im 
mediate  command  of  General  Franklin,  commenced  to 
arrive,  and  by  the  26th  had  all  got  in.  In  a  few  days 
afterwards  the  movement  of  the  troops  in  the  direction  of 
Shreveport  was  commenced,  while  the  fleet  of  gunboats 
worked  their  way  up  Red  River  with  some  difficulty. 

On  the  23d  of  March,  General  Steele  left  Little  Rock 
with  two  divisions  of  troops  for  Arkadelphia,  about  one 
hundred  miles  southwest,  where  Brigadier-General  John 
M.  Thayer  was  ordered  to  join  him  with  the  Frontier 
Division  from  Fort  Smith.  When  General  Thayer  joined 
him  he  would  have  about  twelve  thousand  men,  infantry, 
cavalry,  and  artillery,  and  with  this  force  he  proposed  to 
push  on  and  take  Camden,  a  strongly  fortified  town  on 
the  Washita  River,  and  then  to  march  to  Red  River  to 
join  Banks.  The  next  day  after  he  left  Little  Rock  a 
hard  rain  made  the  road  very  heavy,  particularly  in  the 
creek  and  river  bottoms,  which  rapidly  exhausted  the 
strength  of  the  mules  in  the  train  and  the  artillery  horses. 
The  road  across  the  bottoms  of  some  of  the  streams  was 
in  such  bad  condition  that  it  had  to  be  corduroyed  in 
places  before  all  the  train  could  get  over.  After  leaving 
Benton,  his  advance  skirmished  with  the  enemy  continu 
ally  until  he  arrived  at  Arkadelphia  on  the  29th.  On 
arriving  at  this  place  he  was  unable  to  hear  anything 
about  the  movements  of  the  Frontier  Division  after 
leaving  Fort  Smith,  and  couriers  sent  out  to  communi 
cate  with  General  Thayer  returned  without  being  able 
to  find  him.  Having  the  longer  march  to  make  to  form 


THE   CAMDEN  EXPEDITION.  2$$ 

a  junction  with  Steele's  forces  at  Arkadelphia,  General 
Thayer  left  Fort  Smith  on  the  2ist,  but  on  account  of 
bad  roads  and  the  difficulty  of  getting  forage  for  his 
transportation  and  artillery  animals,  he  was  obliged  to 
abandon  the  route  agreed  upon  and  take  another,  pre 
senting  fewer  difficulties,  but  less  direct  and  requiring 
several  days  more  than  the  estimated  time  for  making 
the  march.  On  leaving  Fort  Smith  his  command  con 
sisted  of  the  Twelfth  Kansas,  the  First  and  Second  Kan 
sas  Colored  Infantry,  the  Eighteenth  Iowa,  and  the  First 
and  Second  Arkansas  Union  Infantry;  detachments  of 
the  Second,  Sixth,  and  Fourteenth  Regiments  Kansas 
Cavalry ;  Rabb's  Second  Indiana  Battery,  Starks'  Battery 
First  Arkansas  Light  Artillery,  and  two  twelve-pounder 
mountain  howitzers  attached  to  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry, 
the  whole  force  of  about  five  thousand  men,  with  twelve 
field-guns  and  two  howitzers,  being  divided  into  two 
brigades  of  infantry,  commanded  respectively  by  Colonel 
John  Edwards,  of  the  Eighteenth  Iowa,  and  Colonel 
Charles  W.  Adams,  Twelfth  Kansas  Infantry,  and  one 
cavalry  brigade,  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Owen 
A.  Bassett,  Second  Kansas  Cavalry. 

When  Steele's  forces  left  Little  Rock  and  Fort  Smith, 
the  Confederate  forces  under  General  Sterling  Price, 
commanding  the  District  of  Arkansas,  consisted  of  three 
divisions  of  about  twelve  thousand  men,  occupying 
Arkadelphia,  Washington,  and  Camden,  the  latter  place 
being  well  fortified  and  a  large  depot  for  army  sup 
plies.  Two  or  three  days'  marching  brought  General 
Thayer's  command  into  a  mountainous  region.  The 
recent  rains  having  washed  deep  gullies  in  the  road 
up  and  down  the  narrow  valleys  and  carried  away 
the  soil,  left  the  road  in  such  a  rough,  rocky  condition 
as  to  make  it  impassable  in  places  for  the  heavy  trains 
and  artillery  until  it  was  repaired  by  the  pioneer  corps. 
However,  he  pushed  forward,  overcoming  every  obsta- 


256  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

cle,  and  made  the  march  in  fairly  good  time.  In  pass 
ing  through  the  mountains  some  part  of  his  command 
was  occasionally  fired  upon  by  guerillas,  who  did  not 
generally  venture  near  enough  to  do  any  damage  to  the 
troops  on  the  march,  or  to  the  pickets  after  the  com 
mand  had  gone  into  camp.  The  mountainous  and 
wooded  country  marched  over  was  infested  with  so  many 
guerillas  that  Generals  Steele  and  Thayer  did  not  suc 
ceed  in  keeping  each  other  advised  of  their  respective 
movements  by  couriers  and  scouts  after  leaving  Little 
Rock  and  Fort  Smith. 

A  few  days  after  General  Thayer's  command  left  Fort 
Smith,  important  despatches  came  to  that  post  for  him, 
and  were  sent  forward  by  three  scouts  to  overtake  and 
deliver  to  him.  While  crossing  the  mountains  the  de 
spatch  bearers  were  fired  upon  by  a  party  of  guerillas  and 
pursued  several  miles,  and  finally  surrounded  and  cap 
tured,  one  of  their  horses  having  been  killed  in  the  last 
skirmish.  As  soon  as  the  three  men  were  captured,  the 
guerillas  took  from  them  all  the  letters  and  despatches 
and  newspapers  in  their  possession  ;  but  in  their  eagerness 
to  read  the  newspapers  to  find  out  what  was  going  on 
in  other  parts  of  the  country,  laid  the  letters  and  de 
spatches  aside  for  a  while.  When  they  had  finished 
reading  the  newspapers,  the  guerillas,  claiming  that  they 
could  not  read  writing  very  well,  ordered  one  of  the  pris 
oners  to  read  the  letters  and  despatches,  and  warned 
him  that  if  he  did  not  read  them  correctly  he  would 
certainly  be  put  to  death  the  next  day ;  and  stated  that 
they  were  going  to  a  house  the  next  morning  where  there 
was  a  woman  who  could  read  the  letters  without  any 
trouble.  In  opening  and  reading  the  letters  and  de 
spatches,  the  unimportant  letters  were  put  back  in  the 
envelope  after  reading,  and  some  of  the  most  important 
despatches  put  in  with  them  without  being  read,  and 
finally  destroyed.  Fearing  that  they  would  be  killed, 


THE   CAMDEN  EXPEDITION.  257 

the  prisoners  determined  to  escape  during  the  night  if 
possible.  When  darkness  came  on,  the  guerillas,  with 
their  prisoners,  encamped  on  Reveille  Creek,  which  emp 
ties  into  the  Petit  Jean,  and  soon  made  up  a  blazing 
fire,  as  the  evening  was  chilly.  After  talking  around  the 
fire  for  a  while,  the  men  laid  down  upon  their  blankets 
on  the  ground,  except  two  guerillas  who  were  left  as 
guards  to  prevent  the  escape  of  the  prisoners. 

In  an  hour  or  so  the  men  who  had  laid  down  appeared 
to  be  sound  asleep.  But  the  prisoners  were  only  feigning 
sleep,  and  about  midnight,  not  having  been  relieved,  the 
guards  fell  asleep.  When  satisfied  that  the  guards  were 
sound  asleep,  the  prisoners  cautiously  crept  away  from 
their  captors  into  the  darkness,  taking  along  several 
revolvers,  and  were  soon  wandering  in  the  mountains, 
endeavoring  to  make  their  way  to  Little  Rock,  the  near 
est  point  occupied  by  Federal  troops  they  could  reach 
with  safety. 

The  Frontier  Division  arrived  at  Rockport,  on  the 
Little  Rock  and  Arkadelphia  road,  about  a  week  after 
General  Steele  had  passed  that  place,  and  then  pushed 
forward  as  rapidly  as  the  condition  of  the  roads  would 
permit  to  overtake  him.  After  waiting  several  days  at 
Arkadelphia  for  the  Fort  Smith  troops,  General  Steele 
marched  to  Okolona,  about  twenty  miles  southwest, 
thinking  that  Thayer  must  have  struck  a  route  west  of 
the  one  at  first  proposed.  In  making  this  movement  his 
rear-guard,  under  Brigadier-General  S.  A.  Rice,  was  at 
tacked  about  twelve  o'clock,  April  2cl,  by  General  Shelby, 
with  fifteen  hundred  men  and  two  pieces  of  artillery,  on 
Gentry  Creek,  a  few  miles  east  of  Okolona.  When  the 
attack  was  made,  Colonel  Thomas  H.  Benton,  Jr., 
Twenty-ninth  Iowa  Infantry,  was  in  command  of  the 
rear-guard,  and  immediately  deployed  his  regiment  in 
line,  and  ordered  into  position  a  section  of  Captain 
Voegele's  battery.  He  repulsed  the  enemy  after  a  few 


2$8  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

volleys  and  then  retired  about  half  a  mile  to  the  ridge 
overlooking  Terre  Noir  Creek  and  nearer  the  rear  of  the 
train,  and  formed  in  line  again. 

General  Rice,  commanding  the  brigade  in  charge  of 
the  supply,  pontoon,  and  brigade  trains,  now  came  on  the 
field  and  directed  the  movements  of  his  troops.  He  soon 
ascertained  that  Shelby  was  preparing  for  another  attack, 
and  then  ordered  up  the  Fiftieth  Indiana  Infantry  to  re 
inforce  the  Twenty-ninth  Iowa.  The  Fiftieth  Indiana 
had  just  arrived  on  the  ground  when  the  firing  com 
menced  again  with  artillery  and  small-arms.  The  Con 
federate  force  being  mounted,  and  by  making  a  slight 
detour  to  the  right,  had  taken  possession  of  the  ridge  on 
the  Federal  left  by  the  time  the  Federal  line  was  fully 
formed.  While  his  section  of  artillery  kept  up  a  hot  fire 
on  the  Confederate  battery,  General  Rice  ordered  his  in 
fantry  to  charge,  and  drove  the  enemy  from  their  position 
at  all  points.  The  time  consumed  in  the  two  actions  had 
made  quite  an  interval  of  space  between  his  troops  and 
the  moving  train,  and  as  it  was  reported  that  the  train 
was  threatened  by  another  force  of  the  enemy,  under 
General  Cabell,  moving  from  the  south  on  the  Washing 
ton  road,  General  Rice  withdrew  his  troops  the  moment 
the  enemy  were  driven  from  the  field  and  marched 
rapidly  to  overtake  the  train.  In  resuming  the  march, 
the  Fiftieth  Indiana,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  S.  T. 
Wells,  covered  the  rear,  and  for  the  next  two  miles  and 
until  he  arrived  at  the  junction  of  the  Camden  and  Wash 
ington  roads  his  command  was  constantly  skirmishing 
with  the  enemy,  who  at  times  pressed  forward  with  a 
good  deal  of  determination. 

Near  the  junction  of  the  Camden  and  Washington 
roads,  Colonel  Wells'  command  was  relieved  by  four 
companies  of  the  Ninth  Wisconsin  Infantry,  under  Colo 
nel  C.  E.  Salomon.  This  force,  in  retiring,  continued  to 
engage  the  Confederates  for  the  next  half-mile,  when 


THE   CAM  DEN  EXPEDITION. 

Shelby  dismounted  part  of  his  command  and  formed  line 
of  battle  and  placed  his  artillery  in  a  favorable  position 
for  a  desperate  assault.  In  a  few  moments  after  the 
action  commenced,  General  Rice  arrived  with  the  Fiftieth 
Indiana,  and  threw  them  into  line  on  the  right  of  the 
Ninth  Wisconsin  Infantry,  and  formed  the  Twenty-ninth 
Iowa  in  line  in  reserve,  with  the  section  of  the  battery  in 
the  centre  so  that  its  fire  would  sweep  the  road.  These 
dispositions  were  hardly  completed  when  the  enemy 
showed  themselves  in  greater  numbers,  and  the  fire 
from  their  small-arms  and  artillery  increased  in  intensity. 
After  firing  a  few  rounds,  General  Rice  ordered  his  troops 
to  charge  the  enemy,  which  they  did  in  gallant  style, 
again  driving  them  from  the  field  in  disorder.  The  Fed 
eral  troops  again  faced  to  the  front  and  resumed  the 
march,  but  had  not  advanced  more  than  half  a  mile  when 
Shelby  rallied  his  men  and  moved  forward  to  another 
attack.  Colonel  Wells  and  Colonel  Salomon  again 
changed  front  to  rear,  and,  charging,  drove  the  enemy 
off,  and  as  darkness  was  approaching,  they  withdrew  from 
the  contest  without  getting  a  single  team  from  the  Fed 
eral  trains.  The  cavalry  under  General  Carr  were  several 
miles  in  advance  of  the  army  that  day,  so  that  the  in 
fantry  were  kept  constantly  in  motion,  marching,  form 
ing  in  line,  and  in  protecting  their  flanks.  They  set  the 
grass  and  leaves  on  fire  in  a  number  of  places,  which  had 
the  effect  of  annoying  the  Confederates  a  good  deal  with 
smoke  and  dust,  and  several  times  disarranged  their  ad 
vancing  line.  It  was  nearly  ten  o'clock  when  the  Federal 
rear-guard  got  into  camp  near  Okolona  that  night,  and 
the  men  were  so  much  exhausted  from  constant  marching 
and  fighting  the  last  ten  hours  that  food  and  rest  were 
never  more  welcome.  General  Rice  reported  his  loss  dur 
ing  the  day  at  eight  killed  and  thirty-two  wounded.  The 
Confederate  loss  was  perhaps  somewhat  heavier  than  the 
Federal  loss  from  the  fact  that  their  attacks  were  made 


260  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

upon  infantry  who  were  placed  in  defensive  positions  as 
far  as  practicable  before  opening  fire  upon  their  assailants. 
It  was  the  policy  of  the  Confederate  commander  to  use 
his  numerous  cavalry  in  making  vigorous  attacks  on  the 
Federal  flanks,  front,  and  rear,  to  impede  the  march  of 
the  Federal  troops  as  much  as  possible  until  they  arrived 
at  the  Little  Missouri  River,  when  he  proposed  to  con 
centrate  his  scattered  forces  on  the  south  side  of  that 
stream  to  oppose  General  Steele's  crossing  it.  In  accord 
ance  with  this  policy,  General  Shelby  made  an  attack 
about  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  4th  on  the 
Federal  picket  about  a  mile  north  of  camp  on  the  Wash 
ington  road.  When  the  attack  was  made,  Colonel  Adolph 
Engelmann,  who  was  under  orders  to  inarch  back  to 
Hollywood,  fourteen  miles,  with  the  Third  Brigade, 
Third  Division,  and  with  a  brigade  of  cavalry  under 
Colonel  Ritter,  to  find  and  establish  communication  with 
the  Frontier  Division,  under  General  Thayer,  was  still 
in  camp,  and  was  just  getting  ready  to  move.  He  at 
once  ordered  Colonel  Krez  to  reinforce  the  picket  with 
two  companies  of  the  Twenty-seventh  Wisconsin  In 
fantry,  in  the  absence  of  the  cavalry,  which  was  out  on  a 
reconnoissance  on  the  Little  Missouri  River,  and  would 
not  be  due  for  several  hours.  In  a  short  time  the  Con 
federates  were  attacking  the  reinforced  picket  with  so 
much  energy  that  Colonel  Engelmann  ordered  forward 
Colonel  Krez  with  the  other  companies  of  his  regiment, 
with  instructions  to  clear  the  woods  of  the  enemy  for  two 
miles  northeast  of  Okolona,  if  possible.  Leaving  one 
company  in  camp,  and  collecting  the  other  companies  of 
his  regiment  not  already  on  the  picket-line,  Colonel  Krez 
moved  forward  with  his  men  deployed  in  line,  and  soon 
came  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  and  opened  fire  upon  them, 
and  drove  them  from  their  position  in  a  thicket  to  the 
opposite  side  of  a  clearing  in  the  timber,  where  they 
made  a  stand  and  fired  several  rounds  of  grape  and  can- 


THE    CAM  DEN  EXPEDITION.  26 1 

ister  from  their  two  guns,  and  several  shot  and  shell,  into 
Colonel  Engelmann's  position  in  camp.  A  section  of 
Vaughn's  battery  of  Engelmann's  brigade  was  brought 
out,  and  after  throwing  a  few  shells  at  the  Confederate 
guns,  caused  them  to  change  their  position  beyond  the 
range  of  the  pieces  of  the  Federal  batteries. 

After  the  skirmishing  had  lasted  an  hour  or  so  without 
any  decided  advantage  to  either  side,  General  Shelby 
made  a  movement  that  threatened  to  flank  Colonel  Krez 
on  his  left.  When  advised  of  this  movement,  Colonel 
Engelmann  sent  two  companies  of  the  Seventy-seventh 
Ohio  Infantry  to  form  on  the  left  of  Colonel  Krez,  and 
two  companies  of  the  same  regiment  to  form  in  his  rear 
as  a  reserve.  A  severe  rainstorm  now  came  up,  accom 
panied  with  heavy  thunder  and  vivid  flashes  of  lightning, 
which  interrupted  operations  for  a  short  time  on  both 
sides.  Directly  after  the  storm  passed  over,  Colonel 
Krez  got  the  separated  companies  of  his  regiment  into 
position  so  that  he  could  direct  their  movements  to  better 
advantage,  and  when  he  extended  his  line  on  his  right  and 
left  and  began  to  move  forward,  threatening  to  outflank 
them,  the  Confederates  withdrew  from  his  front,  firing  a 
few  shots  as  they  retired.  At  times  the  firing  on  the 
skirmish-line  was  quite  animated,  and  during  the  day's 
operations  Colonel  Krez  lost  three  men  killed  and  three 
wounded.  When  the  firing  became  heaviest  along  the 
picket-line,  Colonel  Engelmann  ordered  into  line  the 
troops  of  his  brigade  who  had  not  been  sent  to  the  front. 
It  did  not,  however,  become  necessary  for  them  to  move 
out.  Only  the  Twenty-seventh  Wisconsin,  two  com 
panies  of  the  Forty-third  Illinois,  two  companies  of  the 
Fortieth  Iowa,  and  two  companies  of  the  Seventy-seventh 
Ohio  Infantry  were  engaged  in  the  action  on  the  picket- 
line  that  day.  The  Federal  cavalry  under  Colonel  Ritter 
did  not  arrive  at  Okolona  from  the  Little  Missouri  River 
until  two  o'clock,  too  late  to  be  employed  in  the  pursuit 


262  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

of  the  Confederates,  who  had  just  withdrawn  from  Colo 
nel  Engelmann's  front.  It  was  four  o'clock  when  the 
Colonel  had  drawn  in  his  pickets  and  had  his  troops  in 
motion  on  the  march  back  to  Hollywood.  When  he 
arrived  at  the  Washington  and  Arkadelphia  road,  dark 
ness  was  coming  on,  and  running  into  the  Confederate 
pickets  he  bivouacked  in  line  of  battle  until  the  next  morn 
ing,  when,  finding  that  the  Confederate  pickets  had  been 
withdrawn,  he  resumed  the  march  to  Hollywood,  arriving 
there  at  four  o'clock.  He  sent  out  detachments  of  his 
cavalry  beyond  that  point  in  the  direction  of  Arkadelphia, 
and  also  on  the  Fort  Smith  road ;  but  they  all  returned 
without  being  able  to  obtain  any  information  of  General 
Thayer's  movements.  After  waiting  until  ten  o'clock 
of  the  5th  for  reports  from  his  detachments  of  cavalry, 
he  faced  to  the  front  again,  and  rejoined  General  Steele 
near  Elkins'  Ferry  on  the  Little  Missouri  River  that 
evening  after  dark,  having  made  a  hard  day's  march  of 
twenty-two  miles  over  bad  roads,  terribly  cut  up  by  the 
passage  of  the  large  trains. 

On  starting  out  from  Little  Rock,  Brigadier-General 
E.  A.  Carr,  commanding  the  cavalry  division,  led  the 
advance  of  the  army  under  General  Steele,  and  had  fre 
quent  skirmishes  with  the  enemy  on  the  flanks  and  in 
front.  When  the  Federal  forces  arrived  at  Arkadelphia, 
the  Confederate  commander  in  front  supposed  that  their 
next  objective  point  would  be  either  Camden  or  Wash 
ington,  the  two  most  important  points  held  by  the  Con 
federates  in  the  State. 

The  Confederate  general  officers  understood  the  gen 
eral  plan  of  the  campaign  proposed  by  the  Federal 
authorities,  which  was  for  the  forces  of  Banks  and  Steele 
to  unite  at  some  point  on  Red  River,  perhaps  at  Shreve- 
port.  If  General  Steele  desired  to  strike  Red  River  at 
Fulton,  the  nearest  point,  Washington  would  be  on  his 
direct  line  of  march  from  Arkadelphia;  or  if  he  desired 


THE    CAMDEN  EXPEDITION.  263 

to  strike  Red  River  lower  down,  near  Shreveport,  still  the 
route  via  Washington  would  be  the  nearest  and  most 
practicable.  But  his  instructions  were  to  reach  Red 
River  via  Camden,  which  was  the  best  fortified  town 
in  the  State,  as  well  as  one  of  the  most  important,  the 
Washita  River  being  navigable  to  that  point  about  two 
thirds  of  the  year.  And  then  it  was  not  considered  a 
good  policy  to  leave  such  a  strongly  fortified  place,  pro 
visioned  and  occupied  by  the  enemy,  in  the  Federal  rear. 
General  Steele  determined,  if  practicable,  to  manoeuvre 
the  Confederate  forces  under  Price  out  of  Camden  and 
occupy  the  place  without  a  general  battle.  He  was 
satisfied  that  if  he  marched  from  Arkadelphia  directly 
towards  Camden,  Price  would  concentrate  his  forces 
from  Washington  and  Camden  to  oppose  him  on  that 
line;  or  if  he  marched  towards  Washington  that  Price 
would  concentrate  his  forces  to  oppose  him  on  that  line. 
Camden  was  southeast  of  Arkadelphia  and  Washington 
southwest,  and  the  three  places  were  nearly  equally  dis 
tant  from  each  other — about  sixty  miles.  When  General 
Steele  marched  out  twenty  miles  southwest  from  Arka 
delphia  on  the  Washington  road,  the  Confederate  gen 
erals  did  not  doubt  but  that  his  next  objective  point  in 
the  campaign  was  Washington,  and  at  once  commenced 
concentrating  their  forces  on  the  military  road  near  the 
Little  Missouri  River  to  oppose  his  crossing  that  stream. 
But  about  nine  miles  southwest  of  Hollywood  there  was 
a  road  leading  off  from  the  Arkadelphia  and  Washington 
road  to  the  south,  through  Okolona  to  Elkins'  Ferry  en 
the  Little  Missouri  River,  and  thence  to  Camden,  which 
General  Steele's  forces  took,  except  part  of  his  cavalry 
that  had  been  thrown  forward  on  the  Washington  road 
to  cover  his  movements.  When  he  turned  off  on  this 
road  he  directed  General  Carr,  commanding  the  cavalry 
division,  to  move  forward  and  occupy  a  position  com 
manding  the  crossing  at  Elkins'  Ford  or  Ferry. 


264  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

General  Carr  arrived  at  the  ford  at  three  o'clock  on  the 
2d,  and,  finding  the  river  fordable,  posted  a  mounted 
picket  on  the  south  side,  placed  his  four  howitzers  in 
position  on  the  north  side  to  command  the  ford,  and 
sent  a  message  back  to  General  Steele,  describing  the 
situation  and  suggesting  that  a  regiment  of  infantry  and 
a  rifled  battery  be  sent  forward  to  strengthen  the  position. 
He  found  that  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  had 
crossed  the  river  at  the  ford  that  day,  going  south,  and 
he  skirmished  with  a  small  force  south  of  the  ford,  and 
did  not  doubt  but  General  Marmaduke  would  send  a 
strong  force  there  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment  for 
the  purpose  of  dislodging  him  if  possible.  The  holding 
of  the  ford  was  considered  so  important  that  General 
Salomon  while  on  the  march  in  the  afternoon  of  the  2d 
sent  forward  part  of  the  Second  Brigade  of  his  division, 
under  Colonel  William  E.  McLean,  Forty-third  Indiana 
Infantry,  who,  by  making  a  forced  march,  reached  the 
ford  and  crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  river  about  nine 
o'clock  that  night,  and  went  into  camp  near  the  ferry. 

On  April  3d,  the  balance  of  General  Steele's  army,  ex 
cept  Colonel  Engelmann's  brigade,  which  had  been  sent 
back  to  Hollywood,  moved  forward  from  Okolona  to 
Elkins'  Ferry  and  went  into  camp  on  high  ground  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Little  Missouri  River.  In  the  early  part 
of  that  day  some  of  Marmaduke's  mounted  detachments 
discovered  the  Federal  pickets  near  the  ford,  on  the  south 
side  of  the  river,  and  a  courier  was  hastily  sent  to  him  at 
the  place  on  the  military  road  a  few  miles  south  of  the 
Little  Missouri  River  where  he  was  concentrating  his 
forces,  advising  him  of  the  situation.  He  at  once  ordered 
forward  Lieutenant-Colonel  Preston,  with  his  regiment 
of  Colonel  Colton  Greene's  brigade,  to  make  a  reconnois- 
sance  and  ascertain  whether  the  main  part  of  Steele's 
army  had  crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  river  at  Elkins' 
Ford.  The  Federal  cavalry  picket,  about  four  miles 


THE   CAMDEN  EXPEDITION.  26$ 

south  of  the  ford  on  the  Prairie  d'Ane  road,  was  en 
countered  by  Colonel  Preston,  and  driven  back  nearly 
two  miles  upon  the  infantry  outposts.  Here,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  F.  M.  Drake,  of  the  Thirty-sixth  Iowa  Infantry, 
who  had  been  sent  forward  with  three  companies  of  his 
own  regiment  and  three  companies  of  the  Forty-third 
Indiana  Infantry,  arrived  and  deployed  his  men  in  line 
and  checked  the  Confederates,  who  retired  a  few  miles  to 
await  the  arrival  of  the  forces  under  General  Marmaduke. 
The  Federal  and  Confederate  pickets  had  a  skirmish 
south  of  the  ford  before  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Preston, 
and  in  that  skirmish  Major  W.  W.  Norris,  of  the  Forty- 
third  Indiana  Infantry,  came  to  the  assistance  of  the 
cavalry  picket  with  four  companies  of  his  regiment,  and 
deploying  them  in  line,  soon  routed  the  enemy,  driving 
them  some  two  miles  and  capturing  sixteen  Confederate 
soldiers. 

In  reconnoitring  on  the  picket-line  that  evening,  Colo 
nel  Drake  became  satisfied  that  the  Confederates  were 
directly  in  his  front  in  strong  force,  preparing  to  make 
an  attack  that  night  or  early  the  next  morning,  and 
so  advised  Colonel  McLean,  commanding  the  brigade. 
Colonel  Drake  was  ordered  to  take  command  of  all  the 
troops  at  the  front,  deploy  them  on  each  side  of  the 
road,  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  if  attacked, 
resist  them  as  far  as  he  might  consider  advisable,  and  to 
retire  on  his  reserves  if  the  enemy  advanced  in  force. 
His  cavalry  picket  consisted  of  two  companies  of  the 
First  Iowa  Cavalry,  with  vedettes  in  advance.  About 
two  hundred  yards  in  the  rear  of  his  cavalry,  he  deployed 
three  companies  of  the  Thirty-sixth  Iowa  Infantry  on 
the  right  of  the  road,  and  three  companies  of  the  Forty- 
third  Indiana  Infantry  on  the  left  of  the  road,  with  an 
interval  of  one  hundred  yards  between  each  company, 
with  instructions  for  a  few  men  of  each  company  to  keep 
vigilant  watch  while  the  others  slept  on  their  arms  until 


266  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

four  o'clock  next  morning,  when  all  should  be  aroused  to 
breakfast  from  their  haversacks.  A  section  of  the  Second 
Missouri  Light  Artillery,  under  Lieutenant  Charles  Peetz, 
was  posted  about  two  hundred  yards  in  the  rear  of  his 
centre  companies  so  as  to  sweep  the  approaches  from  the 
front  and  flanks  as  soon  as  the  picket  retired.  In  a  few 
hours  after  sending  forward  the  regiment  under  Colonel 
Preston,  General  Marmaduke  followed  him  with  the  bal 
ance  of  Greene's  brigade  and  General  Cabell's  brigade  and 
four  pieces  of  artillery,  and  bivouacked  in  line  that  night 
on  the  edge  of  the  Little  Missouri  River  bottom  in  front 
of  the  Federal  pickets,  prepared  to  attack  the  Federal 
position  in  the  morning  at  daylight.  When  daylight 
came  he  moved  forward  his  troops  to  the  attack,  Greene's 
brigade  in  advance,  and  part  of  Cabell's  brigade  being 
placed  in  position  in  reserve. 

In  a  short  time  the  Federal  cavalry  picket  were  driven 
in,  firing  upon  the  enemy  as  they  fell  back  upon  the  in 
fantry  companies  deployed  by  Colonel  Drake.  The  Con 
federates  continuing  to  advance,  with  most  of  their  force 
dismounted,  the  firing  became  brisk  along  the  skirmish- 
line.  As  soon  as  the  Confederates  came  up  within  range, 
Lieutenant  Peetz  opened  upon  them  with  the  section  of 
his  battery,  checking  them  for  a  short  time  and  until 
Marmaduke  ordered  his  guns  into  position.  The  roar  of 
artillery  was  then  continuous  for  an  hour,  with  very  little 
intermission  of  firing  between  the  opposing  skirmish-lines. 
Early  in  the  action  the  Confederates  endeavored  to  flank 
the  Federal  skirmish-line  on  the  left,  but  Colonel  Drake 
extended  his  line  in  that  direction  and  drove  them  back 
beyond  the  range  of  his  small-arms.  Colonel  Greene 
then  sent  a  mounted  force  against  the  Federal  right, 
where  his  men  were  driven  back  by  a  detachment  of  the 
First  Iowa  Cavalry,  with  the  assistance  of  Colonel  Drake's 
infantry.  He  then  advanced  his  skirmish-line,  supported 
by  three  dismounted  regiments,  and  forced  Colonel 


THE   CAM  DEN  EXPEDITION.  267 

Drake's  front  line  back  about  fifty  yards,  the  firing  from 
the  opposing  lines  being  quite  heavy  at  times. 

At  this  point  in  the  action,  General  Marmaduke  came 
onto  the  field  to  direct  the  operations  of  his  troops  in 
person,  and  brought  with  him  Monroe's  regiment  and  a 
section  of  a  battery  of  Cabell's  brigade,  and  placed  them 
in  position,  the  regiment  on  his  right,  and  the  two  guns 
so  as  to  cross-fire  the  Federal  line.  He  then  ordered  his 
entire  line  forward,  and  in  the  charge  forced  Colonel 
Drake's  line  back  upon  the  infantry  reserves,  two  regi 
ments  of  which  had  been  brought  over  from  the  north 
side  of  the  river  under  General  Rice  early  in  the  action 
to  strengthen  Colonel  McLean's  brigade  holding  the 
advance.  Colonel  C.  W.  Kittredge,  Thirty-sixth  Iowa 
Infantry,  had  moved  up  with  seven  companies  of  his 
regiment  to  the  rear  of  the  skirmishers  on  the  left  of  the 
road,  and  when  he  saw  the  left  of  Colonel  Drake's  line 
retiring  across  an  open  field  in  his  front,  he  formed  his 
companies  in  line  behind  a  rise  of  ground  on  the  left  of 
the  section  of  the  battery,  and  ordered  his  men  to  lie 
down.  The  enemy  were  firing  and  advancing  rapidly, 
and  he  was  satisfied  that  they  were  charging  the  battery. 
When  they  advanced  into  the  open  ground  and  came  up 
within  range,  he  ordered  his  men  to  rise  and  fire,  which 
had  the  effect  of  instantly  checking  the  Confederate  line. 
He  then  ordered  his  men  to  give  the  enemy  a  few  well- 
directed  volleys,  which  caused  them  to  fall  back  as  hastily 
as  they  had  just  advanced. 

When  that  part  of  Colonel  Drake's  line  on  the  left  of 
the  road  fell  back  across  the  field,  he  retired  with  the 
companies  on  the  right  of  the  road,  in  good  order,  con 
testing  every  step  of  the  ground,  to  a  position  nearly 
parallel  with  Colonel  Kittredge's  line,  where  he  made  a 
stand  and  repulsed  the  enemy  on  that  part  of  the  field. 
The  section  of  the  battery  under  Lieutenant  Peetz,  when 
it  appeared  to  be  endangered  by  the  charge  of  the  enemy, 


268  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

was  withdrawn  across  Howard's  Creek,  a  short  distance 
in  the  rear,  and  placed  in  a  good  position,  where  it  con 
tinued  to  play  upon  the  enemy's  line  until  it  fell  back 
out  of  range.  This  repulse  of  the  enemy  ended  the  fight 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  rounds  from  their  artillery,  a 
grape  shot  from  which  slightly  wounded  General  Rice 
just  as  he  had  come  onto  the  field  to  make  disposition  of 
the  two  regiments  which  he  had  brought  over  from  the 
north  side  of  the  river  to  the  assistance  of  Colonel  Mc 
Lean,  but  which  took  no  part  in  the  action,  the  enemy 
having  retired.  After  his  repulse,  General  Marmaduke 
retreated  to  a  strong  position  about  four  miles  south  of 
Elkins'  Ferry,  and  felled  trees  to  obstruct  the  Federal 
advance,  and  threw  up  temporary  defences  nearly  three 
miles  in  length,  made  of  logs  and  earth,  but  abandoned 
them  the  next  morning,  and  fell  back  to  the  south  side 
of  Prairie  d'Ane.  When  the  fight  was  over  and  the 
enemy  had  retreated,  General  Steele  strengthened  his 
outposts  south  of  the  ferry,  and  moved  his  troops  and 
trains  which  were  encamped  on  the  north  side  to  the 
south  side  of  the  Little  Missouri  River  on  the  6th  of 
April,  and  advanced  to  the  high  ground  some  three 
miles  south  of  the  ford.  He  waited  in  this  position  for 
several  days  for  General  Thayer's  Frontier  Division, 
which  he  did  not  hear  from  until  the  7th,  and  which  was 
at  Rockport  on  the  5th,  arriving  at  the  Little  Missouri 
River  on  the  Qth.  In  the  meantime  a  heavy  rain  had 
fallen,  raising  the  Little  Missouri  about  three  feet,  so 
that  it  covered  the  lower  bottoms,  making  it  necessary  to 
lay  down  the  pontoon  bridge  and  to  corduroy  about  three 
miles  of  road  across  the  bottom,  to  get  the  troops  and 
trains  of  the  Frontier  Division  over  to  the  south  side. 

On  the  loth,  having  concentrated  the  three  divisions 
of  his  army  on  the  high  ground  south  of  the  Little  Mis 
souri  River,  General  Steele  moved  forward  six  miles 
south  through  pine  forests  to  the  northern  edge  of  Prairie 


THE   CAM  DEN  EXPEDITION.  269 

d'Ane,  where  his  advance,  under  Colonel  Engelmann, 
about  four  o'clock  encountered  the  Confederate  skirmish 
ers  occupying  a  ridge  at  the  edge  of  the  prairie,  running 
east  and  west,  and  covered  with  low  brush  thick  enough 
in  places  to  conceal  them  from  the  view  of  the  advancing 
Federal  line.  The  main  Confederate  force,  under  Gen 
erals  Shelby,  Dockery,  and  Greene,  was  formed  in  line 
on  a  ridge  running  parallel  with  the  one  on  which  their 
skirmishers  had  formed,  about  half  a  mile  south  of  it. 
Colonel  Engelmann  ordered  up  Captain  Vaughn's  Bat 
tery  A,  Third  Illinois  Artillery,  deployed  the  Forty- 
third  Illinois  Infantry,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Adolph 
Dengler,  on  the  left,  the  Fortieth  Iowa  Infantry,  under 
Colonel  John  A.  Garrett,  on  the  right,  to  support  the 
battery,  with  the  Twenty-seventh  Wisconsin  Infantry, 
under  Colonel  Conrad  Krez,  in  reserve,  and  sent  forward 
companies  from  his  front  line  to  ascertain  the  strength 
and  position  of  the  enemy. 

When  it  was  found  that  only  the  Confederate  skir 
mishers  occupied  the  nearest  ridge,  General  Salomon  came 
up  and  ordered  Colonel  Engelmann  to  deploy  his  two 
front  regiments,  under  Colonels  Garrett  and  Dengler,  as 
skirmishers,  and  then  to  advance  and  drive  the  enemy 
from  their  position  in  the  brush,  which  they  did  in  gallant 
style,  carrying  the  ridge  in  a  few  minutes.  The  day  was 
now  far  advanced,  and  desiring  to  hold  the  position  which 
had  been  gained  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  General 
Salomon  ordered  forward  the  brigades  of  his  division, 
Colonel  Engelmann 's  brigade,  with  Vaughn's  battery, 
forming  his  right,  General  Rice's  brigade,  with  Voegelc's 
battery,  forming  his  left,  with  McLean's  brigade  in  re 
serve.  While  Vaughn's  battery  and  the  Twenty-seventh 
Wisconsin  Infantry,  which  was  supporting  it,  were  being 
placed  in  position  on  the  summit  of  the  ridge  just  gained, 
the  Confederate  battery  from  the  ridge  in  front  opened  a 
hot  fire  upon  the  Federal  troops.  This  battery,  however, 


2/0  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

was  soon  obliged  to  leave  the  position  it  occupied,  for  it 
had  fired  only  a  few  rounds  when  it  was  receiving  the 
concentrated  fire  of  Vaughn's  battery  on  the  Federal 
right  and  of  Voegele's  battery  on  the  Federal  left. 
Having  driven  the  Confederate  battery  from  its  posi 
tion,  General  Salomon  ordered  another  advance,  and  his 
troops  from  Rice's  brigade  on  the  left  to  Engelmann's 
in  the  centre  and  Caldwell's  cavalry  brigade  on  the  ex 
treme  right  moved  forward  and  drove  the  Confederates 
steadily  before  them  and  from  the  second  ridge  which 
their  main  force  occupied  when  the  fight  opened. 

Night  was  now  coming  on,  and  it  was  too  late  to  pur 
sue  the  enemy,  who  retreated  over  the  prairie  and  dis 
appeared  in  the  darkness  in  a  southwest  direction.  The 
Federal  troops  bivouacked  in  line  on  the  edge  of  the 
prairie,  and  as  it  was  a  cold,  frosty  night,  they  suffered 
much  discomfort,  being  unable  to  have  fire  or  shelter. 
They  were  kept  standing  in  ranks  or  on  the  skirmish-line 
until  nearly  twelve  o'clock  that  night,  for  General  Shelby 
before  nine  o'clock  posted  two  pieces  of  Collins'  battery 
just  behind  the  ridge  in  the  prairie,  about  half  a  mile  dis 
tant,  and  opened  fire  with  shot  and  shell  on  the  Federal 
position,  lasting  upwards  of  two  hours.  Vaughn's  bat 
tery  replied,  sweeping  the  ridge  around  the  Confederate 
guns  with  a  storm  of  shot  and  shell.  There  was  also 
some  small-arms  firing  between  the  opposing  skirmish- 
lines.  The  roar  of  the  artillery  in  the  stillness  of  the 
night,  and  the  bursting  of  shells  over  the  heads  of  the 
troops,  made  an  impressive  scene  for  the  participants  of 
both  sides.  About  eleven  o'clock  that  night,  General 
Shelby  formed  a  brigade  of  cavalry  in  line  in  a  grove  in 
front  of  the  Federal  right,  and  swept  over  the  prairie  in  a 
charge  on  Vaughn's  battery.  When  this  charging  force 
of  cavalry  came  thundering  over  the  prairie  and  within 
range  of  the  Twenty-seventh  Wisconsin  and  Fortieth 
Iowa  Infantry,  forming  the  front  line  of  Colonel  Engel- 


THE   CAMDEN  EXPEDITION.  2?  I 

mann's  brigade,  Colonels  Krez  and  Garrett,  command 
ing  those  regiments,  ordered  their  men  to  open  fire  upon 
the  enemy,  which  they  did,  giving  them  several  effective 
volleys  before  they  had  passed  out  of  range.  Almost  at 
the  same  instant  that  the  infantry  opened  fire,  the  guns 
of  Vaughn's  battery  belched  forth  in  several  volleys  a 
perfect  storm  of  canister  into  the  charging  cavalry,  and 
sent  them  back  over  the  prairie  in  so  much  disorder  that 
they  made  no  further  demonstrations  against  the  Federal 
front  that  night. 

The  next  morning  at  daylight  skirmishing  commenced 
again  between  the  outposts  of  the  opposing  forces,  and 
in  the  afternoon  General  Steele  ordered  the  Third  Divi 
sion  in  line  of  battle  on  the  prairie,  and  it  advanced  to 
within  a  mile  of  the  Confederate  fortified  position  in  the 
edge  of  the  forest  skirting  the  southwest  part  of  Prairie 
d'Ane.  General  Price,  who  had  concentrated  his  avail 
able  forces  behind  his  works,  and  who  commanded  in 
person,  declined  to  be  drawn  outside  of  them  to  accept 
the  gage  of  battle  offered  by  General  Steele.  Part  of 
General  Rice's  brigade  drew  the  fire  of  the  Confederate 
artillery;  but  after  some  movements  on  the  field  in  front 
of  the  Confederate  works,  to  ascertain  their  position,  it 
was  too  late  to  make  an  assault  that  evening,  and  General 
Steele's  troops  were  withdrawn  after  dark  to  very  nearly 
the  position  they  had  occupied  the  night  before.  The 
Confederates  had  taken  up  a  strong  defensive  position. 
They  had  rifle-pits  nearly  a  mile  in  length,  with  posi 
tions  for  artillery,  and  on  the  flanks  they  had  made  breast 
works  of  logs  and  felled  trees  nearly  a  mile  in  length, 
which  would  have  been  a  great  protection  in  an  assault. 

Having  by  his  reconnoissance  in  force  ascertained  the 
position  of  the  rifle-pits  and  breastworks  behind  which 
the  Confederate  troops  had  been  forced  to  retire,  General 
Steele  ordered  another  advance  of  the  three  divisions  of 
his  army  early  on  the  morning  of  the  I2th,  with  the  view 


272  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

of  attacking  Price  in  his  works.  In  this  movement,  Gen 
eral  Rice's  brigade  on  the  right,  Colonel  Engelmann's 
brigade  on  the  left,  with  General  Carr's  cavalry  on  either 
flank,  formed  General  Steele's  line  of  battle.  The  Fron 
tier  Division,  under  General  Thayer,  formed  the  reserve 
of  the  army.  With  colors  flying,  and  with  the  batteries 
of  the  different  brigades  in  proper  positions,  the  troops 
moved  forward  over  the  beautiful  prairie,  breathing  valor 
all,  with  the  determination  of  carrying  the  fortifications 
of  the  enemy  by  assault.  When  the  movement  com 
menced,  a  heavy  line  of  skirmishers,  consisting  of  one  or 
two  companies  from  each  regiment,  covered  the  advance 
of  each  brigade,  and  soon  came  upon  the  Confederate 
line  of  skirmishers  and  steadily  drove  them  back  to  their 
intrenchments,  when  they  disappeared.  The  Federal 
line  continued  to  advance  until  the  troops  came  in  sight 
of  the  Confederate  works,  when  General  Steele,  with 
Rice's  brigade  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  turned  Price's 
left  flank,  and  without  resistance  he  abandoned  his  forti 
fications  and  fell  back  to  within  eight  miles  of  Washing 
ton.  He  was  still  under  the  impression  that  Steele  desired 
to  reach  that  point,  and  to  conceal  his  real  movement  as 
long  as  possible,  Steele  sent  part  of  his  cavalry  several 
miles  in  pursuit  of  the  retreating  Confederates,  while  with 
the  rest  of  his  army  he  turned  to  the  left  and  marched 
for  Camden  as  rapidly  as  practicable,  General  Carr,  with 
a  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Colonel  Ritter,  taking  the 
advance. 

The  road  General  Steele  was  moving  on  intersected 
the  Washington  and  Camden  road  on  the  prairie  in  front 
of  the  intrenchments,  so  that  his  troops  and  trains  on 
coming  to  the  junctions  of  those  roads  took  the  left-hand 
road  to  Camden,  the  head  of  his  column  encamping  on 
Terre  Rouge  Creek  that  night.  The  recent  heavy  rains 
having  made  the  road  crossing  the  bottom  of  this  stream 
impassable  for  the  trains  and  artillery,  the  pioneer  corps, 


THE   CAM  DEN  EXPEDITION.  2?$ 

under  Captain  J.  B.  Wheeler,  Chief  Engineer,  was  sent 
forward  with  heavy  details  to  repair  it.  As  long  stretches 
of  the  road  had  to  be  corduroyed  and  bridges  repaired, 
much  time  was  expended  in  collecting  rails  and  timber 
for  the  purpose,  so  that  the  movement  of  the  army  was 
delayed  until  noon  the  next  day.  On  the  morning  of  the 
1 3th,  General  Price  was  informed  that,  instead  of  pursuing 
him  vigorously  after  he  was  manoeuvred  out  of  his  in- 
trenchments  at  Prairie  d'Ane,  the  Federal  forces  had 
turned  to  the  left  and  were  marching  rapidly  for  Camden. 
There  were  three  roads  leading  from  Washington  to  Cam- 
den,  the  most  northern  of  which  the  Federal  forces  were 
marching  on.  When,  therefore,  Price  found  that  he  had 
been  deceived  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  Federal  com 
mander,  he  sent  forward  most  of  his  cavalry  and  some 
light  batteries,  under  General  Marmaduke,  on  the  middle 
Camden  road,  to  get  in  front  of  the  Federal  forces  and 
contest  their  advance  on  Camden,  while  he  took  the 
divisions  of  Maxey  and  Fagan  and  moved  forward  rapidly 
and  attacked  General  Steele's  rear  under  General  Thayer, 
commanding  the  Frontier  Division,  near  the  little  village 
of  Moscow  on  the  south  side  of  Prairie  d'Ane. 

General  Dockery  came  upon  and  attacked  and  drove  in 
General  Thayer's  outposts  about  one  o'clock  on  the  I3th, 
while  General  Steele's  Third  Division  was  crossing  the 
Terre  Rouge  Creek  bottom.  The  Frontier  Division  had 
encamped  in  the  timber  near  the  prairie,  and  the  teams 
of  the  trains  were  hitched  up  and  the  troops  in  readiness 
to  move  when  the  attack  was  made.  The  Confederates 
advanced  over  the  prairie  and  deployed  to  the  right 
and  left  of  the  road  in  such  large  numbers  that  General 
Thayer  saw  that  he  must  make  disposition  of  his  troops 
at  once  for  battle.  He  had  hardly  completed  the  forma 
tion  of  his  line  and  placed  his  batteries  in  position,  with 
his  cavalry  on  his  flanks,  when  Price  opened  with  his 
artillery  and  threw  forward  a  brigade  under  Dockery, 


VOL.    II.  — 17 


274  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

which  made  a  furious  charge  in  the  direction  of  the 
Second  Indiana  Battery  with  the  intention  of  taking  it. 
When  this  charging  force  came  up  within  range,  the  Fed 
eral  infantry  poured  several  volleys  of  musketry  into  their 
ranks,  with  fatal  precision,  and  the  twelve  guns  in  the 
batteries  of  Thayer's  division  also  swept  their  ranks  and 
the  field  in  front  with  a  storm  of  grape  and  canister, 
causing  them  to  retire  hastily  with  a  heavy  loss  of  killed 
and  wounded.  There  was  an  almost  incessant  roar  from 
the  artillery  firing  from  one  until  five  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon,  with  several  sharp  conflicts  with  small-arms  between 
the  opposing  forces,  when  the  Confederates  were  driven 
from  the  field  and  pursued  about  three  miles.  In  this 
action  the  Second  Indiana  Battery  fired  210  solid  shot 
and  shell,  besides  a  number  of  rounds  of  grape  and 
canister. 

When  General  Thayer's  troops  returned  from  the  pur 
suit  that  evening,  his  division  resumed  the  march  and 
marched  all  that  night  through  the  swamp  and  over  the 
terrible  road  across  the  Terre  Rouge  bottom.  Although 
the  road  had  been  repaired  and  corduroyed  across  most 
of  this  bottom,  there  were  places  in  it  where  the  rails 
and  timber  laid  down  had  sunk  out  of  sight  in  the  mud 
from  the  weight  of  the  loaded  wagons  of  the  trains  and 
the  artillery  which  had  already  passed  over  it.  While 
the  troops  and  trains  of  the  Frontier  Division  were  floun 
dering  in  the  swamps  and  mud  of  Terre  Rouge  bottom, 
General  Steele's  advance  was  delayed  at  Cypress  Bayou 
until  the  pioneer  corps  could  repair  several  bridges  and 
corduroy  the  road  in  places  across  the  low  bottom-land  of 
that  stream.  Having  received  information  on  the  I4th 
that  a  large  Confederate  force  of  cavalry  and  artillery 
was  marching  on  the  middle  Washington  and  Camden 
road  to  get  in  his  front  at  the  junction  of  that  road  with 
the  one  he  was  moving  on,  General  Steele  sent  forward 
part  of  his  cavalry  under  General  Carr,  and  a  brigade  of 


THE   CAMDEN  EXPEDITION.  275 

infantry  and  Battery  E,  Second  Missouri  Light  Artillery, 
under  General  Rice,  to  reach  the  junction  of  the  roads, 
fourteen  miles  northwest  of  Camden,  if  practicable,  before 
the  enemy.  This  force  marched  to  White  Oak  Creek 
that  evening  and  encamped  that  night.  On  arriving  at 
that  point,  General  Carr  sent  forward  250  cavalry  to 
make  a  reconr  oissance  to  the  junction  of  the  roads,  four 
miles  farther  on,  and  250  cavalry  to  make  a  reconnoissance 
to  the  middle  Washington  and  Camden  road  by  turning 
to  the  right  on  a  cross-road  a  mile  or  so  in  advance. 
These  detachments  of  Federal  cavalry  met  and  skirmished 
with  the  Confederate  cavalry  after  dark,  killing  one  and 
wounding  and  capturing  two  men  who  belonged  to  Mar- 
maduke's  command.  From  these  prisoners  it  was  ascer 
tained  that  Shelby's  and  Greene's  brigades  had  arrived  at 
the  junction  of  the  northern  and  middle  Washington  and 
Camden  roads  that  evening,  and  were  prepared  to  oppose 
the  Federal  advance. 

The  next  morning,  the  1 5th,  Steele's  advance,  under 
Generals  Carr  and  Rice,  marched  only  a  few  miles  when 
they  met  the  Confederate  skirmishers  near  the  junction 
of  the  northern  and  middle  Washington  and  Camden 
roads,  and  drove  them  nearly  two  miles,  when  they  joined 
Marmaduke,  who  had  formed  two  brigades  on  each  side 
of  the  road,  and  who  at  once  had  five  pieces  of  his  artil 
lery  open  fire  upon  the  Federal  advance.  General  Carr 
had  been  using  his  mountain  howitzers  to  drive  the  Con 
federate  skirmishers  from  several  positions,  but  when  the 
Confederate  field-guns  opened  upon  him,  Captain  Stange's 
battery,  Second  Missouri  Light  Artillery,  under  Lieuten 
ant  Peetz  of  General  Rice's  brigade,  was  brought  to  the 
front,  supported  by  the  Twenty-ninth  Iowa  on  the  left, 
and  Thirty-third  Iowa  Infantry  on  the  right,  and  replied 
very  effectively  to  the  Confederate  guns. 

When  the  cannonading  had  lasted  nearly  two  hours, 
with  some  skirmishing  with  small-arms,  General  Rice  or- 


2/6  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

dered  Colonel  Salomon,  commanding  the  Ninth  Wisconsin 
Infantry,  to  turn  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  the  nature  of 
the  ground  not  admitting  of  the  formation  of  cavalry  on 
that  part  of  the  field.  While  this  movement  was  being 
made,  Marmaduke  withdrew  his  battery  and  fell  back  in 
the  direction  of  Camden,  closely  pursued  by  the  Federal 
forces,  making  only  a  few  feeble  efforts  to  check  their 
advance.  He  was  pushed  so  closely  by  Generals  Rice 
and  Carr  that  when  within  three  miles  of  Camden  he 
turned  to  the  right  and  moved  over  on  to  the  lower  Wash 
ington  and  Camden  road,  leaving  one  regiment  under 
Colonel  Lawther  to  skirmish  with  the  Federal  advance 
into  the  city.  Generals  Carr  and  Rice  marched  into  Cam 
den  before  dark,  with  their  commands;  but  the  last  of 
the  troops  and  the  trains  of  the  Third  Division  did  not 
get  in  until  nearly  midnight,  and  General  Thayer's  Fron 
tier  Division  did  not  enter  the  city  until  the  next  day. 

At  that  time  Camden  was  the  second  town  in  population 
and  in  importance  in  the  State,  and,  until  the  near  ap 
proach  of  General  Steele's  army,  had  been  the  headquar 
ters  of  General  Price,  commanding  the  Confederate  forces 
in  the  District  of  Arkansas.  It  was  a  beautiful  little 
place,  situated  on  high  ground  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
Washita  River,  which  was  navigable  for  good-sized  steam 
boats  to  that  point  the  greater  part  of  the  year.  It  had 
for  several  months  been  the  base  of  supplies  for  the 
Southern  forces  in  all  that  section,  and  the  Confederate 
authorities  had  constructed  nine  forts  for  the  defence  of 
the  place  at  a  great  cost  of  money  and  labor.  General 
Steele  had  executed  a  brilliant  movement,  for  in  manoeu 
vring  Price  out  of  his  intrenchments  at  Prairie  d'Ane, 
he  also  manoeuvred  him  out  of  his  strong  fortifications  at 
Camden,  and  took  the  place  without  a  general  battle. 
When  Price  saw  that  he  had  been  outgeneralled,  he  made 
every  possible  effort,  by  attacking  the  Federal  forces  in 
rear  and  front,  to  detain  them  until  he  could  hurry  his 


THE   CAMDEN  EXPEDITION. 


277 


mounted  infantry  and  artillery  over  the  lower  Washing 
ton  and  Camden  road,  and  get  to  Camden  and  reoccupy 
the  works  before  the  arrival  of  his  adversary.  But  his 
interposing  force  was  unable  to  check  the  Federal  advance 
more  than  a  few  hours. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THE   BATTLE    OF   POISON   SPRING,    ARKANSAS. 

ON  General  Steele's  arrival  at  Camden,  information 
had  been  received  there  by  telegraphic  despatches  that 
General  Banks  had  been  defeated  above  Natchitoches 
and  obliged  to  fall  back  in  the  direction  of  Grand  Ecore 
and  Alexandria.  This  information  by  telegraph,  which 
had  come  through  Southern  sources,  was  soon  confirmed 
by  the  return  and  report  of  one  of  General  Steele's  spies, 
who  had  been  sent  to  communicate  with  General  Banks. 
A  day  or  so  later  an  officer  on  the  staff  of  General  Banks 
arrived  with  despatches  confirming  the  reports  of  his  de 
feat,  and  that  he  was  falling  back  to  Alexandria.  When 
it  was  definitely  known  that  Banks  had  been  defeated 
and  was  falling  back,  General  Steele  saw  that  it  was  use 
less  for  him  to  advance  any  farther  in  the  direction  of 
Red  River.  His  column  was  a  cooperating  one,  and  the 
point  upon  which  the  several  columns  were  converging 
was  now  a  point  from  which  the  other  columns  were  re 
treating.  At  that  time  there  were  twenty-four  feet  of 
water  in  the  channel  of  the  Washita  River  at  Camden, 
and  General  Steele  thought  that  he  might  make  that 
place  his  base  of  supplies  if  he  could  get  a  gunboat  to 
convoy  steamers  up  the  river.  But  a  crisis  was  rapidly 
approaching  when  he  must  either  get  supplies  up  the 
Washita,  or  fall  back  with  his  army  to  Little  Rock  or 
Pine  Bluff  on  the  Arkansas  River.  Already  there  were 

2/3 


BATTLE    OF  POISON  SPRING.  279 

rumors  that  General  E.  Kirby  Smith  had  promised  to 
send  General  Price  eight  thousand  infantry  and  the 
complement  of  artillery  from  the  troops  who  had  been 
operating  against  General  Banks  in  Louisiana.  In  the 
march  from  Little  Rock  to  Camden,  General  Steele  found 
that  the  country  had  been  nearly  exhausted  of  supplies 
by  the  Confederate  troops  during  the  past  winter  and 
spring,  and  that  they  had  destroyed  all  the  forage  on  the 
Federal  line  of  march,  as  far  as  practicable,  which  they 
could  not  use  or  take  away.  His  troops  had  been  on 
half  rations  of  bread  since  he  started  out  upon  the  expe 
dition,  and  less  than  that  proportion  of  the  meat  ration 
had  been  issued  to  them.  His  cavalry,  artillery,  and 
transportation  animals,  numbering  as  many  as  ten  thou 
sand,  required  a  large  amount  of  forage,  and  on  account 
of  the  short  ration  and  hard  service  imposed  upon  them, 
many  of  them  were  daily  becoming  unserviceable.  In 
deed,  the  bread  ration  was  so  nearly  exhausted  that  a 
part  of  the  corn  ration  for  the  animals  was  turned  over  to 
the  commissary  department  to  be  ground  into  meal  for 
the  troops.  As  the  Confederates  were  driven  back  they 
destroyed  nearly  all  the  best  mills  in  that  section,  to  pre 
vent  the  Federal  troops  from  using  them,  so  that  most  of 
the  meal  made  had  to  be  ground  by  the  soldiers  with 
hand-mills.  The  large  steamer  Homer,  with  a  cargo  of 
four  thousand  bushels  of  corn,  was  captured  by  General 
Steele's  cavalry,  under  Colonel  Ritter,  on  the  Washita, 
thirty  miles  below  Camden,  on  the  night  of  the  i6th,  and 
brought  back  up  the  river  to  the  city  and  unloaded,  and 
the  corn  issued  to  the  army,  relieving  the  present  situation. 
There  were  a  few  Union  people  in  Camden,  and  they 
reported  to  Captain  C.  A.  Henry,  chief  quartermaster  of 
the  expedition,  how  much  corn  they  could  spare,  and  he 
purchased  it  and  paid  them  for  it.  He  also  ascertained 
that  there  were  considerable  quantities  of  corn  at  a  num 
ber  of  plantations  in  the  vicinity  of  Camden,  and  made 


280  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

arrangements  to  secure  it.  In  that  section  very  few  of 
the  slaves  had  left  their  masters  on  the  arrival  of  the 
Federal  troops,  and  the  last  year  the  planters  and  small 
farmers  had  raised  an  increased  acreage  of  corn,  and  a 
decreased  acreage  of  cotton,  for  the  demand  for  corn  to 
supply  subsistence  and  forage  for  the  Southern  army  and 
for  home  consumption  had  increased,  while  the  market 
for  cotton  had  become  more  uncertain. 

The  Confederate  officers  had  made  it  a  point  to  use  up 
and  destroy  the  forage  in  the  disputed  territory  occupied 
by  the  outposts  of  the  two  armies  between  Arkadelphia 
and  Little  Rock,  up  to  the  time  General  Steele's  expedi 
tion  started  out,  and  had  drawn  as  sparingly  as  possible 
on  the  supplies  of  the  citizens  in  the  vicinity  of  Camden. 
When  the  people  found  that  the  Confederates  were  burn 
ing  the  forage  likely  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Federal 
troops,  a  good  many  of  them  endeavored  to  secrete  their 
corn.  In  the  advance  on  Camden,  Captain  Henry  had 
ascertained  that  there  was  a  large  amount  of  corn,  esti 
mated  at  from  four  to  five  thousand  bushels,  at  several 
plantations  near  the  road  on  which  the  Federal  troops 
had  passed,  out  about  eighteen  miles,  and  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  i/th  made  up  a  train  of  198  wagons,  and  asked 
for  an  escort  for  it  of  a  regiment  each  of  cavalry  and  in 
fantry,  and  a  section  of  artillery,  to  send  out  and  get  this 
forage.  General  Thayer  was  instructed  to  detail  troops 
from  his  division  for  the  escort.  He  directed  Colonel 
James  M.  Williams,  First  Kansas  Colored  Infantry,  to 
take  command  of  the  escort,  which  consisted  of  the 
Colonel's  own  regiment,  under  Major  Richard  G.  Ward, 
195  cavalry  of  the  Second,  Sixth,  and  Fourteenth  Kan 
sas  Regiments,  and  two  pieces  of  the  Second  Indiana 
Battery,  under  Lieutenant  William  W.  Haines — in  all, 
695  men.  Although  the  road  near  which  the  forage 
would  be  found  was  the  one  over  which  the  Federal 
troops  had  just  passed,  it  was  by  no  means  the  rear  of 


BATTLE   OF  POISON  SPRING.  28 1 

the  army — was,  in  fact,  as  much  the  front  as  the  rear. 
It  was  contrary  to  the  general  policy  of  military  com 
manders  to  forage  to  the  front.  But  in  the  face  of  this 
sound  military  maxim,  the  train  and  escort  were  sent  out, 
and  upwards  of  one  hundred  of  the  wagons  loaded  with 
corn  that  evening  and  during  the  early  part  of  the  night. 

The  next  morning  details  were  sent  out  with  teams, 
and  the  empty  wagons  were  to  be  loaded  with  forage 
from  plantations  on  either  flank,  with  instructions  to  join 
the  loaded  part  of  the  train  en  route  to  Camden.  The 
balance  of  the  troops  of  the  escort  and  the  loaded  part  of 
the  train  were  at  once  put  in  motion  on  the  road  to  Cam- 
den,  and  about  four  miles  east  of  the  point  where  they 
had  encamped  during  the  night,  near  Poison  Spring,  met 
a  reinforcement,  under  Captain  William  M.  Duncan,  of 
383  men  of  the  Eighteenth  Iowa  Infantry,  90  cavalry  of 
the  Second,  Sixth,  and  Fourteenth  Kansas  Regiments, 
and  two  twelve-pounder  mountain  howitzers  attached  to 
the  Sixth  Kansas,  under  Lieutenant  A.  J.  Walker  of  that 
regiment.  This  reinforcement  halted  until  the  train 
passed  and  then  became  a  part  of  the  rear-guard.  About 
a  mile  east  of  this  point  the  advance-guard  came  up  to 
and  fired  upon  the  Confederate  picket  in  the  road  and 
pursued  it  nearly  a  mile,  when  it  joined  the  Confederate 
line  of  skirmishers  which  occupied  a  good  position  in  the 
pine  woods  on  each  side  of  the  Camden  road. 

When  the  Federal  train  and  escort  left  Camden,  Gen 
eral  Price's  headquarters  were  at  Woodlawn,  sixteen 
miles  southwest,  and  about  ten  miles  southeast  of  the 
place  where  Colonel  Williams  encamped  that  night. 
The  Confederate  scouts  had  watched  the  movement  of 
the  train  and  escort  from  the  moment  they  left  Camden 
until  they  went  into  camp  that  night,  and  knew  the 
number  of  wagons  in  the  train  and  approximately  the  num 
ber  of  troops  in  the  escort,  and  reported  all  this  to  Gen 
eral  Marmaduke  near  Woodlawn  that  evening.  Later  in 


282  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

the  evening  these  scouts  also  reported  to  General  Mar- 
maduke  the  advance  of  the  troops  under  Captain  Duncan 
which  left  Camden  in  the  afternoon  of  the  day  the  train 
and  escort  left  there  in  the  morning  to  reinforce  Colonel 
Williams.  With  this  information  it  was  determined  that 
night  by  General  Marmaduke  to  make  an  effort  to  cap 
ture  the  train,  and  preparations  were  made  to  start  early 
the  next  morning  with  picked  men  from  three  divisions — 
the  divisions  of  Marmaduke,  Cabell,  and  Maxey,  with 
a  four-gun  battery  to  each  division — the  whole  force  of 
thirty-seven  hundred  men  and  twelve  pieces  of  artillery 
to  be  under  the  command  of  General  S.  B.  Maxey,  the 
senior  officer  of  the  three  brigadier-generals  who  were 
to  direct  the  movements  of  the  troops.  In  the  plan  of 
attack,  Marmaduke's  division  was  to  form  on  the  right, 
with  a  battery  near  his  centre;  Cabell's  division  in  the 
centre,  with  a  battery  near  his  centre;  and  Maxey's 
division  of  Texans  and  Indians  on  the  left  of  the  Con 
federate  line,  with  a  battery  near  his  centre.  In  taking 
their  positions  on  the  field,  Marmaduke's  and  Cabell's 
lines  faced  west,  covering  the  Federal  front,  and  Maxey's 
line  faced  north,  covering  the  Federal  right. 

Of  course,  when  his  advance-guard  fired  upon  and  drove 
in  the  Confederate  picket,  Colonel  Williams  knew  nothing 
about  these  dispositions  of  the  Confederate  troops  in  his 
front  and  on  his  flanks,  nor  of  the  strength  of  the  force 
confronting  him.  But  from  what  he  saw  of  the  move 
ments  and  boldness  of  the  Confederate  skirmish-line,  he 
suspected  that  the  situation  might  be  a  serious  one,  and 
one  that  demanded  of  him  extreme  caution.  Up  to  that 
moment  it  was  thought  that  if  an  attack  should  be  made 
on  the  train,  it  would  more  likely  be  made  on  the  rear 
than  in  front,  and  in  consequence  most  of  his  troops  who 
were  not  out  with  his  forage  details  were  in  the  rear  of 
the  train.  He  ordered  the  train  halted  and  parked,  and 
forming  in  line  the  small  force  of  his  cavalry  advance, 


BATTLE   OF  POISON  SPRING.  283 

directed  Lieutenant  Haines,  commanding  the  section  of 
the  battery,  to  open  fire  upon  the  Confederate  position 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  the  enemy  had 
artillery,  and  that  the  sound  of  the  artillery  firing  might 
warn  his  forage  details  which  were  out  to  come  in.  The 
fire  of  his  two  guns  did  not  have  the  effect  of  at  once 
drawing  a  response  from  the  Confederate  artillery,  but 
the  Confederate  skirmishers  opened  a  brisk  fire  of  mus 
ketry  at  long  range,  doing  very  little  damage. 

The  moment  the  Confederate  skirmish-line  was  ob 
served,  Colonel  Williams  ordered  his  colored  infantry, 
under  Major  Ward,  to  the  front.  As  they  came  up  they 
formed  in  line  on  each  side  of  the  road  at  the  top  of  a 
hill,  the  right  of  the  line  overlooking  the  north  end  of 
a  field  which  was  a  hundred  yards  or  so  in  front.  The 
field  may  have  had  twenty  to  thirty  acres  in  it,  and  the 
north  end  of  it  was  about  two  hundred  yards  south  of 
the  Camden  road.  Nearly  all  the  high  ground  in  that 
section  not  in  cultivation  was  covered  with  pine  timber, 
and  in  some  places  with  a  young  growth  of  pine,  making 
it  impossible  to  see  objects  more  than  a  hundred  yards  or 
so  in  front. 

While  the  Confederate  commander  was  making  dis 
position  of  his  troops  on  his  left,  most  of  Colonel  Wil 
liams'  forage  details  which  were  out,  on  hearing  the 
cannonading  of  the  first  skirmish,  hastily  came  in,  and 
Lieutenant  Robert  Henderson,  of  the  Sixth  Kansas,  who 
had  been  out  with  a  train  of  eighteen  wagons,  on  return 
ing  turned  them  over  to  the  quartermaster,  and  then 
marched  to  the  front  and  reported.  Colonel  Williams 
had  just  noticed  through  openings  in  the  pine  woods  a 
movement  of  Confederate  infantry  towards  his  right ; 
but,  still  desiring  to  know  the  nature  of  the  force  in  his 
front,  sent  forward  from  his  right  Lieutenants  Henderson 
and  Mitchell  with  their  cavalry,  with  instructions  to  press 
the  Confederate  line,  and  if  possible  ascertain  the  position 


284  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

and  strength  of  the  enemy.  While  moving  along  the 
north  end  of  the  field  in  the  pine  woods  between  the  field 
and  road,  and  just  as  it  was  nearing  the  northeast  corner, 
this  cavalry  received  a  heavy  volley  of  musketry  from  the 
enemy  posted  in  the  brush  in  front,  wounding  Lieuten 
ant  Henderson  severely,  who  was  held  on  his  horse  and 
taken  to  the  rear.  On  returning  the  fire  with  their  car 
bines  this  cavalry  was  driven  back  upon  the  line  of 
colored  infantry,  and  were  then  ordered  to  take  a  posi 
tion  on  the  extreme  right  of  that  regiment.  On  bringing 
up  the  colored  infantry,  a  skirmish-line  was  thrown  for 
ward  about  a  hundred  yards  in  front,  covering  the  left 
wing.  This  skirmish-line  was  kept  out  upwards  of  half 
an  hour,  exchanging  shots  with  the  Confederate  skir 
mishers,  and  was  called  in  only  when  it  was  evident  that 
the  Confederate  infantry  were  on  the  point  of  advancing 
against  the  Federal  right. 

In  a  short  time  after  the  cavalry  under  Lieutenants 
Henderson  and  Mitchell  were  driven  in  on  the  Federal 
right,  the  batteries  of  Marmaduke's  and  Cabell's  divisions 
in  the  Federal  front,  and  the  battery  of  Maxey's  division 
on  the  right  of  the  Federal  position,  opened  a  heavy 
cross-fire  of  shot  and  shell  upon  the  Federal  line,  lasting 
perhaps  for  half  an  hour.  During  this  heavy  cannon 
ade,  Major  Ward  ordered  his  men  to  lie  down  on  the 
ground  just  behind  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and  though 
exposed  to  the  storm  of  shot  and  shell  from  this  terrible 
cross-fire,  his  line  suffered  very  few  casualties.  This  was 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  pine  woods  concealed  the  exact 
location  of  his  line  from  the  view  of  the  Confederate  artil 
lery  officers.  In  the  course  of  this  fierce  artillery  contest, 
a  piece  of  shell  struck  one  of  the  colored  infantry  between 
the  shoulders,  and  he  jumped  up  and  spun  around  for  a 
moment  in  great  agony.  A  mounted  Confederate  officer 
near  his  battery  in  front,  through  an  opening  in  the 
woods,  saw  the  wounded  soldier  jump  up,  disclosing 


BATTLE   OF  POISON  SPRING.  285 

the  position  of  the  Federal  line,  and  at  once  turned  his 
guns  in  that  direction  and  swept  nearly  every  foot  of  the 
ground  a  few  paces  in  front  of  the  colored  infantry  with 
a  storm  of  shot  and  shell.  Colonel  Williams  sat  on  his 
horse  a  few  paces  in  the  rear  of  his  line  with  his  field-glass 
in  his  hands,  looking  through  it  and  carefully  watching 
every  movement  of  the  enemy  as  far  as  could  be  seen 
through  the  openings  in  the  woods,  and  while  a  storm  of 
shot  and  bursting  shell  were  flying  thickly  around  him, 
cautioned  his  men  to  keep  their  eyes  to  the  front.  Even 
before  the  Confederate  battery  had  opened  fire  on  his 
right,  he  had  noticed  through  openings  in  the  pine  forest 
heavy  masses  of  Confederate  infantry  moving  to  his  right, 
and,  feeling  satisfied  that  he  would  soon  be  attacked  from 
that  quarter,  directed  Major  Ward  to  form  the  right  wing 
of  his  regiment  facing  south.  To  guard  against  a  flank 
ing  movement  on  his  left  front,  Lieutenant  Josephus  Utt 
was  posted  on  his  extreme  left,  with  seventy-five  men  of 
the  Fourteenth  Kansas  Cavalry.  Captain  Duncan,  com 
manding  the  rear-guard  of  the  train,  when  it  was  found 
that  the  enemy  were  advancing  against  the  Federal  front 
and  right  flank,  formed  his  men  of  the  Eighteenth  Iowa 
Infantry  in  line  south  of  the  road,  facing  southeast,  with 
the  section  of  howitzers,  under  Lieutenant  Walker,  and 
the  cavalry,  under  Lieutenant  R.  L.  Phillips,  Sixth  Kan 
sas,  on  his  right. 

When  the  Confederate  artillery  ceased  firing,  the  Con 
federate  infantry  advanced  through  the  pine  woods  on 
the  left  and  right  of  the  road  in  front,  through  the  field 
south  of  the  road,  and  through  the  brush  southwest  of 
the  field,  and  came  up  at  a  trail-arms  within  one  hundred 
yards  of  the  Federal  line,  when  Major  Ward  gave  the 
order  and  the  colored  infantry  rose  from  the  ground  and 
commenced  firing  from  the  right  of  each  wing,  and  then 
along  the  entire  line,  and  kept  it  up,  firing  four  or  five 
volleys,  using  buck  and  ball,  until  the  Confederates  re- 


286  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

tired  out  of  range,  having  also  fired  several  volleys. 
Generals  Cabell  and  Marmaduke  in  front,  and  General 
Maxey  on  the  Federal  right,  re-formed  and  reinforced 
their  assaulting  columns,  and  in  a  few  moments  moved 
forward  in  another  charge,  coming  up  within  seventy-five 
yards  of  the  line  of  colored  infantry,  when  a  fierce  con 
flict  with  small-arms  took  place  between  the  opposing 
lines,  lasting  perhaps  twenty  minutes,  when  the  Confed 
erates  again  retired  out  of  range.  In  this  second  assault 
the  men  of  the  opposing  lines  were  near  enough  to  hear 
each  other  talking,  and  part  of  General  Maxey's  line  on 
the  Federal  right  introduced  themselves  as  the  Twenty- 
ninth  Texas,  and  called  out,  "  You  First  Nigger,  now 
buck  to  the  Twenty-ninth  Texas."  The  Twenty-ninth 
Texas  and  the  First  Kansas  Colored  Infantry  were  op 
posed  to  each  other  in  the  battle  of  Honey  Springs, 
Indian  Territory,  and  in  that  fight  the  Texans  were 
driven  off  the  field  in  much  confusion  and  with  a  heavy 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded.  After  the  charge,  Colonel 
Williams  saw  from  the  overwhelming  forces  hurled  against 
him,  supported  by  twelve  pieces  of  artillery  posted  so  as 
to  cross-fire  his  position,  that  there  was  no  reasonable 
prospect  of  defeating  the  enemy;  but  he  determined  to 
defend  the  train  as  long  as  possible,  hoping  that  the  roar 
of  the  battle  would  bring  out  reinforcements  from  Cam- 
den  to  his  assistance.  He  kept  the  section  of  the  Second 
Indiana  Battery  steadily  at  work  on  the  Confederate 
positions  in  his  front  and  on  his  right  from  the  first  skir 
mish,  now  nearly  two  hours,  and  he  did  not  doubt  but 
that  this  continuous  cannonading  would  notify  the  offi 
cers  and  troops  at  Camden,  ten  miles  distant,  that  he  was 
heavily  engaged. 

In  order  to  strengthen  his  left  centre,  which  had  twice 
been  driven  back,  General  Maxey  ordered  Greene's  bri 
gade  of  Marmaduke's  division  on  the  right  to  take  position 
in  the  centre  between  Maxey's  and  Cabell's  divisions,  and 


I. 


BATTLE    OF  POISOI?  SPRING.  28? 

then  the  Confederate  forces  moved  forward,  four  lines 
deep,  in  a  third  charge,  their  continuous  shouting  at 
times  rising  above  the  roar  of  musketry.  They  were 
permitted  to  approach  within  easy  musket  range,  when 
Major  Ward  ordered  his  men  to  open  fire  upon  them,  to 
which  the  Confederates  replied  with  vigor,  but  were  again 
obliged  to  retire  out  of  range  after  a  sharp  conflict  of 
fifteen  to  twenty  minutes.  Every  time  the  Confederate 
infantry  retired  out  of  range  to  lower  ground,  the  Con 
federate  batteries,  from  elevated  positions,  firing  over 
their  heads,  cross-fired  the  Federal  position  with  a  perfect 
storm  of  shot  and  shell.  Just  at  the  close  of  the  third 
assault  the  two  pieces  of  the  Second  Indiana  Battery 
having  nearly  exhausted  their  shell  and  canister,  and 
nearly  all  the  gunners  of  the  right  piece  being  wounded 
and  disabled,  Lieutenant  Haines  was  ordered  to  report 
with  that  piece  to  Captain  Duncan,  commanding  the  rear 
guard,  and  number  one  on  the  left  was  limbered  towards 
the  rear  on  the  north  side  of  the  road. 

In  the  three  desperate  assaults  which  the  enemy  had 
made  on  his  lines,  Colonel  Williams  saw  that  his  right 
and  front  had  suffered  so  heavily  in  killed  and  wounded 
that  he  could  not  sustain  another  charge,  for  which  the 
Confederates  were  preparing,  without  too  great  a  sacri 
fice,  and  started  to  ride  to  the  rear  to  form  the  Eighteenth 
Iowa  in  a  favorable  position  for  the  colored  infantry  to 
fall  back  upon,  when  his  horse  was  shot  under  him. 
Major  Ward  immediately  gave  him  his  horse,  and  he 
mounted  it  and  rode  back  and  formed  the  Eighteenth 
Iowa  in  line  facing  in  the  direction  from  which  the  enemy 
were  advancing;  but  he  had  hardly  completed  this  duty 
when  the  Confederates  made  their  fourth  charge,  forcing 
the  line  of  colored  infantry,  which  from  the  first  assault 
had  been  a  curved  line,  with  the  centre  of  the  curve  out 
ward,  back  about  one  hundred  yards,  close  upon  the  train. 
At  this  time  the  smoke  was  so  dense  along  the  line  of 


288  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE   BORDER. 

battle  that  the  troops  could  see  each  other  distinctly  only 
a  few  yards  distant,  making  it  difficult  to  keep  a  perfect 
alignment.  Two  companies  of  the  colored  regiment 
which  had  at  first  formed  the  left  of  the  left  wing,  under 
Lieutenant  W.  C.  Gibbons,  on  the  north  side  of  the 
road,  on  retiring  on  that  side  of  the  road  became  sepa 
rated  from  the  other  companies  by  the  train,  which  was 
now  between  them.  But  as  the  Confederates  were  also 
pressing  forward  on  the  Federal  left,  Lieutenant  Gibbons 
had  all  he  could  do  to  keep  them  off  until  his  men  joined 
their  comrades  north  of  the  road  near  the  rear  of  the  train. 
Early  in  the  action  Colonel  Williams  was  convinced 
from  the  movements  of  the  Confederates  and  from  in 
formation  obtained  from  a  Confederate  soldier,  who  rode 
into  his  line  inquiring  for  Colonel  De  Morse,  that  their 
main  attack  was  going  to  be  directed  against  his  front 
and  right  flank,  and,  to  strengthen  this  part  of  his  line, 
and  to  be  prepared  for  the  charge  which  he  knew  was 
coming,  ordered  up  from  the  rear  four  companies  of 
the  Eighteenth  Iowa.  In  the  meantime  Colonel  Tandy 
Walker's  Choctaw  Indian  Brigade  had  formed  in  line  on 
General  Maxey's  left  about  half  a  mile  south  of  the  rear 
of  the  train,  on  Captain  Duncan's  right  when  his  line 
faced  east,  but  directly  in  his  front  when  he  changed  his 
line  facing  south,  and  in  view  of  the  situation  he  sent  a 
message  to  Colonel  Williams,  stating  that  he  was  so 
closely  pressed  by  the  enemy  that  he  could  not  spare  the 
men  called  for.  Though  Captain  Duncan  was  threatened 
by  this  Indian  brigade  in  his  front  while  the  desperate 
conflict  was  going  on  in  front  and  on  the  right  of  the 
train,  his  command  did  not  become  heavily  engaged  until 
the  line  of  colored  infantry  was  broken,  and  the  retreat 
had  commenced.  After  the  line  of  colored  infantry  was 
forced  back  in  the  fourth  assault,  the  Confederate  com 
mander  rapidly  drew  his  lines  closer  around  the  Federal 
position,  and  his  troops,  seeing  that  success  was  assured, 


k 

K 

•2 


BATTLE   OF  POISON  SPRING.  289 

went  into  the  closing  scenes  of  the  fight  with  a  wild 
hurrah,  shooting  down  the  colored  wounded  soldiers  as 
they  came  upon  any  who  were  left  on  the  field.  With 
desperate  valor  and  contesting  every  inch  of  ground,  the 
colored  infantry  were  forced  from  their  position  back 
to  the  rear  of  the  train  and  formed  on  the  left  of  the 
Eighteenth  Iowa,  pouring  volley  after  volley  into  the 
lines  of  the  exulting  foe  as  they  retired. 

The  Federal  troops  and  train  were  now  entirely  sur 
rounded,  and  the  firing  of  small-arms  and  artillery,  the 
crashing  of  shot  and  bursting  shell  in  among  the  teams 
of  the  large  train,  the  roar  of  the  battle,  and  the  shout 
ing  of  the  victorious  Confederate  troops  soon  caused  a 
scene  of  great  confusion.  Colonel  Williams  now  saw  that 
it  was  impossible  to  save  the  train,  and  that  it  would  re 
quire  heroic  courage  to  save  his  troops  who  were  not 
already  left  on  the  field,  killed  and  wounded.  In  a  few 
moments  after  part  of  the  colored  infantry  formed  on  the 
left  of  the  Eighteenth  Iowa,  the  united  commands  were 
compelled  by  overpowering  numbers  of  the  enemy  to 
retire  to  the  north  side  of  the  Camden  road,  where  a 
stand  was  made  for  a  short  time  to  enable  the  section  of 
the  battery  to  move  to  the  rear,  which  was  then  north 
of  the  road.  When  forced  from  this  position  the  Federal 
troops  retired  through  an  open  field,  and  in  the  timber 
on  the  north  side  of  it  formed  in  line  again,  and  after  a 
few  volleys  checked  the  Confederates,  who  were  advancing 
with  yells  from  the  front  and  left  and  right  flanks.  In 
falling  back  to  this  position,  this  main  part  of  the  com 
mand  was  joined  by  quite  a  number  of  the  colored  soldiers 
who  had  fallen  back  from  the  front  on  the  north  side  of 
the  train  under  Lieutenant  Gibbons,  and  by  others  who 
made  their  way  between  the  teams  to  the  north  side  of 
the  road  when  Colonel  Williams'  front  and  right  flank 
were  forced  back  after  the  fourth  charge.  Of  course  it 
was  now  the  purpose  of  the  Federal  troops  to  retreat  to 

VOL.  II. — 19 


2QO  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Camden  by  the  most  direct  route  practicable.  Closely 
pressed  by  the  enemy  from  all  sides,  and  retreating 
through  timber  and  thick  brush  and  over  ground  cut  up 
by  ravines,  over  which  it  was  impracticable  to  move  artil 
lery,  it  became  necessary  to  cut  the  horses  loose  from  the 
two  pieces  of  the  Second  Indiana  Battery  and  the  two 
howitzers  of  the  Sixth  Kansas,  and  abandon  the  guns. 

Near  the  field  north  of  the  Camden  road,  Colonel 
Williams  rallied  part  of  his  cavalry,  under  Lieutenant 
Phillips,  Sixth  Kansas,  and  held  them  in  line  long  enough 
to  enable  his  wounded  colored  soldiers  who  had  fallen  in 
the  rear  to  come  up  and  reach  a  swamp  which  lay  in  his 
front  and  get  away.  After  leaving  the  position  behind 
the  field  in  the  timber,  the  Confederate  infantry  did  not 
again  get  up  within  range  of  the  Federal  troops ;  but  the 
Confederate  cavalry  continued  the  pursuit  about  two 
miles,  frequently  pressing  closely  upon  Colonel  Williams' 
flanks  and  rear,  so  that  his  troops  were  obliged  to  form 
four  or  five  times,  face  to  the  rear,  and  give  the  enemy  a 
volley  each  time  to  hold  them  off.  As  General  Maxey 
wished  to  secure  the  large  train  and  the  abandoned  guns, 
and  fearing  that  a  large  Federal  force  would  come  out 
from  Camden  and  attack  him,  he  very  soon  called  off  his 
troops  from  the  pursuit  and  placed  part  of  them  in  posi 
tion  on  the  Camden  road  east  of  the  train.  It  was  about 
two  o'clock  when  the  Confederate  cavalry  disappeared 
from  the  rear  and  flanks  of  the  retreating  Federal  troops, 
after  which,  by  toilsome  marching  through  swamps  and 
pine  woods,  they  reached  Camden  that  night  about  eight 
o'clock,  without  further  interruption,  in  a  nearly  ex 
hausted  condition. 

On  account  of  the  repeated  threats  which  the  Confed 
erates  had  made  that  they  would  show  no  quarter  to 
colored  soldiers,  and  having  that  day  seen  the  Confed 
erates  shooting  and  bayoneting  the  wounded  colored 
soldiers  where  they  had  fallen,  every  colored  soldier  who 
was  wounded  in  the  fight  and  who  could  walk  came  off 


BATTLE   OF  POISON  SPRING.  29 1 

the  field  with  the  troops  in  the  retreat.  Some  who 
were  too  badly  wounded  to  walk,  lay  on  the  field,  and 
when  the  Confederates  came  near  them,  feigned  being 
dead,  and  crawled  off  the  field  after  dark,  and  endeavored 
to  make  their  way  back  to  camp,  marching  while  they 
had  strength  and  then  lying  down  in  the  grass  and  weeds 
to  rest.  Several  colored  soldiers  who  were  badly  wounded, 
and  who  from  weakness  and  loss  of  blood  were  obliged  to 
march  and  rest  at  intervals,  were  bitten  by  poisonous 
snakes  while  lying  down  in  the  grass  or  weeds  during  the 
night,  and  when  they  got  into  camp  the  next  day  their 
bodies  were  horribly  swollen  from  the  effect  of  the  poison 
which  had  spread  through  their  systems.  One  of  the 
colored  soldiers  who  was  wounded  and  lay  on  the  field 
until  night  feigning  death,  and  then  crawled  off  and  made 
his  way  into  camp,  stated  that  he  saw  the  Confederates 
shooting  the  wounded  colored  soldiers  who  were  left  on 
the  field,  and  that  Confederate  soldiers  went  over  the 
field  after  the  battle,  calling  out  and  answering  each 
other,  "  Where  is  the  First  Nigger  now  ?  "  "  All  cut  to 
pieces  and  gone  to  hell  by  bad  management." 

The  Federal  loss  in  the  battle  was  122  men  killed,  97 
wounded,  and  81  missing.  In  the  fight  and  in  the  re 
treat,  the  colored  regiment  had  117  men  and  officers 
killed  and  65  wounded.  When  separated  from  their  com 
mand  or  cut  off  from  it,  the  colored  soldiers  were  shot 
down  without  mercy.  General  Cabell  reported  that  one 
of  his  regiments,  stationed  east  of  the  battle-field  on  the 
Camden  road,  killed  at  least  80  negroes. 

General  Maxey  reported  his  loss,  from  incomplete  re 
turns  of  casualties  in  his  different  commands,  at  17  men 
killed  and  88  wounded.  His  officers  reported  only  4 
colored  men  captured.  Immediately  after  the  fight  was 
over  he  commenced  removing  the  train,  artillery,  and 
captured  property  from  the  scene  of  the  conflict  to  the 
Confederate  camp  near  Woodlawn,  the  last  of  the  troops 
not  leaving  the  field  until  nearly  dark. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

BATTLE  OF  JENKINS'  FERRY. 

IN  all  the  movements  of  his  troops  up  to  the  occupa 
tion  of  Camden  General  Steele  had  shown  extreme  caution 
against  being  drawn  into  a  position  from  which  he  could 
not  give  blow  for  blow  if  attacked.  He  had  kept  out 
heavy  cavalry  reconnoissances  miles  in  his  front  and  on 
his  flanks,  with  a  strong  infantry  rear-guard.  When  the 
train  left  Camden  he  knew  that  all  Price's  forces  were  in 
his  immediate  vicinity,  and  if  he  did  not  know  their  exact 
position,  a  cavalry  reconnoissance  might  have  discovered 
it  and  prevented  the  Poison  Spring  disaster.  In  view  of 
his  habitual  caution  it  seems  probable  that  his  attention 
was  not  called  by  his  chief  quartermaster  to  the  distance 
and  direction  the  forage  he  desired  to  secure  was  from 
Camden.  When  he  heard  of  the  disaster,  he  stated  that 
he  was  opposed  to  foraging  to  the  front.  The  loss  of 
this  large  train  and  artillery  was  seriously  felt  by  him, 
and  would  necessarily  cripple  his  future  operations,  while 
the  success  of  the  Confederates  in  the  enterprise  would 
stimulate  the  leaders  to  still  greater  exertion  to  throw 
their  forces  upon  his  line  of  communication  with  his  base 
of  supplies  at  Little  Rock  and  Pine  Bluff.  His  hopes  of 
getting  the  assistance  of  the  gunboats  on  the  Washita  were 
dissipated  by  information  brought  to  him  by  one  of  his 
messengers  from  General  Banks  that  Red  River  had  fallen 
so  rapidly  that  part  of  the  gunboats  of  Admiral  Porter's 

292 


BATTLE   OF  JENKINS'   FERRY.  293 

fleet  had  grounded,  and  that  none  of  them  would  prob 
ably  be  able  to  get  back  over  the  falls  above  Alexandria. 
His  troops  had  hardly  got  into  camp  at  Camden  from  the 
field  of  Poison  Spring,  when  his  spies  and  scouts  reported 
that  General  E.  Kirby  Smith  had  arrived  at  General 
Price's  headquarters  on  the  iQth,  to  direct  in  person  the 
further  operations  of  the  Confederate  forces,  and  that  on 
the  next  and  following  days  the  divisions  of  Walker, 
Churchill,  and  Parsons,  from  Louisiana,  numbering  about 
eight  thousand  men  and  artillery,  would  be  up. 

A  supply  train  of  150  wagons,  loaded  with  commissary 
and  ordnance  stores,  was  due  from  Pine  Bluff,  and  Gen 
eral  Steele  sent  out  a  brigade  of  infantry,  under  Colonel 
Thomas  H.  Benton,  Jr.,  Twenty-ninth  Iowa  Infantry,  to 
meet  it  and  guard  it  into  Camden.  Colonel  Benton  met 
the  train  out  about  seventeen  miles,  and  brought  it  in 
safely  on  the  2Oth,  and  half  rations  for  ten  days  were 
issued  to  the  troops.  As  soon  as  unloaded,  the  train  was 
sent  back  to  Pine  Bluff  for  further  supplies,  guarded  by 
a  brigade  of  infantry,  four  hundred  cavalry  of  the  First 
Iowa,  and  four  pieces  of  the  Second  Missouri  Light  Artil 
lery,  all  under  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Francis 
M.  Drake,  Thirty-sixth  Iowa  Infantry.  To  guard  against 
a  surprise,  General  Steele  had  sent  out  his  cavalry,  under 
General  Carr,  to  scout  the  country  for  a  distance  of  thirty 
miles  below  Camden  and  an  equal  distance  above  and  in 
the  direction  of  Pine  Bluff  and  Little  Rock,  and  before 
the  train  started  back,  his  officers  who  had  been  on  this 
scouting  service  reported  that  they  could  not  hear  of  any 
Confederate  force  north  of  the  Washita  River. 

On  his  arrival  in  the  vicinity  of  Camden,  and  having 
assumed  command  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  person, 
General  Smith  sent  out  an  expedition,  under  General 
Fagan,  of  four  thousand  picked  cavalry  and  several  bat 
teries  of  light  artillery,  with  instructions  to  cross  to  the 
north  side  of  the  Washita  River  and  destroy  General 


2Q4  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

Steele's  supplies  at  Little  Rock  and  Pine  Bluff,  and  then 
to  make  such  disposition  of  his  force  as  to  effectually  in 
terrupt  the  communication  of  the  Federal  commander 
with  those  points.  The  expedition  under  General  Fagan 
left  the  Confederate  camp,  a  few  miles  south  of  Camden, 
on  the  22d,  the  same  day  that  the  Federal  supply  train 
under  Colonel  Drake  crossed  to  the  north  side  of  the 
Washita  en  route  for  Pine  Bluff.  To  attract  General 
Steele's  attention  from  Fagan's  movement,  General  Price 
moved  up  part  of  his  troops  and  batteries  and  opened  a 
heavy  cannonade  upon  the  Federal  outposts  at  Camden, 
lasting  several  hours.  General  Fagan  crossed  the  Washita 
thirty  to  forty  miles  below  Camden,  and  by  making  a 
forced  march  got  his  troops  in  position  to  attack  the  es 
cort  to  the  train  under  Colonel  Drake  in  front  and  rear  at 
Marks'  Mill,  near  the  Moro  Swamp,  on  the  morning  of 
the  25th. 

After  a  desperate  battle  of  nearly  five  hours,  the  Fed 
eral  troops  were  overwhelmed  and  nearly  all  the  infantry 
killed,  wounded,  and  captured,  Colonel  Drake,  the  gallant 
commander,  being  severely  wounded  in  the  thigh  and 
hip.  The  train  of  211  wagons  and  the  four  pieces  of 
artillery  also  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Confederates. 
The  Federal  troops  fought  the  battle  under  great  disad 
vantages,  the  force  in  front  being  separated  from  the 
one  in  the  rear  by  the  length  of  the  train,  probably 
nearly  two  miles,  besides  being  outnumbered  as  four  to 
one  by  the  enemy,  who  were  stripped  for  the  fight. 
General  Fagan  reported  that  his  killed  and  severely 
wounded  would  not  exceed  150  men.  General  Cabell, 
however,  reported  that  his  brigade  alone  had  over  200 
men  wounded.  In  his  report  of  the  battle,  Colonel  Drake 
stated  that  his  chief  surgeon  informed  him  that  he  had 
about  250  men  killed  and  wounded.  He  also  stated  that 
after  the  fight  that  day  it  was  estimated  that  there  were 
800  to  900  dead  and  wounded  men  on  the  battle-field ; 


BATTLE   OF  JENKINS'   FERRY.  295 

that  about  one  half  of  these  were  Confederates,  and  that 
a  large  proportion  of  the  others  were  Arkansas  refugees 
and  negroes  who  were  going  along  with  the  train  to  Pine 
Bluff,  and  who  had  been  inhumanly  murdered.  A  good 
many  of  the  colored  men,  however,  when  they  saw  that 
the  train  was  going  to  be  captured,  fled  to  the  swamps 
and  got  away,  and  in  a  few  days  reached  Pine  Bluff  and 
Little  Rock.  Very  few  of  the  cavalry  were  captured, 
and  those  who  were  in  the  rear  of  the  train  fell  back  in 
the  direction  of  Camden,  some  of  the  men  reaching  that 
point  early  that  night  to  inform  General  Steele  of  the 
disaster. 

A  council  of  war  was  held  at  General  Steele's  head 
quarters  that  night,  and  it  was  the  opinion  of  nearly  all 
the  general  officers  present  that  the  army  should  evacuate 
Camden  and  abandon  the  line  of  the  Washita  at  once  and 
fall  back  to  Little  Rock;  that  the  supply  line  from  Little 
Rock  or  Pine  Bluff  was  too  long  to  keep  up  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  General  Kirby  Smith  had  brought  large  re 
inforcements  from  Louisiana  and  could  pass  to  the  Fed 
eral  rear  and  cut  the  army  off  from  its  base  of  supplies. 
The  greater  part  of  Price's  force  was  cavalry,  or  rather 
mounted  infantry,  and  could  be  moved  very  rapidly  to 
any  given  point  to  make  an  attack,  and  was  very  effective 
in  operating  against  the  Federal  supply  line. 

On  his  arrival  at  Camden,  General  Steele  had  directed 
Captain  Wheeler,  his  chief  engineer,  to  lay  down  the 
pontoon  bridge  across  the  river  opposite  the  city,  con 
necting  with  the  Pine  Bluff  road,  so  that  it  was  ready  for 
immediate  use  when  it  was  determined  to  evacuate  the 
place.  The  next  day,  the  26th,  the  baggage  trains  and 
artillery  crossed  the  bridge  over  the  river  to  the  north 
side,  the  troops  keeping  their  respective  positions  until 
an  hour  or  so  after  dark,  when  they,  too,  were  quietly 
withdrawn,  without  attracting  the  attention  of  the  citi 
zens,  to  the  north  side.  When  daylight  came  the  next 


296  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

morning  the  pontoon  bridge  had  been  taken  up,  and  the 
Federal  troops  and  trains  were  on  the  march  to  Little  Rock 
by  way  of  Princeton.  In  the  movement  of  the  troops, 
General  Steele  left  Colonel  William  F.  Cloud,  Second 
Kansas  Cavalry,  commanding  the  cavalry  brigade  of  the 
Frontier  Division,  in  charge  of  the  rear-guard.  The 
steamer  Homer,  which  the  Federal  cavalry  had  captured 
with  a  cargo  of  corn,  was  left  in  the  river  at  the  landing 
after  the  army  had  moved  out,  and  it  was  with  great 
reluctance  that  the  Colonel  did  not  destroy  the  boat,  for 
he  felt  certain  that  it  would  be  used  by  Generals  Smith 
and  Price  on  their  arrival  at  Camden,  to  cross  their  troops 
and  artillery  over  the  Washita  to  take  up  the  pursuit. 
But  having  special  instructions  from  General  Steele  not 
to  destroy  it,  he  marched  away  leaving  it  uninjured,  as 
far  as  he  knew.  It  may,  however,  have  been  disabled 
for  use  by  the  removal  of  some  parts  of  its  machinery,  for 
when  the  Confederate  troops  arrived  in  town  the  next 
day,  a  raft  bridge  was  constructed  to  cross  them  and  their 
artillery  over  the  river  at  that  point.  As  soon  as  they 
got  their  troops  and  artillery  over  the  river  at  Camden, 
Generals  Smith  and  Price  pushed  forward  in  pursuit  of 
the  retreating  Federal  army,  marching  day  and  night, 
with  a  few  hours'  intervals  for  rest,  hoping  to  overtake  it 
before  it  crossed  the  Saline  River. 

At  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  2Qth,  General 
Steele's  advance  arrived  at  Jenkins'  Ferry  on  the  Saline 
River.  That  stream  was  too  deep  to  ford,  and  the  pon 
toon  train  was  hurried  up  and  the  pontoon  bridge  laid  in 
less  than  three  hours.  Nearly  all  the  cavalry  and  part  of 
the  wagon  trains  crossed  the  river  on  the  bridge  that 
evening  before  dark,  and  the  balance  of  the  trains  and 
artillery  crossed  over  during  the  night  and  the  next  morn 
ing.  There  was  a  steady  downpour  of  rain  all  the  after 
noon  and  nearly  all  night,  so  that  the  next  morning  the 
Saline  River  was  out  of  its  banks  in  places,  and  the  low 


BA  TTLE   OF  JENKINS  '   FERR  Y. 


297 


bottom  lands  on  each  side  of  it  for  two  miles  covered 
with  from  two  to  three  inches  to  nearly  a  foot  of  water, 
requiring  the  greatest  efforts  for  troops  and  animals  to 
pass  over  the  ground  after  a  few  trains  in  advance  had 
worked  it  into  a  deep  mud.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  2Qth, 

m 


BATTLE-FIELD  OF  JENKINS'  FERRY,  ARKAN6AS. 

Greene'  s  brigade  of  Price's  command  came  up  with  and 
attacked  General  Steele's  rear-guard  under  Colonel  Engel- 
mann,  bringing  up  a  battery  to  rake  the  road  on  which 
the  Federal  troops  were  marching.  The  attacks  of  the 
Confederates  were  so  persistent  that  Colonel  Engelmann 


298  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

formed  part  of  his  brigade  in  line  facing  to  the  rear, 
and,  with  a  section  of  Vaughn's  battery,  skirmished  with 
them  until  they  retired  out  of  range.  When  he  resumed 
the  march  his  rear  was  covered  by  two  companies  of  the 
Fortieth  Iowa  Infantry,  deployed  as  skirmishers,  and  he 
had  no  further  annoyance  from  the  enemy  until  his 
command  arrived  on  the  high  ground  overlooking  Saline 
River  Valley,  about  three  miles  from  the  ferry.  At  this 
point  he  was  instructed  to  leave  as  a  picket  a  regiment  of 
infantry,  two  companies  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry, 
under  Captain  John  Rogers,  and  a  section  of  Vaughn's 
battery,  under  Lieutenant  C.  W.  Thomas. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Adolph  Dengler,  Forty-third  Illi 
nois  Infantry,  had  just  formed  the  two  battalions  of  his 
regiment,  one  on  each  side  of  the  section  of  the  battery, 
behind  the  crest  of  the  hill,  facing  to  the  rear,  with 
cavalry  vedettes  a  short  distance  back  on  the  road  upon 
which  the  enemy  were  advancing,  when  the  Confederates 
again  came  in  sight  and  commenced  using  their  artillery 
in  throwing  shot  and  shell.  After  a  few  rounds  from  the 
section  of  Vaughn's  battery,  the  Confederate  guns  were 
limbered  to  the  rear.  The  skirmish-line  which  Colonel 
Dengler  sent  forward,  covering  both  wings  of  his  regi 
ment,  and  the  detachment  of  cavalry  on  his  flanks  en 
gaged  the  Confederates  with  small-arms  until  dark,  when 
the  firing  ceased.  While  this  skirmishing  was  going  on, 
Colonel  John  A.  Garrett,  Fortieth  Iowa  Infantry,  was 
ordered  to  march  back  and  form  his  regiment  a  short  dis 
tance  in  the  rear  of  the  Forty-third  Illinois  and  to  throw 
out  skirmishers  on  his  right  and  left  flanks,  and  to  use  the 
utmost  vigilance  to  guard  against  surprise. 

As  night  was  drawing  a  mantle  of  darkness  over  the 
wet,  hungry,  and  tired  troops  and  animals,  the  section  of 
Vaughn's  battery  was  withdrawn  to  a  less  exposed  posi 
tion.  The  Forty-third  Illinois  was  also  relieved  from 
picket  duty  on  the  hill  by  the  Thirty-third  Iowa  Infantry, 


BATTLE  OF  JENKINS'  FERRY.  299 

under  Colonel  C.  H.  Mackey,  who  kept  his  men  standing 
in  line  in  the  rain  until  four  o'clock  the  next  morning. 
He  then  received  orders  to  retire  his  regiment  about 
three  quarters  of  a  mile  in  the  direction  of  the  river,  so 
as  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  troops  and  trains  on  the 
pontoon  bridge.  He  made  this  movement  before  it  was 
fairly  light,  and  took  up  a  position  a  few  yards  west 
of  the  field  south  of  the  main  road  near  the  foot  of  the 
hill,  where  his  skirmishers  engaged  the  skirmish-line  of 
Greene's  brigade,  composed  of  the  same  troops  who 
had  skirmished  with  the  Federal  rear-guard  the  previous 
evening.  He  held  the  Confederates  in  check  for  half  an 
hour,  when  his  regiment  was  relieved  by  the  Twenty- 
seventh  Wisconsin  Infantry.  His  regiment  and  the  men 
of  several  other  regiments  who  had  stood  in  line  all  night 
were  marched  to  the  second  field  south  of  the  road  nearest 
the  crossing,  where  they  were  halted  and  made  fires  to 
prepare  coffee  for  their  breakfast,  and  if  possible  get  a 
few  moments  of  needed  rest. 

The  demonstrations  against  his  rear-guard  up  to  dark 
on  the  29th  convinced  General  Salomon,  whose  division 
was  in  the  rear,  that  an  attack  in  force  by  the  Confeder 
ates  might  be  anticipated  during  the  night  or  the  next 
morning.  His  troops  were  therefore  posted  so  as  to  be 
in  readiness  to  meet  an  assault  at  any  moment.  But  in 
the  skirmishes  his  rear-guard  had  not  captured  any  of  the 
enemy  from  whom  he  could  obtain  information  as  to 
the  strength  of  the  forces  in  his  rear,  and  who  was  in 
command  of  them.  General  Steele  supposed  that  they 
were  General  Pagan's  troops,  who  only  a  few  days  before 
had  captured  the  Federal  train  at  Marks'  Mill,  less  than 
a  day's  march  distant,  and  who  that  day  had  crossed  the 
Federal  line  of  march  near  Princeton  only  two  or  three 
hours  before  the  Federal  advance  came  along.  The 
heavy  rain  nearly  all  night  had  made  the  crossing  of  the 
trains  over  the  river  on  the  pontoon  bridge  very  slow 


300  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

and  tedious,  and  at  daylight  on  the  3Oth  there  were  still 
nearly  two  miles  of  trains  and  artillery  on  the  west  side 
to  be  crossed  over.  General  Salomon,  commanding  the 
Third  Division,  was  left  on  the  west  side  to  cover  the 
crossing  of  these  trains,  and  made  such  disposition  of  his 
troops  as  to  withdraw  them  as  rapidly  as  the  trains 
moved  forward  on  the  road  to  the  bridge.  His  picket 
had  prevented  the  Confederates  from  posting  artillery  on 
the  bluffs  during  the  night  within  range  of  the  Federal 
troops,  and  he  now  desired  to  retire  his  line  far  enough  in 
the  direction  of  the  bridge  so  that  it  would  still  be  out  of 
range  of  batteries  planted  on  the  hills  west  of  the  Saline 
Valley.  After  his  troops  were  withdrawn  into  the  valley, 
his  right  flank  was  protected  by  a  deep,  narrow  stream, 
or  bayou,  known  as  Toxie  Creek,  on  the  north  side  of 
the  road,  and  that  ran  parallel  with  it  and  emptied  into 
the  Saline  at  Jenkins'  Ferry,  and  on  his  left,  when  facing 
to  the  rear,  south  of  the  field  nearest  the  ferry  was  a 
swamp  in  the  heavy  timber,  covered  with  water  by  the 
incessant  rains,  and  impassable  for  infantry,  artillery,  or 
cavalry. 

While  the  Twenty-seventh  Wisconsin  and  Fiftieth  In 
diana  Infantry  were  holding  the  first  line  behind  the  field 
at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  after  they  had  relieved  the  Thirty- 
third  Iowa  Infantry,  General  Rice  formed  a  second  line 
with  the  Twenty-ninth  Iowa  and  Ninth  Wisconsin  In 
fantry,  just  east  of  that  field,  in  the  timber.  When  this 
line  was  completed,  his  first  line  was  retired  behind  it.  On 
the  retiring  of  the  first  line,  the  Confederates  under  Greene 
again  moved  up  and  attacked  the  second  Federal  line, 
first  driving  in  the  skirmishers.  In  the  meanwhile  Gen 
eral  Rice  formed  the  Fiftieth  Indiana,  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Wells,  on  his  left,  and  sent  the  detachment  of 
the  Second  Brigade  and  two  companies  of  the  Twenty- 
ninth  Iowa  Infantry  to  the  north  side  of  Toxie  Creek  on 
his  right  to  check  a  movement  of  the  enemy  on  that  part 


BATTLE   OF  JENKINS'   FERRY.  30! 

of  the  field.  At  eight  o'clock  the  Confederate  division 
of  General  T.  J.  Churchill  arrived  on  the  field;  his  four 
brigades,  under  Brigadier-Generals  Tappan,  Hawthorn, 
and  Dockery  and  Colonel  Gause  were  deployed  in  line  of 
battle,  and  with  one  regiment  deployed  as  skirmishers  and 
two  regiments  in  reserve  he  moved  forward  and  attacked 
the  Federal  position.  In  this  movement  part  of  Greene's 
brigade  formed  on  the  right  of  Churchill's  division  and 
part  on  the  left. 

On  Churchill's  division  descending  from  the  hill  to  the 
Saline  bottom,  Dockery's  brigade  was  detached  by  Gen 
eral  Smith  to  advance  down  on  the  north  side  of  Toxie 
Creek  and  to  attack  any  Federal  troops  posted  on  that 
side.  The  Confederate  skirmish-line  under  General  Tap- 
pan  came  upon  the  Federal  skirmishers  in  the  field  nearest 
the  river,  and  at  once  engaged  them  and  drove  them  in 
upon  the  main  Federal  line  posted  in  the  timber  east  and 
south  of  the  field.  General  Rice,  commanding  the  ad 
vance  Federal  line,  had  posted  his  troops  with  excellent 
judgment,  so  that  when  the  Confederates  were  crossing 
the  field,  which  was  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  long  and 
wide,  and  were  nearing  the  eastern  edge  of  it,  his  men 
poured  a  terribly  destructive  fire  into  their  ranks  from  the 
front  and  from  the  southeast  side  of  the  field,  suddenly 
checking  their  advance.  General  Tappan  brought  up  his 
reserve  regiments  and  threw  them  into  action,  but  the 
volleys  of  the  Federal  musketry  increased  in  intensity, 
and  were  wasting  his  ranks  so  rapidly  that  he  called  on 
General  Churchill  for  reinforcements  to  enable  him  to 
hold  his  position.  General  Hawthorn's  brigade  was  sent 
to  his  support  and  formed  on  his  left,  and  then  the  roar 
of  musketry  that  went  up  along  the  opposing  lines  was 
terrific.  The  Confederate  attack  which,  up  to  this  time, 
had  been  directed  mainly  against  the  Federal  right  and 
centre  was  now  being  directed  against  the  Federal  left 
and  centre  with  great  energy,  and  succeeded  in  forcing 


302  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

back  the  Thirty-third  Iowa,  under  Colonel  Mackey,  which 
had  been  brought  up  to  the  support  of  the  Fiftieth 
Indiana  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  about  two 
hundred  yards. 

While  the  Thirty-third  Iowa  were  retiring  from  their 
position,  Colonel  Garrett  came  up  with  four  companies  of 
his  regiment,  the  Fortieth  Iowa  Infantry,  from  Colonel 
Engelmann's  brigade,  and  formed  his  men  a  few  paces  to 
the  left  and  in  front  of  the  position  lately  occupied  by  the 
Thirty-third  Iowa,  and  opened  fire  upon  the  enemy. 
When  he  got  his  men  in  position  he  noticed  that  there 
was  quite  a  gap  between  the  right  of  his  line  and  the  left 
of  the  line  of  the  troops  on  his  right,  which  if  not  closed 
up  at  once  might  endanger  his  command.  He  therefore 
moved  forward  and  to  the  right,  firing  as  he  advanced, 
until  his  right  joined  the  left  of  the  Twenty-seventh 
Wisconsin,  which  had  also  been  sent  forward  by  Colonel 
Engelmann,  at  the  request  of  General  Rice,  to  support 
the  Thirty-third  Iowa.  The  entire  Federal  line  now 
advanced,  driving  the  Confederates  before  it  about  a 
quarter  of  a  mile,  pouring  volley  after  volley  into  them 
as  they  retired,  and  passing  over  their  dead  and  wounded. 
The  battle  was  now  assuming  such  proportions  that,  at 
the  request  of  General  Salomon,  General  Steele  sent  back 
to  him  three  regiments,  the  Twelfth  Kansas  Infantry, 
under  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  E.  Hayes,  the  Second  Kan 
sas  Colored  Infantry,  under  Colonel  Samuel  J.  Crawford, 
and  part  of  the  First  Arkansas  Infantry,  under  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  E.  J.  Searle,  from  General  Thayer's  Frontier 
Division,  which  had  not  yet  crossed  the  river.  The 
Twelfth  Kansas  arrived  on  the  field  and  formed  on  the 
left  of  Colonel  Garrett  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  Federal 
line  in  time  to  participate  in  the  advance  in  which  the 
Confederates  were  driven  back  across  the  field. 

While  the  battle  was  thus  raging  with  great  fierceness 
in  and  around  the  field  nearest  the  river  on  the  south 


BATTLE    OF  JENKINS'   FERRY.  303 

side  of  Toxie  Bayou,  General  Dockery's  brigade  of  sharp 
shooters  had  moved  down  on  the  north  side  of  that 
bayou,  accompanied  by  Lieutenant  E.  Cunningham, 
Aide-de-Camp  on  General  Smith's  staff,  and  attacked  Gen 
eral  Rice's  extreme  right  on  that  side,  consisting  of  the 
Forty-third  Illinois,  a  detachment  of  the  Second  Brigade, 
two  companies  of  the  Twenty-ninth  Iowa,  two  companies 
of  the  Fortieth  Iowa  Infantry,  and  two  companies  of  the 
Second  Kansas  Colored  Infantry.  After  the  fighting  on 
that  side  of  the  bayou  had  lasted  upwards  of  an  hour,  the 
Confederates  were  driven  back  some  distance,  and  then 
withdrew  to  the  south  side  of  the  stream,  but  before  re 
tiring  they  advanced  near  the  bank  of  the  bayou  and 
directed  their  fire  against  General  Rice's  right  on  the 
south  side  near  the  corner  of  the  field.  When  the  enemy 
were  reported  to  have  retired  from  the  north  side  of  the 
bayou,  General  Salomon  ordered  all  his  troops,  except 
the  two  companies  of  the  Twenty-ninth  Iowa,  from  that 
to  the  south  side,  and  they  were  obliged  to  again  plunge 
in  and  wade  the  swollen  stream  waist  deep.  After 
Churchill's  division  had  been  driven  off  the  field,  a  calm 
prevailed  along  the  Federal  front  for  nearly  half  an  hour, 
during  which  time  the  troops  who  had  been  fighting  in 
the  front  line,  and  who  had  expended  nearly  all  their 
ammunition,  replenished  their  cartridge-boxes  from  boxes 
brought  up  by  mounted  troops  from  the  ordnance  train 
across  the  river. 

When  Generals  Smith  and  Price  saw  that  Churchill's 
division  had  been  repulsed  with  heavy  loss,  Parsons' 
division  was  hurried  forward  to  his  support.  On  coming 
to  the  strip  of  timber  between  the  fields,  General  Parsons' 
First  Brigade,  under  General  Clark,  was  posted  on  the 
left  of  Churchill's  reserve  brigade  under  Gause,  and  his 
Second  Brigade,  under  Colonel  Burns,  was  posted  on  the 
right  of  Gause.  When  these  dispositions  had  been  made, 
this  second  line  moved  forward  to  the  support  of  the  two 


304  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE   BORDER. 

brigades  of  Tappan  and  Hawthorn  in  the  first  line.  In 
this  order  the  whole  force  moved  forward  and  again  at 
tacked  the  Federal  position.  To  meet  this  assault,  Gen 
eral  Rice  placed  the  Second  Kansas  Colored  Infantry  on 
his  right,  the  right  of  the  regiment  resting  on  Toxie 
Bayou,  or  Creek,  and  the  left  joining  the  right  of  the 
Twenty-ninth  Iowa  Infantry.  The  Ninth  Wisconsin 
formed  his  right  centre,  and  the  Thirty-third  Iowa  In 
fantry  his  left  centre.  And  the  Twenty-seventh  Wis 
consin  formed  the  right,  four  companies  of  the  Fortieth 
Iowa  the  centre,  and  the  Twelfth  Kansas  Infantry  the 
left,  of  his  left  wing.  His  second  line,  naming  the  regi 
ments  from  the  left,  consisted  of  part  of  the  Second 
Arkansas,  part  of  the  Fortieth  Iowa,  the  Forty-third  Illi 
nois,  the  Fiftieth  Indiana  Infantry,  and  a  detachment 
of  McLean's  Second  Brigade.  The  regiments  of  this 
line  were  near  enough  to  support  any  part  of  the  front 
line  in  a  few  minutes.  The  moment  the  heavy  masses  of 
the  Confederates  advanced  within  range  of  the  Federal 
line,  a  sheet  of  flame  burst  forth  along  the  entire  length 
of  the  opposing  lines  with  a  terrific  roar  of  musketry. 

As  General  Rice  knew  every  foot  of  the  ground  the 
Confederates  would  be  obliged  to  pass  over,  his  troops 
were  posted  so  that  their  fire  would  be  as  effective  as 
possible.  His  line  was  by  no  means  straight,  but  parts 
of  it  stood  at  such  angles  as  to  enfilade  and  cross-fire  the 
advancing  Confederates.  General  Clark's  brigade,  in 
attempting  to  charge  across  the  field,  when  they  got 
about  two  thirds  over  met  a  terrific  fire  from  the  Second 
Kansas  Colored  and  the  Twenty-ninth  Iowa  Infantry, 
which  checked  them  and  in  a  short  time  sent  them  back 
in  some  confusion  into  the  timber  to  re-form.  It  was 
on  this  part  of  the  field  that  a  Confederate  battery  had 
taken  position  near  the  road  and  had  commenced  to 
furiously  assail  the  Federal  line,  when  Colonel  Crawford 
requested  permission  of  General  Rice  to  charge  it  with 


BATTLE   OF  JENKINS'   FERRY.  305 

his  regiment,  the  Second  Kansas  Colored  Infantry.  The 
request  was  granted,  and  Colonel  Crawford  ordered  his 
men  to  fix  bayonets,  and  they  moved  forward  steadily 
with  a  cheer,  firing  as  they  advanced,  and  shooting  down 
the  artillery  horses  and  part  of  the  men  of  the  battery 
before  they  could  remove  the  guns,  and  they  were  cap 
tured  and  drawn  off  the  field  by  the  men  with  ropes. 
The  lieutenant  of  the  battery  and  most  of  his  men  were 
also  captured.  In  the  Federal  centre  the  Ninth  Wiscon 
sin  and  Thirty-third  Iowa  Infantry  were  being  hotly 
pressed  by  Cause's  Confederate  brigade;  the  Thirty- 
third  Iowa  had  expended  their  ammunition  and  were 
relieved  by  the  Forty-third  Illinois  Infantry  from  the 
second  line,  which  moved  forward  under  Colonel  Den- 
gler,  firing  as  they  advanced,  and  soon  commenced  driv 
ing  the  Confederates,  and  drove  them  almost  to  the  foot 
of  the  bluff.  The  Forty-third  Illinois  then  retired  to 
their  former  position. 

While  the  Federal  right  and  centre  were  thus  engaged, 
the  Twenty-seventh  Wisconsin,  four  companies  of  the 
Fortieth  Iowa,  and  the  Twelfth  Kansas  Infantry  on  the 
Federal  left  were  having  a  fierce  conflict  with  the  Con 
federate  brigades  of  Burns  and  Tappan  opposed  to  them, 
and  forced  them  to  retire  about  the  time  the  Confederate 
centre  gave  way. 

The  battle  was  not  yet  ended.  Lieutenant-General 
Smith  still  had  Major-General  J.  G.  Walker's  Texas 
division  of  infantry,  which  had  just  arrived,  to  place  in 
action  to  dislodge  or  capture  the  Federal  force  opposed 
to  him  on  the  west  side  of  the  river.  His  advance  brigade, 
under  Brigadier-General  Waul,  had  moved  forward  only 
a  short  distance,  when  Major-General  Price  was  met 
bringing  the  Missouri  and  Arkansas  divisions  of  Parsons 
and  Churchill  off  the  field  in  a  demoralized  condition. 
Proceeding  to  the  field,  General  Walker  formed  his  line 
of  battle,  General  Waul's  brigade  on  his  left,  and  the 


VOL.  II.— 20 


306  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

brigades  of  Brigadier-Generals  Scurry  and  Randall  in  his 
centre  and  on  his  right.  As  he  advanced  to  the  scene  of 
conflict,  a  heavy  line  of  skirmishers  was  thrown  forward, 
covering  his  entire  front. 

Having  repulsed  and  driven  the  divisions  of  Churchill 
and  Parsons  from  the  field,  General  Rice  made  some 
changes  in  his  line.  The  Second  Kansas  Colored  In 
fantry,  having  expended  their  ammunition,  had  retired 
to  replenish  their  cartridge-boxes,  and  were  then  placed 
in  position  in  the  centre  of  his  front  line,  their  right  join 
ing  the  left  of  the  Ninth  Wisconsin  and  their  left  connect 
ing  with  the  right  of  the  Fiftieth  Indiana  Infantry,  which 
had  been  brought  up  from  the  second  line  to  relieve  the 
Twenty-seventh  Wisconsin.  Farther  to  his  left  were 
the  Thirty-third  Iowa,  four  companies  of  the  Fortieth 
Iowa,  and  the  Twelfth  Kansas  Infantry,  the  last-named 
regiment  on  his  extreme  left.  The  attack  of  General 
Walker  was  directed  mainly  against  the  Federal  centre 
and  left,  his  troops  moving  forward  with  much  steadiness. 
His  left,  under  General  Waul,  came  in  sight  of  part  of 
the  Federal  line  as  it  was  crossing  the  field  and  driving 
before  it  the  last  of  the  retreating  troops  of  Churchill's 
and  Parsons'  divisions.  The  troops  of  the  Federal  line 
retired  to  their  positions  in  the  timber  east  and  south  of 
the  field,  and  when  General  Waul's  brigade  had  advanced 
about  two  thirds  across  the  field,  poured  a  terrific  fire  of 
musketry  into  it  from  the  front  and  enfiladed  his  line 
from  the  direction  of  the  bayou  on  his  left,  and  from  the 
south  side  of  the  field  on  his  right.  In  a  few  moments 
more  the  other  two  brigades  of  Walker's  division,  which 
had  come  upon  the  field  on  a  road  from  the  south 
west,  attacked  the  Federal  left,  and  then  the  devour 
ing  flames  of  the  battle  swept  along  the  opposing  lines 
with  tremendous  fury  for  more  than  three  quarters  of  an 
hour. 

An  order  had  been  given  to  charge  the  Federal  line, 


BATTLE  OF  JENKINS'  FERRY.  307 

but  while  preparing  the  troops  for  its  execution,  Briga 
dier-Generals  Scurry  and  Randall  fell,  mortally  wounded, 
and  General  Waul  was  severely  wounded.  Colonel 
Watson,  of  the  Eighteenth  Texas  Infantry,  was  also 
killed,  and  Colonel  Overton  Young,  of  the  Eighth  Texas 
Infantry,  was  severely  wounded,  besides  a  number  of 
other  officers.  General  Waul  was  able  to  stay  in  his 
saddle  on  the  field  for  some  time,  but  the  loss  of  the 
other  two  brigade  commanders  and  the  heavy  loss  in 
regimental  commanders  soon  caused  great  confusion 
among  the  troops  of  those  brigades,  who  were  still 
receiving  a  terrible  fire  from  the  Federal  left,  and  the 
whole  division  was  withdrawn  from  the  field  to  the  strip 
of  timber  between  the  two  fields,  where  it  occupied  a 
defensive  position  until  the  Federal  troops  resumed  the 
march.  In  the  early  part  of  this  fight  with  Walker's 
division,  General  Rice  received  a  wound  in  the  foot  while 
directing  the  movement  of  his  troops  on  his  left,  which 
disabled  him  temporarily  from  active  service.  This  attack 
on  the  Federal  left  was  so  determined  that  troops  of  the 
second  line  had  to  be  ordered  up  to  support  those  of  the 
first  line.  Indeed,  nothing  could  surpass  the  bravery  and 
determination  and  deliberation  with  which  the  Federal 
troops  delivered  their  volleys  in  resisting  the  three  des 
perate  assaults  made  upon  their  line. 

After  Generals  Churchill  and  Parsons  had  taken  their 
divisions  out  to  the  foot  of  the  hill,  collected  their  numer 
ous  stragglers,  re-formed  their  lines,  and  supplied  their 
troops  with  ammunition,  they  were  ordered  to  return  to 
the  field  to  the  support  of  Walker's  division.  But  when 
they  returned  to  the  field  they  found  that  Walker's 
division  had  withdrawn  from  the  conflict,  his  troops  were 
in  confusion,  and  the  battle  was  over.  The  Federal 
troops  were  in  no  condition  to  follow  up  their  success, 
for  their  rations  were  exhausted  that  morning,  with  no 
hope  of  getting  supplies  until  they  arrived  at  Little 


308  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Rock ;  and  their  artillery  horses  and  train  animals  were 
starving  for  forage. 

Having  effectively  repulsed  every  assault  of  the  Con 
federates,  and  being  in  no  condition  to  assume  the 
offensive,  General  Steele  withdrew  his  troops  from  the 
field,  and  crossed  them  over  the  river  on  the  pontoon 
without  interruption.  As  many  of  his  severely  wounded 
as  he  could  furnish  transportation  for  were  gathered 
up  from  the  field  and  brought  along.  Those  who  were 
too  badly  wounded  to  bring  along  with  the  army  were 
taken  up  and  removed  to  a  house  near  the  field,  which 
was  turned  into  a  field  hospital,  and  surgeons  and  at 
tendants,  with  medical  supplies,  left  with  them  to  take 
care  of  them.  The  infantry  as  they  passed  over  the 
bridge  were  formed  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  sup 
ported  by  artillery,  to  protect  the  rearmost  troops  in  the 
event  of  pursuit  by  the  enemy.  It  was  about  half-past 
twelve  o'clock  when  General  Walker's  division  withdrew 
from  the  fight,  and  shortly  after  two  o'clock  the  last  of 
the  Federal  troops,  except  the  severely  wounded,  had 
crossed  the  bridge  to  the  east  side  of  the  Saline. 

The  battle  was  fought  almost  entirely  by  infantry. 
Where  the  ground  was  not  covered  with  water,  it  was  so 
saturated  with  the  continuous  rain  that  it  was  almost  im 
practicable  to  move  artillery  on  any  part  of  the  field. 
Only  a  single  section  of  the  Federal  batteries  was  left  on 
the  west  side  of  the  river  during  the  battle,  and  it  fired 
only  a  single  shot  to  reassure  the  troops.  Two  Confed 
erate  batteries  were  brought  on  the  field,  one  of  which 
was  captured  a  few  minutes  after  its  arrival,  and  the  other 
was  withdrawn  before  it  had  fired  a  dozen  rounds.  The 
Federal  loss  in  the  battle  was  86  men  killed,  500  wounded, 
and  61  missing.  Lieutenant  E.  Cunningham,  on  General 
Smith's  staff,  stated  that  the  Confederate  loss  was  about 
800  killed  and  wounded.  Incomplete  returns  of  casual 
ties  of  Price's  three  divisions  show  a  loss  of  99  killed  and 


BATTLE   OF  JENKINS'   FERRY.  309 

437  wounded.  The  loss  in  Walker's  veteran  division  was 
probably  nearly  as  large  as  in  Price's  three  small  divisions. 
On  the  Federal  side  there  were  only  two  officers,  a  cap 
tain  and  a  lieutenant,  killed.  On  the  Confederate  side 
there  were  two  brigadier-generals,  three  colonels,  and  a 
large  number  of  field  and  line  officers  killed.  The  Con 
federates  had  also  two  brigadier-generals,  Waul  and  Clark, 
wounded.  General  Steele  did  not  have  more  than  4000 
men  on  the  field,  the  balance  of  his  troops  having  crossed 
to  the  east  side  of  the  river.  General  Smith  had  ten 
brigades,  including  Colonel  Colton  Greene's  brigade  of 
Marmaduke's  division,  in  the  fight,  and  estimating  1000 
men  to  the  brigade,  which  is  a  very  low  estimate,  he  must 
have  had  nearly  10,000  men  in  the  battle. 

The  Federal  troops  occupied  a  good  position  in  the 
timber,  and  they  protected  themselves  as  much  as  possi 
ble.  The  bayou  on  their  right  and  the  swamp  on  their 
left  made  it  necessary  for  the  enemy  to  approach  their 
position  across  the  open  field.  Every  time  the  Confed 
erates  advanced  to  near  the  centre  of  the  field,  a  sheet  of 
flame  burst  from  the  east  side  and  from  the  east  halves 
of  the  north  and  south  sides,  which  no  troops  could  stand 
very  long  without  being  cut  down  almost  to  a  man.  As 
showing  how  busily  employed  the  Federal  troops  were 
during  the  action,  Colonel  Garrett,  who  commanded  part 
of  his  regiment  on  the  left,  stated  that  his  men  used  sixty 
to  one  hundred  rounds  of  cartridges  each  during  the  fight. 

When  the  last  of  the  Federal  troops  had  passed  over 
the  pontoon  bridge  it  was  destroyed,  the  mules  being 
so  much  weakened  for  want  of  forage  that  they  were 
unable  to  draw  the  wagons  over  the  terrible  road  across 
the  bottom  for  upwards  of  two  miles.  It  was  necessary 
to  double  the  teams  to  the  artillery,  to  the  wagons  of 
the  ammunition  train,  and  to  the  wagons  of  all  the  trains 
that  were  brought  through.  For  long  stretches  of  the 
road  across  the  bottom  the  wagon  wheels  sank  to  the 


THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 


hubs  in  the  mud,  and  the  mules  floundered  and  struggled 
in  the  mud  without  being  able  to  touch  solid  ground  for 
their  feet.  A  large  number  of  wagons,  therefore,  got 
hopelessly  stuck  in  the  mud  and  were  abandoned.  The 


CONfTDCRATE. 


BATTLE  OF  JENKINS'  FERRY,  ARKANSAS. 
FIRST  FEDERAL  POSITION   IN  THE  MORNING. 

Confederates  were  in  so  much  confusion  that  they  did  not 
venture  to  come  to  the  river  until  an  hour  and  a  half  after 
the  Federal  troops  had  crossed. 

Nearly   all    General    Steele's   cavalry,   under    General 
Carr,  crossed  the  river  on  the  pontoon  on  the  evening 


BA  TTLE   OF  JENKINS'   FERR  Y.  311 

and  night  of  the  29th,  with  instructions  to  proceed  to 
Little  Rock  by  the  most  direct  route  practicable  by  rapid 
marches,  to  intercept  a  Confederate  force  under  General 
Fagan,  which  was  reported  by  prisoners  just  captured  to 
be  marching  on  that  point,  by  way  of  Benton,  to  destroy 
the  Federal  supplies.  But  General  Fagan  was  unable  to 
cross  the  Saline  above  Jenkins'  Ferry  on  account  of  high 
water,  and  returned  and  joined  General  Smith  on  the 
battle-field  just  as  the  battle  was  over.  After  crossing 
the  Saline  bottom,  General  Steele  met  with  no  further 
interruption  in  his  march  to  Little  Rock. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE   BUILDING   OF   THE    RED    RIVER    DAM   THAT    SAVED 
THE    MISSISSIPPI    SQUADRON. 

THE  Red  River  campaign,  the  most  disastrous  to  the 
Union  cause  of  any  campaign  in  the  West  during  the  war, 
was  planned  in  Washington,  a  fact  which  appears  to  have 
been  generally  overlooked  in  the  criticisms  in  regard  to 
it.  That  the  plan  originated  in  Washington  has  cer 
tainly  never  been  made  prominent  by  those  who  have 
written  upon  that  campaign,  for,  as  it  turned  out  a  fail 
ure,  General  Banks  was  selected  as  a  scapegoat  and 
loaded  down  with  the  sins  of  those  responsible  for  it. 
As  every  one  knows  who  is  familiar  with  the  trans-Mis 
sissippi  operations  of  that  period,  there  were  to  be  three 
converging  columns  upon  Shreveport,  Louisiana,  the 
objective  of  the  campaign,  where  they  were  to  unite  in 
the  early  part  of  May.  These  three  columns  were  to 
start  from  points  as  distant  from  each  other  as  New 
Orleans,  Vicksburg,  and  Little  Rock,  the  latter  part  of 
March,  each  column  under  an  independent  commander, 
until  two  or  more  columns  united,  when  the  senior  officer 
would  command.  For  the  expedition,  General  Banks 
was  to  furnish  about  17,000  men  from  the  Department  of 
the  Gulf,  General  Sherman  10,000  men  from  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee,  and  General  Steele  15,000  men  from 
the  Department  of  Arkansas,  and  the  Mississippi  Squad 
ron  under  Admiral  Porter  was  to  cooperate  in  the 

312 


THE   RED  RIVER  DAM.  313 

general  movement.  Banks'  troops,  under  Major-General 
W.  B.  Franklin,  were  to  concentrate  at  Franklin,  on 
Bayou  Teche,  March  /th,  and  move  to  Red  River  and 
meet  the  detachment  of  Sherman's  army,  under  General 
A.  J.  Smith,  at  Alexandria,  Louisiana,  on  the  i/th. 
Sherman's  detachment,  under  General  Smith,  left  Vicks- 
burg,  March  loth,  in  transports,  was  convoyed  up  Red 
River  by  Admiral  Porter's  gunboats,  and  arrived  at 
Alexandria  on  the  i8th,  having  en  route  assaulted  and 
captured  Fort  De  Russey,  a  strongly  fortified  position  on 
Red  River,  with  ten  guns  and  several  hundred  prisoners. 
All  the  concentrations  of  troops  for  the  expedition,  it 
will  be  observed,  were  to  be  in  hostile  territory,  with 
many  intervening  obstacles  to  overcome.  It  was  neces 
sary  to  reduce  Fort  De  Russey  before  concentration  of 
the  troops  and  fleet  for  the  expedition  at  Alexandria. 
General  Steele  was  to  concentrate  his  troops  from  Little 
Rock  and  Fort  Smith  at  Arkadelphia,  a  point  in  hostile 
territory,  and  then  march  to  Shreveport  via  Camden,  a 
town  on  the  Washita  River  fortified  by  nine  forts.  It 
was  impossible  that  there  should  have  been  unity  of  ac 
tion  of  troops  from  such  distant  points,  moving  into  a 
hostile  country,  every  step  of  which  presented  obstacles 
to  be  overcome,  and  many  of  them  of  a  very  serious 
nature.  General  Steele,  with  two  divisions  of  his  army, 
left  Little  Rock,  March  23d,  for  Arkadelphia,  the  first 
point  of  concentration,  and  General  John  M.  Thayer, 
with  the  Frontier  Division,  Seventh  Army  Corps,  to  which 
the  writer  belonged,  left  Fort  Smith,  March  2ist,  for  the 
same  place,  where  he  was  to  effect  a  junction  with  the 
troops  from  Little  Rock  on  the  1st  of  April.  But  on 
account  of  the  terrible  condition  of  the  roads  over  the 
mountains,  the  troops  of  this  division  did  not  join  Steele 
until  the  roth  of  April,  on  the  Little  Missouri  River  be 
yond  Arkadelphia.  We  not  only  had  continued  skirmish 
ing  in  front,  on  the  flanks,  and  in  the  rear,  but  it  was 


314  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER, 

with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  we  got  our  trains  and 
artillery  over  the  mountains.  The  roads  up  or  down  the 
deep  hollows  or  gorges,  leading  to  the  mountain  passes, 
were  washed  out  by  recent  rains,  and  had  to  be  repaired 
before  the  heavy  trains  and  artillery  could  pass  over 
them.  When  we  joined  Steele  on  the  Little  Missouri, 
and  even  before,  the  road  across  the  swamps  and  low 
bottom-lands  of  all  the  bayous  and  rivers  had  to  be  cor 
duroyed,  in  some  places  for  miles,  to  enable  the  trains 
and  artillery  to  pass  over  it. 

At  the  time  of  this  concentration  of  Steele's  troops, 
Price  had  nearly  as  many  men  in  our  front  and  on  our 
flanks  and  rear  as  we  had,  and  as  they  were  mostly 
mounted,  they  could  be  and  were  used  as  infantry  to 
oppose  our  advance,  or  as  cavalry  to  operate  on  our  rear 
and  to  interrupt  our  communication  with  Little  Rock. 
We  knew  that  Arkadelphia  and  Washington  were  strongly 
fortified  towns,  and  the  Confederates  also  had  extensive 
fortifications  on  the  bluffs  commanding  the  crossing  of 
the  Little  Missouri  River,  and  at  Prairie  d'Ane,  a  few 
miles  beyond.  General  Steele  drove  the  Confederates 
from  and  turned  these  positions,  and  then  manoeuvred 
Price  out  of  Camden  and  took  that  strongly  fortified  city 
without  a  general  battle. 

After  Steele  left  Little  Rock,  he  had  no  direct  and 
certain  communication  with  the  other  columns  en  route 
to  Shreveport,  and  he  had  no  means  of  knowing  where 
Banks  was  and  what  he  was  doing,  and  Banks  had  no 
means  of  knowing  where  Steele  was  and  what  he  was 
doing  until  a  week  or  more  had  elapsed.  We  with  Steele 
first  received  the  news  of  Banks'  reverses  at  Sabine  Cross 
Roads  from  Southern  sources.  The  nearer  the  converg 
ing  Federal  columns  approached  Shreveport,  the  greater 
was  the  facility  with  which  General  Kirby  Smith  could 
throw  his  whole  force  against  either  column  he  might 
desire  to  attack.  The  detachment  of  General  Sherman's 


THE  RED  RIVER  DAM.  315 

army,  under  General  A.  J.  Smith,  was  loaned  as  a  co 
operating  column  against  Shreveport  for  thirty  days 
from  March  loth,  and  the  time  for  the  return  of  the 
troops  thus  detached  expired  April  loth,  the  day  after 
the  battle  of  Pleasant  Hill,  and  only  a  few  days  after  the 
concentration  of  the  troops  and  the  vessels  of  the  fleet  at 
Alexandria.  It  was  certainly  a  strange  policy  that  could 
inaugurate  such  extensive  operations  and  then  order  them 
brought  to  an  end  if  not  successful  in  ten  to  fifteen  days. 
This  was  a  different  policy  to  that  which  proposed  to 
"  fight  it  out  on  this  line  if  it  took  all  summer." 

The  withdrawal  of  ten  thousand  veteran  troops  under 
one  of  the  ablest  commanders  in  the  army  only  a  few  days 
after  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  and  two  days  after  the 
reverse  of  Banks'  army  at  Sabine  Cross  Roads,  made  further 
aggressive  operations  on  that  line  impracticable.  Banks 
was  unable  to  follow  up  his  success  after  his  victory  over 
the  Confederate  forces  at  Pleasant  Hill,  on  account  of  the 
loss  of  his  trains  at  Sabine  Cross  Roads  and  separation 
from  his  supplies.  He  therefore  retired  to  Grand  Ecore, 
threw  a  pontoon  across  the  river,  intrenched  his  position, 
and  proposed  to  advance  again.  But  as  the  river  was 
falling  so  that  he  could  not  have  the  cooperation  of  the 
navy,  and  as  General  A.  J.  Smith's  troops  were  under 
orders  to  return  to  Vicksburg,  Banks  retired  with  the 
army  to  Alexandria,  where  he  arrived,  April  25th.  On 
his  arrival  at  Alexandria  he  was  soon  informed  that  the 
river  had  fallen  so  much  that  the  vessels  of  the  fleet  would 
be  unable  to  pass  over  the  falls.  He  had  been  ordered 
to  bring  the  campaign  to  a  close  and  to  evacuate  the 
country,  and  now  he  was  confronted  with  the  prospect 
of  being  detained  at  that  point  for  an  indefinite  time,  or 
of  being  obliged  to  abandon  the  fleet.  If  the  fleet  was 
destroyed  it  would  be  a  great  loss  to  the  Government,  be 
sides  the  loss  of  prestige  to  the  Union  cause,  equivalent 
to  the  loss  of  a  great  battle ;  and  if  it  fell  into  the  hands 


316  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

of  the  enemy  it  would  be  used  in  blockading  the  Mis 
sissippi,  and  probably  in  prolonging  the  war — in  either 
event  a  great  disaster  to  the  country.  Admiral  Porter 
and  nearly  all  his  officers,  and  many  officers  of  the  army, 
believed  that  the  fleet  would  have  to  be  abandoned  or 
destroyed. 

When  the  Grecian  hosts  had  been  collected  and  em 
barked  in  a  great  fleet  for  the  Trojan  war,  and  was 
becalmed  in  the  port  of  Aulis,  Calchas,  the  seer,  was 
sought  to  explain  the  displeasure  of  the  gods,  and  in 
formed  Agamemnon  that  they  would  not  give  him  favor 
able  winds  to  sail  out  until  he  had  sacrificed  his  daughter 
Iphigenia.  But  when  our  army  was  detained  at  Alexan 
dria  on  account  of  the  low  stage  of  the  water  making  it 
impossible  for  the  fleet  to  pass  over  the  rapids,  our  seer, 
Colonel  Joseph  Bailey,  conceived  the  plan  of  raising  the 
water  on  the  rapids  by  constructing  a  dam  across  Red 
River  at  the  foot  of  the  falls  to  a  sufficient  depth  to  float 
the  vessels  over. 

The  building  of  the  Red  River  dam  above  Alexandria, 
Louisiana,  in  May,  1864,  by  which  the  Mississippi  Squad 
ron  under  Admiral  Porter  was  saved  from  destruction  or 
capture,  was  a  great  work  of  engineering  skill,  and  was  not 
only  one  of  the  great  achievements  of  the  war,  but  was 
an  achievement  scarcely  surpassed  in  military  annals, 
when  viewed  in  connection  with  the  situation  it  relieved. 
There  are  one  or  two  points  in  connection  with  that  work, 
which  directly  saved  the  Government  several  millions  of 
dollars  in  saving  the  fleet,  and  probably  indirectly  saved 
it  many  millions  of  dollars  if  the  gunboats  had  fallen  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy,  which  have  never  been  given  the 
prominence  they  deserve.  While  it  is  generally  known 
that  Lieutenant-Colonel  Joseph  Bailey,  Fourth  Wisconsin 
Cavalry,  Acting  Chief  Engineer,  Nineteenth  Army  Corps, 
afterwards  Brigadier-General,  was  the  originator  of  the 
plan  of  a  single  dam  across  Red  River  by  which  the 


THE  RED  RIVER   DAM.  317 

water  on  the  falls  was  to  be  raised  to  a  sufficient  depth  to 
float  the  vessels  over,  it  is  not  generally  known  that  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  U.  B.  Pearsall,  Fifth  Engineers,  Corps 
d'Afrique,  afterwards  Colonel  Forty-Eighth  Wisconsin 
Infantry,  and  Brevet  Brigadier-General,  first  suggested 
the  plan  of  two  dams,  a  plan  which  was  finally  adopted  in 
order  to  float  all  the  vessels  over  the  falls. 

Of  course  it  will  not  detract  from  the  merit  and  genius 
of  General  Bailey  to  give  General  Pearsall  due  credit  for 
the  genius  and  skill  he  displayed  in  that  great  work,  and 
to  make  more  prominent  that  part  of  the  work  of  which 
he  was  the  originator. 

It  was  a  singular  coincidence  that  these  two  distin 
guished  men  in  one  of  the  great  events  of  the  war  should 
have  drifted  to  places  within  a  few  miles  of  each  other, 
to  become  practically  neighbors,  directly  after  the  war. 
When  I  was  discharged  from  the  service  in  January, 
1865,  I  returned  to  my  home  at  Fort  Scott,  Kansas, 
where  I  enlisted,  and  was  soon  made  chief  clerk  of  the 
ordnance  office  at  that  post,  and  closed  up  the  business 
of  that  large  depot.  In  the  latter  part  of  the  spring  of 
1865,  General  Pearsall  was  placed  in  command  of  the 
District  of  the  Indian  Territory  and  Southern  Kansas, 
and  I  issued  ordnance  stores  to  his  officers.  After  he 
was  mustered  out  of  the  service  the  latter  part  of  Decem 
ber,  1865,  he  settled  down  at  Fort  Scott,  and  I  have 
known  him  since  as  a  neighbor  and  fellow-townsman. 

General  Bailey  came  to  that  section  directly  after  the 
war — in  the  early  part  of  1866 — with  his  family,  and  pur 
chased  lands  in  Vernon  County,  Missouri,  which  is  only 
four  miles  east  of  Fort  Scott,  and  was  elected  sheriff  of 
that  county,  and  held  the  office  up  to  the  time  he  was 
assassinated  in  the  spring  of  1867  by  some  of  the  outlaws 
who  had  been  followers  of  Quantrill  and  Jackman  during 
the  war,  and  whom  he  had  arrested  and  was  taking  to 
Nevada,  the  county  seat.  At  the  suggestion  of  his 


318  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

friends,  his  family  permitted  his  remains  to  be  interred 
in  Evergreen  Cemetery,  Fort  Scott,  where  a  suitable 
monument  now  marks  their  resting-place.  I  was  quite 
well  acquainted  with  him,  for  he  had  been  keeping  his 
flags,  medals,  and  swords  in  our  vault  for  some  time  be 
fore  his  death.  He  was  a  man  greatly  beloved  by  those 
who  knew  him. 

In  all  the  operations  pertaining  to  the  construction  of 
the  dam  to  raise  the  water  on  the  falls  of  Red  River  so 
that  the  vessels  of  the  fleet  could  pass  over  them,  Colo 
nel  Pearsall  was  Colonel  Bailey's  assistant,  was  frequently 
consulted  by  him,  and  had  charge  of  the  work  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river.  While  the  skill  and  genius  of 
Colonel  Bailey  in  saving  the  fleet  in  this  great  emergency 
cannot  be  too  highly  commended,  and  while  perhaps 
most  of  the  officers  of  the  army  and  navy  believed  that 
the  plan  was  impracticable  and  would  prove  a  failure,  the 
fact  may  here  be  emphasized  that  there  was  at  least  one 
officer  of  the  army  under  General  Banks  who  had  had 
practical  experience  in  constructing  such  dams  before  the 
war,  and  who  not  only  would  have  urged  substantially 
the  plan  adopted  by  Colonel  Bailey,  when  it  was  found 
that  the  water  on  the  falls  was  of  insufficient  depth  to 
float  the  vessels,  but  who  actually  suggested  such  a  plan 
while  the  army  and  fleet  were  at  Grand  Ecore,  should 
the  river  continue  to  fall.  That  officer  was  Colonel  U.  B. 
Pearsall.  Colonel  George  D.  Robinson,  commanding  the 
engineer  brigade,  in  his  report  in  regard  to  the  building 
of  the  dam,  and  in  referring  to  Colonel  Pearsall,  states 
that  "  the  plan  for  building  two  dams  across  Red  River, 
which  from  necessity  was  finally  adopted,  was  originally 
proposed  by  him  (Colonel  Pearsall),  and  the  success  of 
the  dam  was,  in  my  opinion,  mainly  due  to  his  efforts. 
If  the  thanks  of  Congress  are  due  to  any  one 
for  the  final  success  of  this  dam,  I  believe  they  are  due 
to  him  as  much  as  to  any  one  else." 


THE  RED  RIVER  DAM.  319 

Without  dwelling  upon  the  ill-conceived  plan  of  the 
campaign,  for  which  General  Banks  was  not  responsible, 
there  was  the  fact  that  Red  River  was  unusually  low  for 
that  season  of  the  year,  while  all  the  rivers  in  Arkansas 
were  out  of  their  banks  the  latter  half  of  April  from  the 
constant  rains.  During  our  occupation  of  Camden  under 
Steele  from  the  i$th  to  the  2/th  of  April,  there  were 
twenty-four  feet  of  water  in  the  channel  of  the  Washita 
River  at  that  point.  But  the  Washita  empties  into  Red 
River  some  distance  below  the  Alexandria  Falls,  and  of 
course  could  have  no  effect  in  relieving  the  fleet  from  its 
perilous  situation. 

After  the  first  reverse  of  the  army  at  Sabine  Cross 
Roads,  and  before  it  had  retired  to  Grand  Ecore,  Colonel 
Bailey  had  ascertained  that  Red  River  was  falling,  and  as 
it  seemed  to  him  that  the  fleet  under  Admiral  Porter 
would  not  likely  be  able  to  pass  over  the  falls  on  account 
of  the  low  stage  of  the  water,  he  submitted  a  plan  to 
General  Franklin,  proposing  to  raise  the  water  on  the 
falls  to  a  sufficient  depth  to  float  the  vessels  over.  The 
General  expressed  a  favorable  opinion  of  the  plan,  and 
shortly  afterwards,  on  hearing  of  the  sinking  of  the  iron 
clad  Eastport  below  Grand  Ecore,  gave  Colonel  Bailey  a 
letter  of  introduction  to  Admiral  Porter,  directing  him  to 
do  all  in  his  power  to  assist  in  raising  the  unfortunate 
vessel,  and  to  communicate  to  the  Admiral  his  plan  for 
constructing  a  dam  to  float  the  vessels  of  the  fleet  over 
the  falls.  His  offer  to  raise  the  Eastport  was  declined, 
and  no  action  in  regard  to  constructing  the  dam  to  float 
the  fleet  over  the  falls  was  taken  until  the  army  arrived 
at  Alexandria.  When  Admiral  Porter  arrived  at  the 
head  of  the  falls  he  saw  that  it  was  impossible  to  get  his 
vessels  over,  and  as  the  army  was  under  orders  to  evacu 
ate  the  country,  the  loss  or  destruction  of  his  fleet  seemed 
inevitable.  But  on  the  arrival  of  the  army  at  Alexandria, 
Colonel  Bailey  examined  the  river  and  submitted  to  Gen- 


320  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

eral  Franklin  additional  details  for  the  construction  of  the 
proposed  dam. 

The  General  approved  the  plan,  and  directed  the  Colo 
nel  "  to  see  the  Admiral  and  again  urge  upon  him  the 
necessity  of  prevailing  upon  General  Banks  to  order  the 
work  to  be  commenced  at  once."  In  the  interview  with 
the  Admiral,  Colonel  Bailey  represented  that  General 
Franklin  had  full  confidence  in  the  success  of  the  under 
taking  and  might  be  relied  upon  to  give  it  all  the  assist 
ance  in  his  power.  The  supplies  of  the  army  would  soon 
be  exhausted  and  something  had  to  be  done  at  once,  or 
the  fleet  would  have  to  be  abandoned,  so  that  Colonel 
Bailey  was  also  directed  to  see  Generals  Banks  and  Hun 
ter,  and  explain  to  them  the  details  for  the  proposed 
dam,  which  he  did.  General  Hunter,  who  had  just 
arrived  from  Washington  with  positive  orders  from  Gen 
eral  Grant  to  General  Banks  to  bring  the  expedition  to 
an  end,  expressed  little  confidence  in  the  plan  of  con 
structing  the  proposed  dam,  but  was  willing  that  the 
experiment  might  be  tried,  inasmuch  as  the  plan  was 
approved  by  General  Franklin,  who  was  a  distinguished 
engineer.  Finally,  orders  were  issued  by  General  Banks 
for  details  of  troops  and  teams  to  report  to  Colonel  Bailey 
to  commence  work  on  the  dam,  four  or  five  days  after 
the  army  arrived  at  Alexandria. 

The  surveys  showed  that  the  falls  were  over  a  mile  in 
length,  filled  with  rugged  rocks,  with  a  fall  of  nearly  nine 
feet  in  that  distance.  When  our  army  occupied  Alexan 
dria  in  1863,  complete  surveys  of  the  falls  were  captured 
from  the  Confederates  and  were  in  possession  of  the  en 
gineer  officers  of  the  army.  These  charts  and  some  further 
surveys  of  the  river  made  by  Captain  John  C.  Palfrey, 
United  States  Engineers,  Acting  Chief,  Engineer  Depart 
ment  of  the  Gulf,  showed  that  the  channel  was  narrow 
and  tortuous  and  formed  in  solid  rock  or  soapstone,  so 
that  it  was  impracticable  to  deepen  it  during  the  short 


THE  RED  RIVER  DAM.  321 

time  the  army  would  remain  at  that  point.  Hence,  the 
only  possible  way  of  relieving  the  fleet  was  by  raising 
the  water  on  the  falls.  Though  Admiral  Porter  states 
that  Colonel  Bailey's  proposition  to  construct  a  dam 
across  the  river  to  raise  the  water  "  looked  like  madness 
and  the  best  engineers  ridiculed  it,"  it  is  certain  that 
Captain  Palfrey,  of  the  Regular  Army  Engineers,  be 
lieved  it  practicable. 

The  plan  proposed  and  adopted  was  to  construct  a 
dam  across  the  river  at  the  foot  of  the  falls,  the  river  at 
that  point  being  758  feet  wide.  As  time  was  the  impor 
tant  element  in  the  work,  General  Banks  ordered  about 
three  thousand  men  and  upwards  of  two  hundred  wagons 
and  teams  to  report  to  Colonel  Bailey.  This  large  force 
was  divided  into  working  parties,  cutting  and  hauling 
timber,  quarrying  and  hauling  rock,  tearing  down  sugar- 
houses  and  mills  in  the  vicinity  of  Alexandria  and  collect 
ing  and  hauling  the  lumber,  brick,  and  machinery  from 
them,  while  other  parties  were  employed  in  using  the 
material  collected  in  constructing  the  dam  and  trestles 
for  runways  on  the  south  side,  under  the  superintend 
ence  of  Colonel  Pearsall. 

The  work  was  commenced  on  the  3<Dth  of  April,  and 
from  that  time  on  until  the  completion  of  the  dam,  May 
8th,  there  was  everywhere,  on  the  banks  of  the  river,  in 
the  river,  in  the  forests  near  by,  and  in  and  about  the 
city,  presented  a  busy  scene,  the  soldiers  working  like 
beavers,  singing  and  laughing  and  jolly,  while  on  the 
banks  of  the  river  there  were  thousands  of  men,  officers 
and  soldiers,  mounted  and  on  foot,  watching  the  progress 
of  the  work  and  making  all  kinds  of  suggestions  and  pre 
dictions  as  to  their  belief  in  the  success  or  failure  of  the 
enterprise.  The  forests  rang  with  the  sound  of  axes  in 
the  hands  of  the  details  of  soldiers  felling  trees  and  trim 
ming  them  up  for  the  cribs  and  tree-dam  ;  and  at  other 
points  were  heard  the  sounds  of  axes  and  hammers  in 


VOL.  II. — 21. 


322  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

hewing  and  fitting  timbers  for  flatboats  to  be  used  in 
bringing  material  to  points  where  it  was  required. 

It  will  doubtless  be  interesting  to  some  to  glance  at  de 
tails  of  the  work  at  its  different  stages.  When  the  point 
for  building  the  dam  had  been  determined  by  Colonel 
Bailey,  four  large  coal-barges,  with  a  steam  tug  to  handle 
them,  were  furnished  him  by  the  navy.  Two  of  the 
barges  were  then  hitched  together  end  to  end  and  taken 
to  one  side  of  the  channel,  and,  as  soon  as  placed  in  the 
desired  position,  scuttled  by  auger-holes  made  in  the 
bottom  of  each.  They  were  held  in  position  by  long 
iron  rods  passing  through  the  auger-holes  and  then  driven 
into  the  soapstone  bed  of  the  river.  The  upstream  end 
of  the  upper  barge  was  presented  to  the  current,  and  to 
hold  them  in  position  as  effectively  as  possible  the  tops 
of  the  iron  rods  leaned  upstream  at  an  angle  of  about 
forty-five  degrees.  The  other  two  barges,  also  fastened 
together  end  to  end,  were  taken  to  the  other  side  of  the 
channel,  scuttled,  and  made  secure  to  the  bed  of  the  river 
in  the  same  manner  as  the  first  two  barges,  leaving  a 
space  of  sixty-six  feet  in  the  centre  of  the  channel  be 
tween  the  barges.  The  barges,  as  now  placed,  formed 
two  piers  in  the  river.  Having  placed  the  barges  in  their 
proper  positions,  the  next  step  in  the  work  was  to  con 
struct  a  crib-dam  from  the  south  bank  to  the  barges  on 
that  side  of  the  channel,  and  a  tree-dam  from  the  north 
bank  to  the  barges  on  that  side  of  the  channel. 

Leaving  Colonel  Pearsall  in  charge  of  the  work  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river,  Colonel  Bailey  went  over  to  the 
north  side  to  superintend  the  construction  of  the  tree- 
dam  from  that  bank  to  the  nearest  barges.  The  work  of 
filling  the  four  barges  with  stone,  brick,  and  heavy  ma 
terial  for  weight,  as  well  as  the  building  and  setting  of  the 
cribs,  was  therefore  left  to  Colonel  Pearsall.  Before  he 
could  commence  filling  the  barges,  he  was  obliged  to  set 
his  men  to  work  to  build  a  long,  high  trestle  runway  ex- 


THE  RED  RIVER  DAM.  323 

tending  from  the  south  bank  to  the  farther  barges,  the 
runway  being  made  wide  enough  for  the  working  gangs 
to  pass  each  other  in  going  to  and  returning  from  the 
barges.  Every  wheelbarrow  in  and  about  Alexandria 
that  could  be  found  was  pressed  into  use,  and  a  good 
many  barrows  were  made  out  of  cracker-boxes,  until 
enough  were  obtained  to  keep  about  six  hundred  men 
steadily  employed  in  carrying  material  from  the  shore  to 
the  barges.  To  obtain  lumber  for  making  the  trestle 
runway,  sugar-houses  were  torn  down,  and  the  stone, 
brick,  and  machinery  in  them  were  used  for  weight.  A 
large  lot  of  railroad  iron  found  at  Alexandria  was  also 
used  for  weight  in  filling  the  barges  and  cribs. 

After  completing  the  trestle  runway,  and  setting  his 
men  to  work  filling  the  barges,  Colonel  Pearsall  went  up 
the  south  bank  of  the  river  about  half  a  mile  and  "  selected 
a  suitable  place  to  build  large  skidways  upon  which  to 
construct  the  log  cribs  "  which  were  to  be  launched  and 
floated  to  their  proper  places  when  completed  and  other 
parts  of  the  work  were  ready  for  them.  The  building 
and  launching  of  these  cribs  was  a  difficult  and  important 
part  of  the  work,  and  required  a  large  force  of  men  to 
carry  it  forward  with  the  expedition  the  situation  de 
manded.  Each  of  the  cribs  was  32  feet  long  by  12  feet 
wide  and  12  feet  deep.  They  were  constructed  on  the 
principle  of  the  ordinary  log  house,  with  the  upper  ends  of 
the  logs  saddled  and  the  under  ends  notched  to  fit  on  to 
the  saddled  ends.  When  thus  fitted  the  timbers  were  fast 
ened  together  by  heavy  iron  spikes.  After  completion, 
joists  were  placed  upright  near  the  corners  of  each  crib 
and  bolted  together.  There  was  a  pole  floor  running 
across  the  crib,  the  end  of  each  pole  resting  on  the  lower 
log  of  each  side,  to  hold  the  material  for  weight  and  for 
stopping  the  water. 

While  the  work  of  filling  the  barges  and  building  the 
cribs  was  in  progress,  Colonel  Bailey,  who  had  gone  over 


324  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

to  the  north  side,  was  busy  constructing  the  tree-dam 
from  that  bank  to  the  barges  on  that  side  of  the  channel. 
This  dam  was  made  of  large  trees,  with  the  tops  up 
stream  and  held  down  by  brush  weighted  with  stone 
*brought  down  by  flatboats,  the  butts  resting  on  cross 
logs  which  raised  them  with  a  slope  towards  the  tops. 
The  butts  of  some  of  the  trees  were  notched,  and  the 
cross  logs  rested  in  the  notches  to  hold  them  in  position. 
Just  as  soon  as  the  tree-dam  was  completed  above  water 
from  the  north  bank  to  the  barges,  Colonel  Pearsall  com 
menced  closing  the  channel  from  the  south  bank  to  the 
nearest  barges,  using  large  ropes,  which  were  furnished  by 
the  navy,  to  ease  the  cribs,  after  they  were  launched,  down 
stream  to  their  places.  Each  crib  was  placed  in  position 
with  its  upstream  end  to  the  current,  so  that  twelve  feet 
of  the  channel  between  the  south  bank  and  the  barges 
were  closed  at  a  time.  On  floating  each  crib  to  its  place, 
it  was  made  secure  by  driving  large  iron  rods,  leaning  up 
stream,  through  cracks  between  the  pole  floor  into  the 
soapstone  bed  of  the  river.  When  the  cribs  were  brought 
down  to  their  proper  places  and  secured,  the  work  of 
loading  them  with  stone,  iron,  and  debris  was  commenced 
by  part  of  the  working  force  which  had  been  employed 
in  filling  the  barges,  and  by  such  additional  details  of 
men  as  were  required  to  carry  on  the  work  with  the 
proper  despatch.  Of  course  when  the  channel  was  closed 
by  the  tree-dam  from  the  north  bank  to  the  barges,  and 
by  the  cribs  from  the  south  bank  to  the  barges,  a  large 
amount  of  water  still  continued  to  flow  through  the 
spaces  between  the  trunks  of  the  trees  and  through  the 
spaces  between  the  logs  of  the  cribs,  so  that  it  became 
necessary  to  tighten  the  dam  on  each  side  in  order  to  force 
nearly  all  the  water  of  the  river  through  the  opening  of 
sixty-six  feet  between  the  barges.  But  even  before  work 
was  commenced  to  tighten  the  dam  on  each  side,  the 
water  was  raised  on  the  rapids  above  about  three  feet. 


THE  RED  RIVER  DAM.  325 

In  tightening,  brush  and  clay  were  used  to  stop  the  water 
from  flowing  through  the  spaces  between  the  trunks  of 
the  trees  and  through  the  cracks  between  the  logs  of  the 
cribs, 

Even  so  accurate  a  writer  as  Colonel  R.  B.  Irwin,  As 
sistant  Adjutant-General,  Department  of  the  Gulf,  was 
under  the  impression  that  "  the  space  between  the  wing- 
dams  was  closed  by  sinking  across  it  four  of  the  large 
coal-barges  belonging  to  the  navy."  This  is  an  error. 
The  space  of  sixty-six  feet  between  the  barges  placed  as 
described  never  was  closed,  and  Colonel  Bailey  never  in 
tended  to  close  the  channel  completely,  but  to  force  all 
the  water  through  the  opening  of  sixty-six  feet,  believ 
ing  that  this  would  raise  the  water  above  the  dam  to  a 
sufficient  depth  to  float  the  gunboats  over  the  upper  falls. 
On  this  point  there  was  a  difference  of  opinion  between 
Colonel  Bailey  and  Colonel  Pearsall,  the  latter  holding 
that  narrowing  the  channel  to  sixty-six  feet  would  not 
raise  the  water  on  the  upper  falls  to  a  depth  that  would 
permit  the  vessels  of  the  fleet  to  pass  over. 

To  properly  understand  the  difficulties  encountered  in 
building  the  dam,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  cur 
rent  of  the  river  at  that  point  was  running  like  a  mill-tail, 
at  a  velocity  of  nearly  ten  miles  an  hour.  But  by  work 
ing  day  and  night,  in  the  scorching  sun,  and  sometimes 
in  water  up  to  their  necks,  the  soldiers  of  the  army,  with 
out  accident,  on  the  8th  of  May,  completed  the  dam, 
which  raised  the  water  on  the  rapids  five  feet  four  and  a 
half  inches. 

In  the  afternoon  of  that  day  the  water  had  risen  suffi 
ciently  on  the  upper  falls  to  allow  the  three  light-draught 
gunboats  Osage,  Hindman,  and  Ncosho  to  get  over  at 
four  o'clock,  to  be  in  readiness  to  pass  the  dam.  General 
Banks,  who  from  the  beginning  had  watched  the  progress 
of  the  work  with  intense  interest,  and  who  had  en 
couraged  it  with  his  presence  every  day,  inspected  it  at 


326  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

eleven  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  8th,  with  a  member 
of  his  staff,  and  feeling  that  the  pressure  of  the  water  was 
so  great  that  the  dam  could  not  stand  another  day,  rode 
at  once  up  to  the  point  where  the  fleet  was  anchored  to 
ascertain  whether  the  other  vessels  of  the  navy  were  in 
readiness  to  follow  those  which  had  already  passed  over 
the  upper  falls  into  the  pond  above  the  dam.  When  he 
arrived  at  the  fleet  about  midnight  he  saw  from  the  still 
ness  that  prevailed,  and  the  few  dim  lights  burning  on 
the  vessels,  that  no  preparation  had  been  made  to  take 
advantage  of  the  rise  of  about  five  feet  of  water  above 
the  dam  to  get  the  balance  of  the  fleet  out  at  the  earliest 
practicable  moment.  He  addressed  a  note  to  Admiral 
Porter  at  one  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  Qth,  which 
was  delivered  to  him  by  Colonel  J.  G.  Wilson  at  two 
o'clock,  stating  his  belief  that  the  dam  would  not  stand 
another  day,  and  requesting  that  immediate  measures  be 
taken  to  put  the  balance  of  the  fleet  in  readiness  to  pass 
the  rapids  early  that  morning.  None  of  the  heavier 
vessels  of  the  fleet  had  had  any  of  their  heavy  guns  or 
armor  removed  to  lighten  their  draught. 

Shortly  after  five  o'clock  that  morning  the  enormous 
pressure  of  the  water  swept  away  the  two  barges  from 
the  distal  end  of  the  crib-dam,  sweeping  them  around  to 
the  north  side  of  the  chute  just  below  the  barges  at  the 
distal  end  of  the  tree-dam.  The  breaking  away  of  the 
barges  was  considered  by  both  Colonel  Bailey  and  Colo 
nel  Pearsall  as  a  fortunate  occurrence,  inasmuch  as  they 
in  their  new  position  tended  to  lengthen  the  chute  and 
confine  the  water  passing  through  the  gap  between  them 
and  the  south  bank  to  a  point  below  a  dangerous  ledge 
of  rocks.  After  the  breaking  away  of  the  barges,  the 
water  above  the  dam  fell  six  to  eight  inches.  But  work 
was  at  once  commenced  to  narrow  the  channel  to  raise 
the  water  to  its  former  height  by  putting  in  additional 
cribs  and  by  tightening  the  dam.  At  the  time  the  barges 


THE  RED  RIVER  DAM.  327 

were  swept  away,  the  gunboat  Lexington  was  the  only 
vessel  of  the  fleet  above  the  rapids  ready  to  move.  Ad 
miral  Porter  galloped  around  to  the  upper  falls  and 
ordered  her  to  run  the  rapids,  and  with  a  full  head  of 
steam  she  plunged  into  the  turbulent,  foaming  waters, 
and  passed  the  rapids  and  the  dam  also,  watched  with 
the  deepest  interest  by  the  thousands  of  troops  on  the 
shore,  and  greeted  by  them  with  rousing  cheers  when 
she  rode  in  safety  in  the  smooth  water  below.  In  a 
short  time  she  was  followed  by  the  Hindman  and  the 
light-draught  monitors  Osage  and  Neosho,  which  had 
passed  over  the  upper  falls  and  rapids  the  evening  be 
fore  and  were  waiting  in  the  pond  above  the  dam.  It 
was  asserted  by  General  Banks  and  other  officers  of  the 
army  that  had  the  other  vessels  of  the  fleet  been  in  readi 
ness  to  move  they  could  have  passed  the  rapids  and  the 
chute  through  the  dam  that  morning.  But  the  safe  pas 
sage  of  four  vessels  of  the  fleet  over  the  rapids  and  through 
the  chute  in  the  dam  to  the  tranquil  waters  below  showed 
that  the  plan  of  the  dam  for  raising  the  water  to  float  the 
vessels  of  the  fleet  over  the  falls  was  sound,  and  instead 
of  Colonel  Bailey  being  discouraged  by  the  breaking  away 
of  the  barges,  he  proposed  to  construct  at  once  wing- 
dams  from  the  north  and  south  banks  at  the  upper  falls, 
extending  a  hundred  or  so  feet  into  the  river,  and  leaving 
a  space  wide  enough  between  the  distal  ends  of  each  dam 
for  the  vessels  of  the  fleet  to  pass  through  the  chute. 

Leaving  the  work  of  repairing  and  tightening  the  lower 
dam  under  a  proper  officer,  he  rode  to  the  upper  falls  on 
the  south  side  to  locate  the  points  from  which  to  build 
the  wing-dams  from  each  side.  It  was  decided  to  make 
these  dams  of  light  log  cribs,  lashed  together  with  ropes 
and  filled  with  brush  and  brick.  This  part  of  the  work 
was  under  the  immediate  supervision  of  Colonel  Pearsall, 
who  in  a  few  hours  had  a  large  force  of  men  employed  in 
making  and  setting  the  cribs  and  filling  them.  By  the 


328  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

afternoon  of  the  loth  this  work  was  far  enough  advanced 
to  raise  the  water  on  the  upper  falls  fourteen  inches. 
While  the  troops  were  constructing  these  wing-dams  at 
the  upper  falls,  the  heavy  guns  and  armor  were  removed 
from  some  of  the  vessels  of  the  fleet  above  the  rapids  to 
lessen  their  draught  and  the  depth  of  water  necessary  to 
float  them,  a  precaution  that  should  have  been  taken  dur 
ing  the  construction  of  the  dam  at  the  foot  of  the  rapids. 
The  heavy  naval  guns  thus  taken  off  the  vessels  were  re 
moved  from  the  shore  to  a  point  below  the  dam,  under 
the  direction  of  Lieutenant  Beebe,  of  the  Ordnance  De 
partment,  with  details  of  soldiers  from  the  army.  Where 
the  guns  were  not  taken  off  a  vessel  they  were  moved 
towards  the  stern  to  keep  the  boat  from  diving  after 
plunging  through  the  chute  of  the  lower  dam.  Before 
starting  to  run  the  rapids  the  port-holes  of  the  vessels 
had  to  be  closed  and  calked,  for  after  passing  the  lower 
dam  all  the  boats  would  dive  and  for  a  moment  would  be 
completely  submerged.  After  making  her  plunge  through 
the  chute  of  the  dam,  it  is  stated  that  one  of  the  gun 
boats,  perhaps  the  Essex,  actually  dipped  water  into  her 
smoke-stacks. 

On  the  loth,  before  the  wing-dams  at  the  head  of  the 
falls  were  completed,  the  gunboat  Chillicothe  passed  the 
rapids  and  through  the  chute  of  the  lower  dam  in  safety. 
In  a  short  time  afterwards  the  Carondelet  was  ordered  to 
follow  her,  but  in  passing  through  the  chute  of  the  upper 
dam  she  was  driven  by  the  force  of  the  strong  current 
too  far  towards  the  north  bank  and  grounded  just  below 
the  distal  end  of  the  wing-dam  extending  from  that  bank, 
with  her  bow  upstream,  her  position  being  diagonally 
across  the  channel.  After  it  was  found  impossible  to 
move  her  from  this  position  and  her  loss  appeared  in 
evitable,  the  officers  of  the  navy  thought  there  was  room 
enough  for  the  other  vessels  of  the  fleet  to  pass  alongside 
of  her,  and  ordered  the  Mound  City  to  try  it.  This  vessel 


THE  RED  RIVER   DAM.  329 

met  with  no  better  success,  and  grounded  abreast  of  the 
Carondelct.  Here  was  a  serious  situation,  for  raising  the 
water  above  the  dam  would  not  help  these  vessels  in  their 
present  position,  and  there  were  still  five  ironclads  above 
them. 

In  this  perplexing  situation,  Colonel  Bailey  came  to  his 
assistant,  Colonel  Pearsall,  and  asked  him  what  could  be 
done  to  relieve  the  boats.  In  reply  Colonel  Pearsall 
proposed  that  if  the  matter  was  left  to  him  to  adopt  a 
plan  of  his  own,  and  if  he  could  have  the  required  men  and 
material,  he  would  agree  to  put  a  foot  of  water  under  the 
grounded  vessels  by  the  next  evening.  His  proposition 
was  accepted,  and  the  pioneer  corps  of  the  Thirteenth 
Army  Corps,  under  Captain  J.  B.  Hutchins,  was  ordered 
to  report  to  him  that  night  on  the  south  side  of  the  river. 
Nothing,  however,  was  done  that  night,  as  he  was  unable 
to  get  cutters  from  the  navy  to  cross  his  working  force 
over  the  river  to  the  north  bank  to  the  point  where  he 
proposed  to  build  a  bracket-dam  until  daylight  the  next 
morning.  When  he  reached  the  north  bank  the  next 
morning  and  made  an  examination  of  the  river,  he  deter 
mined  to  build  a  bracket-dam  below  the  crib-dam  from 
that  bank,  commencing  at  a  point  opposite  the  stern  of 
the  Carondelct,  the  distal  end  of  the  dam  to  extend  close 
up  to  that  vessel.  In  a  few  hours  after  he  got  over, 
lumber  and  material  were  arriving  on  the  ground,  and  he 
set  his  men  to  work  making  A-shaped  trestles  to  be  used 
in  building  the  dam. 

This  bracket-dam  was  made  of  logs  with  the  up-stream 
ends  resting  on  the  bed  of  the  river,  and  the  lower  ends 
raised  on  the  A-shaped  trestles.  The  logs  were  then 
covered  with  heavy  plank,  nailed  down,  and  that  fitted  so 
closely  as  to  make  the  space  between  them  almost  water 
tight,  thus  turning  the  water  from  that  side  of  the  river 
into  the  narrow  channel  and  raising  it  fourteen  inches  by 
eleven  o'clock  that  day,  and  enabling  the  grounded 


330  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE  BORDER. 

vessels,  the  Carondelet  and  Mound  City,  to  float  off  easily 
and  pass  the  rapids  and  through  the  chute  of  the  lower 
dam  in  safety.  The  wing-dams  from  the  north  and  south 
banks  were  now  also  completed,  and  the  remaining  gun 
boats  passed  through  the  chute,  the  rapids,  and  the  chute 
of  the  lower  dam  on  that  and  the  following  day,  and  thus 
were  united  in  safety  all  the  vessels  of  the  Mississippi 
Squadron  in  Red  River  below  the  Alexandria  Falls.  It 
appears  from  the  data  furnished  by  Colonel  Pearsall  that 
the  upper  dam  was  located  over  two  hundred  feet  above 
the  crest  of  the  soapstone  ledge  over  which  the  water 
poured,  so  that  while  the  water  was  raised  to  a  sufficient 
depth  for  the  vessels  to  enter  the  chute,  "  it  expanded 
immediately  below  the  dam  and  left  the  boats  hard 
aground."  Had  Colonel  Bailey  been  fully  impressed 
with  the  fact  that  the  water  after  passing  through  the 
opening  in  the  dam  would  rapidly  spread  out  on  both 
sides,  he  would  probably  have  located  it  near  the  brink 
of  the  ledge  of  rock.  The  water  then  forced  through  the 
opening  would  have  poured  directly  into  the  deep  water 
below,  thus  obviating  the  necessity  of  building  the 
bracket-dam. 


CHAPTER    XXI. 

OPERATIONS    IX    NORTHWESTERN"    ARKANSAS. 

THE  Districts  of  Southwest  Missouri  and  Northwest 
Arkansas  in  the  month  of  January,  1864,  were  not  seri 
ously  disturbed  by  incursions  from  the  Southern  partisan 
bands  or  guerillas.  But  in  the  latter  part  of  the  month, 
after  the  severe  cold  weather  of  the  winter  had  passed  off, 
General  Sanborn,  commanding  that  district,  received  in 
formation  that  the  Confederate  forces  of  Colonels  Free 
man,  Love,  and  McRae  were  concentrating  in  Searcy 
and  Newton  Counties,  in  Northern  Arkansas,  twelve  to 
fifteen  hundred  strong,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  raid 
into  Missouri  to  capture  the  Federal  trains  between  Rolla 
and  Springfield,  or  between  Springfield  and  Fayetteville. 
General  Sanborn  was  soon  convinced  that  the  most  effec 
tive  way  of  preventing  these  hostile  incursions  was  for  the 
troops  of  his  district  to  march  into  Arkansas  and  strike 
any  Confederate  force  found  north  of  the  mountains.  He 
determined,  therefore,  not  to  wait  for  the  Confederates  to 
move,  but  to  concentrate  a  sufficient  number  of  his  own 
troops  in  the  section  occupied  by  them  to  strike  them 
before  they  could  get  ready  to  start  on  the  contemplated 
expedition.  His  troops  were  ordered  to  concentrate  at 
Rolling  Prairie,  Boone  County,  Arkansas,  January  23d. 
To  cooperate  in  this  movement,  Captain  W.  C.  Hu 
man,  commanding  a  battalion  of  two  hundred  men  of 
the  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  marched  from 

331 


332  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Ozark,  Missouri,  on  the  i8th;  Colonel  John  E.  Phelps, 
Second  Arkansas  Cavalry,  with  two  hundred  men  of  his 
regiment,  marched  from  Cassville,  Missouri,  on  the  i/th, 
and  Major  Charles  Galloway,  First  Arkansas  Cavalry,  with 
185  men  of  that  regiment  and  one  howitzer,  marched  from 
Fayetteville,  Arkansas,  a  little  earlier  in  the  month,  hav 
ing  been  instructed  to  make  a  scout  that  would  take  him 
off  the  direct  line  of  march.  These  forces  formed  a  junc 
tion  on  Marshall's  Prairie,  in  Searcy  County,  Arkansas,  on 
the  morning  of  the  22d,  marched  in  the  direction  of  Bur- 
rowsville,  and  had  two  sharp  skirmishes  with  the  enemy 
that  day,  who  had  taken  up  strong  positions  at  the  cross 
ings  of  Clear  Creek  and  Tomahawk. 

The  Confederates  were  driven  from  their  positions  with 
some  loss,  and  the  united  Federal  forces  marched  into 
Burrowsville  the  next  day.  At  this  point  the  Federal 
forces  divided  for  the  purpose  of  thoroughly  scouting  the 
adjoining  counties,  the  command  of  Captain  Human, 
Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  going  as  far  south 
as  Clinton,  in  Van  Buren  County,  in  pursuit  of  the  fleeing 
partisan  bands.  While  these  forces  were  operating  in  that 
section  a  Confederate  force  of  two  or  three  hundred  men 
passed  to  their  rear  and  appeared  in  Carroll  County  a  few 
miles  from  Berryville.  On  hearing  of  this  movement 
General  Sanborn  sent  General  C.  B.  Holland,  of  the  Mis 
souri  Enrolled  Militia,  with  a  battalion  of  the  Sixth 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry  of  two  hundred  men 
under  Major  George  W.  Murphy,  and  a  section  of  the 
First  Missouri  Light  Artillery  under  Lieutenant  Stierlin, 
to  the  point  of  disturbance,  and  to  assume  command  of 
the  Federal  forces  in  the  field  in  Northern  Arkansas. 
General  Holland  moved  by  way  of  Cassville,  Missouri, 
and  arrived  at  Berryville  on  the  2Qth,  where  he  was  de 
tained  a  week  by  high  water  and  for  his  supplies  to  come 
up.  He  then  moved  forward  and  formed  a  junction  with 
the  forces  under  Galloway,  Phelps,  and  Human  at  Rolling 


OPERATIONS  IN  NORTHWESTERN  ARKANSAS.     333 

Prairie  on  February  8th.  From  this  point  he  marched 
with  his  united  forces  to  Yellville,  in  Marion  County, 
where  he  captured  eight  Southern  Partisan  Rangers,  some 
of  whom  were  considered  bad  characters.  After  scouting 
the  country  in  all  directions  for  two  or  three  days,  and 
dispersing  several  bands  of  Partisan  Rangers,  he  left  Cap 
tain  Human  with  his  battalion  of  the  Eighth  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry  at  Yellville,  and  with  the  battalion 
of  the  Sixth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry  and  the  section 
of  artillery  he  returned  to  Springfield.  Colonel  Phelps 
and  Major  Galloway,  with  their  commands,  returned  to 
their  respective  stations  at  Cassville,  Missouri,  and  Fay- 
etteville,  Arkansas.  Major  Galloway  reported  that  in 
the  different  skirmishes  and  actions  the  Federal  troops  of 
the  expedition  killed  one  hundred  of  the  enemy,  with  a 
loss  of  two  killed  and  three  wounded  on  the  Federal  side. 
In  connection  with  these  operations,  the  heaviest  loss 
on  the  Federal  side  fell  on  a  detachment  of  twenty-four 
men,  under  Sergeant  Isaac  T.  Jones,  of  the  Eleventh  Mis 
souri  Cavalry,  who  were  sent  out  by  General  Sanborn 
from  Springfield  with  despatches  to  Captain  Human, 
commanding  a  battalion,  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia 
Cavalry.  On  the  23d  of  January,  while  Sergeant  Jones 
and  his  men  were  marching  across  Rolling  Prairie,  Ar 
kansas,  they  were  suddenly  attacked  and  charged  upon 
by  some  sixty  guerillas,  and  in  the  fight  that  took  place 
the  Sergeant  and  six  of  his  men  were  killed  on  the  ground 
and  five  captured  and  afterwards  shot ;  the  despatches 
also  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  On  that  same 
day  a  Federal  force  of  two  hundred  men  under  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  W.  Baumer,  First  Nebraska  Cavalry,  and 
ninety-two  men  under  Captain  Samuel  E.  Turner,  Sixth 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  attacked  a  Confederate 
force,  under  Colonel  Thomas  Freeman,  of  three  hundred 
men,  on  Sylamore  Creek,  a  day's  march  southeast  of 
Rolling  Prairie,  killing  and  wounding  25  men,  capturing 


334  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

57  men,  including  8  officers,  besides  all  the  Colonel's 
train,  125  horses  and  mules;  and  his  trunk  containing  his 
private  papers  and  commission. 

Captain  Human  held  the  post  of  Yellville  for  a  month 
or  so,  during  which  time  his  command  was  constantly 
employed  in  scouting,  and  had  frequent  conflicts  with  the 
guerilla  bands  of  that  section.  A  battalion  of  the  First 
Arkansas  Cavalry  under  Major  Fitch  also  cooperated 
with  Captain  Human  in  endeavoring  to  restore  quiet,  and 
prevent  incursions  of  bandits,  Partisan  Rangers,  and  Con 
federate  recruiting  parties.  There  was  a  strong  Union 
sentiment  throughout  that  section,  and  as  nearly  all  the 
able-bodied  Union  men  had  enlisted  in  the  loyal  Arkansas 
regiments,  it  was  desirable  to  protect  their  families  as  far 
as  practicable  from  being  robbed  and  plundered  by  the 
bandits  and  rangers  infesting  the  country. 

After  the  Second  Arkansas  Union  Cavalry  had  com 
pleted  its  organization  under  Colonel  John  E.  Phelps,  it 
was  kept  in  the  field  in  the  counties  of  Carroll.  Newton, 
and  Searcy,  in  Northern  Arkansas,  most  of  the  time  during 
the  spring  and  summer  of  1864,  and  had  frequent  conflicts 
with  the  bandits  and  rangers  in  the  rough  mountainous 
regions  of  that  country.  He  not  only  had  the  Southern 
rangers  and  guerillas  who  lived  in  that  country  to  contend 
with,  but  his  troops  sometimes  met  bands  of  desperate 
characters  who  had  been  driven  out  of  Missouri  and  who 
were  watching  for  favorable  opportunities  to  return.  The 
most  serious  loss  he  sustained  during  his  operations  in 
that  section  was  in  an  action  a  detachment  of  one  hun 
dred  of  his  regiment  under  Lieutenant  Garner  had  with 
some  two  hundred  bandits  under  the  notorious  Colonel 
S.  D.  Jackman,  of  Missouri,  on  Richland  Creek,  in  Searcy 
County.  This  man  Jackman  appears  to  have  been  some 
times  a  bandit  of  the  Quantrill  type,  and  at  other  times 
to  have  commanded  regular  Confederate  troops  in  the 
field. 


OPERATIONS  IN  NORTHWESTERN  ARKANSAS.     335 

On  the  1st  of  May  Colonel  Phelps  had  a  train  of  sup 
plies  detained  a  day  or  so  on  the  north  side  of  Buffalo 
River,  in  the  western  part  of  Searcy  County,  by  high  water. 
There  being  no  rumors  of  a  hostile  force  in  that  section, 
the  escort  and  train  under  Lieutenant  Garner  crossed  to 
the  south  side  of  Buffalo  River,  and  were  moving  along 
leisurely,  near  the  mouth  of  Richland  Creek,  when  the 
advance-guard  was  fiercely  attacked  by  Jackman  and  cut 
off  from  the  main  body  of  the  escort.  A  force  of  the 
bandits  was  thrown  in  between  the  main  part  of  the  es 
cort  and  train  and  rear-guard,  so  that  in  the  defence  of 
the  train  the  Federal  detachment  was  beaten  in  detail 
and  terribly  cut  to  pieces,  Lieutenant  Hester  and  thirty- 
seven  men  having  fallen  in  the  bloody  massacre ;  besides, 
there  were  eleven  men  who  were  wounded.  Colonel 
Phelps  reported  that  his  men  had  been  slaughtered ;  in 
the  fight  Jackman  had  not  taken  any  prisoners — all  the 
Federal  soldiers  who  fell  into  his  hands  were  murdered. 
On  hearing  of  the  disaster  from  some  of  his  men  who  had 
escaped  from  the  bloody  scene,  Colonel  Phelps  hastily 
collected  about  one  hundred  soldiers  of  his  regiment, 
and  marching  all  night,  some  thirty  miles,  attacked  Jack 
man  in  his  camp  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  and  drove 
him  out  of  it  with  some  loss.  The  bandits  attempted  to 
rally  near  their  camp,  but  Colonel  Phelps  charged  them 
again  and  routed  them,  and  would  have  pursued  them 
more  vigorously  had  his  horses  not  been  so  much  ex 
hausted  by  the  night's  hard  marching.  In  this  fight 
Colonel  Phelps  had  seven  men  wounded.  He  recovered 
part  of  the  mules  belonging  to  the  train.  The  bandits 
had  burned  the  train  and  shot  some  of  the  mules. 

A  short  time  before  this  affair,  Colonel  Phelps  sent  out 
Major  James  A.  Melton,  of  his  regiment,  with  two  hun 
dred  men  to  find  and  attack  and  break  up  the  guerilla 
command  of  Colonel  Sissell,  supposed  to  be  in  the  south 
ern  part  of  Newton  County.  After  several  days'  hard 


336  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

marching,  Major  Melton  ascertained  that  the  enemy,  180 
strong,  were  encamped  in  Limestone  Valley,  and  timed 
his  movements  so  as  to  attack  them  just  after  daybreak. 
He  surprised  them  and  charged  into  their  camp,  and 
routed  them  before  they  had  time  to  form  in  line.  He 
pursued  the  main  body  of  them  eight  miles,  and  in  the 
fight  around  camp  and  in  the  pursuit  killed  30,  and  cap 
tured  9  men,  23  head  of  horses,  and  25  stands  of  arms, 
without  sustaining  any  loss  in  his  command. 

While  the  operations  of  the  Second  Arkansas  Cavalry 
under  Colonel  Phelps  were  mostly  confined  to  the  coun 
ties  of  Carroll,  Boone,  Marion,  Newton,  and  Searcy,  the 
operations  of  the  First  Arkansas  Cavalry  under  Colonel 
M.  La  Rue  Harrison  were  confined  mostly  to  the  counties 
of  Washington,  Benton,  Madison,  and  Crawford,  Arkan 
sas,  and  to  the  eastern  part  of  the  Cherokee  Nation,  with 
headquarters  at  Fayetteville.  In  those  western  counties 
of  the  State  the  Southern  partisan  bands  were  under  the 
leadership  of  Captain  Buck  Brown,  of  Benton  County. 
These  bands,  of  a  dozen  up  to  fifty  to  one  hundred  men 
each,  were  scattered  over  those  counties,  and  it  was 
thought  by  the  Federal  officers  at  Fayetteville  could  be 
concentrated  four  or  five  hundred  strong. 

When  the  Southern  Cherokees  of  Stand  Watie's  com 
mand  were  on  a  raid  through  the  Indian  Territory  north 
of  the  Arkansas  River,  they  sometimes  cooperated  with 
Brown's  partisan  bands  when  their  united  forces  could 
act  effectively  against  the  Federal  troops  in  that  section. 
Colonel  Harrison  was  unable  to  make  his  force  at  Fayette 
ville  very  effective  against  these  guerillas  during  the  spring 
and  summer,  on  account  of  most  of  his  men  being  dis 
mounted,  their  horses  having  become  unserviceable  for 
want  of  forage.  Most  of  the  force  he  was  able  to  keep 
mounted  was  constantly  employed  in  escort  duty,  guard 
ing  trains  to  and  from  Springfield,  and  patrolling  the  wire 
road  to  keep  the  telegraph  line  in  working  order.  There 


OPERATIONS  IN  NORTHWESTERN  ARKANSAS.     337 

were  a  good  many  Southern  families  in  Fayetteville,  and 
the  guerilla  leaders  easily  obtained  information  from  them 
of  the  movements  of  the  Federal  troops  from  that  post. 
The  latter  part  of  June,  while  most  of  Colonel  Harrison's 
mounted  force  was  on  a  scout  into  the  Indian  Territory, 
Buck  Brown  evaded  the  scout,  got  in  its  rear,  and  made 
a  dash  on  the  herd  of  the  First  Arkansas  Cavalry  grazing 
two  or  three  miles  from  Fayetteville,  and  drove  off  up 
wards  of  two  hundred  mules  and  horses.  A  force  from 
Fayetteville  was  immediately  sent  in  pursuit  of  the  gue 
rillas,  but  as  it  was  mostly  dismounted  it  was  unable  to 
overtake  them.  Some  of  this  stock  was  recaptured  by  a 
detachment  of  the  Ninth  Kansas  Cavalry  while  carrying 
the  mail  to  Fayetteville. 

On  the  loth  of  July,  Colonel  Harrison  sent  Major  Gal 
loway  with  a  mounted  force  of  two  hundred  men  into  the 
Indian  Territory  west  of  Fayetteville  to  find,  attack,  and 
disperse  a  force  of  two  to  three  hundred  Southern  Indians 
reported  to  be  on  the  waters  of  Flink  Creek  or  Illinois 
River.  After  a  day  or  so  of  hard  marching,  Major  Gallo 
way  met  detachments  of  the  enemy  and  skirmished  with 
them,  and,  driving  them  upon  the  main  body,  had  a  sharp 
fight  lasting  more  than  an  hour.  In  this  fight  the  Indians 
showed  unusual  stubbornness,  but  were  finally  routed 
with  considerable  loss  in  killed  and  wounded — Major  J. 
F.  Pickler  and  Captain  Albertee,  of  Colonel  Watie's  com 
mand,  being  among  the  killed.  In  their  flight  the  Indians 
also  left  thirty-five  head  of  horses  and  mules  and  some 
arms  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  Major  Galloway's  command. 
The  Major  Pickler  who  was  killed  had  attained  some 
prominence  along  the  line  of  Arkansas  and  the  Indian 
Territory,  on  account  of  his  dashing  operations  in  that 
section  during  the  past  spring. 

In  different  parts  of  Northwestern  Arkansas  the  Fed 
eral  forces  were  employed  in  active  operations  against  the 
Southern  partisan  bands  during  the  summer  and  autumn. 


VOL.    II.— 22 


338  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

The  latter  part  of  August,  Lieutenant-Colonel  A.  W. 
Bishop,  First  Arkansas  Cavalry,  with  a  detachment  of 
his  regiment  and  Captain  Eli  Hughes'  company,  Sixth 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  in  all  about  three  hun 
dred  men,  made  two  successsful  scouts  from  Fayetteville 
through  Washington  and  Benton  Counties,  Arkansas, 
dispersing  Lieutenant  Tuck  Smith's  band  of  guerillas, 
killing  eight  of  the  enemy,  wounding  nine,  and  capturing 
fifty  horses  and  equipments.  At  Carrollton,  in  Carroll 
County,  Lieutenant  Halsey,  with  a  detachment  of  eight 
een  Arkansas  Union  Militia,  attacked  Captain  Wilson's 
company  of  guerillas,  fifty  strong,  and  killed  four  men, 
including  Captain  WTilson.  On  the  I3th  and  I4th  of  Sep 
tember,  Captain  John  I.  Worthington,  First  Arkansas 
Union  Cavalry,  with  ninety-nine  men  of  that  regiment, 
while  escorting  a  train  to  Cassville  and  scouting  on  the 
flanks,  attacked  the  partisan  bands  of  Captains  Carroll, 
Etter,  and  Raley,  killing  eight  guerillas,  wounding  ten, 
killing  eleven  horses  in  the  fights,  and  capturing  thirty- 
five  guns.  Captain  Worthington  also  captured  Lieuten 
ant  Rogers,  of  the  Eighth  Missouri  Confederate  Infantry, 
carrying  a  mail  from  the  troops  of  Price's  army  to  their 
families  and  friends  in  Missouri.  Some  of  the  letters 
captured  showed  that  a  large  part  of  Price's  army  was  in 
the  vicinity  of  Camden  and  Princeton,  Arkansas,  prepar 
ing  to  start  immediately  for  the  invasion  of  Missouri. 

Directly  after  the  Price  Raid,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hugh 
Cameron,  Second  Arkansas  Cavalry,  with  160  men  of  his 
regiment,  made  a  scout  from  Cassville,  Missouri,  into 
Northern  Arkansas,  for  the  purpose  of  dispersing  detach 
ments  of  Jackman's  and  Schnable's  regiments,  which 
had  recently  gone  into  that  section  after  leaving  Price's 
army  at  Cane  Hill.  The  men  of  these  regiments  were 
still  greatly  demoralized,  and  being  scattered  over  the 
country  in  small  parties  many  of  them  were  ridden  down 
by  the  Federal  cavalry  and  killed  or  captured.  On  this 


OPERATIONS  IN  NORTHWESTERN  ARKANSAS.     339 

expedition  Colonel  Cameron  wounded  and  captured  Major 
Lauderdale  of  the  Southern  army,  killed  Lieutenant  Hast 
ings  and  captured  Major  Mooney  of  Schnable's  regiment, 
and  brought  in  a  considerable  number  of  other  Confeder 
ate  prisoners  with  the  arms,  horses,  and  equipments  cap 
tured  from  them. 

Major  H.  S.  Greeno,  with  a  detachment  of  130  men  of 
the  Fourth  Arkansas  Union  Cavalry,  left  De  Vall's  Bluff 
on  the  8th  of  November  on  a  scout  northwest  in  the  di 
rection  of  Batesville,  and  found  that  McCray's  brigade  of 
three  regiments  had  just  returned  from  Price's  army  to 
that  section,  and  was  scattered  over  the  country  in  small 
parties.  From  the  statements  of  prisoners  captured  by 
Major  Greeno,  it  appeared  that  there  were  a  great  many 
desertions  from  these  Confederate  regiments,  and  that 
many  of  the  men  had  thrown  away  their  arms,  and  ex 
pressed  a  determination  not  to  go  out  into  the  service  of 
the  Confederacy  again.  If  they  could  not  stay  at  home, 
they  preferred  to  surrender  to  the  Federal  authorities. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

OPERATIONS   ON   THE   ARKANSAS   RIVER. 

GENERAL  CARR,  who  was  sent  forward  with  his  cavalry 
from  Jenkins'  Ferry  on  the  night  of  April  2gth  to  head  off 
General  Fagan  in  his  march  on  Little  Rock,  reached  that 
point  on  the  morning  of  May  1st,  and  at  once  made 
arrangements  and  sent  back  a  train  of  wagons  loaded 
with  rations  for  General  Steele's  troops,  who  were  begin 
ning  to  feel  the  pinch  of  hunger.  Even  after  their  sup 
plies  had  been  exhausted,  the  severest  hardships  were 
imposed  upon  the  troops  in  repairing  and  corduroying  the 
road  for  the  trains  to  pass  over.  On  the  3d  of  May,  Gen 
eral  Steele  arrived  at  Little  Rock  with  all  his  infantry  and 
artillery,  and  at  once  set  himself  to  work  to  make  such 
dispositions  of  his  forces  as  would  enable  him  to  hold  that 
place  and  the  line  of  the  Arkansas  River  until  he  could 
assume  the  offensive  again  ;  for  he  felt  certain  that  General 
Smith  would  push  forward  the  Missouri  Confederate  forces 
as  soon  as  they  could  cross  the  Saline  River,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  preventing  the  navigation  of  the  Arkansas,  and 
also,  perhaps,  endeavor  to  throw  a  force  to  the  north  side 
of  that  river  to  interrupt  railroad  communication  between 
Little  Rock  and  De  Vall's  Bluff.  The  Frontier  Division 
under  General  Thayer  was  ordered  back  to  Fort  Smith, 
and  leaving  Little  Rock  on  the  6th,  arrived  at  its  destina 
tion  on  the  i6th  of  May,  having  been  since  the  2 1st  of 
March  almost  constantly  moving.  In  the  march  of  180 

340 


OPERATIONS  ON   THE  ARKANSAS  RIVER.         341 

miles  up  the  river,  the  division  encountered  no  opposition 
except  that  the  cavalry  had  several  skirmishes  with  South 
ern  partisan  bands,  resulting  in  a  small  loss  to  each  side. 
On  the  evacuation  of  Camden  by  the  Federal  forces, 
General  Smith  sent  General  Maxey,  with  his  division  of 
Texas  and  Indian  troops,  back  to  the  Indian  Territory  to 
enter  upon  an  aggressive  campaign.  Immediately  on  his 
arrival  at  Fort  Towson,  Choctaw  Nation,  the  headquar 
ters  of  his  district,  a  few  miles  from  Red  River,  General 
Maxey  ordered  his  troops  under  Generals  Cooper,  Gano, 
and  Walker  to  be  pushed  north  in  the  direction  of  the 
Arkansas  River  as  rapidly  as  supplies  could  be  obtained. 
Only  a  few  days  before  the  arrival  of  General  Thayer,  two 
Federal  spies,  who  had  been  sent  into  Northern  Texas  and 
the  Red  River  Valley  to  ascertain  the  strength  and  move 
ments  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  southern  part  of 
the  Indian  Territory,  returned  to  Fort  Smith  and  reported 
to  Major  T.  J.  Anderson,  Assistant  Adjutant-General, 
District  of  the  Frontier,  that  the  Southern  forces  were 
already  on  the  march  north  and  proposed  to  attack  Fort 
Smith  and  Fort  Gibson  in  a  very  short  time.  As  many 
soldiers  as  could  be  spared  from  the  troops  stationed  at 
Fort  Smith  had  been  employed  during  the  spring  in  the 
construction  of  four  forts  in  the  south  and  southeast  quar 
ters  of  the  town,  commanding  all  the  approaches  from  the 
south.  To  be  prepared  to  meet  the  enemy,  if  they  should 
make  an  attack  before  the  arrival  of  General  Thayer  from 
Little  Rock,  a  large  number  of  citizens  were  called  out  to 
push  forward  the  completion  of  the  fortifications  as  rapidly 
as  practicable,  and  guns  were  mounted  so  as  to  sweep  the 
fronts  and  flanks  of  each  of  the  forts  on  the  advance  of  a 
hostile  force.  Nearly  all  the  residents  of  the  city  were 
strong  Southern  sympathizers,  and  one  or  more  members 
of  many  of  the  families  were  in  the  Southern  army,  so  that 
a  Confederate  officer  making  a  reconnoissance  in  the  vicin 
ity  had  no  difficulty  in  obtaining  very  accurate  informa- 


342  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

tion  of  the  number  of  Federal  troops  stationed  there,  and 
the  number  and  position  of  the  forts  and  the  number  of 
guns  mounted. 

The  Arkansas  River  was  in  good  navigable  condition 
during  the  spring,  and  every  few  days  boats  came  up  from 
Little  Rock  loaded  with  supplies  for  the  troops.  It  turned 
out  that  the  Confederate  force  reported  to  be  advancing 
was  only  a  heavy  scout  sent  out  by  General  Maxey  a 
short  time  after  his  return  to  Fort  Towson  with  his  divi 
sion,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  how  far  north  he 
could  safely  establish  his  outposts.  After  the  arrival  of 
General  Thayer  there  were  no  fears  that  the  Confederate 
forces  would  attack  Fort  Smith  or  Fort  Gibson  ;  but  there 
were  very  soon  indications  that  their  efforts  were  going  to 
be  directed  to  interrupting  the  navigation  of  the  Ar 
kansas  River  so  as  to  cut  off  all  supplies  coming  in  to 
the  Federal  troops.  All  General  Maxey's  troops  were 
mounted,  and  he  had  enough  light  artillery  to  make 
them  very  effective,  in  attacking  boats,  or  Federal  de 
tachments  stationed  along  the  river  for  their  protection. 
His  advance  of  a  regiment  of  Texas  cavalry  under  Colo 
nel  Bell  arrived  at  Northfork  on  the  Canadian  River  on 
May  I5th,  where  it  was  proposed  to  establish  a  camp, 
from  which  point  General  Cooper  would  direct  the  opera 
tions  of  the  troops  on  his  arrival  with  other  regiments  and 
batteries.  This  point  was  nearly  equally  distant  from 
Fort  Smith  and  Fort  Gibson,  and  at  either  place  the  Fed 
eral  troops  were  strong  enough  to  check  the  operations  of 
Cooper  in  the  vicinity,  but  there  was  need  of  a  Federal 
mounted  force  to  operate  against  him. 

After  the  failure  of  the  Camden  Expedition  and  the 
retreat  of  the  Federal  forces  to  the  line  of  the  Arkansas 
River,  their  further  operations  were  of  a  defensive  char 
acter.  To  keep  the  river  open  to  navigation  from  Fort 
Smith  to  Dardanelle,  eighty  miles  below,  required  all  the 
troops  General  Thayer  could  spare  from  his  division,  and 


OPERAl^IONS   ON    THE   ARKANSAS  RIVER.         343 

to  keep  it  open  from  that  point  to  Little  Rock  and  below 
required  all  the  men  General  Steele  could  spare  from  Little 
Rock  and  Pine  Bluff.  General  Thayer  had  Colonel  Ful 
ler,  of  one  of  the  newly  organized  Arkansas  Union  regi 
ments,  stationed  at  Dardanelle;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Gid 
eon  M.  Waugh,  Second  Arkansas  Union  Infantry,  was 
stationed  at  Clarksville,  and  detachments  of  the  Second 
and  Sixth  Regiments  Kansas  Cavalry  were  stationed  at 
Roseville  and  Ozark,  for  the  purpose  of  affording  all  the 
protection  possible  to  boats  passing  up  and  down  the  river. 
At  each  of  these  stations  there  was  a  small  mounted  force 
used  in  scouting  in  all  directions  to  break  up  bands  of  Par 
tisan  Rangers,  and  to  ascertain  as  far  as  practicable  the 
movement  of  any  regular  Confederate  troops  through  the 
country.  The  force  under  Colonel  Fuller  at  Dardanelle 
was  attacked  by  General  Shelby  on  the  night  of  May 
i6th,  and  dispersed  with  some  loss  in  killed  and  wounded, 
and  several  men  drowned  in  attempting  to  cross  the  Ar 
kansas  River  in  a  frail  boat.  At  that  point  Shelby  ob 
tained  two  or  three  fiatboats  and  crossed  his  brigade  to 
the  north  side  of  the  Arkansas,  and  then  continued  his 
march  to  White  River,  which  is  beyond  the  field  of  oper 
ations  covered  by  this  work.  Colonel  Waugh,  with  his 
loyal  Arkansans,  was  so  energetic  and  successful  in  hunt 
ing  down  and  punishing  the  Southern  bandits  in  the 
vicinity  of  Clarksville  and  for  about  forty  miles  north  of 
that  point,  that  thirty-five  of  the  marauders  were  re 
ported  to  have  been  killed  that  spring. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  winter  and  in  the  early  part  of 
the  spring  the  Federal  troops  were  on  short  rations  most 
of  the  time,  for  the  reason  that  supplies  could  not  be 
brought  up  by  boats,  the  Arkansas  River  being  too  low 
for  navigation  above  Little  Rock;  and  the  great  distance 
from  Fort  Smith  to  Fort  Scott  or  Springfield,  and  the 
terrible  condition  of  the  roads  in  the  spring  season,  made 
it  extremely  difficult  to  bring  supplies  from  those  points 


344  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE  BORDER. 

by  large  wagon  trains.  A  number  of  large  trains  came 
down  from  Fort  Scott  during  the  winter  with  supplies  for 
the  troops,  and  large  escorts  were  required  to  accompany 
them  both  ways.  But  from  the  middle  of  April  to  the 
middle  of  June  there  was  a  good  stage  of  water  in  the 
Arkansas  River  between  Fort  Smith  and  Little  Rock,  and 
boats  were  arriving  and  departing  nearly  every  day  until 
supplies  were  brought  up  for  ten  to  twelve  thousand  men 
for  six  months.  It  took  a  boat  about  four  days  to  come 
up  from  Little  Rock  to  Fort  Smith,  and  about  two  days 
to  return  with  the  rapid  current  of  the  river.  This  was  a 
great  improvement  over  wagon  transportation,  which  had 
hitherto  furnished  the  Army  of  the  Frontier  with  its  sup 
plies,  for  a  steamboat  brought  up  an  amount  of  supplies 
that  would  have  required  a  train  of  two  hundred  wagons 
to  haul  them. 

Even  with  the  most  energetic  scouting  of  the  Federal 
cavalry  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  nearly  every  boat  com 
ing  up  from  Little  Rock  or  returning  was  fired  upon  by 
bandits,  who  approached  the  river  and  concealed  them 
selves  on  the  banks  at  points  near  which  the  boats  were 
obliged  to  pass.  But  every  boat  had  a  detachment  of 
infantry  and  generally  a  howitzer  or  two  on  board,  and 
breastworks  of  boxes  and  sacks  of  corn  or  oats,  or  of  cot 
ton  bales,  were  made  for  the  protection  of  the  soldiers  and 
the  crew.  If  the  bandits  were  bold  enough  to  show  them 
selves  they  received  volleys  from  the  small-arms  of  the 
soldiers  behind  the  breastworks,  and  grape  and  canister 
or  shell  from  the  howitzer,  as  the  situation  demanded. 
They  were  invariably  driven  off,  and  sometimes  with  loss. 
The  pilot-house  of  each  boat  was  protected — made  bullet 
proof—and  several  were  struck  by  bullets  fired  by  the 
bandits.  Nearly  every  boat  going  down  the  river  took 
on  board  a  good  many  refugee  families,  white  and  colored, 
who  were  landed  at  Little  Rock,  Memphis,  and  points  on 
the  Mississippi  River  as  high  up  as  St.  Louis,  where  they 


OPERATIONS   ON   THE  ARKANSAS  RIVER.         345 

could  do  something  for  themselves.  Large  numbers  of 
these  refugees  also  accompanied  every  wagon  train  that 
returned  to  Fort  Scott,  Kansas,  from  which  point  they 
scattered  out  to  different  parts  of  the  State.  They  had 
nearly  all  been  robbed  and  plundered  and  persecuted  by 
the  Southern  partisan  bands  until  they  were  in  very  des 
titute  condition,  and  sought  the  friendly  shelter,  protec 
tion,  and  assistance  of  the  Federal  troops  at  Fort  Smith. 
If  the  Federal  authorities  had  not  furnished  these  desti 
tute  people  with  rations,  many  of  them  would  certainly 
have  starved  for  want  of  food.  Most  of  the  Union  men 
of  these  families  enlisted  in  the  Union  Arkansas  regi 
ments  then  being  organized,  and  took  their  rations  home 
to  be  cooked  and  divided  in  some  instances,  which  relieved 
the  almost  distressing  situation  in  many  cases.  Even 
poor  Southern  families  had  to  be  fed  at  the  expense  of 
the  Government  they  were  endeavoring  to  destroy.  As 
the  problem  of  furnishing  supplies  for  the  large  number 
of  troops  required  at  that  point  and  in  the  vicinity  was  the 
most  difficult  one  with  which  the  Federal  authorities  had 
to  contend,  all  destitute  families  were  encouraged  to  go 
north  by  the  boats  or  with  the  trains,  where  they  could 
find  opportunities  of  doing  something  for  themselves,  or 
where  they  could  be  more  easily  taken  care  of  until  the 
issues  of  the  war  were  determined.  This  humane  policy 
of  the  Government  in  providing  for  these  destitute  fami 
lies  until  they  found  a  friendly  asylum  in  the  loyal  section 
of  the  country  frequently  embarrassed  the  Federal  com 
manders  in  their  military  operations,  for  taking  part  of 
the  ration  of  the  soldier  for  these  people  impaired  his 
efficiency,  and  was  the  cause  of  more  or  less  complaint. 

The  past  winter  and  spring  the  troops  of  the  Indian 
Brigade  under  Colonel  Phillips  at  Fort  Gibson  had  been 
receiving  their  supplies  by  wagon  trains  from  Fort  Scott. 
They,  too,  had  been  on  short  rations  most  of  the  time, 
and  the  Colonel  had  been  obliged  to  send  part  of  his 


346  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE  BORDER. 

command  to  Rhca's  Mills  and  other  points  in  Western 
Arkansas  east  of  Fort  Gibson,  to  secure  as  much  wheat 
and  corn  as  possible  to  grind  into  flour  and  meal  for  his 
men.  A  battalion  of  troops  was  required  to  collect  the 
wheat  and  corn  and  guard  the  mill  while  grinding,  and 
another  battalion  was  generally  employed  in  guarding 
trains  on  part  of  the  route  to  and  from  Fort  Scott — all  of 
which  weakened  the  efficiency  of  his  command  for  opera 
ting  south  of  the  Arkansas  River.  In  the  recent  change 
of  Department  lines,  the  Indian  Territory  fell  in  the  De 
partment  of  Arkansas,  under  General  Steele,  and  it  was 
desirable  to  furnish  the  troops  at  Fort  Gibson  with  sup 
plies  from  Fort  Smith  as  far  as  practicable.  A  good 
navigable  condition  of  the  river  at  Fort  Smith  did  not 
always  enable  boats  to  pass  over  Webber's  Falls,  about 
thirty-five  miles  above,  which  was  necessary  to  reach  Fort 
Gibson.  But  about  the  middle  of  June  there  was  a  rise 
in  the  Arkansas  River  of  a  sufficient  volume  of  water  to 
allow  a  light-draught  steamer  to  pass  over  Webber's  Falls 
and  land  at  Fort  Gibson.  The  steam  ferryboat  J.  R. 
Williams  was  kept  at  Fort  Smith  for  the  purpose  of 
ferrying  troops  and  trains  over  the  river  at  that  point, 
and  for  the  purpose  of  furnishing  posts  up  and  down  the 
river  with  supplies.  On  the  morning  of  June  I5th,  this 
steam  ferryboat  left  Fort  Smith  loaded  with  supplies, 
mostly  flour,  for  the  Indian  troops  at  Fort  Gibson.  The 
escort  to  the  boat  consisted  of  twenty-six  men  detailed 
from  the  Twelfth  Kansas  Infantry,  under  Lieutenant  H. 
A.  B.  Cook.  The  boat's  cargo  of  supplies  was  in  charge 
of  Lieutenant  George  W.  Houston,  Quartermaster  Four 
teenth  Kansas  Cavalry. 

In  a  day  or  so  after  his  return  to  Fort  Smith  from  the 
Camden  Expedition,  General  Thayer  was  informed  by  his 
scouts  that  a  Confederate  force  upwards  of  a  thousand 
strong,  under  General  Cooper,  had  arrived  at  Northfork 
on  the  Canadian  River,  about  fifty  miles  west.  Though 


OPERATIONS   ON   THE  ARKANSAS  RIVER.         347 

this  force  fell  back  south  on  hearing  of  the  return  of  the 
Frontier  Division  to  Fort  Smith,  General  Thayer  was 
again  informed  on  the  7th  of  June  that  General  Maxey 
had  probably  by  that  time  arrived  at  Perryville,  Choctaw 
Nation,  with  several  Texas  regiments  and  six  pieces  of 
artillery,  and  was  to  be  joined  at  that  point  by  General 
Cooper  with  the  Southern  Indians.  A  heavy  scout  sent 
out  by  Colonel  Phillips  from  Fort  Gibson  in  the  direction 
of  Perryville  captured  three  or  four  Confederate  Indian 
soldiers,  and  these  prisoners,  who  belonged  to  Maxey's 
command,  confirmed  his  reported  advance  north.  Gen 
eral  Thayer  sent  out  Major  L.  K.  Thatcher,  Ninth  Kan 
sas  Cavalry,  with  four  hundred  men  of  that  regiment  and 
of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry,  to  make  a  scout  through  the 
Choctaw  Nation  southwest  of  Fort  Smith.  On  his  re 
turn  Major  Thatcher  reported  that  he  obtained  reliable 
information  that  there  was  a  Confederate  force  of  fifteen 
hundred  men  in  the  Upper  Poteau  Valley,  about  forty 
miles  distant. 

The  Upper  Poteau  Valley  is  south  of  Fort  Smith,  and 
no  Federal  scout  was  sent  out  west  in  the  direction  of 
Northfork  along  the  south  bank  of  the  Arkansas  River. 
Nor  when  the  boat  left  Fort  Smith  was  any  Federal 
cavalry  sent  out  to  keep  in  the  neighborhood  of  it  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Arkansas  for  the  purpose  of  notifying 
the  officers  in  charge  of  it  if  the  enemy  should  be  dis 
covered  advancing  in  force.  On  leaving  Fort  Smith 
Lieutenant  Cook  cautioned  his  men  to  keep  a  sharp  look 
out,  as  they  were  liable  to  be  fired  upon  at  any  moment 
by  guerillas  concealed  at  any  of  the  favorable  points 
along  the  river.  His  men  realized  the  necessity  for  vig 
ilance,  and  cheerfully  held  themselves  in  readiness  to  exe 
cute  every  order  given.  The  boat  steamed  along  up  the 
river  about  fifty  miles  without  any  interruption  until  it 
came  to  a  great  bend  in  the  river  to  the  south,  where  the 
channel  approached  near  the  south  bank.  At  this  point, 


348  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

which  was  about  five  miles  below  the  mouth  of  the  Can 
adian  River,  the  Arkansas  River  was  about  350  yards 
wide,  and  the  boat  could  not  pass  it  without  passing 
near  the  south  bank.  Colonel  Stand  Watie,  who  com 
manded  the  Confederate  Indians,  had  ascertained  that 
the  boat  was  coming  up  and  selected  this  place,  known 
as  Pleasant  Bluff,  to  make  his  attack  upon  it.  He  knew 
it  was  a  good  position  to  command  the  river  with  artillery, 
and  had  three  pieces  masked  behind  clusters  of  bushes, 
about  one  hundred  yards  apart,  on  the  bluff  overlooking 
the  river.  When  the  boat  came  up  opposite  the  centre 
gun,  the  three  pieces  opened  a  direct  and  cross  fire  upon 
it,  belching  forth  fire  and  smoke  and  shot  and  shell  with 
a  terrific  roar.  The  Confederate  Indians  almost  at  the 
same  instant  also  discharged  a  heavy  volley  of  musketry 
from  their  concealed  position  on  shore,  not  one  of  whom 
could  be  seen  by  the  officers  or  soldiers  on  the  boat. 

The  officers  and  men  on  the  boat  knew  nothing  of  the 
presence  of  the  enemy  until  they  heard  the  roar  of  the 
artillery  and  musketry  and  saw  the  thick  clouds  of  smoke 
arising  from  the  discharge  of  the  cannon  and  small-arms. 
In  another  moment  a  cannon-ball  crashed  into  the  boat, 
and  then  Lieutenant  Cook  ordered  his  men  to  take  posi 
tions  behind  barrels  and  boxes  and  return  the  fire  with  as 
much  precision  as  possible.  While  his  firing  did  not  likely 
do  the  Confederates  much  damage,  it  had  the  effect  of 
keeping  them  back  at  long  range  and  from  showing  them 
selves  in  force  in  the  open  ground.  After  getting  the 
range  of  the  boat  almost  every  shot  fired  from  the  Con 
federate  guns  struck  her,  so  that  in  a  short  time  she  was 
so  badly  disabled  as  to  be  unmanageable.  One  of  the 
first  shots  fired  by  the  hostile  guns  struck  the  smoke-stack 
about  four  feet  above  the  cabin  floor,  and  a  second  shot 
hit  the  pilot-house,  knocking  most  of  it  away,  and  a  third 
shot  struck  the  boiler,  or  some  of  the  steam  pipes,  which 
released  the  steam  with  an  almost  deafening  sound.  A 


OPERATIONS   ON   THE  ARKANSAS  RIVER.         349 

dense  volume  of  steam  instantly  enveloped  the  boat  so 
that  those  on  board  for  a  few  moments  could  see  nothing 
on  deck  or  on  shore.  When  the  Confederates  heard  the 
explosion  and  saw  the  cloud  of  steam  burst  forth  envelop 
ing  the  boat,  they  at  once  rent  the  air  with  shouts  along 
their  line,  but  continued  the  artillery  fire  with  greater 
energy,  thinking  that  she  would  soon  sink  or  surrender. 
While  the  boat  was  thus  enveloped  in  steam  and  disabled, 
the  soldiers  on  board  could  not  keep  up  their  fire  with 
much  advantage,  and  Lieutenant  Cook  went  to  the  cap 
tain  to  ascertain  the  extent  of  the  damage  to  her  machin 
ery,  but  he  replied  that  he  did  not  know.  The  Lieutenant 
then  ordered  the  engineer  to  examine  the  machinery,  and 
he  did  so  and  returned  and  reported  her  disabled.  In  the 
meanwhile,  before  her  machinery  stopped  working,  the 
pilot  ran  her  on  a  sand  bar  near  the  north  side  of  the  river, 
within  a  few  yards  of  the  shore. 

Finding  that  the  boat  could  not  be  moved  either  up  or 
down  the  river,  Lieutenant  Cook  took  his  men  off  her  and 
waded  to  the  north  shore,  leaving  Lieutenant  Houston 
and  the  captain  on  board.  Immediately  after  reaching 
the  shore  Lieutenant  Cook  formed  his  men  behind  a 
sand  bar  in  such  position  as  to  command  the  boat  should 
any  of  the  enemy  attempt  to  swim  over  to  take  it  off  or 
set  it  on  fire.  His  plan  of  keeping  the  boat  and  her  cargo 
from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  was,  however, 
soon  defeated.  To  his  great  astonishment  and  mortifica 
tion,  in  a  few  moments  he  saw  Lieutenant  Houston  and 
the  captain  of  the  boat  and  one  of  her  crew  going  over  to 
the  enemy  in  a  yawl.  Their  conduct  was  unaccountable 
and  reprehensible,  and  some  of  Lieutenant  Cook's  men 
thought  it  was  due  to  cowardice  or  treachery.  As  he 
could  now  see  no  prospect  of  saving  the  boat,  Lieutenant 
Cook,  with  some  twenty  of  his  men,  started  for  Fort 
Smith,  arriving  at  that  place  the  next  day.  Three  or 
four  of  his  men  who  got  separated  from  him  went  to 


3 SO  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Mackey's  Salt  Works,  in  the  Cherokee  Nation,  about  ten 
miles  distant,  where  Colonel  John  Ritchie  was  stationed 
with  the  Second  Union  Indian  Regiment,  and  related  to 
him  what  had  taken  place.  The  Colonel  at  once  collected 
about  two  hundred  warriors  and  hastened  to  the  point 
where  the  boat  was  represented  to  have  been  left,  with 
the  view  of  holding  it  if  it  had  not  been  taken  to  the  south 
side  before  he  arrived.  But  he  did  not  reach  the  point 
where  it  was  abandoned  until  the  next  morning,  and  he 
then  found  that  it  had  been  taken  over  to  the  south  side 
of  the  river,  and  that  the  enemy  were  unloading  it  on  a 
sand  bar.  He  estimated  that  the  boat  and  as  much  of 
her  cargo  as  had  been  taken  off  and  piled  upon  the  sand 
bar  were  within  range  of  some  of  his  best  small-arms,  and 
he  at  once  ordered  his  Indian  soldiers  to  open  fire  upon 
the  enemy  along  the  opposite  shore.  Shortly  after  this 
the  enemy  set  fire  to  the  boat,  and  it  floated  off  down  the 
river  enveloped  in  flames. 

The  river  continued  to  rise  until  it  covered  the  sand 
bar  where  the  boat's  cargo  had  been  unloaded,  and  in  a 
day  or  so  barrels  and  boxes  of  commissary  supplies  were 
seen  floating  in  the  river  past  Fort  Smith,  the  Confeder 
ates  having  been  able  to  secure  and  carry  off  only  a  small 
part  of  the  goods.  They  had  no  wagons  along  with  the 
expedition,  and  took  only  so  much  of  the  supplies  as  they 
could  carry  off  on  their  horses.  There  were  some  sutler's 
goods  on  the  boat,  however,  which  the  Southern  Indians 
took,  and  with  which  they  almost  loaded  themselves 
down,  and  immediately  started  for  their  homes  with  their 
booty,  almost  breaking  up  Watie's  command.  Lieuten 
ant  Cook  was  blamed  for  not  keeping  his  men  together  on 
shore  within  range  of  the  boat,  for  if  he  had  done  so  it 
was  thought  that  he  could  have  prevented  the  enemy 
from  coming  over  to  her  by  a  well-directed  fire  upon  any 
one  attempting  to  approach  her  in  the  small  boat  which 
Lieutenant  Houston  and  the  captain  had  taken  to  the 


OPERATIONS  ON  THE  ARKANSAS  RIVER.          351 

south  side  when  they  went  over.  The  Lieutenant  re 
ported  that  two  of  the  crew  and  one  of  the  engineers  had 
been  killed  when  he  abandoned  the  boat.  In  the  skir 
mish  across  the  river  after  Colonel  Ritchie  came  up  that 
officer  had  one  sergeant  and  three  men  wounded. 

As  soon  as  information  reached  Fort  Smith  of  the  at 
tack  on  the  boat,  General  Thayer  sent  out  Colonel  S.  J. 
Crawford,  Second  Kansas  Colored  Infantry,  with  part  of 
his  own  regiment  and  part  of  the  Eleventh  United  States 
Colored  Infantry,  in  all  about  seven  hundred  men,  and  a 
section  of  artillery,  with  instructions  to  march  to  the  point 
where  the  boat  was  captured  as  rapidly  as  practicable, 
and  if  possible  drive  the  enemy  off  before  they  could  get 
away  with  the  supplies.  When  the  Colonel  arrived  in 
the  vicinity  where  the  boat  was  abandoned,  he  found  that 
the  enemy  had  left  the  river  and  fallen  back  a  short  dis 
tance.  He  then  moved  forward  and  came  upon  their 
picket  at  San  Bois  Creek,  and  chased  them  to  Wire 
Bridge,  where  about  150  of  Colonel  Wratie's  men  showed 
themselves  as  if  they  intended  to  contest  his  advance. 
As  Colonel  Crawford  did  not  know  the  strength  of  the 
Confederate  force,  he  formed  his  men  in  line  of  battle, 
sent  forward  his  skirmishers,  and  opened  fire  with  his 
artillery  upon  the  enemy,  who,  after  a  few  rounds,  fled, 
having  sustained  a  small  loss  of  killed  and  wounded.  It 
was  impracticable  to  pursue  to  any  advantage  with  his 
infantry  the  mounted  force  of  the  enemy,  and  Colonel 
Crawford  returned  to  Fort  Smith  with  his  command. 
After  the  capture  and  burning  of  that  boat,  it  was  con 
sidered  unsafe  to  attempt  to  ship  supplies  to  the  troops 
at  Fort  Gibson  by  steamboat,  for  in  a  short  time  the 
forces  of  Maxey  and  Cooper  occupied  the  country  south 
of  the  Arkansas  River  in  the  Indian  Territory,  pushing 
their  outposts  up  to  within  a  short  distance  of  Fort  Smith. 
General  Thayer  certainly  did  not  display  a  very  aggres 
sive  policy,  for,  by  drawing  in  his  troops  from  two  or 


352  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

three  unimportant  posts,  he  had  enough  men  to  march 
out  and  attack  Maxey  and  Cooper,  with  a  strong  prob 
ability  of  success.  Of  course  his  general  movements  were 
directed  by  General  Steele,  the  Department  Commander, 
who  was  busy  in  looking  after  Shelby  on  the  Upper  White 
River,  and  Marmaduke  on  the  Mississippi  below  the 
mouth  of  the  Arkansas  River.  It  was  known  that  Gen 
erals  Kirby  Smith  and  Price  had  under  consideration  the 
question  of  making  a  campaign  into  Missouri;  but  the 
movements  of  their  troops  had  not  yet  developed  their 
plans.  The  efforts  of  Marmaduke  to  interrupt  the  navi 
gation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the  efforts  of  Shelby  to 
interrupt  the  navigation  of  White  River  below  De  Vall's 
Bluff,  having  failed,  the  question  that  suggested  itself  to 
the  observer  of  events  in  that  section  was,  Would  Price 
now  concentrate  his  forces  to  attack  Little  Rock  or 
Fort  Smith,  or  to  make  an  invasion  of  Missouri  ? 


CHAPTER   XXIII. 
QUANTRILL'S  BANDITS  REPULSED  BY  UNION  MILITIA  AT 

LAMAR,  MISSOURI,  AND  ACTION  ON  CENTRE  CREEK. 

IN  the  latter  part  of  April  and  the  early  part  of  May, 
reports  came  to  the  Federal  officers  commanding  posts 
in  Southwest  Missouri  that  a  hostile  force,  estimated  at 
seven  hundred  strong,  under  Colonel  Adair,  was  on  Grand 
River  in  the  northern  part  of  the  Indian  Territory.  Gen 
eral  Sanborn  at  Springfield  received  information  that  this 
force  intended  to  attack  the  Federal  troops  at  Neosho 
about  the  first  of  May.  On  account  of  disturbances  in 
other  parts  of  his  district,  he  did  not  have  troops  to  spare 
to  send  against  the  enemy  at  once.  The  first  week  in  May, 
Major  John  Cosgrove,  with  a  detachment  of  eighty-two 
men  of  the  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  made 
a  scout  from  Springfield  into  Northwestern  Arkansas  and 
in  the  western  part  of  McDonald  County,  Missouri,  and 
skirmished  with  small  parties  of  Adair's  Indians,  killing 
six,  wounding  two,  and  capturing  three  men  and  eight 
horses.  When  nearing  the  State  line  road,  he  was  in 
formed  that  the  enemy  had  already  started  on  the  march 
to  attack  Major  Burch's  command  at  Neosho,  and  he  at 
once  pushed  forward  for  that  place.  On  his  arrival  at 
Cowskin  Prairie,  Missouri,  he  ascertained  that  the  main 
body  of  the  enemy  had  the  day  before  been  ordered  to 
the  west  side  of  Grand  River,  but  as  his  horses  were  much 
weakened  from  long  and  constant  marching,  he  did  not 

VOL.  II. — 23 

353 


354  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE  BORDER. 

attempt  pursuit,  and  moved  to  Neosho,  where  the  troops 
were  preparing  for  an  attack.  The  reports  of  a  Southern 
force  in  the  Cherokee  Nation  threatening  a  raid  into 
Southwest  Missouri  were  so  persistent  that  Colonel  John 
D.  Allen,  Seventh  Missouri  Provisional  Militia,  stationed 
at  Mount  Vernon,  made  a  scout  with  a  detachment  of  his 
regiment  through  Newton  and  Jasper  Counties  a  week 
or  so  after  Major  Cosgrove  had  returned  to  Springfield. 
When  he  arrived  in  the  neighborhood  of  Granby  he  was 
informed  that  a  Confederate  force  of  80  to  160  men  had 
passed  that  place  on  the  i8th,  the  day  before  his  arrival, 
going  north.  Captain  James  M.  Ritchey,  stationed  at 
Newtonia  with  a  company  of  Colonel  Allen's  regiment, 
had  out  two  scouts  who  saw  the  enemy  going  north,  and 
made  out  the  force  one  hundred  strong. 

After  part  of  Quantrill's  band  of  eighty  men  crossed 
the  Arkansas  River  above  Fort  Gibson  in  April,  moving 
northeast,  nothing  definite  had  been  heard  of  them  by 
the  Federal  officers  in  Northwest  Arkansas  and  South 
west  Missouri,  until  they  passed  between  Neosho  and 
Newtonia  on  the  i8th  of  May.  They  had  been  in  the 
northern  part  of  the  Cherokee  Nation,  resting  and  recruit 
ing  their  horses  and  watching  for  trains  from  Fort  Scott 
and  Fort  Gibson.  In  their  march  north  they  passed  within 
two  miles  of  Carthage,  and  sent  word  to  Captain  Philip 
Rohrer,  commanding  a  company  of  Colonel  Allen's  regi 
ment  at  that  place,  to  come  out  and  fight  them.  When 
the  Captain  had  marched  out  with  his  company  they  were 
gone.  They  continued  their  march  north,  and  at  daylight 
on  the  morning  of  the  2Oth  attacked  a  detachment  of  forty 
men  of  Captain  E.  J  Morns'  company,  Seventh  Provi 
sional  Regiment  Missouri  Enrolled  Militia,  under  Lieu 
tenant  George  N.  Alder,  stationed  at  Lamar.  Captain 
Morris  had  been  stationed  at  Greenfield  for  some  time, 
but  in  May  was  sent  with  his  company  to  Lamar  with 
instructions  to  scout  from  that  point  through  Barton  and 


QU AN  TRILL   REPULSED.  355 

adjoining  counties  for  the  purpose  of  intercepting,  if  prac 
ticable,  small  parties  of  guerillas  who  were  reported  every 
few  days  as  endeavoring  to  make  their  way  from  Arkan 
sas  and  the  Indian  Territory  north  to  the  Missouri  River 
counties.  He  left  Lamar  on  the  iQth  of  May  with  one 
half  of  his  company  on  a  scout,  leaving  the  other  half  of 
forty  men  under  Lieutenant  Alder  to  hold  the  town  and 
protect  his  supplies.  He  had  not  heard  of  the  enemy 
passing  near  Neosho,  and  no  unusual  precautions  were 
imposed  upon  his  men  left  at  the  station. 

Lieutenant  Alder  had  placed  pickets  on  the  different 
roads  leading  into  town,  some  distance  out;  but  the 
picket  on  the  Carthage  road  either  came  in  at  daylight 
without  orders,  or  was  called  in,  so  that  the  guerillas  were 
in  sight  preparing  to  charge  him  before  the  Lieutenant 
knew  of  their  presence.  The  attack  was  so  sudden  that 
most  of  his  men,  who  had  just  got  up  and  were  feeding 
their  horses  or  preparing  their  breakfasts,  scattered  in 
different  directions,  leaving  their  arms  where  they  had 
disposed  them.  Some  of  them,  however,  who  had 
good  horses  had  time  to  mount  them  and  escape  to 
Greenfield  and  Fort  Scott,  while  others,  who  were  in  the 
north  part  of  town,  escaped  afoot  to  the  thick  timber  on 
Muddy  Creek,  which  came  up  to  within  half  a  mile  of 
town  on  the  west  side,  and  made  their  way  towards  Fort 
Scott  until  they  met  reinforcements  from  that  place. 
Orderly  Sergeant  Jeff.  Cavender,  with  nine  men,  instantly 
took  refuge  behind  the  burnt  walls  of  the  brick  court 
house,  where  their  other  comrades  in  town  had  disposed 
their  arms  when  not  on  duty.  The  ammunition  of  the 
company  had  also  been  placed  inside  of  these  old  walls, 
which  were  used  on  that  occasion  as  an  improvised  fort, 
and  the  place  had  been  designated  as  a  rallying-point  in 
the  event  of  attack.  On  hastily  taking  refuge  in  this  de 
fensive  position,  Sergeant  Cavender  and  his  men  not  only 
found  their  own  guns  loaded  and  ready  for  use,  but  also 


356  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

nearly  all  the  guns  of  their  comrades  who  were  cut  off 
from  that  place.  The  old  burnt  walls,  being  in  the  centre 
of  a  large  square,  made  the  place  a  good  one  for  defence 
against  an  enemy  supplied  only  with  small-arms. 

There  was  no  fence  around  the  court-house  square,  so 
that  there  was  a  perfectly  open  space  on  all  sides  of  the  old 
walls  to  the  houses  around  the  square,  most  of  which  had 
been  burned  by  the  guerillas  in  1863  when  they  burned 
the  court-house.  As  soon  as  the  Federal  detachment  got 
into  their  defensive  position  they  seized  their  guns  and 
opened  fire  on  their  assailants,  the  foremost  of  whom  had 
come  up  within  perhaps  fifty  yards.  The  first  volley  of 
the  detachment  checked  the  advance  of  the  enemy  and 
caused  them  to  fall  back  some  distance  under  cover  of 
buildings,  but  near  enough  to  be  heard  plainly  calling 
out  for  the  men  in  the  quasi-fort  to  surrender.  Sergeant 
Montgomery  of  the  detachment  volunteered  to  get  up  on 
the  wall  and  talk  to  them  and  hear  their  proposition  while 
his  comrades  were  reloading  their  guns. 

The  bandits  made  all  sorts  of  promises  of  fair  treatment 
if  the  Federal  soldiers  would  surrender;  but  the  besieged 
detachment  thought  the  enemy  belonged  to  Quantrill's 
band,  as  they  did,  and  knew  it  would  be  death  to  surren 
der  to  them,  and  determined  to  fight  to  the  last.  After 
parleying  a  few  moments,  the  enemy  formed  in  line  and 
charged  again,  coming  up  within  thirty  to  fifty  yards  of 
the  Federal  detachment.  In  this  charge  the  bandits 
brought  up  their  entire  available  force,  which  the  besieged 
estimated  at  one  hundred  men  ;  but  a  second  well-directed 
volley  from  Sergeant  Cavender's  men  had  the  effect  of 
instantly  checking  them  and  of  dismounting  several  men, 
who  were  seriously  wounded.  But  the  bandits  were  still 
determined  to  capture  the  position,  and  in  a  short  time 
commenced  forming  for  another  assault.  The  respite 
was  welcome  to  the  gallant  little  band  of  besieged,  to  en 
able  them  to  reload  their  guns  and  prepare  for  the  worst. 


QUANTRILL   REPULSED.  357 

They  were  armed  with  the  Springfield  musket,  and  their 
ammunition  for  it  was  what  was  known  as  buck  and  ball, 
which  consisted  of  one  ball  and  three  buckshot.  Sergeant 
Cavender  directed  his  men  to  load  with  buckshot,  which 
they  did  by  tearing  off  the  ball  and  throwing  it  aside  and 
ramming  down  the  buckshot.  By  the  time  he  was  ready 
for  them  the  enemy  charged  him  again ;  but  the  volley 
from  his  men  was  so  effective  that  the  bandits  hastily  re 
tired,  and  did  not  make  another  effort  to  capture  the 
position.  It  was  thought  that  they  would  have  shown 
greater  persistence  had  they  known  the  small  number  of 
men  they  were  fighting.  The  Federal  detachment  had 
port-holes  through  the  old  walls  to  fire  from,  and,  as  they 
knew  that  they  were  attacked  by  a  superior  force,  they 
did  not  venture  in  the  heat  of  the  fight  to  put  their  heads 
above  the  walls  to  see  what  casualties  they  had  made. 
They  could  see,  however,  that  a  number  of  men  were  dis 
mounted  by  each  of  their  volleys,  and  that  the  men  were 
picked  up  and  carried  off  by  their  comrades. 

The  bandits  did  not  leave  any  of  their  killed  or  wounded 
in  town,  but  two  women  who  came  in  the  day  of  the 
fight  stated  that  they  counted  thirty  of  the  guerillas,  as 
they  passed  their  houses,  who  had  been  killed  and 
wounded.  At  that  time  the  bandits  were  not  in  the 
habit  of  giving  quarter  to  the  Union  militia  or  any  Fed 
eral  soldiers  who  fell  into  their  hands,  and  of  course  rarely 
left  any  of  their  wounded  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
militia,  but  took  them  along  and  left  them  with  their 
friends  in  the  country  on  the  line  of  march.  In  this  fierce 
conflict  Sergeant  Cavender  did  not  lose  a  man ;  but  one 
of  the  Federal  detachment,  a  Mr.  Underwood,  was  killed 
on  the  street  in  the  early  part  of  the  action  before  he 
could  join  his  comrades  within  the  fortified  position. 

In  a  short  time  after  the  bandits  left  town,  the  company 
bugler,  who  was  one  of  the  men  under  Sergeant  Caven 
der,  was  directed  to  blow  the  assembly  to  recall  the  com- 


358  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

rades  who  in  the  first  attack  had  scattered  and  were 
thought  to  be  within  hearing  of  the  call.  Some  of  Lieu 
tenant  Alder's  men  who  were  cut  off  from  the  court-house 
position  and  still  within  hearing  of  the  bugle-call,  con 
cealed  in  the  thick  brush  and  timber  on  Muddy  Creek, 
ventured  out  to  a  house  near  by  and  got  a  woman  to  go 
into  town  to  ascertain  if  the  enemy  had  left,  or  whether 
they  had  captured  the  detachment  under  Sergeant  Caven- 
der  and  compelled  the  bugler  to  sound  the  assembly  to 
betray  his  comrades.  When  it  was  found  that  the  de 
tachment  had  held  their  position  and  that  the  enemy  had 
left,  the  men  who  were  cut  off  from  that  position  in  the 
early  part  of  the  fight  returned  to  town.  Immediately 
after  Lieutenant  Alder  got  his  men  together  again,  he 
commenced  to  strengthen  his  position  by  smoothing  the 
tops  of  the  old  walls  and  placing  heavy  hewn  timbers  on 
them,  and  by  making  more  port-holes  for  use  should 
another  attack  be  made.  The  citizens  volunteered  to 
assist  him  in  the  event  of  another  attack,  so  that  he  had 
a  force  that  evening  of  seventy-five  men. 

One  of  Lieutenant  Alder's  men,  Jesse  Sullinger,  who 
was  cut  off  from  his  comrades  at  the  beginning  of  the 
fight,  mounted  his  horse  bareback  and  rode  to  Fort  Scott, 
a  distance  of  forty  miles,  by  ten  o'clock,  and  reported  to 
Colonel  Charles  W.  Blair,  commanding  the  post,  what  he 
had  seen,  and  that  part  of  his  comrades  were  surrounded 
within  the  old  court-house  walls  and,  as  he  supposed,  all 
killed.  In  less  than  half  an  hour  after  receiving  this  in 
formation,  Colonel  Blair  had  two  companies  of  cavalry  on 
the  road  to  Lamar,  which  arrived  there  about  eight  o'clock 
that  night,  accompanied  by  private  Sullinger.  The  two 
companies  from  Fort  Scott  stayed  in  Lamar  until  day 
break  the  next  morning,  and  then  started  north  on  the 
trail  of  the  guerillas,  but  were  unable  to  overtake  them. 

While  the  fight  was  going  on,  there  was  a  piece  of 
heroism  and  devotion  to  the  Government  shown  that  de- 


QU AN  TRILL   REPULSED.  359 

serves  mention.  There  were  two  young  women  in  Lamar, 
the  Misses  Harrington,  who  had  a  brother  in  the  Union 
service,  and  who  was  at  home  on  furlough  that  day. 
When  the  bandits  came  charging  into  town,  the  brother 
of  these  women  hurriedly  left  home,  leaving  his  arms  be 
hind  him.  Directly  after  the  fight  opened,  and  as  soon 
as  the  guerillas  were  driven  off  to  the  south  side  of  town, 
one  of  the  young  women  gathered  up  her  brother's  arms 
and  delivered  them  to  the  men  holding  the  position  be 
hind  the  old  walls.  In  a  short  time  after  this  the  young 
women  each  carried  a  bucket  of  water  to  the  soldiers,  so 
that  they  would  not  suffer  from  thirst  in  the  event  that 
the  siege  should  last  during  the  day.  Most  of  the  horses 
of  Lieutenant  Alder's  detachment  had  stampeded  during 
the  fight,  and  many  of  them  were  not  recovered  for  sev 
eral  days  afterwards,  some  of  them  having  returned  to 
Greenfield,  where  the  company  had  been  stationed. 

In  a  day  or  so  after  the  fight  Captain  Morris  returned 
to  Lamar  with  his  detachment,  evacuated  the  place, 
and  returned  to  Greenfield  with  his  company,  where  he 
was  employed  in  scouting  from  that  point  for  some  time. 
His  leaving  Lamar  brought  out  a  complaint  from  the  loyal 
citizens,  for  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  28th, 
only  a  few  days  after  he  left,  the  guerilla  bands  of  Cap 
tains  Taylor  and  Marchbanks  entered  the  town  and  burned 
nearly  all  the  houses  and  most  of  the  county  records. 

In  the  destruction  of  the  town,  the  loyal  people  were 
able  to  save  very  little  of  their  household  goods,  and  the 
loss  of  the  county  records  was  certain  to  cause  great  in 
convenience  when  the  time  came  for  reorganizing  the 
county.  When  the  militia  occupied  the  place,  quite  a 
number  of  loyal  citizens  returned  to  thc-ir  homes,  to  be 
bitterly  disappointed  by  being  left  unprotected  and 
obliged  to  witness  the  destruction  of  their  homes.  Perhaps 
nearly  nine  tenths  of  the  loyal  people  in  the  county  out 
side  of  Lamar  had  moved  into  Kansas  or  into  the  counties 


360  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

east  of  Barton  since  the  war,  and  as  there  was  a  much 
greater  proportion  of  loyal  people  in  those  counties  than 
in  the  Border  tier  of  counties,  there  was,  of  course,  a 
strong  demand  for  troops  for  their  protection.  All  the 
towns  of  importance  in  the  counties  east  of  the  Border 
tier  had  militia  stationed  in  them,  and  most  of  the  people 
in  the  country,  secessionists  as  well  as  Unionists,  remained 
on  their  farms.  Of  course  nearly  all  the  able-bodied  men 
of  military  age  were  in  the  Federal  or  Confederate  army, 
or  in  the  brush  as  bandits. 

Action  on  Centre  Creek. 

When  Price's  army  was  driven  south  through  the  west 
ern  counties  of  the  State  during  his  raid  in  the  fall  of  1864, 
the  detachments  of  the  loyal  State  militia  stationed  in  the 
county  towns  were  obliged  to  be  withdrawn  to  prevent 
their  capture  by  the  enemy.  Very  soon,  however,  after 
the  Southern  forces  passed  beyond  the  limits  of  the  State, 
the  commanding  officers  of  detachments  of  militia  were 
directed  to  return  to  their  former  stations,  for  the  purpose 
of  giving  protection  to  the  people  and  keeping  down  ban 
dit  depredations.  Although  most  of  the  bandit  outlaws 
of  the  State  joined  Price's  army  and  were  driven  south 
with  it,  they  soon  commenced  returning  to  the  south 
western  counties  in  small  squads  to  renew  their  plundering 
and  murdering  operations.  Their  presence  in  any  local 
ity  was  generally  soon  made  known  by  the  loyal  people  to 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  nearest  military  post,  who 
lost  no  time  in  sending  a  detachment  of  mounted  troops 
against  them.  The  officer  intended,  as  far  as  his  informa 
tion  justified  him,  to  always  send  out  a  force  sufficient 
to  rout  them  and  drive  them  out  of  the  locality.  But, 
knowing  the  vigilance  of  the  militia,  the  outlaws  did  not 
usually  remain  long  in  any  one  place. 

On  the   iQth  of  February,   1865,  Major  Milton  Burch, 


QUANTRILL   REPULSED.  361 

commanding  the  post  of  Neosho,  Missouri,  received  in 
formation  from  a  reliable  source  that  there  was  a  party  of 
bandit  outlaws  operating  in  the  neighborhood  of  Centre 
Creek  in  the  southwestern  part  of  Jasper  County,  some 
twenty-five  miles  distant.  The  Major  had  been  known 
in  Southwest  Missouri,  since  the  early  part  of  the  war,  as 
a  brave  and  energetic  officer  in  breaking  up  and  dispers 
ing  the  bands  of  guerillas  operating  within  the  limits  of 
his  territory.  Probably  no  Federal  officer  operating  in 
Southwest  Missouri  was  so  much  dreaded  by  the  bandit 
outlaws  of  that  section  as  Major  Burch  and  his  captains, 
Kelso  and  Ruark,  for  the  weather  was  never  too  inclement 
and  no  night  too  dark  and  stormy  for  them  to  venture 
out,  and  no  spot  too  inaccessible  for  them  to  find  the  foe 
and  engage  him  in  hand-to-hand  encounters. 

Determined  to  break  up  the  band  of  outlaws  on  Centre 
Creek,  on  the  iQth  of  February  Major  Burch  sent  out  a 
detachment  of  twenty-five  mounted  men  under  Lieuten 
ant  John  M.  Baxter,  of  his  battalion  of  the  Eighth  Mis 
souri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  in  search  of  the  enemy.  The 
detachment  left  Neosho  in  the  morning  with  several  days' 
rations  in  their  haversacks,  and  marched  north  that  day 
down  Shoal  Creek  and  across  the  prairies  to  the  timber 
on  Centre  Creek,  where,  late  in  the  evening.  Lieutenant 
Baxter  received  definite  information  of  the  place  where 
the  bandits  were  stopping.  It  was  then  too  late  to  reach 
the  place  and  attack  them  that  evening,  and  the  detach 
ment,  finding  a  secluded  spot  where  their  presence  would 
not  likely  be  observed,  encamped  for  the  night.  Early 
the  next  morning  the  Lieutenant  resumed  the  march  to 
the  point  where  the  outlaws  were  reported  to  be  located. 
It  was  soon  understood  among  the  men  of  the  Federal 
detachment  that  the  bandits  were  occupying  a  house,  and 
were  less  than  a  dozen  in  number,  but  probably  well 
armed  for  a  desperate  fight.  When  Lieutenant  Baxter 
came  up  within  a  quarter  of  a  mile  of  the  house  he 


362  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

ordered  a  charge  with  drawn  revolvers,  and  when  he  ap 
proached  within  a  few  yards  of  the  building  the  outlaws 
ran  out  of  it,  both  parties  at  the  same  moment  opening  a 
deadly  fire  upon  each  other.  Private  Dodson  Britton, 
one  of  Lieutenant  Baxter's  detachment,  being  a  few  yards 
in  advance  of -his  comrades,  shot  down  one  of  the  bandits 
directly  after  he  ran  out  of  the  house.  Though  the  out 
law  was  mortally  wounded,  he  at  once  rose  to  his  feet  and 
came  forward  a  few  steps,  seized  Britton's  horse  by  the 
bridle-reins,  and  shot  its  rider  through  the  heart,  and  he 
fell  off  dead  upon  his  antagonist.  In  another  moment 
Lieutenant  Baxter  rode  along  over  the  ground  where  the 
desperate  struggle  took  place,  and  the  dying  bandit  raised 
himself  upon  his  elbow  and  shot  the  Lieutenant  off  his 
horse,  mortally  wounded.  In  this  short,  decisive  action 
three  of  the  outlaws  were  killed,  and  of  the  Federal  de 
tachment  one  was  killed  and  five  wounded.  Lieutenant 
Baxter  died  on  the  return  of  the  detachment  to  Neosho 
that  day.  A  more  experienced  officer  would  have  dis 
played  greater  caution  than  the  Lieutenant  in  attacking 
a  desperate  foe  who  had  all  the  advantages  of  position  for 
making  a  good  fight. 

The  father  and  mother  of  young  Britton  resided  at 
Neosho  at  the  time,  and  when  the  lifeless  form  of  their 
son  was  brought  home  that  evening,  a  sacrifice  to  the 
cause  of  the  Union,  their  grief  was  almost  unsupport- 
able.  They  had  borne  with  patience  the  loss  of  property 
through  the  enemy  from  time  to  time  since  the  first  year 
of  the  war,  but  the  loss  of  this  son  seemed  to  almost  fill 
their  cup  of  bitterness.  Of  their  three  sons  who  had  en 
listed  in  the  Union  army,  two  had  now  fallen  in  action  with 
the  enemy,  leaving  the  surviving  son,  the  author  of  this 
work,  to  pay  this  slight  tribute  to  their  devotion  to  the 
Union. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

MILITARY    OPERATIONS    IN    WESTERN    MISSOURI. 

CENTRAL  and  Western  Missouri  during  the  winter  of 
1863-64  were  little  disturbed  by  guerilla  depredations. 
Those  bandits  who  did  not  go  south  with  Quantrill  in 
October  had  kept  very  quiet  in  their  retreats  in  the  deep 
recesses  of  the  rough  and  thickly  wooded  regions  of  Jack 
son,  Lafayette,  and  Johnson  Counties,  and  were  extremely 
cautious  in  communicating  with  their  friends.  It  became 
known  to  the  Federal  officers  at  Lexington  and  Warrens- 
burg  that  a  Captain  Blunt,  the  leader  of  some  twenty 
bandits,  did  not  go  south  with  Quantrill,  but  had  under 
taken  to  stay  during  the  winter  in  the  almost  inaccessible 
regions  of  the  counties  above  mentioned.  Colonel  James 
McFerran  had  sent  out  frequent  scouts  in  search  of  their 
camp,  but  they  were  unable  to  find  it  or  their  trail  until 
February  22d,  when  Lieutenant  W.  B.  Hamilton,  Fourth 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  found  the  bandits  in  the 
brush,  twelve  miles  northwest  of  Warrcnsburg  on  Black- 
water  Creek,  and  attacked  them,  wounding  one  of  them 
and  receiving  a  severe  wound  himself.  The  next  day  after 
this  skirmish,  Captain  Milton  Burris,  First  Missouri  State 
Militia  Cavalry,  with  nineteen  men,  ambuscaded  and 
mortally  wounded  two  of  the  same  band  of  guerillas  in 
the  western  part  of  Lafayette  County.  In  the  latter  part 
of  March,  Major  A.  W.  Mullins,  First  Missouri  State 
Militia  Cavalry,  and  Captain  Burris  scouted  for  ten  days 

363 


364  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

through  the  eastern  part  of  Jackson  and  the  western  part 
of  Lafayette  Counties,  broke  up  a  number  of  guerilla 
camps,  wounded  several  bandits,  and  captured  a  few 
horses  and  arms.  The  troops  left  the  roads  entirely,  and 
part  of  the  country  over  which  they  scouted  was  covered 
with  almost  impenetrable  thickets  and  brush,  so  that  the 
officers  commanding  detachments  were  frequently  obliged 
to  dismount  part  of  their  men  to  advance  on  foot  while 
the  balance  of  the  men  of  the  detachment,  also  dis 
mounted,  led  their  horses  a  short  distance  in  the  rear. 

Information  was  received  by  General  E.  B.  Brown, 
commanding  the  District  of  Central  Missouri,  that  a  con 
siderable  number  of  guerillas  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river  were  preparing  to  enter  the  eastern  part  of  Jackson 
County,  and  this  scout,  under  Major  Mullins,  was  in 
tended  to  check  the  movement  and  prevent  their  concen 
tration.  The  General  had  under  his  command  in  the 
western  part  of  his  district  in  the  spring  and  summer  of 
1864,  the  Second  Colorado  Cavalry,  Colonel  James  H. 
Ford  commanding,  headquarters  at  Kansas  City;  the 
First  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  under  Colonel  James 
McFerran,  headquarters  at  Warrensburg ;  besides  the  En 
rolled  Missouri  Militia  of  the  district,  part  of  which  was 
in  active  service  most  of  the  time.  This  force  was  sta 
tioned  at  the  county-seat  towns  and  at  all  other  important 
towns  in  the  counties,  and  detachments  from  the  different 
stations  constantly  kept  out  scouting.  But  in  the  face 
of  the  activity  and  vigilance  of  the  troops,  as  spring  ad 
vanced  the  guerillas  increased  in  numbers  and  boldness, 
having  made  their  way  into  that  section  in  small  parties 
from  the  south.  Many  of  them  were  dressed  in  the  Fed 
eral  uniform,  and  easily  deceived  the  people  as  to  their 
true  characters  as  they  marched  north. 

The  latter  part  of  March,  Captain  J.  H.  Little,  First 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  commanding  the  station 
at  Germantown,  in  the  southwest  part  of  Henry  County, 


OPERATIONS  IN    WESTERN  MISSOURI.  365 

received  information  late  at  night  that  a  party  of  bandits 
a  few  miles  from  his  post  were  robbing  and  plundering 
the  citizens  and  threatening  the  lives  of  those  who  served 
in  the  Enrolled  Militia  at  the  station  when  called  upon. 
He  at  once  sent  out  Sergeant  John  W.  Barkley,  of  his 
company,  with  a  detachment  of  men,  in  pursuit  of  the 
marauders,  the  citizen  who  brought  in  the  report  accom 
panying  the  soldiers.  At  one  place  where  the  bandits 
were  attempting  to  rob  and  plunder,  they  were  fired  upon 
by  a  citizen  and  one  of  them  severely  wounded,  and  in 
being  taken  off  by  his  comrades  the  party  was  so  much 
delayed  that  they  were  overtaken  by  Sergeant  Barkley, 
where  they  had  taken  refuge  in  the  house  of  a  friend, 
about  one  o'clock  in  the  morning.  The  Sergeant  ordered 
them  to  surrender,  and  they  replied  with  a  volley.  In  a 
short  time  other  bandits  who  were  plundering  in  the 
neighborhood  came  to  the  assistance  of  their  besieged 
friends  and  fired  upon  the  Federal  detachment,  and  called 
to  those  in  the  house  to  come  out.  They  attempted  to 
escape,  but  were  driven  back  by  a  volley  from  the  Fed 
eral  detachment,  and  the  guerillas  who  had  come  to  their 
aid  were  driven  off.  Sergeant  Barkley  covered  his  men 
from  the  fire  of  the  bandits,  and  kept  up  the  fight  until 
daylight,  when,  seeing  no  possibility  of  escape  and  after 
some  discussion  as  to  their  treatment,  they  surrendered, 
and  the  three  men,  including  the  wounded  bandit,  were 
taken  back  to  Germantown.  They  were  identified  by  the 
citizens  as  the  men  who  had  been  committing  the  rob 
beries;  part  of  the  stolen  property  was  found  in  their 
possession;  and  the  two  who  were  not  wounded  were 
tried  by  a  military  court,  found  guilty,  and  executed. 
The  wounded  bandit  was  sent  to  Clinton  to  be  treated 
and  to  await  the  result  of  his  wound.  One  of  the  ban 
dits  who  was  executed,  when  informed  of  the  sentence 
that  was  to  be  imposed,  stated  that  "  he  had  paid  for  his 
life  nine  times."  When  they  found  that  they  were  go- 


366  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

ing  to  be  executed  and  that  their  fictitious  names  were 
no  longer  of  any  use  to  them,  they  gave  their  true  names, 
were  identified,  and  permitted  to  write  to  their  friends. 
They  were  each  wearing  a  Federal  overcoat  when  cap 
tured,  which  fact  justified  their  execution  under  general 
orders. 

The  Federal  officers  serving  in  Western  Missouri  looked 
for  Quantrill's  bandits  to  return  to  the  Missouri  River 
counties  on  the  opening  of  spring,  and  the  distribution 
of  the  troops  was  made  with  the  view  of  rendering  the 
former  haunts  of  the  marauders  as  nearly  untenable  as 
possible.  At  no  time  since  the  war  had  Federal  camps  and 
stations  been  established  in  the  very  heart  of  the  region 
in  which  Quantrill  had  formerly  made  his  retreat  when 
not  on  some  desperate  foray.  As  no  large  body  of  ban 
dits  had  appeared  in  that  section  in  the  early  part  of  the 
spring,  the  Federal  scouting  parties  sent  out  were  usually 
small,  from  fifteen  or  twenty  to  fifty  men.  Should  Quan 
trill's  bandits  return  to  that  section,  no  one  knew  whether 
they  would  come  in  small  parties  or  in  two  or  more  large 
detachments.  As  there  were  Federal  troops  stationed  at 
all  the  important  points  in  Southwest  Missouri  and  in 
Southern  Kansas,  it  did  not  seem  likely  that  as  large  a 
body  of  guerillas  as  nearly  a  hundred  men  would  be  able 
to  advance  as  far  north  as  Johnson  or  Jackson  County 
without  their  march  being  interrupted  or  their  presence 
in  the  section  through  which  they  passed  being  known. 
But  the  western  Border  counties  from  the  Missouri  River 
to  the  Arkansas  line  were  nearly  depopulated,  except  a 
few  towns  in  some  of  them. 

Nearly  one  hundred  guerillas  did  march  over  this  deso 
lated  region  of  nearly  two  hundred  miles  unobserved  and 
surprise  and  attack  Lieutenant  James  E.  Couch,  with  a 
small  detachment  of  the  First  Missouri  State  Militia  Cav 
alry,  near  Chapel  Hill,  killing  the  Lieutenant  and  two  of 
his  men,  on  the  28th  of  April.  Most  of  the  bandits  were 


OPERATIONS  IN    WESTERN  MISSOURI.  367 

wearing  the  Federal  uniform,  and  when  seen  by  citizens 
on  the  march  were  probably  thought  to  be  Federal  sol 
diers.  They  crossed  Grand  River  near  Dayton,  in  the 
southeast  part  of  Cass  County,  at  three  o'clock  P.M.  on 
the  2/th,  and  took  Sergeant  P.  Russell,  Second  Colorado 
Cavalry,  commanding  the  station,  a  prisoner.  Informa 
tion  of  their  passing  Dayton,  marching  north,  was  con 
veyed  to  Major  J.  L.  Pritchard,  Second  Colorado 
Cavalry,  commanding  post  at  Harrisonville,  that  even 
ing,  who  at  once  sent  a  messenger  to  Pleasant  Hill, 
notifying  the  commanding  officer  at  that  place  of  the 
movement  of  the  guerillas.  He  also  hastily  collected 
such  men  as  could  be  spared  from  the  nearest  station  and 
marched  the  next  morning  at  daylight  for  Rose  Hill, 
where  he  struck  the  trail  of  the  bandits  and  followed  it  to 
Holden,  and  ascertained  that  they  had  passed  that  place 
early  that  morning.  A  heavy  rain  had  fallen  during  the 
night,  making  their  trail  easily  followed,  until  he  arrived 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Chapel  Hill,  where  he  lost  it,  it 
being  broken  up  by  the  trail  of  other  Federal  troops  cross 
ing  and  recrossing  it.  After  the  disaster  to  Lieutenant 
Couch,  another  detachment  of  the  First  Missouri  State 
Militia  Cavalry  had  come  up  with  and  attacked  the  ban 
dits  and  dispersed  them  and  pursued  them  until  night, 
capturing  from  them  a  flag  of  an  Indiana  regiment.  The 
next  day  Major  Pritchard  marched  from  Chapel  Hill  to 
Lone  Jack,  where  he  met  Lieutenant-Colonel  Theodore 
H.  Dodd,  with  six  companies  of  the  Second  Colorado  Cav 
alry.  From  that  point  the  united  commands  marched 
north,  scouting  the  Sni  Hills  section  almost  to  Napoleon, 
on  the  Missouri  River,  finding  only  a  few  trails  and  a 
small  party  of  ten  bandits,  who  escaped  into  the  thick 
brush  that  covered  many  square  miles  of  that  region. 
The  main  force  of  the  bandits  had  broken  up  into  small 
parties  and  scattered  out  into  adjoining  counties,  some  of 
them  making  their  way  to  the  north  side  of  the  river, 


368  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

where  they  visited  their  friends  clandestinely,  and  were 
soon  causing  a  disturbance  in  that  section. 

After  the  breaking  up  of  the  guerillas  into  small  parties, 
the  Federal  troops  who  had  participated  in  the  pursuit 
returned  to  their  several  stations  and  resumed  the  work 
of  scouting,  and  as  far  as  practicable  keeping  advised  of 
the  movements  of  bandits  in  the  different  localities.  The 
vigilance  of  the  troops  prevented  any  important  outbreak 
of  the  marauders  for  upwards  of  three  weeks,  when  Colo 
nel  McFerran,  at  Warrensburg,  received  a  despatch  from 
Lieutenant  William  L.  Hardesty,  First  Missouri  State 
Militia  Cavalry,  stationed  at  Germantown,  dated  May 
2 1st,  stating  that  one  hundred  guerillas  had  crossed  the 
Osage  River  at  Taberville,  and  were  marching  north. 
This  force  was  a  part  of  Quantrill's  command  that  had 
attacked  the  Union  militia  at  Lamar  on  the  2Oth  and 
were  driven  off.  Some  of  the  Federal  troops  from  Clin 
ton  who  saw  the  bandits  when  they  passed  several  miles 
west  of  that  place  estimated  that  they  were  more  than 
one  hundred  strong. 

While  at  Holden  on  the  evening  of  the  23d,  Colonel 
McFerran  received  a  message  from  Captain  John  Taggart, 
commanding  a  company  of  Union  militia  a  few  miles  south 
of  town,  that  Quantrill,  with  two  hundred  men,  was  near 
at  hand,  marching  in  the  direction  of  Holden.  The  ap 
pearance  of  the  bandits  was  so  sudden  and  in  such  force 
that  the  Captain  was  unable  to  get  his  company  together 
in  time  to  make  a  fight,  so  that  those  who  had  reported 
were  obliged  to  take  to  the  brush  to  save  themselves.  On 
receipt  of  Captain  Taggart's  message,  Colonel  McFerran 
sent  messengers  to  Kingsville  for  his  men  at  that  station 
to  join  him  that  night  en  roiite  to  Hopewell,  in  Lafayette 
County,  which  they  did,  together  with  fifteen  citizen 
guards  under  Captain  Jones.  With  this  force  of  fifty- 
seven  men  the  Colonel  arrived  at  Hopewell  the  next 
morning  at  daylight,  where  he  was  soon  joined  by  sixty- 


OPERATIONS  IN    WESTERN  MISSOURI.  369 

five  men,  under  Captain  Burris,  of  the  First  Missouri  State 
Militia  Cavalry.  He  then  returned  to  Holden  that  day, 
but  soon  ascertained  that  the  outlaws  had  marched  north 
the  night  before,  without  coming  into  collision  with  any 
detachments  of  Federal  troops.  As  the  bandits  were  a 
day  and  a  night's  march  ahead  of  him,  Colonel  McFerran 
did  not  attempt  to  follow  their  trail,  but  sent  the  troops 
which  he  had  concentrated  to  their  several  stations,  and 
returned  to  his  headquarters  at  Warrensburg. 

It  was  now  known  to  General  Brown  and  his  officers 
commanding  sub-districts  that  at  least  two  hundred  des 
perate  bandits  had  entered  that  section  within  the  last 
month,  and  that  they  were  determined  to  commit  a  series 
of  desperate  and  atrocious  acts  during  the  summer. 
While  the  dispositions  of  the  Federal  troops  in  that  sec 
tion  were  made  with  good  judgment  with  the  view  of 
giving  the  bandits  no  rest,  the  numerous  stations  had  to 
be  supplied  with  subsistence  for  the  men  and  forage  for 
the  animals.  This  was  no  small  task,  and  required  the 
almost  constant  moving  of  a  train  and  escort  from  one 
station  to  another.  During  the  winter,  when  there  were 
only  a  few  bandits  in  the  country,  the  teams  hauling  sub 
sistence  and  forage  for  the  troops  at  the  stations  were 
generally  accompanied  by  escorts  of  fifteen  to  twenty 
men.  The  large  number  of  guerillas  known  to  be  in  that 
section  should  have  suggested  to  officers  sending  out 
teams  thoughts  of  caution  about  exposing  small  escorts 
to  possible  slaughter.  But  of  course  there  were  many 
contingencies  to  be  considered  before  an  officer  could 
be  justly  blamed  for  a  seeming  fault. 

At  most  of  the  stations  the  troops  had  adopted  plans  of 
operations  against  the  bandits  which  the  latter  dreaded 
and  which  often  proved  disastrous  to  them.  Small  scouts 
of  twenty  to  thirty  men  under  a  competent  officer  or  non 
commissioned  officer  would  leave  the  stations  afoot  after 
dark,  with  five  to  ten  days'  rations,  and  each  day  while 

VOL.   II. — 24 


370  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE   BORDER. 

they  were  out  scout  through  the  thick  brush  on  each  side 
of  the  streams,  and  of  nights  watch  the  roads  or  paths 
along  which  the  bandits  would  likely  pass  to  visit  their 
friends  to  get  supplies  and  information  of  the  movements 
of  the  Federal  troops.  The  success  of  these  scouts  de 
pended  upon  the  movements  of  the  men  being  guarded 
with  the  utmost  secrecy,  for  they  would  be  placed  at  a 
great  disadvantage  if  the  neighborhoods  they  intended 
visiting  should  become  known  to  the  guerillas.  A  small 
scout,  mounted  or  dismounted,  leaving  camp  in  the  day 
time,  might  be  watched  by  the  Southern  sympathizers, 
and  information  of  the  direction  it  was  marching  conveyed 
to  the  bandits.  To  scout  the  woods  by  day  and  watch 
the  roads  and  paths  by  night  was  full  of  danger  to  the 
scouting  detachments  from  the  stations,  for  the  outlaws 
neither  expected  nor  gave  quarter. 

While  these  scouts  were  generally  successful  in  inflict 
ing  punishment  upon  the  guerillas,  a  serious  disaster  be 
fell  one  sent  out  from  Holden  by  Captain  John  Wyckoff, 
First  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  on  the  nth  of  June, 
under  Sergeant  J.  V.  Parman  of  his  company.  At  nine 
o'clock  on  that  day  Sergeant  Parman  left  Holden,  with 
fourteen  men  and  one  day's  rations,  with  instructions  to 
scout  the  country  north  of  Kingsville  and  along  Craw 
ford's  Fork  and  to  return  to  camp  the  next  day.  His 
march  that  day  was  mainly  in  the  brush.  He  found  one 
fresh  trail  of  guerillas,  and  followed  it  until  they  sepa 
rated.  He  then  returned  to  a  point  three  miles  west  of 
Kingsville  and  encamped  part  of  the  night  near  a  farm 
house.  The  next  morning,  directly  after  he  started  out 
from  the  place  where  he  had  camped,  he  noticed  a  body 
of  forty  to  fifty  cavalry  in  Federal  uniforms  a  short  dis 
tance  in  his  rear,  rapidly  advancing  upon  him.  He  in 
stantly  formed  his  detachment  in  line,  and  ordered  his 
men  to  fire  upon  the  enemy,  who  were  then  within  easy 
range  and  fast  closing  around  him.  The  fight  was  short 


OPERATIONS  IN   WESTERN  MISSOURI.  3/1 

and  desperate,  and  five  of  his  men  fell  where  he  formed, 
and  seven  others  a  short  distance  from  them  near  the 
brush  after  he  attempted  to  retreat.  The  guerillas,  under 
Captains  Yeager  and  Bill  Anderson,  had  flanked  him  on 
the  right  and  left  before  coming  up  in  sight  in  his  rear, 
and  he  estimated  that  altogether  they  had  at  least  eighty 
men.  It  was  with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  he  and  two 
of  his  comrades  made  their  escape  by  using  their  revolvers 
in  firing  upon  the  bandits  who  were  in  their  front  and  on 
their  right  and  left.  The  Sergeant  made  a  serious  mis 
take  in  attempting  to  fight  so  large  a  force  with  his  small 
detachment.  As  he  was  near  the  brush  when  the  enemy 
were  seen  in  his  rear,  by  hastily  retreating  he  could  prob 
ably  have  escaped  with  very  little  loss.  He  reported  that 
he  was  satisfied  that  the  bandits  had  been  advised  of  his 
position  and  strength ;  that  they  had  marched  from  the 
north — from  the  direction  of  the  Sni  Hills — during  the 
night,  and  that  after  the  fight  they  returned  in  the  direc 
tion  from  whence  they  had  marched.  Whether  they  were 
informed  of  his  movements  after  leaving  Holden  by  some 
of  their  friends,  or  whether  information  of  his  presence 
near  the  farmhouse  was  conveyed  to  them,  could  not  be 
determined.  In  a  short  time  information  of  the  disaster 
reached  Kingsville  and  Holden,  and  in  a  few  hours  Cap 
tains  Wyckoff  and  J.  D.  Eads  had  all  their  available 
men  on  the  trail  and  in  pursuit  of  the  outlaws,  coming  up 
with  them  just  at  dark  as  they  were  entering  the  Sni 
Hills,  and  mortally  wounded  one  of  them  in  the  skirmish 
that  took  place.  Directly  after  this  skirmish  Captain 
Wyckoff  was  joined  by  forty  men  of  the  Second  Colorado 
Cavalry  from  Pleasant  Hill,  who  stayed  with  him  nearly 
all  night  in  the  cautious  pursuit  and  search  for  the  bandits. 
But  they  soon  scattered  in  small  parties,  and  the  Federal 
troops  were  unable  to  bring  them  to  a  stand. 

Only  two  days  after  the  disaster  to  Sergeant  Parman's 
detachment,  Sergeant   Shackleford,    commanding  a  de- 


3/2  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

tachment  of  thirty  men  of  Captain  Burris'  company,  First 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  was  attacked  by  one  hun 
dred  guerillas,  twelve  miles  from  Lexington,  while  guard 
ing  a  train  of  two  wagons  hauling  rations  for  the  troops 
at  one  of  the  stations,  and  had  eight  of  his  men  killed  and 
one  mortally  wounded  and  fifteen  mules  killed.  The  Ser 
geant  made  a  gallant  fight  with  his  men  and  repulsed 
three  charges  of  the  bandits,  when  they  flanked  him, 
nearly  surrounded  him,  and  cut  him  off  from  the  brush, 
making  it  necessary  for  him  to  abandon  the  teams  and 
retreat  to  save  the  balance  of  his  command  from  being 
overpowered  and  killed.  He  was  unable  to  ascertain  the 
loss  he  inflicted  on  the  guerillas  in  the  fight,  but  thought 
that  they  must  have  had  a  number  of  men  killed  and 
wounded.  These  disasters  were  the  most  serious  the 
Federal  troops  sustained  in  Central  and  Western  Missouri 
during  the  war.  No  impartial  observer  could  doubt  but 
that  such  disasters  might  be  looked  for  as  long  as  the 
policy  of  the  Government  allowed  Southern  families  to 
remain  in  the  country  as  spies  and  informers  for  the  ban 
dits.  But  severe  as  were  the  Federal  losses  in  these  two 
instances,  General  Brown  reported  that  while  he  lost  in 
the  various  operations  in  his  district  during  the  month 
of  June,  twenty-three  men  killed,  reports  from  his  officers 
from  different  stations  showed  that  his  troops  had  killed 
eleven  and  mortally  wounded  sixteen  bandits.  The  sys 
tem  of  sending  out  foot  scouts  at  night  from  the  different 
stations  in  his  district  had  proved  very  successful  in  in 
creasing  the  mortality  among  the  guerillas. 

Directly  after  receiving  information  of  the  disasters  to 
the  Federal  detachments  near  Kingsville  and  Lexington, 
General  Rosecrans  telegraphed  General  Curtis,  command 
ing  Department  of  Kansas, that  the  guerillas  were  reported 
concentrating  in  the  Sni  Hills  on  the  line  of  Jackson  and 
Lafayette  Counties  for  an  important  movement,  and 
arrangements  were  at  once  perfected  for  the  cooperation 


OPERATIONS  IN    WESTERN  MISSOURI.  373 

of  the  Federal  troops  of  the  two  Departments  against  the 
outlaws.  On  the  morning  of  June  1 5th  one  company  of  the 
Fifth  and  parts  of  the  Eleventh  and  Fifteenth  Regiments 
Kansas  Cavalry  were  concentrated  at  Aubrey,  Johnson 
County,  Kansas,  under  Colonel  Thomas  Moonlight,  from 
the  troops  in  the  District  of  Southern  Kansas,  Brigadier- 
General  Thomas  J.  McKean  commanding,  for  the  purpose 
of  making  an  expedition  into  Missouri,  in  cooperation 
with  Colonel  Ford,  Second  Colorado  Cavalry,  command 
ing  the  western  counties  of  General  Brown's  district,  in  a 
movement  against  the  guerillas.  The  Kansas  troops  left 
Aubrey  on  the  i6th,  in  two  columns  of  four  squadrons 
each;  one  column  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  George  H. 
Hoyt,  Fifteenth  Kansas,  moving  down  the  Big  Blue, 
thoroughly  scouting  the  timber  on  each  side  of  that 
stream,  and  the  other  column  under  Colonel  Moonlight 
marching  up  Grand  River  in  the  direction  of  Pleasant  Hill, 
scouting  the  brush  on  each  side.  As  a  part  of  the  expe 
dition,  some  of  the  troops  marched  on  the  high  ground 
between  the  streams  and  in  the  open  prairies  to  watch 
for  and  intercept  any  bandits  who  might  be  run  out  of  the 
brush.  At  Pleasant  Hill,  Colonel  Moonlight  met  Colonel 
Ford  with  part  of  the  Second  Colorado  Cavalry,  and  they 
proceeded  together  to  Lone  Jack  and  thence  to  the  Sni 
Hills  to  thoroughly  scout  all  that  region.  In  accordance 
with  prearranged  plans,  the  several  columns  met  after 
dark  on  the  i8th,  a  few  miles  from  Sibley  on  the  Missouri 
River,  having  that  day  come  upon  one  band  of  fifteen 
and  another  of  fifty  guerillas,  who  were  so  wild  that  the 
troops  could  not  get  near  enough  to  get  any  fight  out  of 
them.  In  the  chase  after  them,  however,  the  troops  cap 
tured  a  few  horses,  mules,  and  blankets  which  they  left 
in  their  flight.  It  was  the  opinion  of  the  officers  of  the 
expedition  that  the  scout  had  had  the  effect  of  driving  the 
bandits  out  of  the  Border  counties  into  Johnson  and  La 
fayette  Counties  and  to  the  north  side  of  the  Missouri 


374  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

River,  and  prevented  the  concentration  for  which  they 
were  preparing. 

Having  accomplished  all  that  was  possible,  the  Kansas 
troops  under  Colonel  Moonlight  returned  to  Aubrey, 
from  whence  they  were  sent  to  their  several  stations  along 
the  State  line.  On  returning  to  Kansas  they  scouted  the 
thickly  wooded  regions  along  some  of  the  small  streams 
which  had  not  been  thoroughly  searched  the  first  two  days 
out,  but  did  not  find  any  of  the  marauders,  or  any  recent 
signs  of  them.  Very  few  of  the  Southern  families  who 
had  been  required  to  leave  their  homes  under  General 
Ewing's  Order  Number  Eleven  had  returned,  except  in 
the  towns,  so  that  the  bandits  found  no  encouragement 
to  make  their  hiding-places  in  the  depopulated  section. 
But  this  fact  did  not  make  the  Kansas  troops  the  less 
vigilant,  for  if  the  guerillas  could  concentrate  in  Johnson 
or  Lafayette  County,  they  might,  by  making  a  night 
march  and  evading  Federal  scouting  parties,  get  into 
Kansas  unobserved.  The  militia  in  the  eastern  Border 
counties  in  Kansas  had  been  organized,  and  the  people 
in  the  towns  were  armed  and  better  prepared  to  meet  an 
invading  force  of  bandits  than  in  1863.  Even  during  the 
temporary  absence  of  the  troops  from  their  stations  in  the 
expedition  under  Colonel  Moonlight,  the  Kansas  militia 
were  called  out  to  guard  the  towns. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

THE    CENTRALIA    MASSACRE. 

IN  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1864,  Brigadier-General 
Clinton  B.  Fisk  was  in  command  of  the  Union  forces  in 
the  District  of  North  Missouri,  operating  against  the 
guerilla  bands  of  Perkins,  Thrailkill,  Todd,  Anderson, 
Holtzclaw,  Davis,  and  other  guerilla  leaders  in  that  sec 
tion.  The  General's  headquarters  were  at  St.  Joseph, 
from  which  point  he  directed  the  movements  of  the  troops 
of  his  district.  His  principal  subordinate  commanders 
were  Brigadier-Generals  James  Craig  and  J.  B.  Douglass. 
General  Craig's  sub-district  embraced  Northwest  Mis 
souri,  and  General  Douglass  commanded  in  Central  Mis 
souri,  north  of  the  river.  In  directing  their  operations 
against  the  Southern  guerillas,  these  officers  had  the 
State  militia,  the  Enrolled  Militia,  and  some  companies 
of  Volunteer  cavalry,  a  total  force  of  two  or  three  thou 
sand  men.  But  this  force  was  distributed  over  such  a 
large  territory  that  it  was  generally  divided  into  detach 
ments  of  one,  two,  or  three  hundred  men,  or  even  smaller 
numbers.  As  the  guerillas  made  no  pretensions  to  hold 
ing  any  place,  their  leaders  could  divide  up  their  forces 
into  squads  of  a  dozen  or  so  men,  up  to  a  hundred  or 
more,  and  when  they  desired  could  concentrate  the  men 
of  different  leaders  so  as  to  bring  five  or  six  hundred 
together  in  a  very  short  time.  In  nearly  all  the  Missouri 
River  counties  above  Boonville  the  Southern  sympathiz- 

375 


376  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

ers  and  open  secessionists  were  as  numerous  if  not  indeed 
more  numerous  than  the  Unionists;  so  that  the  bandits 
could  conceal  themselves  in  considerable  force  in  many 
neighborhoods  for  days  without  the  Union  people  or  loyal 
militia  knowing  their  positions.  As  the  non-combatant 
Southern  sympathizers  were  allowed  their  freedom  to  go 
and  come  almost  as  they  pleased,  they  frequently  gave 
information  of  the  movements  of  Federal  troops  to  the 
bandits  that  enabled  them  to  make  a  dash  upon  or  waylay 
some  Federal  detachment  and  cut  it  to  pieces.  In  spite 
of  the  vigilance  of  the  loyal  militia  officers,  they  were 
sometimes  drawn  into  ambush  and  roughly  handled  by 
the  guerillas. 

In  the  early  part  of  August,  1864,  Major  John  Grimes, 
commanding  the  Fifty-first  Regiment  Missouri  Enrolled 
Militia,  received  information  that  Bill  Anderson,  with  a 
force  of  about  one  hundred  guerillas,  was  in  Ray  County 
murdering  loyal  men,  committing  depredations  against 
their  property,  and  generally  creating  a  state  of  terror 
among  the  people.  The  Major  at  once  ordered  Captain 
Patton  Colley,  of  his  regiment,  to  take  position  with  his 
company  at  Fredericksburg,  in  Ray  County;  and  Captain 
M.  T.  Reed,  of  the  same  regiment,  was  directed  to  move 
with  part  of  his  company  to  Pleasant  View,  Ray  County, 
with  instructions  for  these  officers  to  cooperate  with  each 
other  in  keeping  the  country  bordering  upon  the  line  of 
Clay  and  Ray  Counties  from  being  disturbed  or  menaced 
by  the  bandits  as  far  as  practicable.  In  a  few  days  after 
arriving  at  his  station,  Captain  Colley  was  informed  on 
the  night  of  August  I2th  by  his  pickets  that  a  consider 
able  body  of  guerillas  was  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
his  camp.  He  took  twenty  men  and  started  in  pursuit 
of  the  bandits  immediately,  and,  when  about  four  miles 
south  of  his  station,  was  drawn  into  an  ambuscade,  and 
after  a  desperate  conflict  he  and  four  of  his  men  were 
killed  and  the  balance  of  his  command  dispersed.  Im- 


THE    CENTRALIA    MASSACRE.  377 

mediately  after  the  fight  in  which  Captain  Colley  and  his 
comrades  were  killed,  Anderson  and  his  bandits  started 
east,  and  in  the  afternoon  of  the  next  day  had  reached  a 
point  forty  miles  east  on  the  Missouri  River  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Wakenda  in  Carroll  County.  On  this  march  An 
derson  captured  two  militiamen,  Samuel  Foreseen  and 
Daniel  Vansant,  who  were  carrying  despatches  to  Major 
Grimes  at  Richmond,  and  killed  both  these  men,  cutting 
Foreseen's  throat  from  ear  to  ear  and  then  scalping  him. 
These  bandits  also  killed  James  Maupin,  a  citizen  militia 
man,  shooting  him  in  his  wagon.  Mr.  Asa  Brookover,  a 
Union  man  who  resided  near  Wakenda,  in  Carroll  County, 
was  able  in  his  lifetime  to  point  out  where  Anderson's  men 
had  shot  down  and  murdered  in  cold  blood  five  Union 
men  and  discharged  Union  soldiers  who  were  at  home. 
These  five  men  were  killed  about  a  mile  below  Wakenda. 
Anderson  had  been  on  the  south  side  of  the  Missouri  River 
murdering  and  robbing  the  people,  but  desiring  to  return 
to  the  north  side,  which  appears  to  have  been  his  special 
field  of  operations,  seized  a  fiatboat  with  which  to  take 
his  men  with  their  arms  and  equipments  over.  His  men 
then  held  their  horses  by  the  halter-straps  and  let  them 
swim  the  Missouri  River  behind  the  boat  as  it  was  ferried 
over.  By  crossing  the  Missouri  River  in  this  manner  the 
bandits  were  able  to  surprise  the  people,  and  no  Union 
man  or  Federal  soldier  found  at  home  was  allowed  to 
escape  their  fiendish  hands  if  they  could  help  it. 

Mrs.  Brookover,  relating  the  narrow  escape  of  her  hus 
band  from  the  outlaws  on  one  occasion,  and  as  showing 
the  desperate  character  of  Anderson's  men,  stated  that  a 
youth  who  came  with  the  bandits  to  her  house  one  night, 
and  who  appeared  to  be  not  over  fifteen  or  sixteen  years 
of  age,  had  the  ears  which  he  had  cut  off  of  murdered 
Union  men  and  Federal  soldiers  strung  on  a  string  and 
hung  around  his  neck.  She  also  stated  that  this  youth 
had  each  side  of  the  brow-band  of  his  bridle  ornamented 


3/8  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

with  the  scalps  of  Union  men  or  Federal  soldiers  whom 
the  desperadoes  had  murdered. 

Another  illustration  may  be  given  of  the  fiendish  char 
acter  of  that  band  of  desperate  outlaws.  It  is  furnished 
by  Dr.  J.  P.  Logan,  an  old  and  respected  citizen  of  De- 
witt,  in  Carroll  County.  A  man  who  lived  about  ten 
miles  north  of  Dewitt,  whose  wife  had  been  confined, 
was  flooding,  and  in  a  dangerous  condition,  came  after  the 
doctor  and  desired  him  to  go  at  once  to  her  relief.  The 
doctor  had  heard  that  the  desperadoes  were  in  the  country 
and  told  the  gentleman  that  he  had  some  fears  of  falling 
into  their  hands  if  he  went  out  that  evening.  He  told  the 
man,  however,  that  he  would  send  out  by  him  medicines 
for  the  relief  of  his  wife,  and  promised  to  go  out  the  next 
morning  to  see  the  sick  woman,  which  he  did.  On  arriv 
ing  at  the  house  of  his  patient,  he  found  her  husband 
dead  at  the  corner  of  the  house  with  a  bullet-hole  in 
his  head.  He  also  found  a  neighbor  a  few  yards  from 
the  house  shot  dead,  and  up  the  road  a  few  hundred 
yards  there  were  two  other  neighbors  who  had  been  shot 
to  death  by  the  bandits,  and  lay  across  the  road  a  short 
distance  apart.  The  fiends  shot  a  woman  in  the  same 
county.  They  were  so  utterly  devoid  of  the  manly  in 
stinct  and  sympathy  that  they  brought  the  husband  of 
the  lady  attended  by  Dr.  Logan  in  before  her  and  seemed 
about  to  kill  him  in  her  presence.  She  asked  them  what 
they  were  going  to  do  with  him,  and  they  replied,  "  Shoot 
him."  She  then  begged  them  not  to  kill  him  in  her 
presence,  so  they  took  him  out  near  the  corner  of  the 
house,  and  she  heard  the  report  of  a  gun  and  knew  that 
her  husband  had  fallen  dead. 

Immediately  after  the  Fredericksburg  affair,  Major 
Grimes  ordered  Captain  Clayton  Tiffin  and  Lieutenant 
Baker,  of  the  Ray  County  militia,  to  join  their  forces  and 
pursue  the  bandits  vigorously,  and  if  possible  overtake 
and  punish  them.  These  officers  soon  struck  the  trail  of 


THE   CENTRALIA    MASSACRE.  379 

the  marauders  and  pursued  them  into  Carroll  County, 
when  the  Carroll  County  militia  united  with  Captain  Tif 
fin's  command,  swelling  it  to  about  250  men.  He  now 
continued  the  pursuit  on  a  fresh  trail,  and  about  twelve 
o'clock  on  Sunday,  August  i/j-th,  found  the  guerillas  on 
the  east  side  of  Wakenda  Prairie,  where  they  had  deter 
mined  to  make  a  stand  in  a  dense  body  of  timber  and 
underbrush.  Captain  Tiffin  at  once  commenced  an  attack 
on  the  bandits,  and  after  a  sharp  conflict  of  about  thirty 
minutes  they  were  driven  from  their  position  and  con 
tinued  their  retreat  to  Grand  River,  which  they  crossed 
at  Rocky  Ford.  In  this  action  Captain  Tiffin  reported  a 
loss  of  four  men  killed  and  six  wrounded.  As  the  bandits 
carried  off  their  killed  and  wounded  he  was  unable  to 
ascertain  their  loss,  but  was  informed  that  it  was  fully  as 
great  as  his  own,  including  their  leader,  Thrailkill,  who 
was  reported  seriously  wounded. 

The  guerillas  of  Bill  Anderson  and  Quantrill  were  guilty 
of  many  fiendish  acts  that  have  never  been  described,  for 
the  victims  of  their  bloody  hands  were  often  despatched 
in  lonely  places  where  no  friendly  eye  or  ear  could  see  or 
hear  what  was  done  and  said.  These  fiends  frequently 
boasted  that  their  victims  numbered  'way  up  in  the  hun 
dreds  in  the  counties  north  of  the  Missouri  River  and  in 
Central  and  Western  Missouri.  Any  one  who  mingled 
with  and  heard  the  stories  or  experiences  of  the  surviving 
inhabitants  of  the  sections  where  those  desperate  outlaws 
operated  would  certainly  have  been  convinced  that  their 
bloody  boasts  were  not  exaggerated.  Of  all  their  bloody 
and  atrocious  acts,  the  Centralia  massacre  was  the  most 
extensive  and  barbarous  in  all  its  details.  The  people  of 
the  less  disturbed  sections  of  the  country  have  never 
realized  what  desperate  characters  the  loyal  people  of 
Missouri  had  to  contend  with  in  their  bitter  struggle  for 
the  Union. 

Early  in  September,  1864,  all  North  Missouri,  and  in  fact 


380  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

the  loyal  people  all  over  the  State,  were  greatly  agitated 
on  account  of  the  stirring  reports  in  the  newspapers  that 
General  Sterling  Price  had  crossed  the  Arkansas  River 
with  a  large  army  of  12,000  to  16,000  men,  consisting  of 
cavalry,  infantry,  and  artillery,  and  was  marching  rapidly 
north  to  invade  Missouri.  It  was  given  out  by  the  South 
ern  sympathizers  that  their  hero  would  capture  St.  Louis, 
Jefferson  City,  and  other  important  towns  in  the  State, 
and  receive  large  accessions  to  his  ranks  from  Illinois. 

After  the  Confederate  forces  were  driven  from  the  State, 
it  had  been  noticeable  that  when  there  was  a  threatened 
invasion  or  raid,  the  guerilla  bands  in  every  section  where 
they  operated  became  unusually  active  and  bold.  Bill 
Anderson  had  already  become  notorious  in  North  Mis 
souri  on  account  of  his  many  bloody  acts  in  that  section. 
Every  few  miles  of  his  recent  march  through  Ray,  Car 
roll,  Chariton,  and  Howard  Counties  was  marked  with  the 
mutilated  corpses  of  his  murdered  victims.  In  a  drunken 
frenzy  on  this  march  he  attacked  a  detachment  of  thirty 
men  of  the  Ninth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry  under 
Lieutenants  Joseph  M.  Street  and  Thomas  H.  H.  Smith 
at  Fayette,  in  Howard  County,  October  23d,  who, 
after  a  gallant  defence,  drove  him  off  after  he  made  three 
charges,  killing  thirteen  of  his  men  and  wounding  many 
others.  The  Federal  detachment  was  posted  in  log  huts, 
and  had  three  men  killed  and  five  wounded.  Anderson 
then  marched^off  in  a  northeast  direction  into  Randolph 
and  Monroe  Counties.  His  presence  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Paris  aroused  the  Federal  officers  commanding  detach 
ments  in  that  section  to  great  activity  and  a  determination 
to  attack  and  disperse  his  band  as  promptly  as  possible. 
While  they  knew  his  force  was  heavily  armed  with  the 
best  arms  in  use  and  mounted  upon  the  best  horses  the 
country  afforded,  they  could  not  ascertain  with  certainty 
the  exact  number  of  his  followers.  The  presence  of  such 
a  desperate  band  in  any  given  locality  gave  rise  to  all 


THE    CENTRA  LI  A    MASSACRE.  381 

kinds  of  reports  as  to  its  strength  and  the  bloody  charac 
ter  of  its  acts.  To  the  different  posts,  therefore,  where 
the  loyal  militia  were  stationed,  the  loyal  people  fled  for 
protection  on  the  approach  of  the  bandits.  Some  of  these 
frightened  citizens  who  saw  them  estimated  their  strength 
as  they  were  passing  as  high  as  five  or  six  hundred  men, 
and  others  estimated  their  number  as  low  as  one  hun 
dred  men.  When  the  bands  of  Anderson,  Gordon,  Todd, 
Bryson,  and  Jones  were  united  there  were  probably  be 
tween  four  and  five  hundred  men. 

The  various  conflicts  with  the  guerillas  had  taught  the 
Federal  officers  who  had  been  in  the  service  since  early  in 
the  war  to  use  great  caution  in  pursuing  or  attacking 
them,  for  more  than  once  Federal  detachments  had  been 
drawn  into  ambuscade,  attacked,  and  cut  to  pieces  by 
reason  of  underestimating  the  strength  of  the  bandits. 
If  any  of  the  detachments  holding  towns  or  stations  of 
importance  in  the  different  counties  were  much  reduced 
in  strength  at  any  time  for  scouting  purposes,  the  gueril 
las  were  certain  to  find  it  out  very  soon  afterwards  through 
their  friends,  and  to  fall  upon  the  weakened  detachment 
with  sufficient  force  to  overpower  it  or  drive  it  into  its 
blockhouse,  if  it  had  one.  The  militia  were  generally  vig 
ilant,  and  perhaps  at  most  of  their  stations  had  defensive 
quarters,  blockhouses,  or  court-houses,  and  the  attacks 
of  the  bandits  were  not  by  any  means  always  successful. 
There  was  also  a  commendable  pride  among  most  of  the 
militia  officers,  which  extended  even  to  the  ranks,  in  gain 
ing  a  reputation  for  successfully  dealing  with  the  guerillas, 
so  that  they  were  led  sometimes  to  take  undue  risks  on 
insufficient  information,  in  pursuing  or  attacking  them. 

But  now  that  Anderson  had  reached  the  neighborhood 
of  Paris  unresisted,  it  fell  to  Major  A.  V.  E.  Johnston, 
Thirty-ninth  Missouri  Infantry, a  regiment  recently  organ 
ized  and  composed  mostly  of  men  who  had  not  seen  ser 
vice,  to  take  such  force  as  he  could  mount  to  check  the 


382  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE   BORDER. 

further  progress  of  the  outlaws.  On  the  morning  of  the 
26th  of  September,  Major  Johnston  left  Paris  with  a  de 
tachment  of  140  men  of  his  regiment,  partly  mounted 
upon  horses  pressed  into  service  for  the  scout,  and 
marched  in  a  southeast  direction  with  the  expectation  of 
soon  ascertaining  definite  information  of  the  exact  loca 
tion  of  the  guerillas,  and  of  their  strength  and  intentions. 
The  Federal  detachment  marched  all  of  the  26th,  and  the 
next  morning  at  daylight  struck  the  trail  of  the  bandits 
near  Long  Branch,  between  Paris  and  Mexico.  At  Long 
Branch  he  sent  back  to  Paris  all  his  dismounted  men. 
He  then  pushed  on,  and  about  sunrise,  just  after  he  had 
halted  his  command  for  breakfast  and  to  feed,  some  of 
his  men  who  were  in  advance  came  in  sight  of  the  gueril 
las,  who  were  perhaps  two  or  three  miles  distant  over  the 
prairie.  Major  Johnston,  Adjutant  Thomas  C.  Tripler, 
Captain  Adam  Theis,  and  Sergeant-Major  Hiram  Haines 
looked  at  the  bandits  through  a  field-glass,  saw  that  they 
were  dismounted,  and  were  satisfied  that  they  belonged 
to  Anderson's  band.  Most  of  the  observers  with  the 
glass,  after  estimating  the  strength  of  the  guerillas  as 
well  as  they  could,  expressed  themselves  as  satisfied  that 
they  were  too  strong  for  the  Federal  detachment  to  at 
tack  single-handed,  incompletely  armed  as  they  were. 
Major  Johnston  ordered  a  picket  guard  thrown  out  to 
watch  the  movements  of  the  bandits  while  the  balance 
of  his  men  refreshed  themselves  with  food  and  rest  for 
a  short  time. 

The  Federal  detachment  and  the  guerillas  resumed  the 
march  about  the  same  time,  the  advance-guard  of  Major 
Johnston  frequently  being  in  sight  of  the  rear-guard  of  the 
outlaws  for  the  next  two  or  three  hours.  Then  the  ban 
dits  passed  into  the  timber  and  the  Federal  force  lost 
sight  of  them,  but  continued  the  pursuit  by  following 
their  trail.  When  Major  Johnston  arrived  at  Centralia 
about  four  o'clock,  he  found  that  the  guerillas  had  been 


THE    CENTRALIA    MASSACRE.  383 

there  only  an  hour  or  so  before  him  and  captured  and 
burned  the  passenger  train  on  the  North  Missouri  Rail 
road,  and  taken  from  it  and  shot  down  in  the  most  atro 
cious  manner  twenty-four  Federal  soldiers,  who  were 
mostly  unarmed  and  returning  home  discharged.  The 
blood  was  still  oozing  from  the  wounds  of  the  murdered 
soldiers,  and  in  some  instances  their  clothing  was  still 
burning  and  their  bodies  scorched  to  a  crisp.  In  their 
death  struggles,  the  bandits  had  plunged  sharp  knives 
through  the  bodies  of  their  victims  with  demon-like 
ferocity.  After  viewing  the  horrible  sight  for  a  few  mo 
ments  and  gathering  such  information  as  was  possible  in 
regard  to  the  strength  and  movements  of  the  outlaws, 
Major  Johnston  directed  Sergeant  Haines  to  count  off 
sixty  men  from  the  right,  and  remarked,  "  We  will  go 
out  and  feel  of  them,"  leaving  the  left  wing  of  his  com 
mand  in  town  under  Captain  Adam  Theis. 

The  town  of  Centralia  is  in  the  prairie,  but  there  was 
a  body  of  timber  about  one  and  a  half  miles  southeast, 
and  it  was  soon  ascertained  from  citizens  on  the  ground 
that  the  guerillas  had  marched  off  in  the  direction  of  the 
timber.  On  leaving  town  or  on  the  march  to  the  timber 
the  Federal  soldiers  were  unable  to  see  the  bandits  in 
ambush,  but  the  bandits  were  posted  so  that  they  could 
see  the  Federal  force  marching  out  and  count  the  number 
of  men  in  it,  and  make  full  preparation  to  meet  it.  In 
hastily  preparing  for  the  reconnoissance,  Major  Johnston 
neglected  to  leave  his  reserve  force  in  a  defensive  posi 
tion,  or  to  suggest  any  provision  for  making  a  stand  in  the 
event  of  being  driven  back  and  pursued  by  the  gueril 
las.  Leaving  town,  the  Federal  detachment  marched  out 
across  the  prairie  until  it  came  to  a  depression  two  or  three 
hundred  yards  from  the  timber.  Here  Major  Johnston 
ordered  his  men  into  line,  and  as  they  were  ascending 
the  opposite  side  of  the  depression  they  saw  the  bandits 
coming  out  of  the  timber  on  a  full  charge,  estimated  at 


384  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE   BORDER. 

least  four  hundred  strong,  yelling  like  fiends,  with  their 
bridle-reins  in  their  teeth  and  a  revolver  in  each  hand. 
In  another  moment  the  opposing  forces  were  within  fifty 
yards  of  each  other  and  Major  Johnston  ordered  his  men 
to  halt  and  open  fire,  which  they  did.  The  volley  from 
his  men  was  quickly  followed  by  a  volley  from  the  out 
laws.  Major  Johnston  and  Captain  James  A.  Smith  fell 
in  this  first  action,  and  as  the  guerillas  were  closing  in 
rapidly  on  their  men,  they  soon  broke  and  commenced 
retreating  back  to  Centralia  to  join  the  detachment  left 
there  under  Captain  Theis.  Only  three  men  of  the  recon 
noitring  force — Lieutenant  Josiah  Gill,  Sergeant  Haines, 
and  a  private — escaped,  the  others  being  overtaken 
and  shot  down  before  reaching  their  comrades.  The 
whole  band  of  guerillas  were  in  town  almost  as  soon  as 
these  three  survivors,  so  that  the  men  left  behind  under 
Captain  Theis,  having  heard  nothing  of  the  disaster  until 
the  bandits  were  upon  them,  had  no  time  to  prepare  for 
action,  but  at  once  commenced  a  hasty  retreat  towards 
Sturgeon.  They  were  quickly  pursued  by  the  guerillas, 
who  were  generally  mounted  upon  better  horses,  and  over 
taken,  and  the  entire  detachment,  except  eighteen  men, 
killed  before  reaching  the  stockade  at  Sturgeon.  Some 
of  the  bandits  came  up  in  sight  of  the  stockade  at  Stur 
geon,  but  then  turned  back  upon  the  road  and  shot  to 
death  all  the  Federal  soldiers  who  had  fallen  wounded, 
except  Frank  Barnes,  who  had  eight  flesh  wounds,  and 
James  Cummings,  who  was  wounded  through  the  lungs; 
the  latter  hid  in  a  cornfield,  and  at  night  managed  to  crawl 
into  Sturgeon,  a  distance  of  four  miles.  The  bodies  of 
Captain  Smith  and  several  of  his  men  who  fell  in  the  dis 
astrous  affair  were  shamefully  mutilated  by  the  guerillas 
before  leaving  the  scene  of  their  bloody  work.  That 
evening,  that  night,  and  part  of  the  following  day  the 
outlaws  rode  over  that  section  in  small  squads,  looking 
for  those  of  the  Federal  force  who  had  been  cut  off  from 


THE   CENTRA  LI  A   MASSACRE.  385 

Sturgeon  and  who  fled  in  other  directions,  shooting  down 
any  they  found  wearing  the  Federal  uniform.  Sergeant 
Hiram  Haines,  one  of  the  survivors  who  was  cut  off  from 
Sturgeon  and  pursued  by  the  bandits,  and  from  whom  the 
particulars  of  the  disaster  were  obtained,  had  an  exciting 
experience  in  making  his  escape  to  Paris,  where  part  of  his 
regiment  was  stationed.  He  managed  to  get  into  the 
timber  before  being  overtaken,  and  night  coming  on  he 
was  able  to  elude  the  squad  pursuing  him.  After  wan 
dering  in  the  woods  and  over  the  prairies  nearly  two  days 
and  nights  he  made  his  way  to  Paris,  where  he  joined  his 
comrades  in  nearly  an  exhausted  condition. 

When  the  bandits  attacked  the  passenger  train  at  Cen- 
tralia,  they  caused  it  to  be  understood  that  if  the  Federal 
soldiers  on  it  would  surrender  without  resistance  they 
would  be  paroled.  Captain  Samuel  E.  Turner,  Sixth 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  and  one  or  two  soldiers 
who  instantly  took  in  the  situation,  quickly  exchanged 
their  military  uniforms  for  citizen  suits,  and  thus  escaped 
death,  which  would  have  otherwise  befallen  them.  Hon. 
James  S.  Rollins,  of  Columbia,  Missouri,  who  was  also  on 
the  train,  came  near  being  identified,  and  as  he  was  a  prom 
inent  Union  man  it  would  probably  have  cost  him  his  life. 
He  had  been  a  candidate  for  Governor  of  Missouri  on  the 
Free  Soil  ticket  in  1858,  and  made  a  strong  canvass. 

In  the  daily  St.  Louis  papers  which  he  took  from  the 
passengers  of  the  train,  Anderson  saw  that  General  Price 
was  at  that  moment  marching  north  through  Arkansas,  if 
he  had  not  already  entered  Missouri,  with  a  large  Con 
federate  force,  and  might  be  expected  in  Central  Missouri 
in  a  few  weeks,  if  not  at  an  earlier  date.  After  complet 
ing  his  bloody  work,  therefore,  the  guerilla  chieftain 
turned  his  face  south  to  join  Price,  whose  first  objective 
point  was  then  reported  to  be  St.  Louis.  It  was  several 
days  after  the  Centralia  massacre  before  the  loyal  militia 
in  North  Missouri  were  able  to  concentrate  at  different 

VOL.  II.— 25 


386  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

points  in  sufficient  force  to  commence  active  operations 
against  the  bandits  again.  And  no  sooner  were  they  in 
condition  to  move  against  the  outlaws  than  they  were 
ordered  south  of  the  Missouri  River  to  operate  against 
Price's  larger  force,  which  was  marching  north  almost 
without  opposition. 

In  this  terrible  massacre,  Major  Johnston's  command 
sustained  a  loss  of  2  officers  and  120  enlisted  men  killed 
and  2  enlisted  men  wounded,  and  there  were  24  men 
taken  from  the  passenger  train  and  shot  down,  making  a 
total  loss  of  146  officers  and  men  killed.  The  loss  of  the 
guerillas  was  insignificant — probably  not  more  than  6  to  8 
men  killed  and  wounded. 

To  understand  how  Major  Johnston's  command  was  so 
utterly  destroyed  without  inflicting  more  serious  loss  upon 
the  bandits  is  not  easy  without  some  explanation  in  re 
gard  to  the  equipment  of  the  two  forces.  But  a  moment's 
consideration  of  the  situation  will  show  that  after  Major 
Johnston  got  into  the  fight  his  men  could  not  have  done 
otherwise  than  retreat  after  he  fell.  His  men  were 
mounted  upon  horses  recently  pressed  into  service  and 
untractable  under  fire,  and  they  were  armed  with  muskets, 
which  were  no  better  than  clubs  against  a  charging  foe 
after  firing  a  single  round.  On  the  other  hand,  the  gue 
rillas  were  armed  with  a  carbine  and  two,  four,  and  six 
revolvers  each,  so  that  the  Federal  soldiers  were  entirely 
at  their  mercy  after  firing  a  single  round.  It  was  a  ter 
rible  and  fatal  mistake  for  the  commanding  officer  of  an 
inferior  force,  having  several  miles  of  open  prairie  in  his 
rear,  to  march  up  and  attack,  or  even  to  reconnoitre,  the 
position  of  a  superior  force  posted  in  the  timber  as  the 
guerillas  were.  In  marching  out  to  the  timber  from  Cen- 
tralia,  Major  Johnston's  mind  appears  to  have  been  so 
much  absorbed  with  the  horrible  sight  he  had  just  wit 
nessed  that  he  did  not  deliberately  consider  the  move 
ment  he  was  making,  and  that  he  was  marching  to  even 
greater  disaster  than  that  which  had  taken  place  in  town. 


CHAPTER    XXVI. 

THE  PRICE  RAID  IN  MISSOURI — BATTLE  OF  PILOT  KNOB, 
MISSOURI. 

AFTER  the  several  divisions  of  his  army  returned  from 
the  Camden  Expedition  to  Little  Rock  and  Fort  Smith, 
General  Steele  was  unable  to  resume  offensive  operations 
against  the  Confederate  forces  in  Arkansas  that  spring  or 
summer.  Indeed,  it  was  as  much  as  he  could  do  to  hold 
on  to  the  positions  he  occupied  before  he  started  for  Cam- 
den.  In  a  short  time  after  the  battle  of  Jenkins'  Ferry, 
Price  detached  Shelby  with  about  two  thousand  mounted 
men  to  cross  to  the  north  side  of  the  Arkansas  River  for 
the  purpose  of  blockading  White  River  and  interrupting 
communication  by  railroad  between  Little  Rock  and  De 
Vall's  Bluff.  About  the  same  time  General  Marmaduke 
was  detached  with  part  of  his  division  and  artillery  to  the 
west  bank  of  the  Mississippi  River  to  blockade  that  river 
below  the  mouth  of  the  Arkansas,  if  practicable.  An 
attack  on  Little  Rock  or  Pine  Bluff  was  threatened  by 
Kirby  Smith's  other  disposable  forces  in  Arkansas  under 
Price;  the  forces  of  Maxey  and  Cooper  in  Western  Ar 
kansas  and  the  Indian  Territory  were  besieging  General 
Thayer  at  Fort  Smith,  and  by  the  latter  part  of  July  the 
Arkansas  River  between  Fort  Smith  and  Little  Rock  was 
closed  to  navigation.  The  ill-conceived  and  disastrous 
Red  River  campaign  had  thus  turned  Steele's  victorious 
and  aggressive  army  into  a  defensive  one  shut  up  in  two 

387 


388  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

or  three  fortified  positions.  Though  this  army  had  suf 
fered  heavily  in  men  and  transportation  by  having  de 
tachments  from  it  overwhelmed  at  Poison  Spring  and 
Marks'  Mills,  it  had  in  the  only  decisive  battle  of  the 
campaign  beaten  the  Confederate  forces  under  the  eyes 
of  General  Kirby  Smith  at  Jenkins'  Ferry  and  driven  them 
from  the  field.  Its  retreat  from  Camden  to  the  line  of 
the  Arkansas  River  and  defensive  attitude  were  not  due 
to  defeat,  but  to  the  withdrawal  from  the  campaign  of 
the  other  cooperating  columns  for  service  in  other  Depart 
ments.  Until  the  results  of  the  campaigns  in  Departments 
east  of  the  Mississippi  River  were  determined,  General 
Steele  could  not  hope  to  receive  sufficient  reinforcements 
to  commence  aggressive  operations  again.  Of  course  the 
troops  of  his  Department  were  actively  and  constantly 
employed  against  Shelby  on  White  River  in  Northeastern 
Arkansas  and  against  the  forces  of  Maxey  and  Cooper  in 
Western  Arkansas  and  the  Indian  Territory;  but  as  the 
Confederate  troops  were  nearly  all  cavalry  and  mounted 
infantry,  a  fact  already  noticed,  he  did  not  have  sufficient 
cavalry  to  make  the  movements  of  his  columns  as  effective 
as  desirable. 

In  sending  Shelby  north  of  the  Arkansas  River  there 
was  foreshadowed  a  determination  of  the  Confederate 
leaders  from  Missouri  to  make  a  raid  into  that  State  in 
the  early  autumn.  General  Price,  commanding  the  Dis 
trict  of  Arkansas,  and  who  was  a  Missourian,  knew  that 
such  a  movement  would  be  popular  among  his  Missouri 
troops  and  could  be  counted  upon  to  urge  its  importance 
upon  General  Kirby  Smith.  Such  a  movement  was  also 
foreshadowed  by  information  obtained  from  Confederate 
prisoners  and  recruiting  officers  who  had  returned  from 
the  South  to  different  parts  of  Missouri  in  the  early  part 
of  the  summer.  There  was  little  attention  paid  to  the 
reports  thus  obtained,  for  the  reason  that  the  Southern 
sympathizers  were  frequently  predicting  the  return  of  the 


THE  PRICE  RAID  IN  MISSOURI.  389 

Southern  forces  to  the  State.  In  his  frequent  reports  to 
General  Price  from  the  White  River  country,  General 
Shelby  represented  his  command  as  capturing  gunboats, 
riding  down  brigades  of  Federal  infantry,  killing  and  cap 
turing  Federal  troops  by  hundreds,  of  neither  giving  nor 
asking  quarter  if  they  had  the  audacity  to  show  too  much 
resistance  and  hurt  some  of  his  men,  and  that  a  raid  into 
Missouri  would  be  simply  a  picnic  excursion.  All  these 
wonderful  achievements  in  overthrowing  and  punishing 
his  pygmean  foes  cost  him  insignificant  losses.  It  is  true 
that  he  surprised  and  captured  a  few  Federal  detachments 
that  were  employed  in  cutting,  baling,  and  putting  up  hay 
on  the  prairie  near  De  Vall's  Bluff  for  the  army,  and  that 
he  tore  up  a  few  miles  of  railroad,  and  with  his  artillery 
blockaded  White  River  at  one  or  two  points  for  a  few 
days;  but  he  was  invariably  driven  by  the  Federal  troops 
sent  against  him. 

No  doubt  other  Confederate  general  officers  on  hearing 
of  such  great  achievements  were  anxious  to  make  a  cam 
paign  into  a  section  where  military  laurels  were  to  be  won 
with  so  much  ease,  and  where  their  enemies,  always  su 
perior  in  numbers  and  equipment,  were  so  easily  killed, 
captured,  or  put  to  flight.  How  far  General  Price  was 
influenced  by  these  exaggerated  reports  is  not  positively 
known.  But  it  was  known  that  after  he  had  an  interview 
and  conference  with  General  Kirby  Smith  at  Shreveport, 
the  Commander  of  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department  on 
the  4th  of  August  directed  him  to  make  immediate  ar 
rangements  for  a  campaign  into  Missouri,  St.  Louis  to  be 
the  objective,  and  placed  under  his  command  the  entire 
cavalry  force  of  the  District  of  Arkansas.  There  was  some 
delay  in  receiving  from  Shreveport  the  necessary  ordnance 
stores  for  the  expedition,  and  he  did  not  arrive  at  Prince 
ton,  where  the  divisions  of  Generals  Fagan  and  Marma- 
duke  were  concentrated,  until  the  2Qth  of  August. 

On  his  arrival  he  assumed  command,  and  the  next  day 


3QO  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

left  that  place  at  the  head  of  twelve  thousand  veteran 
cavalry  and  mounted  infantry  and  fourteen  pieces  of 
artillery  for  the  invasion  of  Missouri.  He  had  intended 
to  cross  the  Arkansas  River  between  Little  Rock  and 
Pine  Bluff;  but  thinking  that  General  Steele  had  become 
advised  of  his  intended  movement,  and  taking  into  con 
sideration  the  question  of  obtaining  subsistence  and  forage 
for  his  troops  and  animals,  he  determined  to  cross  the 
river  above  Little  Rock  at  Dardanelle,  and  at  once 
directed  his  march  to  that  point.  He  arrived  at  that 
place  on  the  6th  of  September,  and,  finding  the  river 
fordable,  on  the  /th  crossed  his  trains  and  entire  force  to 
the  north  side.  From  this  point  he  marched  in  a  north 
east  direction  by  way  of  Dover,  Clinton,  Batesville,  Pow- 
hatan,  and  Pocahontas,  where  he  arrived  on  the  i6th  of 
September,  having  in  the  meantime  been  joined  by 
Shelby,  who  had  been  operating  on  White  River  during 
the  past  summer,  with  ten  thousand  men  and  four  pieces 
of  artillery.  At  Pocahontas  he  reorganized  his  army  in 
three  grand  divisions  for  the  purpose  of  invading  Mis 
souri  in  three  columns.  The  three  columns  were  to  form 
a  junction  at  Fredericktown,  Missouri,  about  the  24th  of 
September.  In  this  movement  the  central  division,  under 
Fagan,  marched  as  direct  as  practicable  to  Fredericktown, 
while  the  divisions  of  Marmaduke  on  the  right  and  Shelby 
on  the  left  marched  for  the  vicinity  of  the  same  place 
on  roads  varying  from  ten  to  twenty  miles  from  the  cen 
tral  column.  In  the  march  of  the  Confederate  columns 
from  the  Arkansas  River  to  the  northern  line  of  the 
State,  Federal  detachments  of  recently  organized  Union 
regiments  were  now  and  then  encountered,  who,  on  find 
ing  themselves  confronted  with  superior  numbers,  retired 
to  the  mountains  and  hills  or  thickly  wooded  regions  of 
the  country  with  little  loss. 

On  entering  Missouri  the  Confederate  column  under 
Shelby  came  upon  and  surrounded  at  Ponder's  Mill,  on 


THE  PRICE  RAID  IN  MISSOURI.  391 

Little  Black  River,  between  Doniphan  and  Patterson,  a 
detachment  of  eighty  men  under  Lieutenant  Erich  Pape, 
Third  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  which  had  been 
sent  out  by  Major  James  Wilson  of  that  regiment  to 
make  a  reconnoissance,  in  view  of  the  excited  rumors  of 
the  advance  of  a  great  army  of  invasion.  Lieutenant 
Pape  gallantly  cut  his  way  through  the  Confederate  line, 
with  the  loss  of  Lieutenant  W.  M.  Brawner  mortally 
wounded  and  five  or  six  enlisted  men  killed  and  wounded, 
and  inflicting  a  loss  on  the  enemy  of  two  men  killed  and 
five  wounded.  This  skirmish  on  the  i8th  developed  the 
fact  that  the  Confederates  under  Price  were  advancing  in 
large  numbers,  and  Major  Wilson,  commanding  that  sub- 
district,  rapidly  drew  into  Pilot  Knob  his  detachments 
from  different  points  under  instructions  from  General 
Thomas  Ewing,  Jr.,  commanding  the  District  of  St. 
Louis,  with  trifling  loss  of  men  and  material. 

In  the  early  part  of  September,  General  W.  S.  Rose- 
crans,  commanding  the  Department  of  the  Missouri,  re 
ceived  information  that  General  Shelby,  who  had  been 
operating  in  Northeastern  Arkansas  during  the  summer, 
would  soon  be  joined  by  a  large  Confederate  force  under 
Price  at  Batesville,  on  the  Upper  White  River  in  Arkan 
sas,  for  the  invasion  of  Missouri.  The  objective  of  Price's 
campaign  was  not  yet  known  to  Rosecrans.  He  thought 
it  would  be  developed  directly  after  the  concentration  of 
the  Confederate  forces  at  Batesville.  From  that  point 
Price  could  push  forward  his  columns  by  way  of  Pilot 
Knob  towards  St.  Louis,  or  to  Jefferson  City  and  Cen 
tral  Missouri  by  way  of  Springfield  or  Rolla,  with  about 
equal  facility.  The  two  last-named  places  were  large  de 
pots  for  furnishing  the  Federal  troops  in  Southern  and 
Southwest  Missouri  and  in  Northern  and  Northwest  Ar 
kansas  with  supplies,  and  would  doubtless  be  regarded  as 
a  valuable  prize  by  the  Confederates,  who,  after  their  long 
march,  would  likely  be  in  great  need  of  such  supplies. 


3Q2  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Until  he  could  ascertain  what  important  point  Price 
intended  to  strike,  General  Rosecrans  ordered  the  con 
centration  of  the  troops  of  the  different  districts  of  his 
Department,  to  be  held  in  readiness  for  movement  at  a 
moment's  notice  to  the  threatened  point.  All  the  troops 
that  could  be  spared  from  stations  in  Southwest  Missouri 
were  concentrated  at  Springfield  under  Brigadier-General 
John  B.  Sanborn,  with  instructions  to  throw  out  scouting 
detachments  in  a  southeast  direction  as  far  as  West  Plains 
and  Gainesville,  and  beyond  if  practicable.  The  troops 
of  the  District  of  Rolla  were  concentrated  at  that  place 
under  General  John  McNeil;  and  the  troops  of  the 
Districts  of  Central  and  North  Missouri  were  concen 
trated  at  Jefferson  City  for  the  defence  of  the  capital  of 
the  State  under  Generals  E.  B.  Brown  and  Clinton  B. 
Fisk,  and  work  at  once  commenced  to  strengthen  the 
defences  by  throwing  up  earthworks. 

Reports  of  the  impending  invasion  were  so  persistent 
that  when,  on  the  6th  of  September,  General  A.  J. 
Smith  was  passing  Cairo  with  a  division  of  infantry  for 
General  Sherman,  General  Rosecrans  telegraphed  Gen 
eral  Halleck  the  situation,  and  requested  orders  for  the 
division  to  be  halted  at  that  point  until  the  intentions  of 
the  Confederate  commander  could  be  ascertained.  The 
request  was  granted,  and  General  Smith  received  orders 
to  operate  against  Price,  and  at  once  moved  his  division 
up  to  within  a  few  miles  of  St.  Louis,  so  that  he  could 
move  by  rail  or  river  against  the  enemy  as  soon  as  his 
designs  were  developed. 

On  the  2Oth  of  September  Major  Wilson  reported  to 
General  Ewing  the  result  of  the  scout  sent  out  under 
Lieutenant  Pape  in  the  direction  of  Doniphan — that  the 
Lieutenant  reported  4000  or  5000  men  in  the  Confed 
erate  force  that  engaged  him ;  and  that  information  was 
obtained  from  a  wounded  Confederate  soldier  left  on 
the  field  when  Lieutenant  Pape  drove  the  Confederate 


THE   PRICE  RAID   IN  MISSOURI.  393 

advance  out  of  Doniphan  on  the  I7th,  that  Price  was 
at  Pocahontas,  but  that  the  Lieutenant  had  no  confi 
dence  in  the  report.  Later  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  M. 
Hiller,  Second  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  reported 
to  General  Ewing  from  Cape  Girardeau,  September 
22d,  that  Captain  Lewis  Sells  of  his  regiment,  who 
had  been  sent  with  his  company  to  reinforce  two  com 
panies  at  Bloomfield,  was  attacked  two  or  three  times 
that  morning  near  Sikeston  by  a  Confederate  force  of 
1500  men  under  Colonel  W.  L.  Jeffers,  sustaining  a  loss 
of  3  men  killed  and  7  wounded,  and  that  Captain  Sells 
reported  that  the  enemy,  6000  strong,  were  marching 
north  from  the  direction  of  Chalk  Bluff.  Though  Gen 
eral  Rosecrans  had  been  informed  that  there  was  a  large 
Confederate  force  of  5000  or  6000  men  in  Southeast  Mis 
souri  on  the  2Oth,  he  did  not  receive  positive  information 
that  Price  had  crossed  the  Arkansas  River  with  two 
divisions  of  mounted  troops,  with  artillery  and  trains,  and 
was  on  White  River  at  or  in  the  vicinity  of  Batesville, 
until  the  23d  of  September.  The  next  day  he  received 
despatches  that  Shelby  was  south  of  Pilot  Knob  with 
5000  men  and  4  pieces  of  artillery,  moving  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Farmington.  He  did  not  yet  feel  certain  that 
this  force  under  Shelby  was  not  thrown  forward  for  the 
purpose  of  attracting  the  attention  of  the  troops  in  the 
vicinity  of  St.  Louis,  while  the  main  Southern  army 
under  Price  passed  into  Central  Missouri  by  way  of  West 
Plains  and  Springfield,  or  \Vest  Plains  and  Rolla.  He 
was  therefore  still  unable  to  determine  at  what  point  he 
should  concentrate  the  troops  of  his  Department. 

The  presence  of  this  large  force  under  Shelby  near 
Farmington  required  the  immediate  attention  of  General 
Rosecrans,  and  on  the  night  of  the  24th  he  directed  Gen 
eral  Ewing  to  take  a  brigade  of  General  Smith's  division 
of  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  then  at  Jefferson  Barracks, 
near  St.  Louis,  to  garrison  and  patrol  the  Iron  Mountain 


394  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Railroad,  and  to  concentrate  all  the  troops  of  the  southern 
part  of  his  district  at  Pilot  Knob  and  Cape  Girardeau. 
Leaving  at  De  Soto  for  the  further  orders  of  General 
Smith  all  the  brigade  except  the  Fourteenth  Iowa  Infan 
try,  he  took  this  regiment  and  went  on,  strengthening  the 
garrisons  at  all  the  bridges  as  far  south  as  Mineral  Point, 
where  he  established  temporary  headquarters.  He  sent 
out  mounted  scouting  parties  from  several  stations  to  the 
south  and  east,  and  they  returned  on  the  morning  of  the 
26th  and  reported  no  Confederate  force  north  of  Fred- 
ericktown.  They  obtained  information,  however,  which 
they  considered  reliable,  that  Price  had  arrived  at  Fred- 
ericktown  with  all  his  army.  On  receipt  of  these  reports 
General  Ewing  took  a  battalion  of  five  companies  of  the 
Fourteenth  Iowa  Infantry  under  Captain  W.  J.  Campbell 
and  boarded  a  train  for  Pilot  Knob,  arriving  there  at 
twelve  o'clock.  Major  Wilson,  commanding  that  sub- 
district,  had  collected  at  that  post  all  his  available  troops 
except  bridge  guards,  and  had  sent  out  mounted  scouting 
detachments  on  all  the  roads  leading  into  that  place. 

General  Ewing  was  instructed  to  hold  Pilot  Knob  if 
practicable  until  he  could  find  out  whether  more  than 
Shelby's  division  was  in  that  section.  He  had  for  the 
defence  of  the  place  six  companies  of  the  Forty-seventh 
Missouri  Infantry,  under  Colonel  Thomas  C.  Fletcher,  and 
one  company  of  the  Fiftieth  Missouri  Infantry,  under 
Captain  Robert  L.  Lindsay,  an  effective  force  of  489 
officers  and  men,  recently  organized  and  that  had  seen 
little  service.  In  addition  to  this  force  he  had  of  troops 
who  had  seen  service  six  companies  Third  Missouri  State 
Militia  Cavalry,  under  Major  James  Wilson  ;  one  company 
Second  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  under  Captain 
A.  P.  Wright;  one  company  Missouri  State  Militia  In 
fantry,  under  Lieutenant  John  Fessler;  Captain  William 
C.  F.  Montgomery's  battery  Second  Missouri  Light  Artil 
lery,  and  the  detachment  of  the  Fourteenth  Iowa  Infan- 


BATTLE   OF  PILOT  KNOB.  395 

try — in  all,  562  men.  He  had  of  raw  troops  and  troops 
who  had  been  in  service  for  some  time  a  total  of  1051 
men  and  officers.  A  company  of  about  100  citizens  of 
Ironton  and  Pilot  Knob,  including  some  of  the  leading 
Union  men  of  that  section,  hastily  organized,  and  were 
commanded  by  Captain  P.  F.  Lonergan,  First  Missouri 
State  Militia  Infantry,  for  the  defence.  To  assist  in  the 
defence  a  company  of  negroes  was  also  organized  and 
commanded  by  a  colored  man  named  Charles  Thurston. 

Pilot  Knob  during  the  war  was  the  terminus  of  the  St. 
Louis  and  Iron  Mountain  Railroad,  eighty-six  miles  south 
of  St.  Louis.  A  mile  south  of  the  village  was  the  town 
of  Ironton,  the  county  seat,  and  a  mile  south  of  that  the 
village  of  Arcadia,  well  known  before  and  during  the  war 
in  all  that  section  for  its  flourishing  academy  for  young 
ladies. 

The  region  around  the  villages  was  noted  for  its  pic- 
turesqueness.  The  road  from  Pilot  Knob  to  Ironton 
passed  through  a  gap  between  Shepherd's  Mountain  on 
the  west  and  Pilot  Knob  Mountain  on  the  east.  Ironton 
was  on  a  high  plateau  about  half  a  mile  south  of  the  en 
trance  to  the  gap,  and  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  just  south 
of  town  the  road  to  Arcadia  crossed  a  small  creek  that 
flowed  off  in  a  southeast  direction  into  the  beautiful  val 
ley  of  Arcadia.  A  small  run  from  the  north  entered 
this  creek  just  east  of  town,  and  others  from  the  south 
west  and  the  north  entered  it  a  short  distance  west  of 
town.  A  hundred  yards  or  so  north  of  Arcadia,  and  just 
east  of  the  road  from  Ironton  to  Arcadia,  and  north  of 
the  Arcadia  and  Fredericktown  road,  on  an  elevated 
position,  there  was  an  old,  unfinished  earthwork  called 
Fort  Curtis.  This  position  had  an  elevation  of  about 
fifty  feet  above  the  road,  and  commanded  the  Arcadia 
and  Fredericktown  road.  But  the  principal  work  for  the 
defence  of  the  position  at  Pilot  Knob  was  Fort  Davidson, 
which  was  located  three  hundred  yards  northwest  of  the 


396  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

base  of  Pilot  Knob,  about  the  same  distance  north  of  the 
base  of  Shepherd's  Mountain,  and  one  thousand  yards 
nearly  north  of  the  gap  between  the  mountains. 

The  village  of  Pilot  Knob  was  about  four  hundred 
yards  east  and  northeast  of  the  fort,  and  near  the  south 
ern  entrance  to  the  gap  between  Rock  and  Cedar  moun 
tains.  The  fort  was  an  irregular  hexagonal  work,  each 
of  the  six  faces  being  somewhat  over  one  hundred  feet, 
with  bomb-proof  magazine.  The  ditch  around  it  was 
ten  feet  wide  and  six  feet  four  inches  deep.  Its  arma 
ment  consisted  of  four  32-pounder  siege-guns,  three  24- 
pounder  howitzers  mounted  en  barbette,  four  6-inch 
Coehorn  mortars,  and  four  steel  2-pounder  skirmish-guns, 
with  a  sufficient  supply  of  ammunition.  Competent  en 
gineers  who  had  examined  the  fort  regarded  it  as  indefen 
sible  against  a  large  force  having  a  few  good  batteries  of 
artillery.  But  General  Ewing  had  it  put  in  a  good  state 
of  defence,  and  added  two  rifle-pits,  each  175  yards  in 
length,  one  extending  from  the  north  side  and  the  other 
from  the  south  side,  commanding  the  approaches  from 
those  quarters.  He  had  also  ordered  the  nearest  hillsides 
cleared  of  timber  and  obstructed  the  roads  leading  up 
the  hills. 

After  the  report  of  Lieutenant  Pape's  skirmish  at  and 
near  Doniphan  on  the  iSth,  and  of  a  large  Confederate 
force  advancing  north,  General  Ewing  ordered  Captain 
Montgomery,  Second  Missouri  Light  Artillery,  to  report 
to  Major  Wilson  at  Pilot  Knob  with  his  battery  of  six 
guns.  Captain  Montgomery  left  St.  Louis  on  the  evening 
of  the  2  ist  and  arrived  at  Pilot  Knob  the  next  morning. 
That  day  all  reports  from  the  southern  part  of  the  State 
indicated  the  approaching  storm — the  advance  of  the 
Confederate  army  under  Price — and  on  the  evening  of  the 
23d  he  was  ordered  by  Major  Wilson  to  have  his  battery 
ready  for  action  at  a  moment's  warning.  As  the  reports 
of  Union  citizens  fleeing  before  the  invading  wave,  which 


BATTLE   OF  PILOT  KNOB.  397 

had  spread  out  upwards  of  forty  miles  wide,  continued  to 
come  in,  and  as  the  situation  hourly  became  more  threat 
ening,  he  kept  the  horses  of  his  battery  harnessed  and 
hitched  and  the  drivers  and  cannoneers  at  their  posts  the 
two  following  nights.  In  the  excited  state  of  the  public 
mind  there  were  some  false  alarms;  but  Major  Wilson 
had  kept  out  scouting  detachments  on  all  the  roads  south 
and  east  leading  into  Arcadia  and  Ironton,  and  on  Mon 
day  morning,  the  26th,  the  detachment  on  the  Frederick- 
town  road  met  a  small  force  of  the  enemy,  which  had 
been  thrown  forward  by  General  Pagan,  advancing  on 
that  road  near  Shut-in  Gap,  about  two  miles  east  of 
Arcadia. 

General  Ewing  having  arrived  and  assumed  command 
of  the  Federal  forces  at  Pilot  Knob,  at  once  sent  out  two 
companies  of  cavalry  to  make  a  thorough  reconnoissance 
in  the  direction  of  Fredericktown.  This  cavalry  soon 
met  the  Confederate  advance  in  Arcadia  Valley  near 
Shut-in  Gap,  and  retired  skirmishing  to  Ironton,  where, 
with  Captain  Franz  Dinger's  company,  Forty-seventh 
Missouri  Infantry,  a  stand  was  made  until  reinforcements 
arrived  under  Major  Wilson.  This  gallant  officer,  with 
all  General  Ewing' s  available  cavalry  and  a  section  of 
Captain  Montgomery's  battery  under  Lieutenant  Morgan 
Simonton,  attacked  the  enemy  fiercely  and  drove  them 
back  to  Shut-in  Gap;  but  as  Fagan's  and  Marmaduke's 
divisions  were  rapidly  coming  up  from  Fredericktown,  he 
was  gradually  forced  back.  He  made  a  stand  at  Fort 
Curtis,  near  Arcadia,  and  held  that  position  until  night, 
and  then  a  rain-storm  suspended  operations.  At  ten 
o'clock  that  night  he  sent  the  section  of  the  battery  back 
to  the  fort,  but  held  Arcadia  until  the  next  morning, 
when  he  was  forced  from  it  by  the  enemy,  whose  en 
campment  had  filled  Arcadia  Valley  during  the  night. 

The  sounds  of  the  rumbling  trains  and  of  the  thousands 
of  mounted  troops  descending  into  the  plain  were  heard 


398  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

by  the  Federal  outposts,  and  General  Ewing  was  satisfied 
that  a  fierce  struggle  was  at  hand — that  the  enemy  would 
make  a  desperate  effort  to  capture  his  position  the  next 
day.  He  at  once  commenced  to  strip  for  the  fight.  That 
night  he  sent  up  the  railroad  within  General  Smith's  line 
all  the  commissary  and  quartermaster  stores  not  required 
in  the  fort,  and  all  the  rolling-stock  of  the  road.  He  de 
tailed  for  duty  on  his  staff  as  aide-de-camp,  Captain  David 
Murphy,  Forty-seventh  Missouri  Infantry,  an  experi 
enced  artillery  officer,  and  gave  him  control  of  the  artil 
lery.  The  Captain  at  once  set  details  to  work  constructing 
platforms  for  the  guns  of  the  field  battery  so  that  they 
could  fire  over  the  parapet,  and  two  sections  were  brought 
into  the  fort  and  mounted  ready  for  action  that  night. 
At  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  2/th,  Lieutenant 
Simonton  was  sent  to  the  front  with  his  section  of  the 
battery  and  reported  to  Major  Wilson,  who  was  holding 
Arcadia  with  his  cavalry  posted  at  Fort  Curtis.  Before 
it  was  fairly  daylight,  General  Fagan,  commanding  the 
advance  division  of  Price's  army,  threw  forward  a  strong 
skirmish-line,  supported  by  the  brigades  of  his  division, 
dismounted,  and  attacked  Major  Wilson  and  soon  forced 
him  from  his  position. 

The  Major  retired  slowly  to  Ironton,  contesting  every 
inch  of  ground,  and  with  the  assistance  of  the  section  of 
the  battery  under  Lieutenant  Simonton,  and  the  skill  with 
which  he  handled  his  small  force,  delayed  the  Confeder 
ate  advance  for  several  hours,  making  every  step  of  it  a 
costly  one.  He  was  here  joined  by  Captain  Campbell 
with  four  companies  of  the  Fourteenth  Iowa  Infantry, 
but  was  soon  forced  back  in  the  direction  of  Pilot  Knob. 
He  was  then  directed  by  General  Ewing  to  form  his  in 
fantry  under  Campbell  on  the  east  end  of  Shepherd's 
Mountain,  and  his  cavalry  on  the  west  side  of  Pilot  Knob, 
so  as  to  command  the  gap  from  both  sides,  and  so  as  to 
leave  a  clear  range  for  his  artillery  in  the  fort  to  sweep 


4 


Reproduced  from  U.  S.  War  Kecori 


400  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

the  pass.  These  dispositions  were  scarcely  completed 
when  General  Pagan's  division  moved  forward  to  force 
the  passage  of  the  gap,  but  were  met  by  such  a  destruc 
tive  fire  from  the  troops  under  Major  Wilson  and  the 
artillery  from  the  fort  under  the  immediate  direction  of 
Captain  Murphy  that  they  were  soon  driven  back  with 
heavy  loss.  Shortly  after  this  attack  Major  Wilson  sent 
word  to  General  Ewing  that  the  enemy  were  displaying 
a  flag  of  truce ;  but  being  satisfied  that  the  display  of  the 
flag  was  simply  a  trick  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  time 
and  allowing  the  Confederate  troops  to  safely  effect  the 
"  passage  of  the  gap  while  parleying  about  a  surrender," 
he  ordered  the  Major  to  renew  the  fight  immediately. 

A  determined  effort  was  now  made  by  the  Confederates 
to  force  the  pass,  precipitating  a  fierce  conflict  in  which 
they  lost  heavily  without  gaining  any  advantage.  The 
volleys  from  the  small-arms  of  the  troops  under  Major 
Wilson  on  the  sides  of  Shepherd's  Mountain  and  Pilot 
Knob,  the  storms  of  shot  and  shell  from  the  seven  heavy 
guns  of  the  fort,  from  the  two  sections  of  the  field  bat 
tery,  mounted,  and  from  the  section  under  Lieutenant 
Simonton  just  north  of  the  fort,  swept  the  pass  like  de 
vouring  flames,  causing  the  Confederate  line  to  waver  and 
then  to  retire  to  shelter  behind  a  projecting  spur  of  the 
mountain. 

While  these  operations  were  taking  place  in  Pilot  Knob 
Gap,  Marmaduke's  division  was  moving  into  position  on 
Shepherd's  Mountain,  except  one  brigade  that  was  sent 
around  to  the  west  side  of  that  mountain  to  attack  the 
fort  from  that  quarter.  When  these  movements  were 
discovered,  General  Ewing  ordered  Captain  Campbell 
with  his  companies  of  the  Fourteenth  Iowa  Infantry  to 
the  summit  of  Shepherd's  Mountain,  which  was  five  or 
six  hundred  feet  above  the  valley  around  the  fort,  the 
north  side  of  the  mountain  being  very  steep.  The  Cap 
tain  soon  became  engaged  in  a  sharp  skirmish  with  Gen- 


BATTLE   OF  PILOT  KNOB.  40 1 

eral  Clark's  brigade,  and  as  the  Confederate  commander 
with  superior  numbers  attempted  to  flank  his  position, 
he  was  obliged  to  fall  back  to  the  rifle-pits  of  the  fort. 
Only  a  few  moments  after  he  had  retired  from  his  posi 
tion,  it  was  reoccupied  by  Captain  T.  J.  Mackey,  Chief 
Engineer  on  the  staff  of  General  Price,  who  made  a  re- 
connoissance  with  a  party  of  officers  to  the  crest  of  the 
mountain  to  make  observations  of  the  character  of  the 
fort,  its  armament,  and  its  command  above  the  plain, 
with  the  view  of  formulating  a  definite  plan  for  its  attack, 
reduction,  and  capture.  The  fort  was  enveloped  in  a 
thick  smoke  from  the  recent  heavy  firing,  obscuring  some 
of  the  details ;  but  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  could 
be  reduced  and  the  garrison  shelled  out  by  bombardment 
in  a  short  time,  by  placing  eight  guns  in  battery  on  the 
crest  of  the  mountain. 

After  the  unsuccessful  attempts  of  Pagan's  division  to 
force  Pilot  Knob  pass,  and  the  failure  of  the  ruse  to  gain 
advantage  by  displaying  the  flag  of  truce,  the  firing  along 
the  fronts  of  the  opposing  lines  ceased  for  nearly  an  hour, 
General  Price  having  called  a  council  of  war  to  consider 
the  situation.  At  the  council  of  war  Captain  Mackey 
stated  the  result  of  his  reconnoissance,  and  advised  that 
the  fort  be  reduced  by  bombardment  from  the  crest  of 
Shepherd's  Mountain.  His  views  were  concurred  in  by 
General  Price,  who  had  previously  consulted  a  map  of  the 
situation  made  by  the  engineers  of  General  Hardee  while 
he  was  serving  in  Southeast  Missouri  in  the  early  part 
of  the  war.  But  as  it  was  currently  reported  among  the 
Confederate  officers  that  a  large  part  of  the  Federal  gar 
rison  was  colored  soldiers  under  Colonel  Fletcher,  who 
was  then  the  Republican  candidate  for  Governor  of  Mis 
souri,  and  as  there  was  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  some 
of  the  Confederate  officers  to  avenge  the  alleged  wrongs 
by  General  Ewing  in  removing  Southern  families  from 
his  district  under  his  famous  General  Order  Number  Eleven 

VOL.    II. — 26 


402  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

after  the  Lawrence  massacre,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  sum 
mer  of  1863,  it  was  decided  by  the  council  of  war  that  an 
immediate  assault  should  be  made  on  the  fort.  Before 
forming  the  lines  for  the  assault,  it  was  considered  desir 
able  by  Price  and  his  generals  to  drive  the  Federal  troops 
from  their  positions  commanding  Pilot  Knob  pass,  and 
for  this  purpose  Pagan's  division  advanced  again  and 
made  a  vigorous  attack.  In  a  short  time  the  troops 
under  Major  Wilson  were  driven  from  their  positions  and 
followed  by  the  Confederates  in  strong  force  along  the 
sides  of  the  mountains.  The  movement  was  watched  by 
General  Ewing  with  intense  interest,  and  as  soon  as  the 
enemy  advanced  far  enough  into  the  gap  to  come  within 
easy  range  of  his  artillery,  he  directed  Captain  Murphy 
to  open  fire  upon  them  with  all  the  guns  of  the  fort. 
Again  the  storm  of  shot  and  shell  burst  forth  from  the 
guns  of  the  fort,  sweeping  the  pass  and  sides  of  the  moun 
tains  and  driving  the  Confederates  back  out  of  range,  so 
that  the  troops  under  Major  Wilson  retook  the  gap. 

In  a  few  moments  the  Confederates  rallied  and  drove 
him  from  the  position,  and  in  turn  were  driven  back  by 
the  artillery  fire  from  the  fort.  In  one  of  the  last  actions 
on  the  side  of  Pilot  Knob,  while  bravely  and  skilfully 
defending  the  pass,  Major  Wilson  was  wounded  in  the 
shoulder  and  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  About 
this  time  the  Confederates  brought  up  and  placed  in 
position  two  field-pieces  on  the  east  end  of  Shepherd's 
Mountain,  and  for  the  first  time  opened  fire  on  the  fort 
with  artillery.  Captain  Murphy  turned  part  of  the  guns 
of  the  fort  upon  the  hostile  pieces  and  endeavored  to 
silence  them  and  prevent  the  Confederates  from  forming 
line  just  behind  them  on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  moun 
tain.  In  the  meantime  Captain  Campbell  had,  under 
orders  of  General  Ewing,  occupied  the  north  side  of 
Shepherd's  Mountain  with  his  companies  of  Iowa  infan 
try,  while  the  troops  of  Major  Wilson  still  held  that  part  of 


BATTLE   OF  PILOT  KNOB.  403 

the  west  side  of  Pilot  Knob  not  raked  by  the  Confederate 
artillery. 

The  telegraph  line  to  St.  Louis  had  been  cut  by  Shel 
by's  force  at  eleven  o'clock  that  day,  interrupting  com 
munication  with  General  Smith,  and  as  there  were  no 
prospects  of  receiving  reinforcements,  General  Ewing  had 
no  alternative  but  to  fight  or  surrender.  He  resolved  to 
defend  his  position  as  long  as  possible  and  thus  delay  the 
advance  northward  of  the  invading  army.  After  the 
Confederates  were  driven  from  Pilot  Knob  the  last  time 
by  the  artillery  fire  from  the  fort,  they  made  no  further 
active  demonstration  for  nearly  an  hour,  except  the  firing 
from  their  battery  on  the  east  side  of  Shepherd's  Moun 
tain.  Generals  Fagan  and  Marmaduke  were  arranging 
their  lines  and  getting  their  troops  in  position  for  the  as 
sault  which  General  Price  had  ordered.  This  silence  was 
considered  ominous  by  General  Ewing,  and  he  ordered 
everything  about  the  fort  put  in  complete  readiness  to 
meet  the  impending  struggle.  To  prevent  the  escape  of 
the  Federal  garrison  on  the  Potosi  road,  General  Price 
sent  a  mounted  brigade  of  fifteen  hundred  men  under 
Colonel  Dobbin  to  take  up  a  position  about  a  mile  to  the 
north  and  rear  of  the  fort.  This  force  was  in  its  assigned 
position  nearly  an  hour  before  the  assaulting  columns  were 
ready  to  move.  At  two  o'clock  two  field-pieces  were 
hauled  up  by  hand  to  the  summit  of  Shepherd's  Moun 
tain,  and  when  placed  in  position  three  shots  were  fired 
by  them  at  the  fort  as  signals  for  the  advance  of  the  as 
saulting  columns.  The  guns  of  the  fort  were  then  turned 
on  the  hostile  pieces  and  played  on  them  with  shot  and 
shell  to  silence  them.  In  a  few  moments  after  the  signal 
shots  were  fired,  the  lines  of  the  assaulting  columns  were 
seen  by  General  Ewing  and  his  troops  emerging  from  the 
timber  into  the  open  spaces  near  the  summits  of  Shep 
herd's  Mountain  and  Pilot  Knob,  moving  down. 

At  the  moment  the  guns  of  the  fort  were  about  to  open 


404  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

fire  on  the  advancing  lines,  one  of  a  group  of  Southern 
officers  displayed  another  white  flag  from  a  projecting 
rock  near  the  summit  of  Shepherd's  Mountain.  This 
trick  did  not  deceive  General  Ewing  and  cause  him  to 
suspend  the  firing  so  that  the  Confederate  troops  could 
move  up  near  the  fort  undisturbed,  but  he  directed  Cap 
tain  Murphy  to  turn  his  guns  on  the  group  of  officers,  and 
only  a  few  shots  were  fired  when  the  flag  quickly  came 
down.  Finding  it  impossible  to  gain  the  desired  advan 
tage  by  the  trick  of  displaying  the  white  flag,  the  Confed 
erate  commander  ordered  that  the  two  guns  on  the  top  of 
Shepherd's  Mountain  and  the  two  guns  on  the  east  end 
of  that  mountain  open  fire  on  the  fort,  both  batteries  soon 
getting  the  range  very  accurately,  being  posted  not  more 
than  seven  or  eight  hundred  yards  distant.  The  moment 
the  Confederate  guns  opened  fire  on  the  fort,  Marma- 
duke's  division  on  the  left  moved  rapidly  down  the  north 
side  of  Shepherd's  Mountain,  and -Pagan's  division  on 
his  right  moved  rapidly  over  and  down  the  west  side  of 
Pilot  Knob  and  through  Pilot  Knob  Gap  to  the  assault, 
sweeping  before  them  the  detachments  of  Major  Wilson 
and  Captain  Campbell  which  had  been  holding  the  pass 
and  the  sides  of  the  mountain.  In  descending  the  steep 
side  of  Shepherd's  Mountain,  the  troops  of  Marmaduke's 
division  were  confronted  at  every  step  with  fallen  trees, 
huge  projecting  rocks,  and  deep  narrow  ravines,  difficult 
to  pass,  while  the  heavy  guns  of  the  fort  were  all  the  time 
playing  upon  their  broken  ranks  with  shell  with  great 
accuracy. 

The  assaulting  lines  of  General  Pagan's  division  were 
also  considerably  broken  at  the  base  of  Pilot  Knob  by  the 
houses  and  fences  of  the  village  that  intersected  the  line 
of  movement,  but  were  quickly  re-formed  by  the  brigade 
commanders,  and,  yelling  wildly,  the  troops  dashed  for 
ward  upon  the  plain  at  a  double-quick  in  the  direction  of 
the  fort.  Captain  Murphy  not  only  turned  his  artillery 


BATTLE   OF  PILOT  KNOB.  405 

upon  the  advancing  lines,  but  he  also  played  with  shot  and 
shell  upon  the  two  hostile  guns  on  the  summit  and  on  the 
east  end  of  Shepherd's  Mountain,  and  while  he  was  un 
able  to  silence  them — they  were  so  well  covered — he 
neutralized  the  effect  of  their  fire.  When  the  charging 
lines  descended  half-way  down  the  mountain  sides,  the 
troops  of  the  fort  opened  fire  upon  them  with  small-arms 
from  the  ramparts  and  rifle-pits,  and  with  artillery,  using 
canister  double  charge.  A  sheet  of  flame  burst  from  the 
south  and  east  sides  of  the  fort,  and  at  every  step  from 
about  six  hundred  yards  up  to  within  a  few  yards  of  the 
ditch  the  advancing  lines  were  met  with  a  constant  steady 
stream  of  iron  and  leaden  hail,  breaking  and  shattering 
their  ranks.  Of  the  five  thousand  six  hundred  men  in  that 
desperate  charge,  scarcely  one  third  arrived  within  fifty 
yards  of  the  ditch,  the  others  having  fallen  upon  the  plain 
or  mountain  sides,  or  having  taken  refuge  in  the  dry  bed 
of  the  creek  on  the  south  and  southeast  sides  of  the  fort. 
Only  a  small  part  of  the  two  divisions  reached  the  ditch, 
at  which,  it  appearing  to  them  impassable,  they  hesitated, 
recoiled,  and  then  fled  in  confusion,  many  of  them  being 
swept  down  by  the  artillery  and  small-arms  of  the  fort 
before  they  could  find  shelter  in  the  bed  of  the  creek  or 
get  out  of  range  by  retreating  through  the  pass.  Their 
casualties  were  so  great  that  General  Ewing  reported  that 
those  who  escaped  appeared  to  have  left  nearly  one  half 
their  comrades  dead  or  wounded  on  the  plain. 

Lieutenant  Simonton,  who  was  posted  on  rising  ground 
just  north  of  the  fort  with  his  section  of  artillery,  held  his 
position,  keeping  up  a  hot  fire  on  the  advancing  lines 
until  they  came  up  within  sixty  yards  of  the  fort,  when 
he  was  ordered  inside.  He  quickly  limbered  up  and 
started  into  the  fort,  when  the  two  horses  of  the  lead 
team  of  the  right  piece  were  shot  down  just  as  they 
were  entering  the  gate  and  blocked  up  the  way  so  that 
the  section  could  not  then  be  brought  inside.  As  they 


406  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

would  be  cut  off  in  another  moment  the  men  were  ordered 
to  take  care  of  themselves,  and  all  came  in  except  one, 
who  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  In  the  midst  of 
the  excitement  of  the  fierce  conflict  and  of  the  roar  of 
artillery  and  small-arms,  the  other  horses  to  the  pieces 
and  gun-carriages  began  to  stampede,  when  Captain 
Montgomery  ordered  his  men  to  shoot  them  to  prevent 
them  from  getting  away  with  any  of  the  carriages.  The 
two  pieces,  however,  were  under  the  fire  of  the  fort,  and 
were  brought  inside  after  the  fight  was  over,  together  with 
all  the  horses  that  were  not  disabled. 

A  short  time  after  the  Federal  forces  had  repulsed  the 
last  assault  in  front,  Colonel  Dobbin's  brigade,  which  had 
been  posted  on  the  Potosi  road  in  the  rear  of  the  fort, 
moved  along  the  base  of  Cedar  Mountain  in  a  threatening 
attitude. 

General  Ewing,  observing  the  movement,  ordered  a 
sortie  from  the  north  ditch,  and  routed  them  with  some 
loss.  After  some  further  firing  with  small-arms  and  ar 
tillery  between  the  troops  of  the  fort  and  the  assaulting 
troops  of  Marmaduke's  division,  who  had  taken  shelter 
behind  the  banks  of  the  creek,  the  approach  of  night  put 
an  end  to  further  operations.  After  dark  all  the  Confed 
erate  troops  who  had  sought  shelter  lying  down  in  the  bed 
of  the  creek  were  quietly  withdrawn  to  their  encampment 
near  Ironton.  The  repulse  was  so  complete  and  the 
demoralization  of  the  Confederate  troops  so  great  that 
General  Price  in  person  was  unable  to  rally  them.  If  he 
accepted  the  defeat  and  made  no  further  effort  to  take 
the  Federal  position,  he  knew  that  the  loss  of  prestige  to 
his  army  would  be  so  great  that  the  thirty  thousand  men 
of  the  Order  of  American  Knights,  an  organization  of 
Southern  sympathizers  throughout  the  State  which  had 
been  promised  him,  would  not  so  zealously  flock  to  his 
standard.  He  determined  therefore  to  renew  the  assault 
the  next  morning  and  at  once  commenced  preparations 


BATTLE   OF  PILOT  KNOB.  407 

for  it.  When  at  Fredericktown  he  had  directed  General 
Shelby  to  march  from  that  place  by  way  of  Farmington 
and  strike  the  St.  Louis  and  Iron  Mountain  Railroad  near 
Mineral  Point  and  destroy  several  railroad  bridges  in  that 
vicinity  to  prevent  General  A.  J.  Smith  from  reinforcing 
the  garrison  at  Pilot  Knob,  and  then  to  rejoin  the  invad 
ing  army  before  Pilot  Knob.  In  the  evening  he  de 
spatched  a  second  courier  to  Shelby,  informing  him  of  the 
repulse  and  of  his  intention  of  renewing  the  attack  the 
next  morning,  and  directing  him  to  rejoin  the  army  as 
early  as  practicable,  to  participate  in  the  proposed  opera 
tions. 

That  evening  after  the  action  had  ended,  General 
Ewing  ascertained  from  prisoners  taken  that  day  that 
Price  was  there  with  the  two  divisions  of  Fagan  and  Mar- 
maduke  and  ten  pieces  of  artillery,  and  that  Shelby  with 
his  division  and  four  pieces  of  artillery  had  been  sent 
north  of  Pilot  Knob  to  tear  up  the  railroad  track  and  de 
stroy  bridges.  The  Federal  troops  had  lost  fully  two 
hundred  men  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  during  the 
last  two  days'  operations,  and  with  the  most  careful 
handling  of  his  men  General  Ewing  had  found  himself 
unable  to  hold  the  mountain  sides  and  prevent  the  enemy 
from  planting  their  batteries  on  the  mountain  command 
ing  his  position.  As  the  Confederates  were  in  possession 
of  the  summits  of  the  mountains,  he  was  convinced  that 
they  would  bring  up  all  the  guns  of  their  batteries  during 
the  night  and  place  them  in  position  so  as  to  completely 
command  the  fort  and  make  it  untenable  when  they  re 
newed  the  attack  next  morning.  In  view  of  the  situation 
as  thus  presented,  he  deemed  it  a  useless  sacrifice  of  life  to 
attempt  further  defence  of  the  position  against  such  over 
whelming  forces,  supported  by  superior  field  artillery 
advantageously  posted.  He  determined  therefore  to 
evacuate  the  fort  that  night  and  blow  up  the  magazine 
so  as  to  destroy  all  the  ammunition  and  public  property 


408  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

he  could  not  take  along.  The  valley  around  the  fort  was 
lighted  up  nearly  all  night  by  burning  buildings  of  the 
village  and  by  the  flames  from  a  large  quantity  of  char 
coal  which  had  been  set  on  fire  at  the  base  of  Pilot  Knob, 
so  that  the  movements  of  the  Federal  garrison  could  be 
easily  observed  by  the  enemy  from  the  nearest  mountain 
sides.  There  was  danger  that  the  preparations  for  evac 
uation  would  be  observed  and  communicated  to  some  of 
the  Confederate  commanders,  who  would  throw  a  strong 
force  across  the  Federal  line  of  retreat  and  cut  the  troops 
to  pieces  in  their  attempt  to  escape.  During  the  night 
General  Ewing  had  sent  out  a  sufficient  force  to  take 
possession  of  the  village  of  Pilot  Knob  and  the  valley 
around  the  fort  to  the  base  of  the  hills  and  to  observe 
any  hostile  movement.  He  ascertained  that  a  strong 
Confederate  force  was  stationed  just  north  of  Pilot  Knob 
on  the  Mineral  Point  road,  and  that  the  Potosi  road  was 
the  only  one  not  guarded  and  by  which  he  could  hope  to 
get  out  with  his  command  unobserved  by  the  enemy. 

At  midnight  preparations  for  the  evacuation  were  com 
menced.  With  as  little  stir  as  possible  the  troops  were 
aroused,  knapsacks  packed,  haversacks  and  cartridge- 
boxes  well  supplied,  artillery  horses  harnessed  and 
hitched  to  the  pieces,  and  the  limber  chests  filled  with 
ammunition.  When  everything  was  in  readiness,  at  three 
o'clock,  Colonel  Fletcher  moved  out  noiselessly  with  the 
infantry  and  formed  them  in  column  near  the  end  of  the 
rifle-pits  extending  from  the  north  face  of  the  fort.  He 
was  soon  followed  by  the  cavalry  and  battery,  which 
passed  out  over  the  drawbridge,  that  had  tents  spread 
upon  it  to  muffle  the  sound.  The  whole  force  then 
moved  forward  in  column  with  instructions  to  make  as 
little  noise  as  possible,  and  soon  struck  the  Potosi  road, 
passing  very  near  a  Confederate  force  on  the  right  and 
another  on  the  left  without  attracting  the  attention  of 
either.  A  good  many  Union  refugees  of  that  section, 


BATTLE    OF  PILOT  KNOB.  409 

men,  women,  and  children,  white  and  black,  who  had 
flocked  into  Pilot  Knob  when  the  Confederates  arrived 
in  Arcadia  Valley,  went  along  with  the  Federal  troops 
and  were  destined  to  embarrass  their  movements. 

The  main  part  of  the  Confederate  army  which  had  en 
camped  around  Ironton  that  night,  and  the  brigades 
which  had  been  assigned  to  the  duty  of  watching  the 
Federal  garrison,  did  not  know  anything  of  the  evacua 
tion  until  they  heard  the  explosion  of  the  magazine  that 
shook  the  surrounding  hills  an  hour  or  so  after  General 
Ewing  left.  The  retreating  column  met  with  no  opposi 
tion  until  nearing  Caledonia,  when  at  sunrise  the  advance- 
guard  attacked  and  routed  at  that  place  twenty-five 
mounted  men  of  Shelby's  command,  killing  one  man. 
At  that  point  General  Ewing  ascertained  that  Shelby  had 
taken  Potosi  the  evening  before,  that  the  men  just  routed 
were  his  advance,  and  that  his  division  was  only  two 
miles  in  the  Federal  front.  This  skirmish  and  the  in 
formation  obtained  induced  General  Ewing  to  change  his 
line  of  march  by  taking  the  road  to  Webster,  nearly  due 
west  in  the  direction  of  Rolla,  thus  avoiding  Shelby,  who 
held  his  division  in  line  of  battle  several  hours  and  until 
he  received  orders  from  General  Price  to  join  with  Mar- 
maduke  in  the  pursuit.  Having  made  disposition  of  the 
troops  and  artillery  for  another  attack  on  the  fort  on  the 
morning  of  the  evacuation,  some  time  was  lost  in  making 
new  disposition  for  the  pursuit,  so  that  Marmaduke  did 
not  leave  Pilot  Knob  until  about  eight  o'clock  that  morn 
ing  with  his  division.  This  delay  of  about  five  hours 
gave  General  Ewing  a  good  start,  and  he  marched  all  that 
day  undisturbed,  arriving  at  Webster,  a  distance  of  thirty- 
one  miles,  at  sundown,  where  he  rested  until  midnight. 
He  then  resumed  the  march,  taking  the  road  to  Leas- 
burg,  a  station  on  the  Southwest  Branch  of  the  Pacific 
Railroad  ;  but  the  night  was  so  dark  and  stormy  that  he 
made  little  progress  until  daylight.  His  decision  to  take 


4IO  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE   BORDER. 

the  Leasburg  instead  of  the  Rolla  road  was  a  wise  one, 
for  nearly  all  the  way  it  ran  along  a  narrow  ridge  sepa 
rating  the  waters  of  the  Courtois  and  Huzza  and  on  each 
side  of  it  there  were  frequent  precipitous  bluffs. 

A  pursuing  cavalry  force  would  have  little  opportunity 
of  making  detours  to  operate  on  his  flanks,  and  if  they 
advanced  directly  upon  his  rear,  he  could  use  the  guns 
of  his  battery  in  sweeping  them  down  with  grape  and 
canister.  Marmaduke  and  Shelby  did  not  leave  Caledonia 
with  their  divisions  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  but  march 
ing  all  night,  overtook  and  vigorously  charged  Ewing's 
rear-guard  the  next  morning  at  eight  o'clock  just  as  he 
reached  the  ridge  which  he  hoped  would  protect  him  from 
flank  movements.  Dispositions  were  at  once  made  for 
defending  his  rear  by  placing  three  companies  of  the 
Third  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  the  detachment  of 
the  Fourteenth  Iowa  Infantry,  one  company  of  the  Forty- 
seventh  Missouri  Infantry,  and  Lieutenant  Smiley's  sec 
tion  of  Captain  Montgomery's  battery,  under  Major  H. 
H.  Williams,  Tenth  Kansas  Infantry,  Aide-de-Camp  on 
the  staff  of  the  General.  Marmaduke's  division  led  the  ad 
vance  in  the  pursuit  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  making 
frequent  charges  on  the  Federal  rear-guard.  As  the  Con 
federate  officers  could  not  deploy  their  troops  so  as  to 
present  a  very  extended  line  on  the  narrow  ridge,  their 
attacks  were  easily  repulsed  by  a  volley  or  so  from  the 
Federal  rear-guard,  or  a  few  rounds  of  grape  and  canister 
from  the  section  of  the  battery.  If  they  came  up  in 
strong  force  and  dismounted  and  attempted  to  deploy 
and  advance  on  foot,  the  section  of  artillery  limbered  up 
and  the  rear-guard  faced  about  and  moved  on  to  overtake 
the  column.  At  a  distance  of  three  or  four  miles  of  Leas- 
burg  the  narrow  ridge  terminated  and  the  road  passed  over 
a  section  less  broken  and  more  favorable  for  the  movement 
of  mounted  troops. 

At  this  point  Shelby's  division  was  given  the  advance 


BATTLE   OF  PILOT  KNOB.  411 

and  pushed  forward  and  attacked  General  Ewing's  force 
on  the  flanks  and  in  front  and  rear  with  a  good  deal  of 
energy.  It  required  the  liberal  use  of  grape  and  canister 
from  the  sections  of  artillery  and  frequent  volleys  from 
different  detachments  of  the  Federal  troops  to  hold  the 
enemy  off  until  the  little  command,  worn  out  from  march 
ing  and  fighting,  could  reach  the  station.  It  was  after 
dark  when  General  Ewing  arrived  at  the  station,  and  his 
artillery  had  barely  time  to  unlimber  and  his  troops  to 
form  line,  when  the  Confederates  under  Shelby  made  a 
charge.  A  detachment  of  Colonel  J.  S.  Warmouth's 
regiment  of  Enrolled  Militia,  which  had  recently  evacu 
ated  the  place,  had  made  breastworks  of  railroad  ties. 
Hastily  occupying  these  rude  defences,  the  Federal  troops 
opened  fire  on  the  enemy  and  soon  repulsed  their  attack. 
When  Shelby  made  his  first  attack  a  few  miles  out  from 
the  station,  the  Union  refugees  who  had  accompanied 
General  Ewing  from  Pilot  Knob  became  excited,  and  by 
their  panics  came  near  seriously  embarrassing  the  opera 
tions  of  the  troops. 

About  nine  o'clock  that  night  a  train  arrived  from  St. 
Louis  with  supplies  for  the  troops  at  Rolla,  thirty-five 
miles  distant.  If  he  remained  at  Leasburg  during  the 
night,  General  Ewing  was  convinced  that  the  enemy 
would  be  up  in  force  the  next  morning  to  renew  the  at 
tack,  and  as  there  was  no  hope  of  receiving  reinforce 
ments,  he  determined  to  put  his  command  aboard  the 
train  and  start  for  St.  Louis.  When  everything  was  in 
readiness  and  the  train  was  about  to  start,  the  lights  of 
burning  buildings  were  noticed  at  the  nearest  stations 
north  and  south  of  Leasburg.  As  the  enemy  evidently 
had  possession  of  the  railroad  at  those  points,  the  troops 
were  taken  off  the  cars  and  spent  the  night  in  fortifying, 
remounting  the  guns  of  the  battery  which  had  been  taken 
off  the  carriages,  and  otherwise  preparing  for  an  attack  the 
next  morning.  The  next  morning  the  Confederates  ap- 


412  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

peared  in  force  and  drove  in  the  Federal  outposts,  and 
there  was  some  sharp  skirmishing  during  the  day  in  which 
E wing's  artillery  fired  several  rounds;  but  after  thor 
oughly  reconnoitring1  the  position,  Marmaduke  and 
Shelby  decided  that  it  would  cost  too  great  a  sacrifice 
of  life  to  make  an  assault,  and  withdrew  their  forces  and 
marched  off  to  Sullivan  station  in  the  direction  of  St. 
Louis.  After  the  enemy  withdrew,  General  Ewing 
marched  for  Rolla  with  his  command,  except  one  hun 
dred  men  left  to  hold  the  station,  and  on  arriving  at  St. 
James,  twelve  miles  from  Rolla,  sent  forward  his  infantry 
by  railroad.  On  Monday,  October  3d,  he  turned  over  the 
command  which  he  had  brought  out  from  Pilot  Knob,  to 
General  John  McNeil  at  Rolla,  and  with  a  small  escort 
and  his  staff  returned  to  St.  Louis. 

The  battle  of  Pilot  Knob  was  an  important  event  in 
Price's  expedition.  The  punishment  Ewing  inflicted  on 
Marmaduke's  and  Pagan's  divisions  in  that  battle  was  so 
severe  that  the  officers  and  men  of  those  divisions  did  not 
recover  their  martial  spirit — elan — during  the  rest  of  the 
campaign.  General  Ewing  reported  his  loss  in  the  battle 
of  Pilot  Knob  in  defending  the  passes  and  in  his  retreat  to 
Leasburg  at  200  men  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  He 
estimated  that  at  least  50  men  of  this  number  were  of  the 
missing,  some  of  whom  were  cut  off  and  afterwards  re 
turned  to  their  commands,  and  the  others  men  who  were 
captured  and  paroled.  He  reported  the  Confederate  losses 
at  Pilot  Knob  and  in  forcing  the  passes  at  1500  men  killed 
and  wounded.  General  Price  never  made  any  report  of 
his  casualties  in  the  series  of  actions  during  the  two  days' 
operations  around  Pilot  Knob,  including  the  assaults  on 
Fort  Davidson,  but  Captain  T.  J.  Mackey,  Chief  Engineer 
on  his  staff,  states  that  "  in  twenty  minutes  we  lost  1164 
officers  and  men  killed  and  wounded,  which,  added  to 
those  who  fell  in  forcing  the  passes  on  the  previous  day, 
made  our  casualties  aggregate  not  less  than  1500  of  our 


BATTLE    OF  PILOT  KNOB.  413 

best  troops  placed  hors  de  combat  since  we  entered  the 
valley  of  Arcadia."  * 

It  would  be  difficult  to  persuade  the  impartial  ob 
server  of  the  events  of  that  period  that  General  Price  was 
not  responsible  for  the  desperate  and  bloody  acts  of  the 
Southern  partisan  bandits  whom  he  commissioned.  And 
it  may  surprise  some  to  know  that  he  permitted  and 
sanctioned  acts  scarcely  less  atrocious  by  the  officers  and 
soldiers  under  his  immediate  control.  Of  the  numerous 
bloody  acts  charged  against  him  and  that  must  forever 
detract  from  his  name  as  an  officer  and  man  of  noble  in 
stincts,  none  perhaps  stands  out  more  conspicuously  than 
the  murder,  by  his  order  or  permission,  of  Major  James 
Wilson,  Third  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  and  six  of 
his  men,  who  were  captured  on  Pilot  Knob,  September 
27th,  while  defending  the  pass.  This  gallant  officer, 
who  had  skilfully  and  resolutely  defended  the  passes  for 
nearly  two  days  and  with  his  small  force  contested  every 
step  of  the  advance  of  the  Southern  army,  was  held  with 
six  of  his  men  a  week  after  capture,  and  then  brutally 
murdered  by  a  detachment  led  by  a  field  officer  of  Mar- 
maduke's  division.  The  Major  was  hung  and  his  men 
were  shot  down  and  their  bodies  left  by  the  roadside. 
When  General  Rosecrans  was  informed  of  the  fate  of 
Major  Wilson  and  his  men,  he  at  once  retaliated  by 
directing  his  provost-marshal  to  order  out  from  among 
the  Confederate  prisoners  a  major  and  six  enlisted  men 
for  execution,  in  reprisal  for  the  prisoners  who  had  been 
wantonly  murdered. 

*See  article  of  Captain  T.  J.  Mackey,  Engineer  C.  S.  A.,  in  Monthly 
Illustrator,  New  York,  1896. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

DEFENCE    OF   ST.    LOUIS   AND   JEFFERSON    CITY, 
MISSOURI. 

WHEN  General  Rosecrans  obtained  satisfactory  infor 
mation  that  Price  with  two  divisions  was  investing  Pilot 
Knob  and  had  sent  another  division  to  cut  the  railroad 
north  of  that  point,  he  commenced  concentrating  his 
troops  for  the  defence  of  St.  Louis  and  Jefferson  City. 
On  the  approach  of  Shelby's  division  to  Mineral  Point 
and  Big  River  Bridge,  General  Smith's  advance  occupy 
ing  those  points  retired  to  De  Soto,  where  his  main  com 
mand  was  in  position.  After  Ewing  evacuated  Pilot 
Knob  and  Price  moved  north  to  Potosi  and  Richwoods, 
General  Smith  retired  with  his  division  from  De  Soto  to 
Jefferson  Barracks  and  points  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Meramec  covering  St.  Louis.  Under  instructions  from 
State  headquarters,  dated  September  25th,  the  Enrolled 
Militia  of  the  St.  Louis  District  were  called  out  for  active 
service,  forming  a  division  of  four  thousand  five  hun 
dred  men,  consisting  of  three  brigades  commanded  by 
Brigadier-General  E.  C.  Pike.  The  three  brigades  were 
commanded  respectively  by  Brigadier-Generals  Madison 
Miller,  C.  D.  Wolff,  and  George  F.  Meyers,  who  were  at 
once  sent  forward  under  instructions  from  General  Smith 
to  guard  the  fords  and  bridges  of  the  Meramec  and  to 
occupy  some  of  the  forts  which  had  been  constructed  for 
the  defence  of  the  city. 

414 


DEFENCE   OF  ST.    LOUIS  AND  JEFFEKSOW  CITY.    415 

The  troops  of  the  expedition — consisting  of  detach 
ments  of  the  First  and  Second  Divisions  of  the  Sixteenth 
Army  Corps  under  Major-General  J.  A.  Mower — which 
had  been  sent  from  Memphis  into  Northeast  Arkansas 
to  operate  against  Shelby,  on  finding  that  Shelby  had 
marched  to  join  Price  for  the  invasion  of  Missouri,  were 
ordered  to  Cape  Girardeau,  Missouri ;  the  cavalry,  ar 
tillery,  and  infantry  arriving  at  that  point  October  5th. 
On  the  7th  and  8th  of  October  these  troops  embarked  on 
steamboats  and  transports  for  St.  Louis  and  Jefferson 
City,  but  did  not  arrive  at  either  place  until  Price  had 
passed. 

General  Rosecrans  also  had  report  to  him  for  the  de 
fence  of  the  city  five  regiments  of  Illinois  One  Hundred 
Days'  Volunteers  whose  terms  of  service  had  expired  and 
who  were  returning  home  to  be  mustered  out.  These 
troops  got  in  on  September  3Oth  and  October  1st,  and 
formed  a  brigade  under  Colonel  Hugo  Wangelin,  Twelfth 
Missouri  Infantry.  They  were  relieved,  however,  in  a 
few  days,  as  Price  turned  west  about  the  time  of  their 
arrival  in  St.  Louis.  After  his  severe  repulse  at  Pilot 
Knob,  and  on  receiving  information  that  St.  Louis  was 
defended  by  a  force  superior  to  his  own,  behind  strong 
fortifications,  General  Price  determined  to  make  no 
further  demonstrations  in  that  direction,  but  to  move  as 
rapidly  as  practicable  upon  Jefferson  City,  which  he 
hoped  to  capture  with  its  troops  and  supplies.  In  Price's 
march  from  Richwoods  to  St.  Claire,  General  Rosecrans 
thought  his  movements  indicated  that  he  was  concen 
trating  his  forces  in  the  hills  between  Big  River  and  the 
Meramec  for  a  demonstration  against  the  city,  and  in 
order  to  meet  a  movement  from  that  quarter,  directed 
General  Smith  to  send  part  of  his  division  to  Kirkwood, 
twelve  miles  west  of  St.  Louis,  to  occupy  a  position  com 
manding  the  crossing  of  the  Meramec  and  the  Richwoods 
road.  Colonel  Lewis  Merrill,  Second  Missouri  Cavalry, 


41 6  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

who  had  been  sent  out  with  his  available  mounted  force 
to  make  a  reconnoissance  in  the  direction  of  Richwoods, 
reported  on  the  evening  of  the  3Oth  that  a  brigade  of  the 
enemy  had  burned  the  Moselle  Bridge  over  the  Meramec 
and  were  advancing  north  in  the  direction  of  Franklin. 
On  the  morning  of  October  1st  General  Smith  sent  the 
Third  Brigade  of  his  division  under  Colonel  Edward  H. 
Wolfe,  Fifty-second  Indiana  Infantry,  on  a  train  to 
Franklin  to  reinforce  the  cavalry,  and  on  arriving  at  that 
point  about  ten  o'clock,  Colonel  Wolfe  soon  became  en 
gaged  in  a  sharp  skirmish  with  a  brigade  of  the  enemy 
under  General  Cabell,  driving  them  from  the  town,  but  not 
until  they  had  burned  the  station.  As  Price's  army  ap 
peared  to  be  moving  west  of  St.  Louis,  on  the  2d  of 
October  the  First  Brigade  of  General  Smith's  command 
marched  from  Jefferson  Barracks  to  Gray's  Summit,  five 
miles  from  and  within  easy  supporting  distance  of  Colonel 
Wolfe's  brigade. 

On  the  2d  General  Price's  forces  advanced  to  Union, 
General  Clark's  brigade  going  as  far  north  as  Washington 
on  the  Missouri  River,  to  tear  up  the  railroad  and  burn 
the  stations.  Finding  that  the  enemy  had  moved  to  the 
west  of  St.  Louis,  General  Rosecrans  on  the  4th  advanced 
the  three  brigades  of  the  Third  Division,  Sixteenth  Army 
Corps,  about  four  thousand  five  hundred  men,  to  Gray's 
Summit,  and  General  Pike's  division  of  Enrolled  Militia, 
of  about  four  thousand  five  hundred  men,  to  Franklin. 
These  troops  under  General  A.  J.  Smith  were  put  in 
motion  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  as  soon  as  it  was  ascer 
tained  that  Price  was  moving  west  in  the  direction  of 
Jefferson  City. 

When  it  appeared  certain  that  the  invading  army  would 
not  strike  west  of  Rolla,  General  Rosecrans  ordered  Gen 
eral  Sanborn  by  telegraph  to  march  with  his  available 
cavalry  to  Rolla,  leaving  a  sufficient  force  at  Springfield 
to  hold  the  place  against  any  attack  likely  to  be  made 


DEFENCE    OF  ST.    LOUIS  AND  JEFFERSON  CITY.    417 

against  it.  Having  concentrated  his  troops  at  Spring 
field,  General  Sanborn  left  that  place  on  the  morning  of 
September  2/th,  with  fifteen  hundred  cavalry,  and  arrived 
at  Rolla  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  September 
29th,  having  marched  a  distance  of  120  miles  in  less  than 
two  days  and  a  half.  After  resting  at  Rolla  one  day,  he 
moved  forward  to  St.  James,  twelve  miles,  to  support,  if 
necessary,  Colonel  John  L.  Beveridge,  Seventeenth  Illi 
nois  Cavalry,  who  had  been  sent  by  General  McNeil  from 
Rolla  to  Leasburg  to  the  assistance  of  General  Ewing, 
who  was  reported  to  have  retreated  to  that  point  from  Pilot 
Knob,  to  be  short  of  ammunition  and  supplies,  and  closely 
pressed  by  the  enemy.  But  as  Marmaduke  and  Shelby 
had  decided  not  to  make  an  assault  on  Ewing's  fortified 
position  and  withdrew  their  forces  about  the  time  of  the 
approach  of  Colonel  Beveridge,  General  Sanborn  did  not 
find  it  necessary  to  advance  any  farther  east  along  the 
railroad  than  Cuba.  He  obtained  information  from  Colo 
nel  John  E.  Phelps,  Second  Arkansas  Cavalry,  who  had 
been  sent  forward  to  make  a  reconnoissance,  that  the 
Confederate  forces  had  crossed  the  railroad  at  Sullivan 
station,  moving  in  a  northwest  direction,  probably  for 
Jefferson  City.  He  communicated  his  information  and 
intentions  to  General  McNeil  and  it  was  arranged  that 

o 

they  should  unite  their  commands  at  Vienna  en  route  to 
Jefferson  City  the  next  evening,  October  4th.  When 
their  forces  formed  a  junction  that  evening  they  had  an 
effective  strength  of  two  thousand  eight  hundred  men, 
six  field-pieces,  and  two  mountain  howitzers.  After  halt 
ing  a  short  time  to  rest  and  feed  they  resumed  the  march 
and  arrived  at  Jefferson  City  the  next  evening,  passing 
the  fords  of  the  Osage  only  a  few  hours  in  advance  of  the 
enemy.  In  fact,  General  Sanborn  received  information 
just  after  crossing  the  Osage  that  the  enemy  had  crossed 
that  stream  at  points  several  miles  below  and  were  ad 
vancing  to  the  Moreau.  He  therefore  removed  his  bri- 

VOL.   II.— 27 


418  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE   BORDER. 

gade  to  the  threatened  point  and  encamped  for  the 
night,  throwing  forward  a  picket  in  the  direction  of  the 
Osage. 

The  troops,  artillery,  and  train  from  the  District  of 
Rolla  under  General  McNeil  moved  on  into  Jefferson 
City  that  evening  and  reported  to  General  E.  B.  Brown, 
commanding  the  District  of  Central  Missouri.  There  was 
now  concentrated  at  Jefferson  City  for  the  defence  of  the 
capital  of  the  State,  seven  thousand  two  hundred  men,  in 
cluding  Enrolled  Militia  recently  called  out.  On  the  first 
reports  of  the  invading  army  entering  Southeast  Missouri, 
General  Brown  set  a  large  force  of  men  to  work  under 
competent  engineers  to  repair  the  forts  which  had  already 
been  commenced,  and  to  construct  new  forts  and  rifle- 
pits  and  other  works  necessary  to  put  the  place  in  a  com 
plete  state  of  defence.  When  he  received  information 
that  the  Confederate  forces  were  moving  west  in  the  di 
rection  of  Jefferson  City,  he  ordered  Colonel  J.  F.  Philips, 
Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  forward  with  eight 
hundred  mounted  men  of  his  own  regiment  and  of  the 
First  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  and  a  section  of 
artillery,  to  resolutely  resist  the  advance  of  the  enemy. 
For  several  days  this  force  was  employed  south  and  east 
of  the  Osage,  scouting  and  getting  all  the  information 
possible  of  the  movements  of  the  Confederate  forces. 
On  the  5th  Colonel  Philips  retired  to  the  north  and  west 
side  of  the  Osage,  and  that  evening  part  of  Shelby's  di 
vision  destroyed  the  Osage  Bridge  and  captured  at  the 
east  end  of  it  in  a  blockhouse  a  detachment  of  Enrolled 
Militia  under  Lieutenant  Berger.  The  next  morning  the 
Confederates  appeared  in  large  numbers  on  the  east  side 
of  the  Osage  for  the  purpose  of  forcing  a  passage  of  the 
river  at  several  points,  so  that  Colonel  Philips  was  obliged 
to  divide  his  command  into  several  detachments  to  guard 
these  crossings.  There  was  hot  skirmishing  at  some  of  the 
fords  that  day,  and  under  cover  of  their  artillery  the  Con- 


DEFENCE   OF  ST.    LOUIS  AND  JEFFERSON  CITY.     419 

federates  forced  a  passage  of  the  river  at  and  below  Castle 
Rock. 

On  hearing  artillery  firing  at  a  ford  below  Castle  Rock, 
Colonel  Philips  ordered  Major  A.  W.  Mullins,  command 
ing  a  battalion  of  the  First  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry, 
to  move  forward  to  the  threatened  point  and  attack  the 
enemy  vigorously  and  if  possible  regain  possession  of 
the  ford.  The  Major  had  advanced  only  a  short  distance 
when  he  met  a  Confederate  force,  and  after  a  sharp  fight 
drove  it  back,  ortally  wounding  Colonel  Shanks,  a  bri 
gade  commander  of  Shelby's  division.  In  a  short  time 
the  Confederates  rallied  and  came  forward  with  increased 
numbers,  and  attacking  him  in  front  and  on  the  flanks, 
compelled  Major  Mullins  to  retire  with  some  loss.  The 
Confederates,  having  crossed  the  Osage  at  several  fords 
that  afternoon,  attacked  General  Sanborn's  pickets,  con 
sisting  of  parts  of  the  Sixth  and  Eighth  Regiments  Mis 
souri  State  Militia  Cavalry  under  Major  William  Plumb 
and  Colonel  J.  J.  Gravely,  posted  south  of  the  Moreau 
and  nearly  south  of  Jefferson  City,  but  were  held  in  check 
until  night.  General  Sanborn's  brigade  encamped  on  the 
Moreau  that  night,  but  early  the  next  morning  all  his 
command,  except  the  Sixth  and  Eighth  Regiments 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry  under  Colonel  Gravely, 
and  a  detachment  of  the  Seventh  Provisional  Regiment 
Enrolled  Missouri  Militia  under  Major  W.  B.  Mitchell, 
was  ordered  into  Jefferson  City.  The  Confederate  forces 
all  crossed  to  the  north  side  of  the  Osage  on  the  6th,  and 
early  on  the  morning  of  the  /th  attacked  the  Federal  de 
tachments  guarding  the  fords  of  the  Moreau.  Colonel 
Gravely  made  such  disposition  of  his  force  as  to  annoy 
the  enemy  as  much  as  possible  and  delay  their  advance. 
He  formed  his  own  regiment,  the  Eighth  Missouri  State 
Militia  Cavalry,  so  as  to  repulse  two  severe  attacks,  and 
was  forced  from  his  position  only  when  the  Confederates 
brought  artillery  into  use  against  him.  When  the  enemy 


420  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE   BORDER. 

dislodged  him  from  his  position  with  artillery,  they  at  once 
pressed  his  front  and  flanks  with  so  much  vigor  that  he 
was  obliged  to  retire  to  the  north  side  of  the  Moreau. 
To  cover  this  movement  he  directed  Major  Plumb  to  form 
the  Sixth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry  on  the  north  bank 
of  the  creek  so  as  to  protect  the  crossing.  Major  Murphy, 
of  the  Sixth,  was  assigned  to  this  duty,  and  hastily  con 
structed  temporary  breastworks  on  the  bank  that  made  a 
good  defence. 

When  the  Eighth  Missouri  retired,  contesting  every 
inch  of  ground,  Major  Murphy  opened  a  destructive 
fire  from  his  defensive  position  upon  the  enemy  the 
moment  they  came  within  range,  instantly  checking 
their  advance.  In  a  few  moments,  however,  the  Con 
federates  deployed  to  the  right  and  left  and  after  cross 
ing  the  stream  were  about  to  flank  Major  Plumb,  when 
he  was  directed  by  Colonel  Gravely  to  fall  back  to  a 
position  on  a  ridge  near  the  Fair  Grounds  where  the 
Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry  had  again  been 
formed  to  resist  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  This  posi 
tion  was  held  by  Colonel  Gravely  about  an  hour,  engag 
ing  the  Confederate  cavalry,  when  he  was  ordered  into 
the  city.  While  his  cavalry  was  still  engaging  the  enemy, 
a  section  of  Sutter's  battery,  Second  Missouri  Light 
Artillery,  and  two  companies  of  the  Forty-fifth  Missouri 
Infantry  under  Adjutant  W.  H.  Hill  of  that  regiment  as 
a  support  to  the  artillery  were  sent  out  to  his  assistance. 
On  the  two  companies  reaching  the  scene  of  action,  Gen 
eral  Sanborn  seems  to  have  thought  that  this  small  force 
was  intended  to  relieve  his  line  under  Colonel  Gravely, 
then  closely  pressed,  and  ordered  Lieutenant  Hill  to  de 
ploy  one  of  his  companies  as  skirmishers,  which  he  did. 
He  was  soon  ordered  to  send  the  other  company,  which 
was  being  held  in  reserve,  to  the  flank  to  prevent  a  flank 
movement.  The  enemy  were  by  this  time  already  on  the 
Federal  flank,  and  as  the  cavalry  retired  leaving  him  un- 


DEFENCE   OF  ST.   LOUIS  AND  JEFFERSON  CITY.    421 

supported,  Lieutenant  Hill  was  obliged  to  give  the  order 
for  his  detachment  to  fall  back,  having  sustained  a  loss 
of  three  men  killed  and  nine  wounded  in  the  movement. 
In  another  moment  Captain  Sutter  opened  fire  with  his 
section  of  12-pounder  guns  on  the  advancing  columns 
of  the  enemy  and  soon  checked  and  drove  them  back  out 
of  range.  At  one  o'clock  the  Federal  forces  which  had 
been  opposing  the  advance  of  the  enemy  retired  within 
the  fortifications  at  Jefferson  City,  and  were  assigned  to 
their  proper  positions  to  meet  the  assault  which  it  was 
thought  Price  would  soon  make  with  his  combined  forces. 
His  moving  columns  and  long  line  of  battle,  about  a  mile 
and  a  quarter  beyond  the  outer  intrenchments,  were 
plainly  seen  by  many  of  the  Federal  troops  from  the 
positions  they  occupied,  and  everything  indicated  that 
an  attack  was  imminent. 

While  Fagan's  division  occupied  a  wooded  height  to 
the  left  of  the  Fair  Grounds,  a  Confederate  battery  from 
that  position  opened  fire  on  the  Federal  line  of  intrench 
ments,  which  soon  brought  into  action  Thurber's  battery 
on  the  Federal  left  and  Sutter's  battery  in  the  Federal 
centre.  In  a  very  short  time  these  batteries  were  pour 
ing  such  a  storm  of  shot  and  shell  around  the  hostile  guns 
that  they  were  quickly  withdrawn.  General  Fisk,  who 
had  just  assumed  command  of  the  Federal  forces  at  Jef 
ferson  City,  in  making  disposition  of  his  troops  within  his 
fortified  lines  to  meet  a  general  attack,  assigned  General 
Brown  with  his  brigade  to  the  left ;  General  Sanborn  with 
his  brigade  to  the  centre;  and  General  McNeil  with  his 
brigade  to  the  right,  which  was  on  the  west  side  of  the 
city.  Late  in  the  afternoon  Shelby's  division  marched 
around  and  invested  the  city  on  the  west  and  northwest 
in  front  of  General  McNeil's  position.  But  no  attack  was 
made  that  day,  and  at  dark  General  Price  withdrew  his 
troops  and  encamped  that  night  two  miles  south  of  the 
city.  He  had  received  information  of  the  arrival  of  Gen- 


422  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

erals  Sanborn  and  McNeil  with  twenty-eight  hundred 
men  and  eight  pieces  of  artillery ;  his  emissaries  reported 
to  him  the  strength  of  the  Federal  force  at  Jefferson  City 
as  being  much  greater  than  it  really  was,  and  the  defences 
as  formidable.  The  heavy  loss  he  sustained  in  his  re 
pulse  at  Pilot  Knob  was  fresh  in  his  mind,  and  his  officers 
and  troops  were  not  manifesting  an  eagerness  to  assault 
the  works  in  his  front.  At  a  conference  with  his  general 
officers  that  night  it  was  decided  not  to  make  an  attack 
on  the  Federal  defences,  but  to  move  the  next  morning 
to  Boonville  and  thence  to  Kansas.  In  anticipation  of 
an  attack  the  next  morning,  the  Federal  troops  had 
worked  all  night  in  strengthening  their  defences,  particu 
larly  on  the  right. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  Price  moved  south 
west  to  Russellville,  leaving  a  force  from  Fagan's  and 
Shelby's  divisions  in  line  in  front  of  Sanborn's  and  Mc 
Neil's  positions.  General  Sanborn  was  satisfied  that  the 
enemy  had  retreated  and  that  the  force  in  sight  was 
simply  the  rear-guard  left  to  watch  the  movements  of 
the  Federal  troops.  He  therefore  ordered  Colonel  Phelps, 
Second  Arkansas  Cavalry,  to  take  a  battalion  of  his  regi 
ment  and  attack  the  enemy  vigorously,  to  test  the  strength 
of  their  line  and  to  ascertain  their  intentions.  After 
skirmishing  with  part  of  his  force  dismounted  for  a  short 
time,  Colonel  Phelps  ordered  two  of  his  squadrons  to 
charge  the  enemy,  which  they  did,  putting  them  to  flight 
and  pursuing  them  for  nearly  two  miles.  Of  course  it 
was  now  known  that  Price  had  retreated  with  his  army 
and  given  up  all  hopes  of  capturing  the  capital  of  the 
State.  General  Fisk  immediately  ordered  all  his  mounted 
troops  in  pursuit,  with  instructions  to  attack  and  annoy 
the  rear  of  the  enemy  as  much  as  possible.  The  pursuing 
troops  had  been  in  motion  only  a  few  hours  when  Major- 
General  Alfred  Pleasonton  arrived  from  St.  Louis  with 
instructions  from  General  Rosecrans,  the  Department 


DEFENCE   OF  ST.   LOUIS  AND  JEFFEXSON   CITY.     423 

commander,  to  assume  command  of  all  the  Federal 
forces  at  Jefferson  City.  The  cavalry,  consisting  of  three 
brigades,  was  organized  into  a  division  of  forty-one  hun 
dred  men,  and  General  Sanborn  placed  in  command. 

The  First  Brigade,  Colonel  John  F.  Philips,  Seventh 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  commanding,  consisted 
of  the  First,  Fourth,  and  Seventh  Regiments  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry  and  the  First  Iowa  Cavalry.  The 
Second  Brigade,  Colonel  J.  L.  Beveridge,  Seventeenth 
Illinois  Cavalry,  commanding,  consisted  of  parts  of  the 
Third,  Fifth,  and  Ninth  Regiments  Missouri  State  Militia 
Cavalry,  part  of  the  Seventeenth  Illinois  Cavalry,  with  a 
section  of  mountain  howitzers.  The  Third  Brigade,  Colo 
nel  J.  J.  Gravely,  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry, 
commanding,  consisted  of  detachments  of  the  Sixth  and 
Eighth  Regiments  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  Sixth 
and  Seventh  Provisional  Regiments  Enrolled  Missouri 
Militia,  and  six  companies  Second  Arkansas  Union  Cav 
alry. 

Captain  Thurber's  battery,  Second  Missouri  Light  Ar 
tillery,  and  a  section  of  Captain  Montgomery's  battery  of 
the  same  regiment  under  Lieutenant  Smiley  were  at 
tached  to  this  cavalry  command. 

The  cavalry  which  General  Fisk  had  sent  out  in  the 
morning  under  Colonel  Philips  soon  came  up  with  Price's 
rear-guard  and  skirmished  with  it  to  a  point  where  the 
Springfield  road  crosses  Moreau  Creek,  eight  miles  south 
west  of  Jefferson  City.  Here  the  Confederates  made  a 
stand,  taking  up  a  strong  position  on  the  west  side  of  the 
stream  and  bringing  into  use  their  artillery.  On  making 
a  reconnoissance  Colonel  Philips  sent  a  message  to  Gen 
eral  Sanborn  stating  that  artillery  was  needed  to  aid  him 
in  dislodging  the  enemy.  The  General,  who  had  been 
detained  at  Jefferson  City  until  the  afternoon  on  account 
of  the  reorganization  of  the  troops,  on  hearing  the  artillery 
firing  ordered  Colonel  Phelps,  with  the  Second  Arkansas 


424  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

Cavalry,  to  reinforce  Colonel  Philips,  and  directly  after 
wards  the  balance  of  the  Third  Brigade,  Colonel  Gravely 
commanding,  and  a  section  of  Thurber's  battery  which 
were  moving  to  the  right  on  the  California  road  were 
ordered  to  the  same  point.  But  before  the  arrival  of 
these  reinforcements  the  Confederates  retired  from  the 
Moreau  in  the  direction  of  Russellville,  with  a  small  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded  and  abandoned  horses. 

Night  coming  on  suspended  further  operations,  and  the 
First  and  Third  Brigades  of  Sanborn's  division  bivouacked 
on  the  Springfield  road  near  the  Moreau,  and  the  Second 
Brigade  of  that  division  and  three  sections  of  artillery 
encamped  several  miles  north  on  the  California  road. 
The  Confederate  army  encamped  at  Russellville  that 
night,  some  of  the  camps  extending  as  much  as  two 
miles  east  of  that  point.  General  Sanborn's  cavalry 
moved  forward  at  daylight  the  next  morning,  the  Third 
Brigade  in  advance,  on  the  Springfield  road.  After 
marching  about  two  miles  his  advance  under  Major  W. 
B.  Mitchell,  Seventh  Provisional  Regiment  Enrolled 
Missouri  Militia,  encountered  the  Confederate  pickets 
and  drove  them  in  upon  a  heavy  line  of  dismounted 
skirmishers  formed  in  the  timber  east  of  Russellville. 
As  the  regiments  of  the  brigade  came  up  they  were 
formed  in  line  and  a  line  of  skirmishers  of  dismounted 
men  thrown  forward,  who  engaged  the  enemy.  In  a 
short  time  the  Third  Brigade  was  supported  by  the 
Second  Brigade,  which  had  marched  over  from  the  Cali 
fornia  road  that  morning.  Colonel  Colton  Green,  com 
manding  a  brigade  in  Marmaduke's  division,  was  in 
charge  of  Price's  rear-guard,  and  made  such  disposition  of 
his  command  as  to  hold  in  check  the  Federal  skirmishers 
for  some  time.  To  drive  the  Confederates  from  their 
sheltered  position,  General  Sanborn  determined  to  charge 
with  a  mounted  force  through  Green's  line  of  skirmishers 
and  attack  his  line  of  battle.  This  charge  was  gallantly 


DEFENCE   OF  ST.    LOUIS  AND  JEFFERSON  CITY.     425 

led  by  Lieutenant  R.  B.  Riggs,  with  a  detachment  of 
the  Sixth  Missouri  State  Militia,  who  passed  through 
the  Confederate  line  of  skirmishers  and  fell  mortally 
wounded  a  short  distance  beyond.  The  other  regiments 
of  the  Third  Brigade  were  deployed  and  followed  up 
the  movement,  clearing  the  road  and  driving  the  Con 
federates  out  of  the  timber  into  the  prairie,  where  they 
endeavored  to  make  a  stand.  Here  General  Sanborn 
ordered  up  a  section  of  the  Second  Missouri  Light 
Artillery  under  Lieutenant  Smiley,  that  opened  fire  on 
the  Confederate  line,  causing  it  to  retire  through  Rus- 
sellville  and  thence  southwest  several  miles  on  the  Ver 
sailles  road. 

From  the  first  skirmish  in  the  timber  east  of  Russell- 
ville  to  a  mile  or  so  west  of  that  place,  Colonel  Gravely's 
brigade  kept  up  a  continuous  fire  of  small-arms  and  artil 
lery  on  the  retreating  rear-guard  of  the  enemy,  and  drove 
it  back  upon  Price's  main  column.  Up  to  this  time  Price 
appeared  to  be  moving  to  Versailles  with  his  entire  army. 
Should  he  turn  north  in  the  direction  of  Boonville,  Gen 
eral  Sanborn  determined  to  strike  him  in  flank  at  Cali 
fornia,  and  discontinuing  the  attack  on  his  rear,  marched 
northwest  by  the  nearest  practicable  route  to  that  place, 
the  First  Brigade,  Colonel  Philips  commanding,  in  the 
advance.  When  the  Federal  troops  passed  through  the 
timber  and  came  out  upon  the  open  prairie  about  a  mile 
southeast  of  California,  they  saw  a  large  part  of  Price's 
army  in  town,  some  of  his  brigades  being  formed  in  line 
of  battle,  while  a  large  force  of  men  was  employed  in 
tearing  up  the  track  of  the  Pacific  Railroad. 

A  section  of  artillery  of  Marmaduke's  division  com 
menced  shelling  the  Federal  advance  when  it  came  up 
within  range  and  just  as  it  was  about  to  enter  a  nar 
row  lane  which  was  the  principal  approach  to  the  town. 
Colonel  Philips  ordered  the  Fourth  Missouri  State  Militia, 
which  was  in  advance,  to  dismount  and  deploy  to  the 


426  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

right ;  the  Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia  to  dismount 
and  deploy  to  the  left;  and  the  First  Missouri  State 
Militia  to  dismount  and  move  forward  to  the  centre  and 
fill  up  the  gap  between  the  Fourth  and  Seventh  Regi 
ments.  In  a  few  moments  the  First  Iowa  Cavalry  was 
up  and  was  held  as  a  mounted  reserve  on  the  extreme  left 
of  the  line.  General  Sanborn  still  had  the  Second  and 
Third  Brigades  in  reserve.  He  selected  a  position  for  the 
section  of  Captain  Thurber's  battery  about  seven  hundred 
yards  from  the  hostile  guns,  and  it  immediately  went  into 
action.  His  dispositions  being  complete,  he  directed 
Colonel  Philips  to  advance  his  line,  and  in  a  very  short 
time  his  left  wing  was  moving  at  a  double-quick  and 
sweeping  back  the  Confederate  skirmishers  so  suddenly 
as  to  cause  General  Clark's  right  to  retire  to  the  north 
side  of  the  railroad  in  some  confusion.  In  this  movement 
the  Confederate  guns,  being  left  without  support,  were 
quickly  limbered  up  and  moved  to  the  rear.  Colonel 
Philips'  line  continued  to  advance  and  the  section  of 
Thurber's  battery  continued  to  pour  a  well-directed  fire 
of  shells  into  the  ranks  of  the  Confederates  until  they 
were  driven  beyond  and  some  distance  north  of  town, 
and  night  suspended  the  pursuit. 

Shelby's  division,  which  had  entered  California  that 
morning,  moved  on  to  Boonville,  and  in  the  evening 
captured  a  company  of  Cooper  County  Enrolled  Militia, 
Captain  H.  Shoemaker  commanding.  In  the  interview 
with  Shelby's  officers  under  a  flag  of  truce,  demanding 
the  surrender  of  his  force,  Captain  Shoemaker  was  prom 
ised  for  himself  and  men  the  protection  accorded  to 
prisoners  of  war.  Yet  in  the  face  of  this  solemn  promise 
he  was  given  over  to  Southern  men  who  were  destitute 
of  that  chivalry  of  which  they  had  talked  so  much,  and 
brutally  murdered  without  any  form  of  trial  whatever. 

On  the  morning  of  the  loth,  at  daylight,  General  San- 
born  marched  west  from  California  along  the  line  of  the 


DEFENCE   OF  ST.    LOUIS  AND  JEFFERSON   CITY.    427 

Pacific  Railroad  to  Tipton  and  then  turned  north  on  the 
road  to  Boonville,  bivouacking  that  night  within  ten  miles 
of  that  place,  without  having  encountered  the  enemy  that 
day.  With  the  divisions  of  Fagan  and  Marmaduke, 
General  Price  marched  that  day  from  his  encampment  on 
the  Moniteau,  near  Pisgah  on  the  California  and  Boonville 
road,  into  Boonville,  where  he  remained  two  days,  re 
cruiting,  receiving  such  bandit  leaders  as  Quantrill  and 
Bill  Anderson,  and  distributing  the  property  of  various 
kinds  of  which  his  army  had  plundered  the  Union  citizens 
since  entering  the  State. 

Having  received  information  that  Price  had  entered 
Boonville  with  his  army,  General  Sanborn  moved  forward 
the  next  morning,  the  nth,  for  the  purpose  of  observing 
the  movements  and  annoying  the  enemy  as  much  as  pos 
sible.  He  directed  Colonel  John  F.  McMahan,  command 
ing  the  Sixth  Provisional  Regiment  Missouri  Enrolled 
Militia,  to  move  to  the  right  until  he  struck  the  road  lead 
ing  from  Pisgah  to  Boonville,  and  to  advance  on  that  road 
and  drive  in  the  pickets  or  any  force  he  might  encounter. 
About  the  same  time  Colonel  James  McFerran,  com 
manding  the  First  Missouri  State  Militia,  was  directed  to 
move  to  the  left  with  his  regiment  until  he  struck  the 
Bellair  and  Boonville  road  and  if  practicable  to  pass 
from  that  road  over  to  the  road  leading  from  Georgetown 
to  Boonville,  and  ascertain  whether  the  enemy  were  pass 
ing  west  on  either  of  those  roads.  In  the  afternoon  of 
that  day  Colonel  Philips  was  directed  to  move  with  the 
balance  of  the  First  Brigade  over  to  the  Georgetown  and 
Boonville  road,  and  if  the  trains  of  the  Southern  army  had 
not  passed  west,  to  advance  on  that  road  as  near  to  the 
town  as  practicable,  attacking  and  driving  in  any  hostile 
force  or  pickets  he  might  meet.  In  the  order  described 
General  Sanborn's  force  moved  forward  until  the  Confed 
erate  pickets  were  met  and  driven  in  on  the  different 
roads  leading  into  Boonville.  His  right  under  Colonel 


428  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

McMahan  was  the  first  to  strike  the  Confederate  pickets 
and  drive  them  in  upon  a  line  of  skirmishers  about  three 
miles  south  of  town.  Here  Colonel  McMahan  halted  and 
awaited  the  arrival  of  the  other  regiments  of  the  brigade 
under  Colonel  Gravely,  who  would  direct  the  further 
movement  of  his  command  in  person.  The  Sixth  Pro 
visional  Militia  under  Colonel  McMahan  were  dismounted 
and  deployed  as  skirmishers,  and  on  their  right  three 
companies  of  the  Second  Arkansas  Cavalry  under  Colo 
nel  Phelps  were  deployed  as  mounted  skirmishers. 
Colonel  Phelps  also  brought  up  four  companies  of  his 
regiment  for  support.  The  skirmish-line  thus  formed 
moved  forward  and  drove  the  Confederate  skirmishers 
from  the  brush  back  upon  their  main  line  nearly  to  the 
city  limits  and  under  the  protection  of  their  batteries. 

While  Colonels  McMahan  and  Phelps  with  their  com 
mands  were  engaging  the  enemy  near  the  city,  drawn  up 
in  long  line  of  battle,  a  Confederate  force  moved  around 
their  right  flank  upon  their  rear.  This  force  was  vigor 
ously  attacked  by  Major  Plumb,  commanding  the  Sixth 
Missouri  State  Militia,  then  in  reserve,  and  driven  off 
with  some  loss.  The  demonstration  of  the  Federal  force 
having  developed  a  line  of  battle  of  two  divisions  of 
Price's  army,  Colonel  Gravely  retired  his  skirmish-line 
upon  his  reserve.  In  an  hour  or  so  General  Sanborn 
ordered  the  line  forward  again  and  it  advanced  firing  to 
within  musket-range  of  Price's  line  of  battle,  drawing  the 
fire  from  his  small-arms  and  artillery,  after  which  it  soon 
retired  to  its  former  position.  As  the  shades  of  night 
were  now  descending,  the  Federal  troops  on  that  part  of 
the  field  were  withdrawn  to  the  south  side  of  Saline 
Creek  and  went  into  bivouac. 

While  these  operations  of  the  Third  Brigade  were  in 
progress  on  the  Federal  right,  Colonel  Philips  with  the 
First  Brigade  moved  forward  on  the  Georgetown  and 
Boonville  road  and  drove  the  Confederate  pickets  on  that 


DEFENCE    OF  ST.    LOUIS  AND  JEFFERSON  CITY.    429 

road  back  upon  a  strong  force  occupying  a  position  from 
which  he  was  unable  to  dislodge  it  in  the  darkness  of  the 
night.  He  moved  two  battalions  of  the  Fourth  Missouri 
State  Militia  to  the  front  to  keep  up  a  harassing  fire  on 
the  Confederate  line  during  part  of  the  night,  and  with 
the  balance  of  the  brigade  bivouacked  a  short  distance 
in  the  rear.  He  marched  the  next  morning  before  day 
break  and  joined  General  Sanborn  on  the  Tipton  and 
Boonville  road,  leaving  the  Fourth  Missouri  State  Militia 
in  position  to  cover  his  movement. 

On  the  morning  of  the  I2th,  just  before  daybreak, 
Colonel  J.  A.  Eppstein  was  directed  to  move  with  his 
regiment,  the  Fifth  Missouri  State  Militia,  to  the  left 
over  on  the  Bellair  and  Boonville  road,  and  to  advance 
in  the  direction  of  Boonville  as  far  as  practicable  on  that 
road.  When  he  reached  that  road  and  crossed  over  the 
bridge  to  the  north  side  of  Saline  Creek  at  daylight,  he 
met  the  Confederate  advance,  consisting  of  a  regiment 
under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Nichols  of  Jackman's  brigade, 
Shelby's  division.  In  a  moment  Major  Kaiser,  com 
manding  the  Federal  advance  of  two  companies,  dis 
mounted  his  men  and  formed  a  line  of  skirmishers  on 
each  side  of  the  road,  opened  fire  on  the  enemy  and 
drove  them  back  nearly  a  mile,  when  they  were  reinforced 
by  Colonel  D.  C.  Hunter's  regiment  and  made  a  stand 
behind  rail  fences  and  barns  and  stables.  At  this  junc 
ture  Colonel  Eppstein  reinforced  his  advance  under  Major 
Kaiser  with  two  additional  companies,  and  with  the  as 
sistance  of  two  mountain  howitzers,  supported  by  two 
hundred  men,  drove  the  Confederates  from  their  position 
and  pursued  them  about  a  mile,  when  they  were  rein 
forced  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Schnable's  regiment  and 
two  pieces  of  artillery  and  made  another  stand  at  the 
junction  of  the  east  and  west  roads  leading  from  Tipton 
to  Boonville.  As  Colonel  Eppstein  could  plainly  see  that 
the  Confederates  largely  outnumbered  his  own  force,  and 


430  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

as  there  were  no  reinforcements  in  sight  to  cover  his  rear, 
he  did  not  consider  it  advisable  to  press  the  fight  so  hotly 
as  to  carry  the  position  as  he  had  done  in  his  first  and 
second  attacks  that  morning.  He  reported  the  situation 
to  Colonel  Beveridge,  commanding  the  brigade,  and  was 
ordered  to  retire,  and  soon  joined  the  other  brigades  of 
the  division  on  the  return  march  to  California  for  rations, 
of  which  the  troops  had  exhausted  their  haversacks.  In 
the  several  skirmishes  that  morning  Colonel  Eppstein 
reported  his  casualties  two  men  killed  and  four  wounded. 
Colonel  Jackman  reported  the  loss  in  his  brigade  at  four 
men  killed  and  twenty  wounded,  and  having  his  own 
horse  shot  under  him. 

While  General  Sanborn  with  his  division  of  cavalry 
was  thus  observing  and  keeping  the  Southern  army  to 
gether  in  constant  expectation  of  a  general  attack,  Gen 
eral  Rosecrans  was  pushing  forward  the  troops  of  the 
divisions  of  Generals  Smith  and  Mower  of  the  Sixteenth 
Army  Corps  as  rapidly  as  practicable,  by  transports  up 
the  Missouri  River,  by  railroad,  and  by  forced  marches 
by  land.  When  the  danger  of  an  attack  on  St.  Louis 
had  passed  and  the  Regular  troops  were  being  pushed 
forward  to  operate  against  the  Southern  army  in  Central 
and  Western  Missouri,  General  Pike  with  his  division  of 
Enrolled  Militia  was  charged  with  guarding  the  line  of 
communication  between  Jefferson  City  and  St.  Louis  and 
of  occupying  the  principal  towns  on  the  line  of  the  rail 
road  between  those  points.  The  advance  infantry  bri 
gade  of  General  Smith's  command  of  the  Sixteenth  Army 
Corps,  and  also  a  brigade  of  fifteen  hundred  veteran 
cavalry  under  Colonel  Catherwood,  Thirteenth  Missouri 
Cavalry,  arrived  at  California  on  the  I2th. 

A  force  of  men  was  at  once  put  to  work  repairing  the 
railroad  track  to  Lamine  Bridge,  and  on  the  i$th  the  in 
fantry  brigades  of  the  First  Division  of  the  Sixteenth 
Army  Corps,  which  had  been  brought  up  to  Jefferson 


DEFENCE   OF  ST.   LOUIS  AND  JEFFERSON   CITY.    431 

City  on  transports,  commenced  to  arrive  on  the  cars.  By 
the  iQth  all  the  infantry  of  the  First  and  Third  Divisions, 
Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  under  General  A.  J.  Smith  had 
passed  west  of  Lamine  Bridge,  marching  via  Sedalia  to 
Lexington.  On  the  iQth  General  Pleasonton  arrived  at 
Dunksburg,  sixteen  miles  northwest  of  Sedalia,  and  as 
sumed  command  of  the  Provisional  Cavalry  Division  just 
organized,  consisting  of  the  three  brigades  of  cavalry 
under  General  Sanborn  and  a  brigade  from  the  cavalry 
division  of  the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps  under  Colonel  E. 
F.  Winslow,  Fourth  Iowa  Cavalry,  which  had  marched 
from  St.  Louis  and  Jefferson  City. 

Having  been  joined  by  Colonel  Catherwood's  brigade, 
and  having  supplied  his  command  with  four  days'  rations 
at  California,  General  Sanborn  returned  to  Boonville  on 
the  morning  of  the  I3th,  Catherwood's  brigade  leading 
the  advance.  He  soon  ascertained  that  Price's  army  had 
left  during  the  night  and  early  that  morning,  marching 
west  in  the  direction  of  Lexington.  He  immediately 
started  in  pursuit,  marching  on  roads  in  the  rear  and  to 
the  left  and  south  of  the  Southern  forces,  so  that  he  could 
observe  well  their  movements;  for  he  desired  to  hold 
them  in  Saline  County  in  the  Great  Bend  of  the  Missouri 
River  until  the  infantry  and  artillery  under  General  Smith 
and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Colonel  Winslow  should 
come  up,  and  to  give  time  to  General  Curtis,  command 
ing  the  Department  of  Kansas,  to  organize  and  concen 
trate  his  troops  and  the  Kansas  militia  on  the  Border. 

The  night  he  left  Boonville  General  Price  received  in 
formation  that  there  were  several  thousand  stands  of 
small-arms  stored  in  the  city  hall  at  Glasgow  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  Missouri  River,  guarded  by  a  small  Federal 
force,  and  as  he  wished  the  arms  to  put  into  the  hands  of 
his  numerous  recruits,  he  directed  General  Clark  to  pro 
ceed  with  his  brigade,  a  section  of  artillery,  and  five 
hundred  men  of  Jackman's  brigade,  cross  the  river  at 


432 


THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 


Arrow  Rock,  and  attack  and  capture  the  garrison  at  Glas 
gow,  with  all  the  arms  and  military  supplies  at  that  post. 
This  movement,  though  successful  to  the  extent  of  cap 
turing  the  garrison  of  550  men  and  their  arms  and  the 
destruction  of  some  property,  detained  Price's  army  in 
the  vicinity  of  Marshall  upwards  of  three  days,  thus  en 
abling  General  Smith  to  bring  up  his  infantry  and  artillery 
within  supporting  distance  of  the  cavalry  under  General 
Pleasonton,  then  at  Dunksburg  and  Cook's  Store. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  KANSAS  FORCES— MOBILIZING 
THE  MILITIA — SKIRMISHES  AT  LEXINGTON,  LITTLE 
BLUE,  AND  INDEPENDENCE. 

THE  latter  part  of  the  summer  of  1864,  General  Curtis, 
commanding  the  Department  of  Kansas,  had  a  large  part 
of  his  troops  under  Major-General  Blunt  employed  against 
hostile  Indians  on  the  Upper  Arkansas  in  the  western  part 
of  the  State.  Major-General  George  Sykes  commanded 
the  District  of  South  Kansas,  which  included  the  eastern 
Border  counties  of  the  State.  Brigadier-General  E.  B. 
Brown  commanded  the  District  of  Central  Missouri,  and 
Brigadier-General  John  B.  Sanborn  commanded  the  Dis 
trict  of  Southwest  Missouri,  and  the  western  limits  of 
their  districts  included  the  western  Border  counties  of 
Missouri.  There  was  a  hearty  cooperation  between  the 
district  commanders  on  both  sides  of  the  line,  and  active 
operations  were  conducted  against  the  Southern  partisan 
bandits,  frequently  striking  them  hard  and  allowing  them 
little  rest.  On  returning  to  his  headquarters  at  Fort 
Leavenworth  on  the  i/th  of  September,  General  Curtis 
found  despatches  awaiting  him  from  General  Thayer, 
commanding  the  District  of  the  Frontier,  Fort  Smith,  Ar 
kansas,  stating  that  Price  had  crossed  the  Arkansas  River 
at  Dardanelle  with  two  divisions  of  mounted  troops  and 
a  complement  of  artillery  and  was  advancing  north  to 
invade  Missouri.  He  at  once  telegraphed  this  informa 
tion  to  General  Halleck,  Washington,  to  General  Rose- 

VOL.    II.— 28 

433 


434  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE   BORDER. 

crans,  commanding  the  Department  of  Missouri,  and  to 
Governor  Carney,  of  Kansas,  and  suggested  to  the  Gov 
ernor  that  the  situation  might  become  so  menacing  as  to 
require  the  calling  out  of  the  militia  of  the  State  to  aid 
in  checking  the  movements  of  the  enemy.  Closely  fol 
lowing  the  reports  of  the  advance  of  Price  north  of  the 
Arkansas  River,  came  information  that  a  force  of  two  or 
three  thousand  men  under  Generals  Gano  and  Stand 
Watie  had  crossed  the  Arkansas  River  above  Fort  Gibson 
and  was  moving  up  through  the  Indian  Territory  to  make 
a  raid  into  Southern  Kansas  to  destroy  if  possible  the 
large  supply  depot  at  Fort  Scott. 

Each  day  brought  additional  information  of  the  ap 
proaching  storm,  and  on  the  2Oth  of  September  General 
Curtis  received  a  despatch  from  Colonel  Blair,  command 
ing  at  Fort  Scott,  that  the  Confederate  force  under  Gen 
eral  Gano,  advancing  north  through  the  Indian  Territory, 
had  captured  a  large  Federal  supply  train  of  upwards  of 
two  hundred  wagons  at  Cabin  Creek  and  had  retired  to 
the  south  side  of  the  Arkansas  River.  For  nearly  two 
weeks  after  Price  crossed  to  the  north  side  of  the  Ar 
kansas  River  no  certain  information  could  be  obtained 
whether  his  invading  columns  would  enter  Southwest  or 
Southeast  Missouri,  so  that  General  Curtis,  like  General 
Rosecrans,  was  at  first  unable  to  determine  at  what  point 
he  should  concentrate  his  troops.  He  was  satisfied  that 
if  the  Southern  forces  entered  Southwest  Missouri  they 
would  swing  around  through  the  eastern  Border  counties 
of  Kansas,  and  that  if  they  entered  Southeastern  Mis 
souri,  they  would  be  driven  west  into  Kansas  by  the 
troops  in  the  Department  of  Missouri,  if  they  did  not 
meet  with  determined  resistance.  To  prepare  for  the 
coming  struggle  he  ordered  General  Blunt,  commanding 
the  District  of  the  Upper  Arkansas,  to  stop  his  pursuit  of 
the  hostile  Indians  and  to  move  with  such  troops  as  could 
be  spared  from  that  district  to  Council  Grove,  thence  to 


ORGANIZATION  OF   THE  KANSAS  FORCES.         435 

Olathe,  near  the  eastern  line  of  the  State.  In  view  of  the 
fact  that  large  Confederate  raiding  forces  had  twice  within 
the  last  two  years  advanced  through  the  western  counties 
of  Missouri  to  the  Missouri  River,  the  Department  com 
mander  of  Kansas  deemed  it  advisable  to  construct  forti 
fications  of  considerable  strength  at  Fort  Scott,  Paola, 
and  Lawrence  and  to  mount  siege-guns,  with  a  sufficient 
force  to  man  them,  for  the  protection  of  those  places. 
In  addition  to  the  rifle-pits,  there  were  three  detached 
bastions  for  the  four  24-pounder  siege-guns  mounted  at 
Fort  Scott.  On  account  of  the  large  quantities  of  army 
supplies  kept  at  that  post,  there  were  nearly  always  from 
five  hundred  to  one  thousand  troops  stationed  there,  to 
gether  with  some  field  artillery. 

When  it  was  satisfactorily  ascertained  that  the  large 
Confederate  force  in  Southeast  Missouri  was  Price's 
army,  General  Curtis  was  kept  constantly  advised  of  its 
progress  north  to  the  vicinity  of  St.  Louis  and  to  the 
Missouri  River  by  General  Rosecrans.  As  soon  as  it  was 
known  that  Price  had  given  up  his  intention  of  attacking 
or  investing  St.  Louis,  and  after  striking  the  Missouri 
River  at  Washington  had  turned  west  in  the  direction  of 
Jefferson  City,  General  Curtis  was  satisfied  that  the  next 
objective  of  the  Southern  forces  was  the  invasion  of 
Kansas  for  plunder  and  revenge,  and  on  the  5th  of  Octo 
ber  wrote  Governor  Carney  urging  him  to  call  out  the 
Kansas  militia  immediately,  equipped  for  service  for 
thirty  days.  The  Governor  did  not  at  once  issue  his 
proclamation  calling  out  the  militia,  for  he  argued  that 
the  forces  of  General  Rosecrans  would  probably  overtake 
and  strike  Price  such  a  blow  that  he  would  be  unable  to 
reach  Kansas.  An  election  for  State  officers  and  Presi 
dential  electors  would  take  place  next  month,  and  as  the 
people  were  in  the  midst  of  a  heated  political  canvass, 
the  Governor  was  anxious  that  the  expense  and  necessity 
of  calling  out  the  citizens  for  military  service,  even  for  a 


436  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

short  period,  might  be  averted.  When  the  newspapers 
first  discussed  the  probability  or  possibility  of  the  Gover 
nor's  calling  out  the  militia,  those  who  were  opposed  to  the 
friends  of  the  National  Administration  charged  that  the 
scheme  for  the  call  was  for  political  effect,  and  denounc 
ing  it  aroused  some  opposition.  There  were  few  telegraph 
lines  in  the  State,  and  outside  of  three  or  four  cities  the 
great  mass  of  the  people  were  not  advised  of  the  position 
or  of  any  given  movement  of  the  enemy  until  a  week  or 
more  had  elapsed. 

After  Price  struck  the  Pacific  Railroad,  interrupting 
communication  between  St.  Louis  and  Jefferson  City, 
Generals  Brown  and  Fisk  at  the  latter  place  kept  General 
Curtis  advised  by  telegraph  of  the  movements  west  of 
the  hostile  forces  until  they  appeared  before  the  State 
capital  on  the  /th.  But  as  Price  concluded  not  to  attack 
Jefferson  City  and  passed  it  on  his  flank  with  some  skir 
mishing,  General  Curtis  saw  that  no  time  should  be  lost  in 
organizing  and  concentrating  his  forces  in  the  neighbor 
hood  of  Kansas  City  and  Olathe,  Kansas,  at  the  earliest 
practicable  moment,  and  on  the  8th  wrote  Governor  Car 
ney  again  urging  him  to  issue  his  proclamation  calling  out 
the  militia.  In  response  to  the  General's  request  the 
Governor  issued  his  proclamation  on  the  8th,  calling  out 
the  people  for  the  defence  of  the  State  against  the  threat 
ened  invasion,  and  directed  the  suspension  of  all  business 
until  the  crisis  had  passed. 

Major-General  George  W.  Deitzler,  who  as  colonel  had 
gallantly  led  the  First  Kansas  Infantry  at  the  battle  of 
Wilson  Creek  until  he  was  severely  wounded,  was  by  the 
Governor  placed  in  command  of  the  Kansas  militia  and 
charged  with  their  immediate  organization  for  service  on 
the  Border.  He  at  once  issued  orders  to  his  brigade  com 
manders  to  concentrate  their  regiments  and  detachments 
at  designated  places,  prepared  for  active  service  for  thirty 
days,  unless  sooner  discharged,  and  to  see  that  each  man 


ORGANIZATION  OF    THE  KANSAS  FORCES.         437 

was  supplied  with  two  blankets,  haversack,  and  some  of 
the  conveniences  for  preparing,  cooking,  and  eating  his 
food.  The  men  were  also  to  bring  such  small-arms  as 
they  had,  with  supply  of  ammunition.  On  receipt  of 
these  orders  the  brigadier-generals  of  districts  forthwith 
notified  their  regimental  commanders  to  order  into  the 
field  every  man  liable  to  duty  and  then  to  march  with 
their  respective  regiments  to  the  places  designated  for 
concentration.  To  secure  prompt  and  efficient  military 
organization  and  action,  General  Curtis  issued  an  order 
declaring  martial  law  throughout  the  State  of  Kansas, 
and  requiring  all  men  subject  to  military  duty  to  attach 
themselves  to  some  of  the  organizations  of  troops  which 
were  being  raised  in  every  locality  to  oppose  the  ap 
proaching  hostile  forces.  On  assuming  command  of  the 
militia,  General  Deitzler  designated  Olathe  as  the  head 
quarters  of  the  State  forces  and  the  point  of  general  con 
centration  of  the  different  organizations  at  the  earliest 
practicable  moment.  That  the  people  might  understand 
and  appreciate  the  imminent  danger,  General  Curtis  gave 
out  to  the  press  for  publication  the  latest  despatches  an 
nouncing  the  movements  and  rapid  approach  of  the 
enemy,  so  that  intense  interest  and  excitement  were 
aroused,  which  rapidly  spread  to  the  remotest  districts, 
causing  a  suspension  of  business  on  the  farms,  in  the 
shops,  and  by  all  classes  throughout  the  State. 

In  less  than  four  days  after  General  Deitzler  issued  his 
orders  mobilizing  the  militia,  organizations  were  marching 
from  all  parts  of  the  State  in  the  direction  of  the  point  of 
concentration  at  Olathe.  Several  regiments  arrived  at 
that  place  on  the  evening  of  October  I2th,  but  as  General 
Curtis  had  already  arrived  and  found  wood  and  water 
scarce,  he  determined  to  take  a  more  advanced  position, 
at  Shawneetown,  about  half-way  between  Olathe  and 
Kansas  City,  and  so  advised  General  Deitzler.  The  regi 
ments  which  had  arrived  and  all  other  militia  organizations 


438  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

as  they  came  up  were  directed  to  proceed  to  the  new 
rendezvous  at  Shawneetown,  where  they  were  immedi 
ately  armed  and  equipped  for  the  field.  Of  the  twenty- 
four  regiments  of  Kansas  militia  mobilized  under  the 
Governor's  proclamation,  all  had  arrived  at  the  encamp 
ment  at  Shawneetown  by  the  i6th  except  those  ordered 
to  rendezvous  at  Atchison  and  Leavenworth  and  some 
detachments  left  to  hold  the  posts  at  Paola  and  Mound 
City. 

As  soon  as  General  Blunt  arrived  from  the  District  of 
the  Upper  Arkansas,  he  was  directed  to  proceed  to  Paola 
and  relieve  Major-General  George  Sykes  of  the  command 
of  the  District  of  South  Kansas.  On  assuming  com- 
mand  of  his  new  district  on  the  loth,  General  Blunt  at 
once  commenced  to  put  his  troops  in  condition  for  active 
service  against  the  approaching  foe.  The  militia  and 
troops  thus  collected  and  organized  formed  two  divisions, 
which  General  Curtis  called  "  The  Army  of  the  Border." 
The  First  Division,  Major-General  Blunt  commanding, 
consisted  of  four  brigades  and  seventeen  pieces  of 
artillery,  mostly  12-pounder  mountain  howitzers.  The 
Second  Division,  Major-General  Deitzler  commanding, 
consisted  of  about  eight  thousand  Kansas  militia  and 
some  artillery,  and  at  first  formed  the  left  wing  of  the 
Army  of  the  Border,  the  First  Division  forming  the  right 
wing. 

On  the  1 3th  General  Blunt  was  directed  to  move  to 
Hickman's  Mills,  in  the  southern  part  of  Jackson  County, 
Missouri,  with  his  mounted  force  and  artillery,  and  to 
send  a  scout  far  enough  east  to  ascertain  whether  Price 
had  moved  south.  Most  of  the  Kansas  militia  were  op 
posed  to  crossing  the  State  line  into  Missouri,  and  were 
posted  along  Turkey  Creek  from  Shawneetown  to  the 
vicinity  of  Kansas  City.  The  slow  advance  of  the  Con 
federate  forces  and  the  conflicting  reports  as  to  their 
position  caused  the  militia  to  become  impatient,  and 


ORGANIZATION  OF    THE  KANSAS  FORCES.         439 

murmurs  of  discontent  were  heard  in  their  camps,  border 
ing  almost  on  insubordination.  This  mutinous  spirit  was 
encouraged  by  some  of  the  Kansas  newspapers  denounc 
ing  the  mobilization  of  the  militia  as  a  fraud  and  asserting 
that  Price  was  not  marching  in  the  direction  of  Kansas, 
but  had  moved  south  from  Central  Missouri.  A  few  of 
the  militia  actually  started  home ;  but  they  were  brought 
back,  and  by  the  tact  and  firmness  displayed  by  General 
Curtis,  and  by  giving  publicity  to  the  latest  movements 
of  the  advancing  foe,  the  gravity  of  the  situation  received 
more  serious  and  thoughtful  consideration. 

As  soon  as  his  Regular  and  militia  forces  were  organized 
and  equipped,  General  Curtis  was  desirous  of  advancing 
the  Army  of  the  Border  as  far  east  into  Missouri  as  Lone 
Jack  and  Pleasant  Hill,  in  accordance  with  his  own  views 
and  with  suggestions  from  General  Rosecrans,  but  was 
obliged  to  content  himself  with  establishing  his  main  line 
on  the  Big  Blue,  where  he  proposed  to  endeavor  to  check 
the  Confederate  advance,  in  consequence  of  the  aversion 
of  many  of  the  Kansas  militia  to  crossing  the  State  line. 
The  Second  Colorado  Cavalry,  Colonel  J.  H.  Ford  com 
manding,  which  was  serving  in  the  western  part  of  the 
Central  District  of  Missouri,  was  ordered  by  General 
Rosecrans  to  report  to  General  Curtis  on  the  2gth  of 
September.  Colonel  Ford  was  ordered  to  concentrate 
his  regiment  at  Pleasant  Hill,  but  on  the  I4th  of  October 
he  was  instructed  to  change  his  headquarters  to  Independ 
ence  and  to  scout  to  the  front  in  the  direction  of  Lexing 
ton.  General  Blunt,  who  had  arrived  at  Hickman's  Mills 
with  the  First  Division,  was  ordered  to  move  with  all  his 
mounted  force  to  Pleasant  Hill  and  reconnoitre  in  the 
direction  of  Warrensburg. 

When  General  Brown  was  ordered  to  concentrate  his 
forces  at  Jefferson  City  for  the  defence  of  the  capital,  the 
Second  Colorado  Cavalry  and  a  few  companies  of  Enrolled 
Militia  were  the  only  troops  left  to  occupy  some  of  the 


440  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

important  towns  and  to  scout  the  country  and  operate 
against  the  bandits  in  the  western  part  of  his  district. 
He  was  obliged  to  evacuate  the  important  post  of  War- 
rensburg,  which  was  then  the  terminus  of  the  Pacific 
Railroad  and  the  headquarters  of  the  Central  District  of 
Missouri,  and  remove  the  public  property  as  far  as  prac 
ticable  to  Jefferson  City.  Before  leaving,  however,  he 
had  a  conference  with  Major  Emory  S.  Foster,  who  had 
recently  resigned  from  the  Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia 
Cavalry,  on  account  of  wounds  received  in  action,  and 
with  Captain  George  S.  Grover,  who  had  been  in  active 
service  in  Central  and  Western  Missouri  from  the  begin 
ning  of  the  war  up  to  a  short  time  prior  to  that  date,  and 
asked  them  whether  they  would  undertake  the  task  of 
raising  several  companies  to  hold  the  post,  with  such  stores 
as  could  not  be  taken  away,  against  any  irregular  force  of 
Southern  partisan  bands  which  might  make  an  attack 
upon  it.  These  gentlemen  agreed  to  re-enter  the  service 
and  to  do  all  in  their  power  to  recruit  as  many  men  as  pos 
sible  to  meet  the  emergency.  Nearly  all  the  men  of  that 
section  who  were  subject  to  military  duty,  and  even  some 
who  were  not,  had  seen  military  service  in  some  of  the 
militia  or  volunteer  organizations  of  the  State  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  so  that  in  four  days  Major  Foster 
and  Captain  Grover  had  raised  four  full  companies  of 
mounted  men.  The  organization  was  at  first  known  as 
"Johnson  County  Citizen  Guards,"  but  subsequently, 
when  the  companies  were  mustered  into  service  and 
received  their  arms  and  equipments,  the  designation  was 
changed  to  "  Foster's  Cavalry  Battalion,  Missouri  Volun 
teers."  With  this  force  Major  Foster  held  the  post  up 
wards  of  two  weeks,  keeping  part  of  his  men  scouting  in 
all  directions  to  guard  against  a  surprise  and  to  keep  him 
advised  of  any  movement  of  the  enemy  threatening  his 
position.  He  was  informed  of  the  movements  of  the  in 
vading  army  until  Price  passed  Jefferson  City,  when  the 


ORGANIZATION  OF    THE   KANSAS  FORCES.         44! 

railroad  and  telegraph  line  were  cut,  interrupting  com 
munication  with  that  point.  A  small  detachment  of  his 
command,  under  Lieutenant  A.  L.  Reavis,  which  had 
been  sent  to  Sedalia  in  connection  with  establishing  com 
munication  with  headquarters,  was  captured  at  that  place 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  I5th  by  Brigadier-General  Jeff. 
Thompson,  who  made  a  dash  on  the  Federal  detachment 
there  with  a  brigade  and  a  section  of  artillery  of  Shelby's 
division.  The  defences  of  the  place  consisted  of  two 
redoubts  with  a  continuous  line  of  rifle-pits  extending 
around  them,  and  were  held  by  about  six  hundred  Home 
Guards  and  citizens  under  Colonel  J.  D.  Crawford  of  the 
Enrolled  Militia.  But  having  observed  the  movement  of 
the  Confederates  as  they  advanced  over  the  wide  expanse 
of  prairie  north  of  town,  and  knowing  that  his  own  men 
were  poorly  armed  and  disciplined  and  unprepared  to 
stand  a  bombardment,  Colonel  Crawford  decided  to  evac 
uate  the  place  without  making  a  fight. 

General  Thompson  remained  in  Sedalia  only  a  few 
hours,  and  then  marched  northwest  to  rejoin  Price  in 
the  vicinity  of  Marshall,  passing  only  a  few  miles  from 
General  Sanborn's  right  flank,  which  had  that  evening 
arrived  at  Dunksburg. 

General  Rosecrans  now  considered  it  desirable  to  es 
tablish  communication  between  his  forces  and  those  of 
General  Curtis,  and  Major  Foster  was  directed  to  move 
west  with  his  command  from  Warrensburg  until  he  met 
General  Blunt  with  part  of  his  division  of  Kansas  troops 
moving  east  from  Pleasant  Hill.  There  was  very  little 
time  lost  in  getting  his  command  in  motion,  and  after  an 
all-night's  march  the  Major  met  General  Blunt  the  next 
morning,  October  i/th,  at  Big  Creek,  east  of  Pleasant  Hill, 
and  reported  to  him  the  positions  of  General  Rosecrans' 
troops  as  far  as  he  had  been  advised.  General  Blunt  con 
tinued  to  advance  east  that  day  to  H olden,  where  he 
halted  and  directed  Major  Foster  to  return  with  a  detach- 


442  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

ment  of  his  command  and  a  telegraph  operator  to  War- 
rensburg  to  make  a  reconnoissance.  That  evening  the 
Major  telegraphed  General  Blunt  the  movements  and 
positions  of  General  Rosecrans'  forces  as  far  as  could  be 
ascertained,  which  determined  Blunt  to  move  at  once  for 
Lexington.  In  this  movement  the  main  part  of  Foster's 
battalion,  which  remained  with  the  Kansas  troops,  fell 
under  command  of  Captain  Grover,  the  senior  captain, 
and  was  assigned  to  Colonel  Jennison's  First  Brigade, 
Army  of  the  Border,  and  being  armed  with  Martini- 
Henry  breech-loading  rifles,  a  very  superior  arm  that  dis 
charged  sixteen  shots  without  reloading,  was  constantly 
kept  to  the  front  and  on  the  skirmish-line. 

All  General  Blunt's  command,  consisting  of  the  First 
and  Second  Brigades  of  his  division  under  Colonels  Jen- 
nison  and  Moonlight,  respectively,  arrived  at  Lexington 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  i8th,  and  finding  no  force  of  the 
enemy  there  except  a  few  guerillas,  of  whom  several  were 
killed  and  captured,  went  into  camp  near  the  Fair  Grounds 
and  College  for  the  night.  Having  obtained  reliable  in 
formation  of  the  positions  of  General  Rosecrans'  forces, 
General  Blunt  before  leaving  Holden  sent  couriers  with 
despatches  stating  his  position  and  movements  to  General 
Sanborn  and  urging  upon  him  the  propriety  of  at  once 
uniting  their  forces  for  an  offensive  movement  against  the 
Southern  army.  He  also  sent  a  despatch  by  telegraph  to 
General  Curtis  to  order  forward  on  the  Independence  and 
Lexington  road  to  reinforce  him  part  of  the  Third  Bri 
gade  of  his  division  under  Colonel  Blair,  consisting  of  the 
Sixteenth  Kansas  Cavalry  and  Second  Colorado  Cavalry. 
On  the  arrival  of  these  reinforcements  he  proposed  to 
make  such  disposition  of  his  force  as  to  hold  the  Confed 
erate  army  if  possible  until  Sanborn  could  come  up  and 
strike  it  in  the  flank.  But  he  was  obliged  to  abandon  his 
plans,  for  General  Curtis  was  embarrassed  by  most  of  the 
Kansas  militia  refusing  to  go  out  of  the  State,  and  he  did 


ORGANIZATION  OF   THE  KANSAS  FORCES.         443 

not  send  him  the  reinforcements  asked  for,  nor  did  the 
couriers  from  General  Sanborn  reach  him.  General  Blunt 
received  reliable  information  directly  after  entering  Lex 
ington  that  the  advance  of  Price's  army,  under  Shelby, 
was  at  Waverly,  twenty  miles  below  on  the  Missouri 
River,  and  would  probably  come  up  the  next  day.  The 
next  morning,  the  iQth,  he  ordered  scouting  detachments 
from  his  two  brigades  sent  out  on  all  the  roads  leading 
into  Lexington  from  the  east  and  southeast,  with  in 
structions  to  report  the  moment  the  Confederate  advance 
came  in  sight. 

On  leaving  Waverly  at  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the 
igth,  Shelby's  division  led  the  advance  of  Price's  army  on 
Lexington.  After  crossing  Tebo  Creek,  Price  made  a 
flank  movement  to  the  left,  part  of  his  force  going  as  far 
south  as  the  Sedalia  and  Lexington  road,  to  prevent  the 
uniting  of  the  forces  of  Sanborn  and  A.  J.  Smith,  which 
were  then  on  Blackwater,  with  those  of  General  Blunt, 
which  he  had  heard  was  contemplated.  He  had  called  in 
his  detachments ;  he  had  received  a  great  many  recruits, 
and  some  arms  at  the  capture  of  Glasgow;  and  most  of 
his  army  having  rested  several  days  he  was  prepared  to 
enter  upon  the  struggle  which  would  determine  the  suc 
cess  or  failure  of  his  campaign.  In  his  movement  from 
Waverly  he  approached  Lexington  in  three  columns,  his 
advance  on  the  Dover  road  driving  in  the  Federal  pickets 
and  scouts  about  one  o'clock.  General  Blunt  promptly 
reinforced  his  outposts,  with  instructions  to  commanding 
officers  to  resist  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  He  then 
ordered  his  command  to  a  position  in  line  of  battle  south 
east  of  the  city,  where  the  open  and  undulating  nature  of 
the  ground  enabled  him  to  observe  the  movements  of  the 
enemy  a  mile  or  so  in  his  front.  His  outposts,  which  were 
deployed  as  skirmishers,  soon  became  warmly  engaged 
with  the  enemy  three  or  four  miles  from  the  main  line, 
but  were  gradually  forced  back  upon  it,  as  the  Confeder- 


444  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

ates  continued  to  increase  in  numbers  and  soon  brought 
into  use  their  artillery.  As  he  had  no  field  artillery  with 
his  division,  his  short-range  howitzers  could  not  reply 
effectively  to  the  long-range  rifled  guns  which  Shelby 
brought  into  action.  But  he  held  his  position  until 
nearly  sundown — until  he  was  convinced  that  Price's 
army  was  in  his  immediate  front,  and  until  the  Confeder 
ates  commenced  to  flank  him  on  the  right  and  left  in 
large  numbers,  when  he  gave  the  order  to  retire  on  the 
road  to  Independence. 

On  seeing  the  Federal  troops  retiring  from  the  field, 
the  Confederates  under  General  Jeff.  Thompson  at  once 
pressed  forward  with  a  good  deal  of  energy  to  overwhelm 
General  Blunt's  rear.  Colonel  Moonlight,  commanding 
the  Second  Brigade,  with  the  Eleventh  Kansas  Cavalry 
and  four  howitzers,  covered  the  retreat,  and  he  was  so 
hotly  pressed  for  two  or  three  miles  that  he  was  several 
times  obliged  to  make  a  stand  and  put  his  men  and  how 
itzers  into  action  to  check  the  enemy.  Darkness  then 
suspended  further  operations,  and  the  Federal  troops 
marched  all  night  in  a  chilly  rain,  arriving  at  the  Little 
Blue  River  the  next  morning  at  daylight,  where  General 
Blunt  determined  to  make  a  stand.  The  Confederate 
troops  under  General  Thompson  who  were  thrown  for 
ward  several  miles  in  the  pursuit  marched  back  to  Lex 
ington  that  night  and  went  into  camp.  In  this  skirmish 
at  Lexington,  if  General  Blunt  had  been  supplied  with  a 
field  battery  of  rifled  guns  he  could  have  made  a  more 
effective  showing  in  resisting  and  punishing  the  enemy 
than  he  did. 

On  arriving  at  the  Little  Blue  and  crossing  to  the  west 
side  of  that  stream,  General  Blunt  took  up  a  good  defensive 
position  along  the  bluffs,  and  sent  to  Independence,  eight 
miles  distant,  for  rations  for  his  troops,  and  a  despatch  to 
General  Curtis,  whose  headquarters  were  then  at  that 
place,  requesting  him  to  send  forward  the  Sixteenth  Kan- 


ORGANIZATION   OF    THE  KANSAS  FORCES.         445 

sas  Cavalry,  the  Second  Colorado  Cavalry,  and  Captain 
McLain's  Colorado  battery  of  five  3-inch  rifled  guns.  But 
as  the  Kansas  militia  were  unwilling  to  move  forward, 
and  as  General  Curtis  had  decided  to  make  the  Big  Blue 
his  line  of  defence,  he  directed  General  Blunt  to  leave  a 
strong  outpost  on  the  Little  Blue  and  to  bring  the  bal 
ance  of  his  troops  on  to  Independence.  Leaving  Colonel 
Moonlight  with  the  Second  Brigade  as  an  outpost  to 
guard  the  bridge  over  the  Little  Blue  and  the  fords  of 
the  stream  above  and  below,  with  instructions  to  burn  the 
bridge  if  the  enemy  advanced  on  that  road,  General  Blunt, 
with  Jennison's  brigade  and  Captain  Grover's  battalion, 
Missouri  Volunteers,  marched  to  Independence  and  went 
into  camp  there  that  night,  giving  his  men  and  animals 
needed  rest  and  food.  As  the  advance  of  the  enemy 
was  expected  at  any  moment,  Colonel  Moonlight  directed 
Major  Martin  Anderson,  of  the  Eleventh  Kansas  Cavalry, 
to  take  two  companies  of  his  regiment  and  guard  the 
bridge  until  the  enemy  were  reported  advancing  in  force 
and  then  to  burn  it.  A  picket  was  posted  a  mile  or  so 
east  of  the  bridge  on  the  Lexington  road,  to  give  notice 
of  the  approach  of  the  enemy. 

While  General  Blunt  was  retreating  to  the  Little  Blue 
during  the  night  of  the  iQth,  General  Price's  army  had 
gone  into  camp  at  Lexington  and  three  miles  south  of 
the  city.  The  next  day  the  Confederate  army  resumed 
the  march  west  on  the  Independence  road,  encamping 
that  night  at  Fire  Prairie,  some  six  miles  east  of  the  Little 
Blue,  having  met  with  no  opposition.  But  in  his  further 
movements  Price  suddenly  found  that  he  must  encounter 
very  determined  opposition  at  every  step,  and  that  the 
Federal  troops  had  been  collected  in  such  numbers  in  his 
front  and  on  his  flank  as  to  give  him  blow  for  blow  in  the 
impending  struggle.  On  the  morning  of  the  2ist,  the 
Federal  picket  posted  east  of  the  Little  Blue  galloped  in 
and  reported  to  Major  Anderson  the  advance  of  the 


446  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

enemy  in  sight,  at  which  the  Major  immediately  fired  the 
bridge  over  the  stream.  When  the  flames  had  made  such 
progress  as  to  make  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  certain, 
the  Major  fell  back  with  his  companies  to  the  hill,  and 
with  other  troops  under  Colonel  Moonlight  opened  fire 
upon  the  enemy  as  soon  as  they  came  up  within  range. 
General  Clark's  brigade  of  Marmaduke's  division  was  in 
advance.  On  coming  up  and  finding  the  bridge  burned, 
the  General  sent  a  regiment  under  Colonel  Preston  to 
secure  the  ford  about  a  mile  above  the  bridge,  and 
another  regiment  under  Colonel  Lawther  to  secure  a 
ford  half  a  mile  below  the  bridge.  Colonel  Moonlight 
had  not  disposed  his  command  so  as  to  defend  either  of 
these  fords  with  much  tenacity,  and  they  were  soon 
forced  and  Clark's  brigade  crossed  over  to  the  west  side 
of  the  stream.  Colonel  Lawther  crossing  the  stream 
first,  pressed  forward  and  attacked  Moonlight,  who  had 
taken  up  a  good  position  behind  a  stone  fence  running  at 
right  angles  to  the  road,  and  not  only  repulsed  the  assault, 
but  in  turn  assailed  the  Confederates  and  drove  them 
back  in  confusion  almost  to  the  river,  until  the  latter 
were  reinforced  by  the  other  regiments  of  Clark's  brigade 
and  the  other  brigades  of  Marmaduke's  division.  In 
deed,  he  so  much  demoralized  Lawther's  regiment  and 
some  supporting  detachments,  that  Shelby's  division  was 
hurried  to  the  front,  and  his  men,  except  one  regiment, 
dismounting  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Little  Blue,  waded 
the  stream  and  formed  on  the  west  side,  on  the  left  of 
Marmaduke's  division. 

This  temporary  check  enabled  General  Price  to  close 
up  with  his  trains  and  to  bring  forward  Fagan's  division 
to  the  support  of  Marmaduke  and  Shelby.  After  some 
discussion  of  the  situation  with  his  principal  officers  and 
with  Senator  J.  H.  Lane,  of  Kansas,  who  was  a  volunteer 
aide-de-camp  on  his  staff,  General  Curtis  decided  to  order 
General  Blunt  with  the  brigades  of  Colonels  Jennison  and 


ORGANIZATION  OF    THE  KANSAS  FORCES.         447 

Ford,  and  McLain's  Colorado  battery,  to  the  support  of 
Colonel  Moonlight,  holding  the  position  on  the  Little 
Blue.  This  force,  including  Captain  Grover's  Missouri 
battalion,  had  just  moved  out  when  General  Blunt  re 
ceived  a  despatch  from  Colonel  Moonlight  stating  that 
the  enemy  were  advancing  in  force  and  that  he  was  then 
engaging  their  advance. 

General  Curtis,  with  members  of  his  staff  and  escort, 
quickly  followed  General  Blunt's  column,  and  on  arriv 
ing  upon  the  field  directed  the  movements  of  troops  and 
the  placing  of  batteries  in  position  in  person.  He  did 
not  desire  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement,  but  he 
wished  to  delay  by  this  demonstration  of  his  small  force 
the  movements  of  the  invading  army,  knowing  that  every 
moment  it  was  held  would  bring  Rosecrans'  forces  nearer 
to  his  support.  When  General  Blunt  met  Colonel  Moon 
light  and  saw  that  he  had  lost  the  strong  position  along 
the  bluffs  west  of  the  Little  Blue,  he  felt  that  a  mistake 
had  been  made  in  not  promptly  sending  to  his  support 
the  day  before  all  the  troops  and  field  artillery  that  could 
have  been  spared  from  Kansas  City  and  Independence. 
Although  Marmaduke's  and  Shelby's  divisions  had 
crossed  to  the  west  side  of  the  stream  and  deployed  in 
line  of  battle,  General  Blunt  determined  to  make  an  effort 
to  drive  them  back  and  retake  the  position  from  which 
Colonel  Moonlight  had  been  forced  by  superior  numbers. 
On  arriving  upon  the  field  and  making  a  hasty  exami 
nation  of  the  situation,  he  dismounted  his  troops,  except 
some  detachments  to  operate  on  his  flanks,  and  com 
menced  making  his  dispositions  for  battle.  He  placed 
Colonel  Ford's  Fourth  Brigade  in  his  centre,  Colonel 
Jennison's  First  Brigade  on  his  right,  and  Colonel  Moon 
light's  Second  Brigade  on  his  left,  with  the  Colorado 
battery  near  the  centre  of  his  line,  supported  by  part  of 
Captain  Grover's  Missouri  battalion,  dismounted  and 
lying  down  just  in  front  of  it  with  a  full  supply  of  ammu- 


448  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

nition  for  their  Martini-Henry  breech-loading  rifles.  It 
was  now  eleven  o'clock  and  in  a  short  time  his  entire  line 
became  engaged  in  a  fierce  conflict  with  the  enemy  in  the 
timber  along  the  bluffs  west  of  Little  Blue,  and  succeeded 
in  driving  them  back  some  distance,  perhaps  half  a  mile. 
While  his  troops  were  thus  engaged,  his  Colorado  battery 
under  the  direction  of  Major  R.  H.  Hunt,  Chief  of  Artil 
lery  on  the  staff  of  General  Curtis,  played  upon  the 
Confederate  lines  and  position  with  good  effect.  The 
mountain  howitzers  of  the  First  and  Second  Brigades 
also  did  good  service,  frequently  using  canister  and 
spherical  case  when  the  enemy  came  up  within  range. 

As  soon  as  Marmaduke  and  Shelby  got  their  artillery 
over  the  river,  they,  too,  opened  fire  from  their  batteries 
on  the  Federal  lines;  but  the  shot  and  shell  from  their 
guns  flew  high  over  the  heads  of  the  Federal  troops, 
doing  very  little  damage.  For  hours  the  fight  went  on 
without  decided  advantage  to  either  side,  when  Price 
pushed  forward  Fagan's  division  to  the  support  of  Shelby 
and  Marmaduke,  thus  enabling  them  to  extend  their  lines 
and  with  their  mounted  troops  to  flank  the  Federal  posi 
tion  on  the  right  and  left.  Having  no  reserves  to  support 
his  troops  thus  engaged,  and  finding  both  of  his  flanks 
threatened  by  a  superior  force,  General  Curtis,  who  was 
present  on  the  field  directing  the  general  movements  of 
his  forces,  ordered  General  Blunt  to  retire  his  command 
on  the  road  to  Independence. 

In  the  retreat  of  the  Federal  troops  from  the  field, 
Colonel  Ford,  Second  Colorado  Cavalry,  commanded  the 
rear-guard,  and  was  obliged  to  form  part  of  his  force  at 
nearly  every  elevated  position  on  the  road  and  bring  into 
use  artillery  and  engage  the  enemy  while  the  other  half 
of  his  command  formed  at  another  favorable  position. 
Thus  the  enemy  were  held  in  check  until  the  command 
arrived  near  Independence,  when  General  Blunt  formed 
a  new  line  of  battle  on  the  east  side  of  that  place.  At 


ORGANIZATION  OF   THE   KANSAS  FORCES.         449 

this  point  there  was  some  skirmishing,  but  as  the  Confed 
erates  did  not  immediately  appear  in  force,  General  Blunt 
retreated  through  Independence  to  the  main  camp  of  the 
Kansas  militia  on  the  west  side  of  the  Big  Blue,  where 
General  Curtis'  engineer  officers  had  been  employed  for 
several  days  in  constructing  defensive  works.  While 
General  Blunt's  skirmish-line  was  engaging  the  enemy 
east  of  town,  the  Twelfth  Kansas  State  Militia,  Colonel 
L.  S.  Treat  commanding,  and  some  Missouri  Enrolled 
Militia,  who  had  been  left  at  Independence  to  hold  the 
place  and  guard  public  property,  fell  back  on  the  Kansas 
City  road  to  the  west  side  of  Big  Blue.  The  moment 
General  Blunt  commenced  to  withdraw  his  troops  from 
his  position  east  of  town,  the  Confederates  of  Shelby's 
division  renewed  the  attack,  the  opposing  forces  fighting 
through  the  streets  of  Independence  just  at  dark.  It 
was  in  this  last  struggle  of  the  day  that  the  notorious 
Captain  George  Todd  of  Quantrill's  bandit  command  was 
killed  by  the  Federal  rear-guard ;  and  it  was  here,  too, 
that  Captain  Grover's  Missouri  battalion  with  their  re 
peating  rifles  did  good  service  in  checking  the  advance  of 
the  enemy. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  fight  on  the  Little  Blue  in  the 
morning,  Major  J.  N.  Smith,  commanding  the  Second 
Colorado  Cavalry,  was  shot  through  the  head  and  in 
stantly  killed  while  gallantly  leading  his  regiment  against 
the  foe.  In  his  service  on  the  Border,  extending  back  up 
wards  of  a  year,  he  had  on  all  occasions  shown  himself  to 
be  a  prudent  and  efficient  officer,  and  only  a  fe\v  days 
before  this  fight  had  made  a  scout  to  Lexington  to  obtain 
information  of  the  movements  and  position  of  the  Con 
federate  forces,  then  reported  to  be  advancing  westward. 

The  latest  despatches  General  Curtis  had  from  General 
Rosecrans  showed  that  his  cavalry  under  Pleasonton 
and  his  infantry  under  A.  J.  Smith  should  be  close 
upon  the  rear  of  Price's  army,  and  the  sound  of  Federal 

VOL.    II. — 29 


450  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

artillery  in  that  direction  was  eagerly  expected  all  day 
long  by  the  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Border.  After 
driving  the  forces  of  General  Curtis  from  the  Little  Blue 
back  upon  their  main  line  of  defence  on  the  Big  Blue, 
Price's  army  with  its  large  trains  moved  forward  and 
encamped  that  night  in  and  about  Independence,  with 
heavy  outposts  thrown  forward  in  the  direction  of  the 
Federal  position  on  Big  Blue,  and  with  a  strong  rear 
guard  left  on  the  west  side  of  the  Little  Blue  to  watch 
for  the  approach  of  Rosecrans'  forces. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

CAPTURE   OF   GLASGOW,    PARIS,    AND   CARROLLTON, 
MISSOURI. 

IN  the  spring  and  summer  of  1864  the  Federal  arms 
met  with  several  serious  reverses  west  of  the  Mississippi 
River — not  in  the  loss  of  battles,  but  in  the  loss  of  trans 
portation,  crippling  the  operations  of  the  army  by  inter 
rupting  its  communication  with  its  base  of  supplies.  The 
latter  part  of  September,  General  W.  S.  Rosecrans,  com 
manding  the  Department  of  the  Missouri,  received  defi 
nite  information  that  General  Price  was  marching  north 
through  Arkansas  with  an  army  of  twelve  to  fifteen 
thousand  men,  and  a  few  days  later  that  he  had  entered 
Southeast  Missouri  and  was  marching  upon  Pilot  Knob 
en  route  to  St.  Louis  and  Jefferson  City.  To  oppose  the 
invading  army  and  to  strengthen  the  points  which  it  was 
thought  Price  would  make  the  most  determined  efforts  to 
capture,  General  Rosecrans  was  obliged  to  concentrate  as 
rapidly  as  practicable  at  St.  Louis  and  Jefferson  City  all 
his  available  troops  in  the  State,  leaving  the  Missouri 
Enrolled  Militia  to  hold  the  stations  from  which  his  other 
troops  were  withdrawn.  Among  the  troops  thus  ordered 
to  the  defence  of  the  capital  of  the  State  was  the  Forty- 
third  Missouri  Infantry  under  Colonel  Chester  Harding, 
Jr.,  which  had  completed  its  organization  at  St.  Joseph 
in  September.  Most  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  regi 
ment  had  seen  service  in  the  militia  organizations  of  the 
State  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  In  compliance 

451 


452  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

with  instructions  six  companies  of  the  regiment  embarked 
on  the  steamer  West  Wind,  October  Qth,  for  Jefferson 
City.  The  Missouri  River  was  very  low  at  the  time,  and 
the  progress  down-stream  was  frequently  interrupted  by 
the  boat  running  on  to  sand  bars,  generally  requiring 
hours  to  get  it  off.  About  fifteen  miles  above  Brunswick 
a  man  on  the  south  side  signalled  the  boat  and  she 
steamed  to  shore  and  took  him  on  board.  He  was  a 
Union  man,  and  reported  that  Bill  Anderson's  guerillas, 
two  hundred  strong,  were  in  the  bend  of  the  river  at  a 
point  where  the  channel  approached  near  the  south  bank, 
waiting  to  attack  the  boat. 

On  nearing  the  point  where  the  guerillas  were  supposed 
to  be  concealed,  Colonel  Harding  ordered  that  a  few 
shots  be  thrown  into  the  brush  from  the  6-pounder  field- 
piece  which  he  had  on  board.  The  soldiers  on  the  boat 
were  lying  down  and  could  not  be  seen  from  shore,  and 
in  passing  the  threatened  point  fired  some  shots  into  the 
woods  to  draw  the  fire  of  the  bandits,  but  without  suc 
cess.  It  was  also  ascertained  from  the  man  taken  on 
board  that  the  guerillas  had  a  little  stockade  on  the  hill 
north  of  Brunswick  about  a  mile  from  the  channel  of  the 
river.  On  approaching  town  the  soldiers  on  the  boat 
again  lay  down  and  concealed  themselves  so  that  they 
could  not  be  seen  from  shore,  and  soon  saw  some  thirty 
to  forty  of  the  guerillas,  mounted,  coming  down  in  the 
direction  of  the  landing  to  see  what  the  boat  had  on 
board.  Before  they  had  come  up  within  rifle-range  they 
suddenly  turned  and  galloped  back  to  town  as  if  they 
had  received  a  signal  of  danger  from  the  boat.  The  pilot 
had  been  in  the  Southern  army  and  was  known  to  be  a 
Southern  sympathizer  and  some  of  the  officers  accused 
him  of  having  signalled  the  bandits  of  danger.  Captain 
Oscar  Kirkham,  who  was  officer  of  the  day,  and  who  had 
watched  the  movements  of  the  guerillas,  was  strongly  of 
the  opinion  that  the  pilot  of  the  boat  had  given  a  signal 


CAPTURE  OF  GLASGOW,  PARIS,  AND  CARROLLTON.    453 

which  they  understood.  He  protested  his  innocence,  but 
claimed  that  if  the  guerillas  caught  him  in  that  service 
they  would  kill  him. 

Colonel  Harding  landed  his  command  at  Brunswick, 
sent  forward  his  skirmishers  under  Lieutenant  Simmonds 
to  attack  the  enemy,  and  encamped  there  and  picketed 
the  town  that  night.  He  pressed  horses  into  the  service 
to  mount  about  fifty  of  his  men,  and  then  sent  a  scout 
into  the  country  four  or  five  miles,  but  it  was  unable  to 
come  up  with  the  bandits  who  were  in  town  on  his  ap 
proach.  He  boarded  the  boat  with  his  troops  again  the 
next  day  and  arrived  at  Glasgow  about  three  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  and  landed  and  went  into  camp,  having 
heard  that  Price  had  passed  Jefferson  City  and  was  ad 
vancing  west  up  the  river.  He  also  soon  heard  of  the 
fight  at  Boonville,  and  was  informed  that  the  enemy  was 
in  the  vicinity,  but  no  word  had  yet  reached  him  that  a 
large  Confederate  force  had  crossed  or  was  preparing  to 
cross  to  the  north  side  of  the  river.  When  he  landed  he 
found  at  Glasgow  the  companies  of  Captain  James  A. 
Adams  and  Captain  S.  A.  Hunter,  of  the  Ninth  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry,  some  twenty  men  of  the  Thirteenth 
Missouri  Cavalry  under  Captain  J.  E.  Mayo,  Captain  Stein- 
metz's  company  of  Citizen  Guards,  and  Captain  Bingham's 
Company  Saline  County  militia.  The  loyal  militia  who 
had  been  stationed  there  had  thrown  up  breastworks  of 
earth  around  a  square  about  as  large  as  the  usual  court 
house  square,  on  a  high  point  in  town,  and  it  would  have 
served  as  an  excellent  defence  against  an  enemy  not  sup 
plied  with  artillery.  Colonel  Harding  was  the  senior 
officer,  and  on  assuming  command  of  the  post  sent  out 
scouts  from  the  mounted  militia  and  had  infantry  pick 
ets  posted  around  town  guarding  all  the  approaches. 
Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  I4th,  reports  came  in 
that  a  Confederate  force  was  crossing  to  the  north  side 
of  the  river  at  Arrow  Rock,  about  sixteen  miles  be- 


454  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

low,  for  the  purpose  of  marching  up  on  that  side  to  at 
tack  him. 

During  the  night  a  cavalry  scout  returned  and  reported 
that  a  large  Confederate  force  had  crossed  to  the  north 
side  of  the  river,  was  advancing  under  General  Clark,  and 
that  an  attack  might  be  expected  the  next  morning.  At 
Glasgow  the  Missouri  River  turns  nearly  due  south  for 
several  miles.  In  the  plan  of  attack  it  had  been  arranged 
that  General  Shelby  should  march  up  and  open  fire  with 
his  artillery  on  the  Federal  position  from  the  west  side  of 
the  river,  while  General  Clark,  who  had  crossed  to  the 
north  side,  should  attack  the  Federal  force  with  small- 
arms  and  three  pieces  of  artillery  on  the  south,  east,  and 
north.  Shelby  marched  during  the  night  and  arrived  in 
front  of  Glasgow  and  posted  a  battery  on  a  sand  bar,  and 
at  sunrise  on  the  morning  of  the  I5th  the  roar  of  his  artil 
lery  was  heard  from  across  the  river  and  the  shot  and 
shell  from  his  guns  were  flying  through  town,  causing  a 
good  deal  of  excitement  among  the  people.  While  Gen 
eral  Shelby  was  cannonading  the  town  and  Federal  camp, 
Colonel  Harding  was  preparing  to  meet  the  Confederate 
force  advancing  under  General  Clark.  He  posted  the 
six  companies  of  his  own  regiment  and  one  company  of 
militia,  dismounted,  on  the  south  and  east  sides  of  town, 
and  the  two  companies  of  Captains  Adams  and  Hunter, 
of  the  Ninth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  on  the  north 
side  of  town.  Captain  Mayo  with  twenty  men  of  the 
Thirteenth  Missouri  Cavalry  and  some  sixty  men  of 
Saline  County  militia  were  sent  out  to  hold  a  bridge 
over  the  creek  on  the  Boonville  road,  south  of  town. 
Having  made  these  dispositions  of  his  troops,  Colonel 
Harding  was  informed  about  nine  o'clock  by  some  de 
tachments  of  cavalry  which  he  sent  out  south  of  town 
that  the  Confederate  advance  was  coming  up  in  sight. 

Very  soon  after  this  the  Federal  outposts  were  driven 
in  and  General  Clark  took  up  a  position  on  high  ground 


CAPTURE  OF  GLASGOW,  PARIS,  AND  CARROLLTON.    455 

facing  the  creek  on  the  south  side  of  town,  overlooking 
the  ground  occupied  by  the  Federal  troops,  with  Jack- 
man's  brigade  on  the  left,  Green's  brigade  in  the  centre, 
and  Lawther's  regiment  on  the  right  of  the  Confederate 
line.  The  opposing  forces  were  now  about  half  a  mile 
apart,  separated  by  a  creek  that  empties  into  the  Mis 
souri  River  below  town.  It  was  nearly  an  hour  after  he 
took  up  his  first  position  before  General  Clark  commenced 
to  extend  his  line  entirely  around  the  town.  When  fully 
extended  the  Federal  officers  thought  that  his  line  was 
upwards  of  a  mile  in  length.  Even  before  there  had 
been  any  heavy  skirmishing  he  sent  in  under  a  flag  of 
truce  a  demand  for  Colonel  Harding  to  surrender,  which 
was  declined.  When  Colonel  Harding's  reply  was  re 
turned,  about  eleven  o'clock,  refusing  to  surrender,  Gen 
eral  Clark  opened  fire  along  his  line  with  small-arms  and 
with  three  pieces  of  artillery,  but  without  doing  much 
damage  to  the  Federal  troops,  the  range  being  too  great. 
About  twelve  o'clock  he  commenced  to  advance  his  sharp 
shooters  and  skirmish-lines  and  to  extend  his  main  line 
around  the  Federal  position.  In  this  advance  he  was 
met  by  a  determined  resistance  from  the  Federal  sharp 
shooters  and  skirmishers,  who  were  posted  in  buildings 
and  behind  fences  and  trees,  and  who  did  effective  work 
in  holding  back  the  enemy  for  nearly  two  hours.  Part 
of  the  Federal  troops  also  occupied  and  kept  up  a  hot 
fire  from  the  brick  buildings  of  Lewis  Brothers'  Tobacco 
Works  in  the  northeast  part  of  town. 

When  the  Federal  detachments  on  the  right  and  left  of 
these  buildings  were  driven  back,  leaving  them  outside 
the  Federal  line,  they  were  abandoned  by  the  men  posted 
in  them,  and  shortly  afterwards  occupied  by  the  Confed 
erates.  General  Clark  now  extended  his  lines  around 
the  Federal  position  from  the  river  below  to  the  river 
above,  and  pushed  the  investment  with  so  much  persist 
ence  that  Colonel  Harding  was  obliged  to  draw  his  troops 


456  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

within  the  fortifications.  The  force  under  Captain  Mayo 
which  had  been  sent  out  to  hold  a  bridge  over  the  creek 
on  the  Boonville  road,  after  repulsing  several  charges  of 
the  enemy,  was  compelled  by  overwhelming  numbers  to 
abandon  the  position  and  fall  back  upon  Colonel  Hard- 
ing's  main  line.  At  half-past  twelve  o'clock,  after  Colo 
nel  Harding  had  retired  to  his  fortifications,  General  Clark 
sent  in  to  him  another  demand  to  surrender,  and  threat 
ened  that  if  his  demand  was  not  complied  with,  Ander 
son's  guerillas  would  be  turned  loose  upon  him.  Colonel 
Harding  again  declined  to  yield  and  resented  the  threat, 
and  the  fight  was  resumed  with  sharp  firing  on  both 
sides  for  about  an  hour,  when  General  Clark  sent  another 
demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  Federal  force.  This 
command  was  not  coupled  with  any  dire  threats  in  the 
event  of  refusal,  and  the  proposition  was  entertained  and 
terms  soon  agreed  upon.  The  ammunition  of  the  Federal 
troops  was  nearly  exhausted ;  the  fire  of  General  Clark's 
three  guns  was  concentrated  upon  them ;  they  were 
surrounded  on  three  sides  by  the  Confederate  forces,  and 
on  the  other  side  was  the  river,  which  was  commanded 
by  Shelby's  artillery  on  the  west  side,  and  there  was  no 
hope  of  reinforcements  coming  to  their  assistance. 

In  the  terms  of  surrender  the  Federal  officers  were  per 
mitted  to  retain  their  side-arms  and  Colonel  Harding 
was  to  have  an  escort  for  his  officers  and  men  to  the 
Federal  lines.  The  Federal  troops  then  marched  out  of 
their  fortifications  to  an  open  space  and  stacked  their 
arms  and  surrendered.  They  were  then  paroled,  but 
were  obliged  to  stay  in  Glasgow  that  night  under  guard ; 
they  were,  however,  well  treated  by  the  Confederate 
officers  and  men.  The  next  day,  with  an  escort  for  pro 
tection,  they  started  for  Boonville.  It  was  estimated  by 
Captain  Kirkham,  from  whom  this  account  of  the  fight 
is  taken,  and  other  Federal  officers,  that  General  Clark 
had  from  5000  to  7000  men  on  the  field  that  day,  while 


CAPTURE  OF  GLASGOW,  PARIS,  AND  CARROLLTON    457 

the  troops  under  Colonel  Harding,  including  the  militia, 
did  not  exceed  750  men. 

In  his  report  of  this  action  Colonel  Harding  stated  his 
casualties  at  1 1  men  killed  and  32  wounded.  Captain 
Steinmetz,  of  the  Citizen  Guards,  was  killed  at  the  head 
of  his  company,  and  Lieutenant  George  F.  Simmonds, 
Sixty-second  United  States  Colored  Infantry,  who  was 
on  sick-leave  and  who  reported  to  Colonel  Harding  for 
duty,  was  shot  and  instantly  killed  while  leading  a  de 
tachment  of  soldiers  to  a  favorable  position  for  sharp- 
shooting.  Colonel  Colton  Greene,  commanding  a  brigade 
of  the  Confederate  force,  reported  his  loss  at  7  men  killed 
and  46  wounded,  including  2  officers  killed.  The  loss  in 
Jackman's  brigade  is  not  reported. 

On  entering  Boonville  Price's  army  captured  a  steam 
ferryboat,  which  was  used  in  crossing  and  recrossing  his 
troops  and  recruits  over  the  river  at  that  and  other  points 
above.  When  Colonel  Harding  assumed  command  of 
the  Federal  forces  at  Glasgow,  telegraphic  communica 
tion  with  St.  Louis  had  just  been  interrupted,  and  he  did 
not  know  that  Price  was  prepared  to  throw  a  large  force 
with  artillery  to  the  north  side  of  the  river  at  his  pleasure. 
An  attack  by  the  guerilla  forces  of  Anderson,  Quantrill, 
and  Todd  and  by  the  Confederate  recruits  of  Thrailkill 
and  other  recruiting  officers  from  Price's  army  was  con 
sidered  probable  ;  but  Colonel  Harding  believed  that  with 
his  Regular  troops  and  the  militia,  posted  behind  the 
rifle-pits  and  in  one  or  two  brick  houses,  he  could  hold 
the  place  against  all  these  hostile  forces. 

The  surrender  of  Glasgow  and  the  report  of  a  large 
Confederate  force  with  artillery  north  of  the  Missouri 
River  made  the  Enrolled  Missouri  Militia  on  that  side 
of  the  river  very  cautious  about  encountering  the  Southern 
troops.  As  Price  marched  up  the  south  side  of  the  river, 
having  the  use  of  a  steam  ferryboat,  he  sent  over  to 
the  north  side  large  recruiting  parties  under  energetic 


458  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

officers,  who  were  sometimes  successful  in  their  move 
ments  against  the  detachments  of  Enrolled  Militia  sta 
tioned  in  the  different  towns.  This  militia  had  rendered 
very  effective  service  in  the  various  operations  against 
the  guerilla  bands  of  that  section ;  but  they  were  not 
prepared  to  engage  regular  Confederate  forces,  supplied 
with  artillery,  and  they  were  constantly  impressed  with 
the  exaggerated  number  of  men  in  every  detachment  of 
the  enemy.  They  saw  from  published  reports  and  were 
told  by  Southern  sympathizers  that  Price's  army  was 
upwards  of  thirty  thousand  strong  and  was  steadily  ad 
vancing  in  spite  of  every  effort  of  all  the  Federal  forces 
of  the  Department  to  check  him.  As  nearly  all  the  Fed 
eral  troops  were  south  of  the  Missouri  River  and  moving 
on  the  left  flank  of  Price  to  keep  him  in  near  the  river, 
his  detachments  were  able  to  overrun  the  counties  north 
of  the  river  with  very  little  opposition — with  such  oppo 
sition  only  as  the  Enrolled  Militia  were  able  to  offer. 

On  the  same  day  that  Glasgow  surrendered,  a  Confed 
erate  force,  more  than  three  hundred  strong,  attacked  Cap 
tain  William  E.  Fowkes'  company,  Seventieth  Regiment 
Enrolled  Missouri  Militia,  stationed  at  Paris,  in  Monroe 
County,  and  after  some  resistance  compelled  him  to  sur 
render.  Two  days  later  a  Confederate  force  of  about  six 
hundred  men  under  Major  Jerry  C.  Cravens  and  Captain 
Williams  surprised  Major  George  Deagle,  commanding 
the  post  of  Carrollton,  with  160  men  of  the  Sixty-fifth 
Regiment  Enrolled  Missouri  Militia,  and  demanded  the 
immediate  surrender  of  his  command,  stating  that  if  the 
demand  was  not  complied  with  in  fifteen  minutes  they 
had  their  artillery  planted  and  would  shell  the  place. 

After  some  parleying  as  to  terms  Major  Deagle  sur 
rendered  his  command,  and  his  men  were  taken  to  the 
south  side  of  the  Missouri  River  and  paroled  near  Wa- 
verly,  except  six  men  who  were  turned  over  to  Anderson's 
bandits  and  brutally  murdered — shot  down  and  their 


CAPTURE  OF  GLASGOW,  PARIS,  AND  CARROLLTON.    459 

bodies  left  by  the  roadside.  The  murdered  men  were 
charged  with  being  connected  with  the  killing  of  Colonel 
William  F.  Peery  and  two  other  Confederate  recruiting 
officers  near  Carrollton  the  latter  part  of  September  while 
operating  in  Carroll  County  as  guerillas.  At  the  time 
these  men  were  captured  Price's  invading  wave  had 
reached  the  flood  mark  and  was  receding,  and  intelligent 
officers  like  General  Shelby  and  Major  Cravens  should 
have  known  that  such  atrocious  acts  would  certainly  soon 
bring  upon  their  own  people  the  severest  retaliation. 
Many  Southern  sympathizers  were  so  much  elated  by 
Price's  advance  that  they  hastened  to  join  some  of  the 
organizations  of  his  army,  without  stopping  to  think  that 
his  victorious  hosts  might  in  a  few  days  become  a  panic- 
stricken,  demoralized,  and  starving  mob.  These  mis 
guided  men,  who  had  so  often  regarded  the  leniency  of 
the  Government  as  a  weakness,  were  deceiving  them 
selves  in  thinking  that  the  preparations  of  the  Federal 
forces  to  strike  were  due  to  weakness  and  fear.  For 
several  weeks  the  operations  of  Price's  army  in  chasing 
the  Enrolled  Militia,  sacking  towns,  and  the  bringing  of 
trains  loaded  with  spoils  into  the  camps  of  his  troops 
appeared  to  the  Southern  sympathizers  as  a  merry  war 
in  which  they  would  like  to  participate.  But  the  picture 
was  not  so  fascinating  when  they  came  to  face  the  hard 
ships  and  realities  of  war — when  they  were  chased  day 
and  night  by  the  Federal  cavalry,  and  were  obliged  to 
live  on  corn  or  meat  without  salt.  In  many  instances 
they  abandoned  their  colors  and  dropped  out  of  ranks  on 
the  march  at  night  and  endeavored  to  work  their  way 
back  to  their  homes.  They  generally  fled  from  the  sight 
of  Federal  cavalry  and  were  pursued  and  shot  down  or 
captured.  Most  of  those  captured  claimed  that  they  had 
been  conscripted  and  taken  off  by  the  Southern  army. 
There  were  probably  a  few  men  conscripted,  but  nearly 
all  the  men  who  went  off  with  Price  were  Southern  sym- 


460 


THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 


pathizers  or  belonged  to  the  Order  of  American  Knights, 
a  disloyal  organization  that  had  a  large  membership  in 
the  State.  Before  the  end  of  December  the  prisons  at 
the  military  posts  of  the  State  were  filled  with  prison 
ers  who  had  been  picked  up  by  the  Federal  cavalry,  or 
who  had  surrendered  to  the  Federal  authorities,  without 
arms,  claiming  that  they  had  been  conscripted  by  certain 
Confederate  recruiting  officers,  and  had  deserted  at  the 
first  opportunity. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

BATTLES   OF   INDEPENDENCE   AND   BIG  BLUE,   MISSOURI. 

ON  the  igth  of  October  Major-General  Pleasonton, 
under  orders  from  Department  Headquarters,  assumed 
command  of  the  Provisional  Cavalry  Division  in  person 
at  Dunksburg,  relieving  Brigadier-General  John  B.  San- 
born,  who  up  to  that  time  had  been  in  command  of  the 
cavalry  in  the  field  operating  against  Price.  In  the  re 
organization  that  took  place,  Brigadier-General  E.  B. 
Brown  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  First  Bri 
gade,  relieving  Colonel  John  F.  Philips,  Seventh  Missouri 
State  Militia;  Brigadier-General  John  McNeil  was  as 
signed  to  the  command  of  the  Second  Brigade,  relieving 
Colonel  J.  L.  Beveridge,  Seventeenth  Illinois  Cavalry; 
and  Brigadier-General  John  B.  Sanborn  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  Third  Brigade,  relieving  Colonel  J. 
J.  Gravely,  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry.  The 
brigade  commanders  thus  relieved  resumed  command  of 
their  respective  regiments.  The  Fourth  Brigade,  Colonel 
E.  F.  Winslow  commanding,  joined  General  Pleasonton 
at  once  from  Sedalia.  Colonel  Catherwood's  Thirteenth 
Missouri  Veteran  Cavalry,  and  the  Seventh  Kansas  Cav 
alry  under  Major  Francis  M.  Malone,  were  assigned  to 
General  McNeil's  brigade.  A  section  of  3-inch  rifled 
guns  was  attached  to  each  brigade.  With  the  cavalry 
thus  organized,  and  General  Smith's  infantry  and  artillery 
within  supporting  distance,  the  troops  of  General  Rose- 

461 


462  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

crans'  Department  were  for  the  first  time  since  the  opening 
of  the  campaign  prepared  for  active  aggressive  operations 
against  the  invading  army.  To  defend  St.  Louis  and 
Jefferson  City  separately  General  Rosecrans  had  been 
obliged  to  concentrate  all  the  available  troops  of  his  De 
partment  at  those  places,  and  when  the  danger  of  attack 
upon  those  points  had  passed,  some  time  was  necessarily 
lost  in  repairing  the  railroad  and  bridges  and  in  waiting 
for  General  Mower's  division  of  infantry  from  Arkansas 
to  come  up. 

It  was  perhaps  a  fortunate  circumstance  for  the  Federal 
forces  that  Price  was  kept  in  Saline  County  nearly  four 
days  waiting  for  the  return  of  the  troops  which  he  had 
despatched  under  Clark  and  Thompson  for  the  capture  of 
Glasgow  and  Sedalia.  During  this  interval  General  Rose 
crans  was  able  to  repair  the  railroad,  forward  supplies  to 
Sedalia  for  his  troops,  and  push  forward  his  infantry  to 
the  support  of  his  cavalry  at  Dunksburg  and  Cook's  Store, 
to  engage  Price  if  he  attempted  to  pass  out  south  from 
Saline  County,  or  to  move  upon  his  rear  if  he  marched 
west  in  the  direction  of  Kansas.  Before  the  arrival  of 
General  Pleasonton  at  Dunksburg  General  Sanborn  re 
ceived  reports  indicating  that  Price  was  about  to  counter 
march  his  army  from  near  Marshall  so  as  to  strike  the 
railroad  east  of  Sedalia  and  again  threaten  Jefferson  City, 
or  pass  out  south  by  way  of  Springfield.  With  the  view 
of  obtaining  reliable  information  of  Price's  movements, 
General  Sanborn  sent  out  a  reconnoissance  on  the  night 
of  the  iQth  under  Colonel  Phelps,  Second  Arkansas  Cav 
alry,  consisting  of  his  own  regiment  and  two  squadrons 
of  the  Sixth  Missouri  State  Militia  under  Major  Plumb, 
with  instructions  to  move  north  until  he  struck  the 
Southern  army  or  reached  the  Missouri  River  at  Dover. 
Moving  forward  rapidly,  Colonel  Phelps  received  reliable 
information  several  miles  south  of  Dover  that  the  South 
ern  army  had  been  moving  west  through  that  place  all 


BATTLES  OF  INDEPENDENCE   AND  BIG  BLUE.       463 


the  afternoon  and  evening  of  the  iQth,  and  that  late  in 
the  evening  artillery  firing  had  been  heard  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Lexington.  He  immediately  sent  a  messenger  to 
General  Sanborn  with  the  information  thus  obtained,  and 
then  continued  his  march  north,  entering  Dover  on  a 
charge  at  sunrise  on  the  morning  of  the  2Oth,  routing  and 
driving  out  a  Confederate  force  of  about  five  hundred 
men,  killing  four  men  and  capturing  four  officers  and  ten 
enlisted  men.  On  receipt  of  this  information  that  morn 
ing  General  Rosecrans  ordered  Pleasonton  to  push  forward 
his  cavalry  to  Lexington,  with  instructions  to  General 
Smith  to  support  the  movement  with  his  infantry  and 
artillery. 

General  McNeil's  Second  Brigade,  in  the  advance,  en 
tered  Lexington  the  night  of  the  2Oth,  and  was  fired  upon 
by  two  parties  of  Confederates  who  had  been  left  by  Price 
in  his  rear  to  observe  the  movements  of  the  Federal  troops. 
In  the  skirmish  that  ensued  in  the  darkness  the  Fifth 
Missouri  State  Militia,  in  the  advance,  drove  the  Confed 
erates,  about  two  hundred  strong,  out  of  town,  capturing 
seven  men.  From  Lexington  Pleasonton's  cavalry  moved 
forward  on  the  2  1st  on  the  road  to  Independence,  his  ad 
vance  under  McNeil  encamping  that  night  about  ten  miles 
east  of  Little  Blue.  Resuming  the  march  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  22d,  McNeil's  brigade  arrived  at  Little 
Blue  about  ten  o'clock,  and  finding  the  bridge  over  the 
stream  destroyed,  crossed  it  at  a  ford  below,  and  imme 
diately  attacked  Price's  rear-guard,  consisting  of  two 
brigades  of  Pagan's  division.  As  the  ford  was  considered 
impracticable  for  crossing  the  trains  and  artillery,  a  tem 
porary  bridge  was  hastily  constructed  for  the  purpose, 
and  a  section  of  Captain  Montgomery's  battery,  Second 
Missouri  Light  Artillery,  was  got  over,  and  moving  to 
the  front  at  a  gallop  soon  came  up  with  General  McNeil's 
brigade,  which  was  deployed  and  steadily  driving  the 
enemy  under  General  Cabell  back  upon  Independence. 


464  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BOEDER. 

In  his  efforts  to  check  the  Federal  advance  General 
Cabell  very  soon  brought  into  use  a  section  of  artillery. 
But  the  Federal  troops  pushed  forward  with  such  deter 
mination  that  he  was  obliged  in  every  instance  to  with 
draw  his  guns  after  firing  two  or  three  rounds.  Thus 
the  fight  continued  over  the  ground  over  which  General 
Curtis  had  retreated  fighting,  the  evening  before,  until 
nearing  Independence,  when  General  Cabell  determined 
to  make  a  stand  at  the  eastern  limits  of  the  city  and  to 
bring  into  action  all  of  Fagan's  division.  Directly  after 
getting  his  troops  and  artillery  in  position  the  Federal 
advance  came  in  sight  and  his  battery  opened  fire  upon 
it.  General  Pleasonton,  who  was  at  the  front  with  his 
leading  brigade  directing  the  movements  of  his  forces,  at 
once  commenced  making  his  dispositions  for  battle.  Mc 
Neil's  Second  Brigade,  which  had  been  advancing  for 
several  miles  dismounted,  on  coming  up  was  ordered  into 
action,  supported  by  a  section  of  the  Second  Missouri 
Light  Artillery  under  Captain  Montgomery  and  two  12- 
pounder  mountain  howitzers  attached  to  the  Fifth  Mis 
souri  State  Militia  under  Lieutenant  A.  Hillerich.  In  a 
short  time  Sanborn's  Third  Brigade  came  up  at  a  gallop, 
and,  dismounting  under  a  hot  fire  from  the  Confederate 
artillery,  formed  on  the  right  of  McNeil  and  immediately 
advanced  against  Cabell's  left.  Closely  following  San 
born's  brigade,  Captain  Thurber's  battery,  Second  Mis 
souri  Light  Artillery,  came  upon  the  field,  and  being 
placed  in  position  by  Colonel  Nelson  Cole,  Chief  of  Artil 
lery  on  the  staff  of  General  Pleasonton,  immediately  went 
into  action,  firing  thirty  rounds  into  the  Confederate  lines, 
causing  a  good  deal  of  damage  and  demoralization. 

The  troops  of  McNeil  and  Sanborn  now  pressed  forward, 
firing  as  they  advanced,  while  the  Federal  batteries  played 
upon  the  Confederate  position  with  a  storm  of  shot  and 
shell.  This  vigorous  attack  soon  caused  Cabell's  line  to 
give  way  and  fall  back  through  Independence.  At  this 


BATTLES  OF  INDEPENDENCE  AND  BIG  BLUE.       465 

moment  General  Pleasonton  ordered  McNeil  to  mount 
his  command  and  charge  the  enemy  in  retreat.  His  regi 
ments  were  mounted  as  quickly  as  practicable,  and  Colo 
nel  Catherwood, Thirteenth  Missouri  Cavalry,  was  ordered 
to  lead  the  charge  with  his  regiment,  using  the  sabre, 
which  they  did  most  gallantly.  His  bugles  sounded  and 
he  dashed  forward  at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  sweeping 
everything  before  him  and  capturing  two  guns  of  the 
Confederate  battery  and  four  hundred  prisoners  on  the 
west  side  of  town.  Generals  Marmaduke  and  Cabell, 
who  were  in  town,  barely  escaped  falling  into  his  hands. 
He  was  supported  in  this  movement  by  the  Seventeenth 
Illinois,  the  Seventh  Kansas  Cavalry,  and  the  Third, 
Fifth,  and  Ninth  Regiments  Missouri  State  Militia.  At 
the  same  time  the  troops  of  General  Sanborn's  brigade 
on  the  right,  dismounted,  were  gallantly  performing  their 
duty,  moving  through  the  north  part  of  town,  crossing 
fences  and  yards  and  keeping  almost  abreast  of  the 
charging  column,  and  giving  the  enemy  no  time  to  form 
line.  Indeed,  General  Cabell  was  pressed  so  closely  on 
his  left  by  Sanborn's  troops  that  Colonel  Phelps,  Second 
Arkansas  Cavalry,  captured  his  sword  and  an  officer  on 
his  staff. 

When  the  fight  opened  that  morning  on  Little  Blue, 
General  Marmaduke's  division  was  encamped  along  Rock 
Creek  about  two  miles  west  of  Independence.  Re 
ports  of  the  Federal  advance  upon  the  Confederate  rear 
were  immediately  sent  in  to  Generals  Fagan  and  Marma 
duke,  and  when  the  sound  of  the  artillery  firing  was  get 
ting  nearer  and  nearer,  showing  that  the  Federal  forces 
were  steadily  approaching  and  the  Confederates  retiring, 
Marmaduke's  division  was  formed  in  line  facing  east  to 
support  Fagan  if  necessary.  This  disposition  of  the 
supporting  troops  enabled  Fagan,  after  his  division  had 
been  driven  back  through  Independence  in  confusion  and 
with  heavy  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  prisoners,  and  guns, 

VOL.    11. — 30 


466  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

to  pass  to  the  rear  of  Marmaduke  and  rally  his  men  and 
re-form  his  lines.  Meanwhile,  Pleasonton  had  handled 
his  troops  so  as  to  use  them  as  effectively  as  possible  in 
the  operations  of  the  day.  Most  of  McNeil's  brigade, 
which  had  been  dismounted  near  Little  Blue  to  press  the 
Confederates  back  upon  their  position  where  they  made 
a  stand  east  of  Independence,  had  become  greatly  ex 
hausted  in  marching  to  the  right  and  to  the  left  to  pass 
hedges  and  inclosures  and  in  crossing  ravines  or  hollows, 
and  his  men  were  anxious  enough  to  be  relieved  of  further 
exertion  of  that  kind  when  the  order  was  given  to  re 
mount  and  make  the  charge  that  was  led  by  Colonel 
Catherwood.  Up  to  this  time  Sanborn's  brigade,  which 
had  been  marching  mounted  all  day,  was  in  good  condi 
tion  to  be  dismounted  to  advance  on  foot  on  the  right  of 
the  Federal  line.  But  the  ground  just  east  of  Independ 
ence  is  broken  by  steep  hollows,  and  in  the  general  move 
ment  when  the  charge  was  ordered  these  dismounted 
troops  of  Sanborn's  brigade  were  required  to  advance  at 
a  double-quick.  In  crossing  the  hollows  and  in  passing 
around  houses,  fences,  and  obstructions  in  town,  Sanborn 
had  been  unable  to  keep  a  perfect  alignment  of  his  men, 
and  it  became  necessary  to  re-form  his  lines  when  the 
charge  was  over  resulting  in  the  capture  of  the  guns  and 
prisoners.  It  was  now  about  four  o'clock,  and  by  the 
time  McNeil  and  Sanborn  had  re-formed  their  brigades, 
now  much  in  need  of  food  and  a  respite  from  their  exer 
tions,  the  First  Brigade  under  General  Brown  and  the 
Fourth  Brigade  under  Colonel  Winslow  came  up  and 
were  pushed  to  the  front  to  renew  the  attack  on  the  Con 
federate  forces  on  the  Westport  road — Brown  in  advance, 
supported  by  Winslow. 

In  this  movement  Colonel  McFerran,  with  the  First 
Missouri  State  Militia,  advanced  to  the  front  at  a  gallop, 
and  about  a  mile  or  so  west  of  town  encountered  General 
Clark's  skirmish-line  in  a  skirt  of  timber  east  of  Rock 


BATTLES  OF  INDEPENDENCE  AND  BIG  BLUE.       467 

Creek.  He  quickly  dismounted  his  regiment,  except  one 
company  held  in  reserve,  and  deploying  his  dismounted 
men,  opened  fire  on  the  Confederates.  By  some  mis 
take  the  Fourth  and  Seventh  Regiments  Missouri  State 
Militia,  also  of  the  First  Brigade,  had  been  halted  in 
town,  leaving  Colonel  McFerran  with  his  single  regiment 
for  nearly  an  hour  to  contend  with  a  superior  force  of 
the  enemy,  which  was  rapidly  flanking  him  on  the  right 
and  left  when  the  other  two  regiments  of  the  brigade 
came  up  to  his  assistance.  A  battery  of  Marmaduke's 
division  which  had  already  commenced  shelling  the  Fed 
eral  line  was  soon  effectively  replied  to  by  a  section  of 
Thurber's  battery  which  was  sent  to  the  front  by  Colonel 
Cole.  General  Brown  now  came  up  and  renewed  the  at 
tack  and  after  severe  fighting  drove  the  Confederate  line 
back  about  two  miles  on  the  Westport  road,  close  upon 
the  rear  of  Price's  train.  His  troops  had  now  been  en 
gaging  the  enemy  for  two  hours,  it  was  getting  dark,  and 
two  of  his  regiments  reported  that  they  had  nearly  ex 
pended  their  supply  of  ammunition,  so  he  requested 
Colonel  Winslow  to  take  the  advance  with  his  brigade, 
consisting  of  the  Third  and  Fourth  Regiments  Iowa 
Cavalry,  and  detachments  of  the  Fourth  and  Tenth  Regi 
ments  Missouri  Cavalry. 

With  the  view  of  relieving  General  Curtis,  who  had  been 
obliged  to  fall  back  from  Independence  to  Big  Blue,  thence 
to  Westport  and  Kansas  City,  General  Pleasonton  deter 
mined  to  push  the  Confederate  force  in  his  front  all 
night,  and  ordered  Colonel  Winslow  to  dismount  his 
brigade  and  keep  up  a  vigorous  attack.  Though  the 
night  was  intensely  dark,  Colonel  Winslow  cautiously 
moved  forward.  The  silence  and  the  stillness  that  pre 
vailed  were  now  and  then  broken  by  the  sharp  volleys 
of  musketry  of  the  opposing  forces,  and  the  flashes  of 
the  guns  at  each  volley  momentarily  lighted  up  the  deep 
gloom  of  the  forest.  These  attacks  were  kept  up  by 


468  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Winslow's  brigade,  closely  supported  by  Brown's  brigade, 
until  nearly  eleven  o'clock  that  night,  driving  Marma- 
duke's  division  back  within  a  mile  or  so  of  the  Big  Blue, 
when  the  Federal  troops  were  ordered  to  bivouac  in  line. 

Shelby's  division  having  forced  a  crossing  of  the  Big 
Blue  at  several  points  early  in  the  day  by  driving  back 
General  Curtis'  forces  guarding  the  fords,  Price's  trains 
crossed  to  the  west  side  of  the  stream  by  night  and  started 
south  on  the  road  to  Little  Santa  Fe.  Fagan's  division, 
which  was  driven  in  confusion  through  Independence  by 
Pleasonton,  after  passing  to  the  rear  of  Marmaduke 
crossed  to  the  west  side  of  the  Big  Blue  that  evening  to 
support  Shelby  and  protect  the  train.  After  ordering  up 
his  ammunition  and  supply  trains  from  the  rear,  General 
Pleasonton  directed  McNeil  to  move  with  his  brigade  at 
twelve  o'clock  that  night  on  the  road  southwest  to  Little 
Santa  Fe,  and  to  be  at  that  point  at  daylight  the  next 
morning  to  intercept  Price's  trains  moving  south.  Be 
fore  marching,  a  battalion  of  the  Third  Missouri  State 
Militia,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  M.  Matthews, 
which  had  participated  in  all  the  operations  of  the  cam 
paign  up  to  that  time,  was  detached  from  the  brigade 
and  left  to  garrison  Independence. 

Having  made  the  necessary  preparations,  General 
Pleasonton  determined  to  move  forward  before  daybreak 
the  next  morning  and  renew  the  attack  upon  the  Confed 
erate  force  in  his  front,  and  ordered  Colonel  Winslow, 
whose  brigade  had  bivouacked  in  advance,  to  continue  in 
advance  until  daylight,  when  he  would  be  relieved  by 
General  Brown,  commanding  the  First  Brigade.  At  four 
o'clock  that  morning  Winslow's  brigade  was  in  motion 
and  soon  came  upon  part  of  Marmaduke's  division,  which 
was  driven  back  after  some  skirmishing  to  the  west  side 
of  Big  Blue.  Here  the  First  Brigade,  Colonel  Philips 
commanding,  relieved  the  Fourth  Brigade  under  Colonel 
Winslow  of  the  advance.  On  coming  to  the  front  that 


BATTLES  OF  INDEPENDENCE   AND  BIG  BLUE.       469 

morning,  General  Pleasonton  thought  that  General  Brown 
had  not  relieved  Winslow's  brigade  of  the  advance  as 
promptly  as  he  should  have  done  and  arrested  him  and 
sent  him  to  the  rear,  and  directed  Colonel  Philips,  Sev 
enth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  to  take  command 
of  the  First  Brigade.  Colonel  McFerran,  First  Missouri 
State  Militia  Cavalry,  was  also  arrested,  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  B.  F.  Lazear  ordered  to  take  command  of  that 
regiment.  Passing  to  the  front  and  finding  a  strong  Con 
federate  force  posted  on  the  west  side  of  the  Big  Blue 
to  contest  the  crossing  of  the  ford,  Colonel  Philips  ordered 
Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  T.  Crittenden,  commanding  the 
Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia,  to  dismount  his  men, 
deploy  them  to  the  left  of  the  road,  and  engage  the 
enemy  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  stream. 

The  Fourth  Missouri  State  Militia  under  Major  G.  W. 
Kelley  and  the  First  Missouri  State  Militia  under  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Lazear,  the  other  two  regiments  of  his 
brigade,  were  pushed  forward  mounted  across  the  stream 
in  the  face  of  a  hot  fire  of  bursting  shell  from  Marma- 
duke's  battery,  placed  in  position  to  sweep  the  ford  and 
approaches.  The  bend  in  the  river  above  the  ford  en 
abled  Colonel  Crittenden  to  attack  the  enemy  in  the  right 
flank  and  rear,  and  driving  them  from  their  position  in 
front  of  the  ford,  he  crossed  his  men  to  the  west  side  of  the 
stream.  He  then  moved  to  the  right  far  enough  for  the 
cavalry  which  had  crossed  over  to  form  in  his  rear.  In 
the  further  dispositions  which  were  made,  Colonel  Crit 
tenden  advanced  on  the  left  of  the  road  with  his  dis 
mounted  men,  and  Major  Kelley  on  the  right  with  his 
mounted  men,  supported  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lazear 
with  the  First  Missouri  State  Militia,  driving  the  Confed 
erates  perhaps  a  quarter  of  a  mile  to  the  bluffs  which  rise 
from  the  valley.  To  carry  this  strong  position  of  the 
enemy  required  a  severe  struggle.  Finding  the  nature 
of  the  ground  such  that  it  was  impracticable  to  advance 


470  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

against  the  position  with  mounted  troops  except  in  col 
umns  of  fours,  Major  Kelley  was  allowed  to  dismount 
his  command  and  form  on  the  right  of  Crittenden. 

A  Confederate  battery  was  posted  on  the  crest  of  the 
hill  so  as  to  sweep  the  road  and  the  approaches  in  front 
with  shell  and  canister,  making  it  impossible  for  cavalry 
to  advance  on  the  narrow  road  in  columns  of  fours  without 
suffering  a  terrible  loss.  In  the  face  of  this  situation 
there  was  a  determination  to  charge  the  position  with 
cavalry  and,  under  instructions,  Colonel  Philips  ordered 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Lazear  to  move  forward  with  the 
First  Missouri  State  Militia.  After  two  gallant  charges 
made  by  Colonel  Lazear  the  effort  to  carry  the  position 
failed.  It  was  now  decided  to  dismount  the  entire  bri 
gade  to  make  the  attack,  and  in  a  few  moments  Colonel 
Philips  advanced  with  his  three  regiments  and  drove  the 
Confederates  from  their  position  back  across  a  field  to 
the  woods  on  the  west  side  where  the  main  part  of  Mar- 
maduke's  division  was  formed  in  line  of  battle.  In  falling 
back  from  this  position  on  the  hill  across  the  field  to  the 
timber,  the  Confederates  fiercely  contested  every  step  of 
the  ground  fought  over,  leaving  their  numerous  dead  and 
wounded  where  they  fell.  At  this  point  in  the  fight, 
Colonel  Winslow's  Fourth  Brigade  came  up  on  the  right 
and  Sanborn's  Third  Brigade  on  the  left  of  Philips'  First 
Brigade,  and  assisted  in  driving  the  Confederates  from 
their  position  in  the  timber  to  the  prairie  about  two  miles 
beyond,  where  Marmaduke  again  formed  line  of  battle. 
In  this  fight  in  the  timber  Colonel  Winslow  received  a 
severe  wound  in  the  leg  with  a  musket-ball  and  turned 
the  command  of  the  Fourth  Brigade  over  to  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  F.  W.  Benteen,  Tenth  Missouri  Cavalry.  But 
up  to  this  time  the  main  part  of  the  fighting  on  the  Fed 
eral  side  had  been  done  by  the  First  Brigade,  composed 
of  Missouri  State  Militia,  one  regiment,  the  Fourth, 
under  Major  Kelley,  having  that  morning  sustained  a 


BATTLES  OF  INDEPENDENCE  AND  BIG  BLUE.       471 

loss  of  two  officers  and  seven  enlisted  men  killed  and 
three  officers  and  forty-four  enlisted  men  wounded,  a  loss 
much  heavier  than  was  sustained  by  the  entire  Fourth 
Brigade  since  leaving  Independence,  including  the  night 
fighting. 

In  dislodging  the  Confederates  from  their  several  posi 
tions  that  morning,  and  in  effectively  replying  to  their 
guns,  Captain  Thurber's  battery,  Second  Missouri  Light 
Artillery,  and  a  section  of  Captain  Montgomery's  battery 
of  the  same  regiment  under  Lieutenant  Smiley,  all  under 
the  direction  of  Colonel  Cole,  Chief  of  Artillery,  rendered 
effective  and  efficient  service,  using  shell  and  grape  and 
canister  from  every  position  where  they  could  go  into 
action.  Having  forced  Marmaduke's  division  from  the 
line  of  the  Big  Blue  back  two  or  three  miles  to  the  south 
west  on  the  Harrisonville  road,  General  Pleasonton 
ordered  the  regiments  of  his  brigades  which  had  been 
dismounted  to  remount  at  once  for  a  cavalry  charge 
against  Pagan's  division  and  Jackman's  brigade,  Shelby's 
division,  which  had  come  up  on  the  prairie.  The  horses 
were  quickly  brought  up  from  the  rear,  when  the  troops 
remounted  and  moved  in  a  gallant  charge  against  the 
enemy,  striking  them,  breaking  their  lines,  throwing  them 
into  the  greatest  confusion,  and  causing  them  to  burn  a 
large  number  of  wagons  and  to  abandon  a  large  amount 
of  artillery  ammunition.  This  movement  of  Pleasonton 
in  forcing  Marmaduke's  and  Pagan's  divisions  south  to 
protect  the  Confederate  trains,  uncovered  and  exposed 
to  his  attack  the  right  flank  and  rear  of  Shelby's  division, 
then  engaging  General  Curtis'  forces  under  Blunt  on 
Brush  Creek  near  Westport.  In  fact  the  Southern  army 
was  now  completely  severed,  and  Price  pushed  to  the 
front  with  his  escort  to  form  his  recruits  and  recall  his 
advance-guard  for  the  protection  of  his  train,  which  was 
now  threatened  by  General  McNeil,  who  had  been  sent 
out  from  Independence  the  previous  night  to  attack  it. 


4/2  THE    CIVIL    WAR    OX    THE   BORDER. 

On  seeing  the  situation  rapidly  developing,  Price  sent 
orders  to  Shelby  and  Pagan  to  fall  back  and  rejoin  him 
as  quickly  as  practicable.  In  withdrawing  their  troops 
from  the  conflict  with  Curtis'  forces  and  facing  south, 
they  soon  saw  in  their  new  front  the  prairie  covered  with 
Pleasonton 's  cavalry.  It  was  now  perhaps  one  o'clock 
when  Pleasonton  recalled  his  troops  from  the  pursuit 
after  dispersing  and  scattering  Pagan's  division  and  Jack- 
man's  brigade,  and  before  he  had  completely  re-formed 
his  brigades  the  head  of  Shelby's  division  was  seen 
advancing  from  the  direction  of  Westport.  Both  sides 
prepared  for  immediate  action.  Shelby  commenced  the 
fight  by  ordering  a  charge  of  a  brigade  against  the  left 
of  the  Federal  line,  striking  Sanborn's  brigade  and  caus 
ing  it  to  yield  a  little.  Colonel  Cole  had  eight  pieces 
of  artillery  up  within  easy  range,  and  double-charging 
them  with  grape  and  canister,  opened  a  terribly  destruc 
tive  fire  upon  the  Confederate  line,  causing  almost  instant 
demoralization. 

General  Pleasonton  now  ordered  his  cavalry  to  charge, 
which  they  did,  breaking  the  Confederate  lines  and  de 
stroying  all  organization  of  the  enemy.  It  was  now  a 
run  for  life  with  the  Confederates,  and  they  were  pursued, 
shot  down,  and  captured  by  the  Federal  cavalry,  who  were 
close  upon  their  heels  until  near  the  village  of  Little 
Santa  Fe,  when  they  struck  the  brush  and  timber  of  In 
dian  Creek  and  most  of  them  escaped.  It  was  a  sight 
for  the  mirth  of  gods  and  men  to  see  the  officers  and 
soldiers  of  that  division,  who  had  dubbed  themselves  "the 
avengers  of  blood,"  throwing  the  dust  from  their  heels 
into  the  eyes  of  their  pursuers  and  suddenly  losing  their 
appetite  for  blood — for  they  had  often  told  with  boastful 
swagger  of  riding  down  Federal  detachments  and  com 
panies  of  loyal  militia  armed  with  worthless  guns.  Mc 
Neil's  brigade,  which  was  sent  out  from  Independence  on 
the  night  of  the  22d  to  reach  Little  Santa  Fe  at  daylight 


BATTLES  OF  INDEPENDENCE  AND  BIG  BLUE.       473 

to  intercept  and  attack  Price's  train,  did  not  arrive  at  the 
designated  point  at  the  appointed  time  and  failed  to  ac 
complish  the  object  for  which  it  was  detached.  When 
Price  was  informed  of  the  position  of  this  Federal  force, 
he  immediately  ordered  up  Marmaduke's  division  to  pro 
tect  the  left  flank  of  his  train  against  the  threatened 
attack,  and  Pagan's  division  to  protect  his  rear.  About 
two  o'clock  that  day  General  McNeil's  line  of  march 
intersected  the  road  on  which  the  Confederate  forces  and 
trains  were  passing.  He  immediately  formed  his  brigade 
in  line  of  battle,  advanced  his  skirmish-line  of  two  com 
panies  Seventeenth  Illinois  Cavalry  under  Captain  John 
F.  Austin,  and  directed  Captain  Montgomery  to  shell  the 
Confederate  column  with  a  section  of  his  battery.  But 
in  a  short  time  the  Confederate  forces  commenced  coming 
up  in  such  numbers  as  to  threaten  to  flank  him  on  the 
right,  and  he  withdrew  his  command  to  another  position 
where  he  could  make  a  better  defence.  A  small  force  of 
Confederates  was  left  to  attract  his  attention  until  nearly 
night,  while  the  main  part  of  the  Confederate  army  and 
train  were  moving  rapidly  south.  His  movement  in  this 
instance  was  so  barren  of  expected  results  as  to  incur 
General  Pleasonton's  decided  disapprobation. 

But  Pleasonton,  too,  made  a  mistake,  even  more  serious 
than  that  made  by  McNeil.  The  night  he  was  fighting 
Marmaduke's  division  west  of  Independence,  he  sent  a 
despatch  to  General  Rosecrans  to  order  General  Smith's 
infantry  corps  of  about  nine  thousand  men  to  Independ 
ence,  as  there  was  a  prospect  of  getting  a  fight  out  of  Price. 
Feeling  certain  that  Price  would  turn  south  when  he 
struck  Curtis'  force,  General  Rosecrans  had  ordered  Gen 
eral  Smith,  who  was  coming  up  on  the  Lexington  and 
Independence  road,  to  march  across  the  country  by  way 
of  Chapel  Hill  to  Hickman's  Mills  and  Little  Santa  Fe  to 
intercept  the  Southern  army.  General  Smith  had  reached 
Chapel  Hill  when  he  received  instructions  to  march  to 


474 


THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 


Independence.  It  was  nearer  to  Hickman's  Mills  than 
it  was  to  Independence,  and  had  he  marched  to  the 
former  place,  Price's  army  would  probably  have  been 
crushed  and  his  entire  train  captured  or  destroyed. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

SKIRMISH  ON  THE  BIG  BLUE  AND  BATTLE  OF  WESTPORT, 

MISSOURI. 

AFTER  being  forced  back  from  the  Little  Blue  through 
Independence  to  the  west  side  of  the  Big  Blue,  on  the 
evening  of  the  2ist,  General  Curtis  was  confident  that 
this  line  of  defence  had  been  so  strengthened  that  he 
would  be  able  to  check  the  further  advance  of  the  South 
ern  forces,  and  so  advised  General  Rosecrans  by  telegraph. 
When  General  Curtis  decided  to  make  the  Big  Blue  his 
main  line  of  defence,  Captain  George  T.  Robinson,  Chief 
Engineer  on  his  staff,  made  a  survey  of  the  stream  from 
the  Missouri  River  to  a  point  three  or  four  miles  above 
its  junction  with  Indian  Creek,  a  distance  of  about  fif 
teen  miles,  and  determined  the  points  to  be  fortified  so 
as  to  command  the  fords  and  approaches.  He  also  di 
rected  the  felling  of  timber  to  obstruct  the  passage  of 
the  fords  and  the  different  fordable  places  in  the  stream, 
and  to  form  abatis  in  front  of  the  different  field-works  to 
be  constructed.  A  large  force  of  Kansas  militia  was  em 
ployed  under  the  direction  of  Major-General  Deitzler, 
Kansas  State  Militia,  and  Colonel  C.  W.  Blair,  Four 
teenth  Kansas  Cavalry,  to  push  forward  this  work  as 
rapidly  as  practicable  a  day  or  so  before  the  other  troops 
fell  back  from  the  Little  Blue.  A  force  of  colored  volun 
teers,  organized  by  Captain  R.  J.  Hinton,  an  aide-de-camp 
on  General  Blunt's  staff,  was  also  employed  on  these  de- 

475 


476  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

fensive  works  until  they  were  ordered  to  take  position  in 
line  of  battle.  On  the  2 1st,  rinding  that  the  Confederate 
forces  were  certainly  advancing  and  pushing  back  upon 
Independence  the  troops  under  General  Blunt  from  the 
Little  Blue,  General  Curtis  directed  General  Deitzler  to 
order  up  all  the  Kansas  militia  who  were  encamped  in  the 
vicinity  of  Shawneetown  and  Shawnee  Mission,  in  Kansas, 
to  positions  on  the  Big  Blue. 

Retiring  with  his  troops  that  evening  after  the  fight 
near  Independence,  General  Curtis  made  his  headquarters 
a  short  distance  west  of  the  Big  Blue  on  the  main  road 
from  Independence  to  Kansas  City,  thus  selecting  a  cen 
tral  position  from  which  he  could  conveniently  direct  the 
further  operations  of  his  forces.  As  the  invading  army 
was  directly  in  his  front,  he  lost  no  time  in  making  dis 
positions  of  his  troops  for  the  struggle  the  next  day. 
Major-General  Blunt  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  his 
right  wing,  extending  south  of  the  Independence  and 
Kansas  City  road  to  near  Hickman's  Mills,  and  Major- 
General  Deitzler  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  his  left 
wing,  extending  north  of  the  Independence  road  to  the 
Missouri  River. 

In  the  left  wing  there  was  only  the  Third  Brigade,  com 
manded  by  Colonel  Blair,  and  some  unassigned  regiments 
of  Kansas  State  Militia.  The  Third  Brigade  consisted  of 
Colonel  William  D.  McCain's  Fourth,  Colonel  G.  A. 
Colton's  Fifth,  Colonel  James  Montgomery's  Sixth,  and 
Colonel  William  Pennock's  Tenth  Regiment  Kansas 
State  Militia  Cavalry;  Lieutenant-Colonel  George  P. 
Eve's  battalion  Bourbon  County  (Kansas)  Militia;  Lieu 
tenant  W.  B.  Clark's  detachment  Fourteenth  Kansas 
Cavalry ;  Lieutenant  D.  C.  Knowles'  section  Second 
Kansas  Battery;  and  Captain  James  H.  Dodge's  Ninth 
Wisconsin  Battery,  six  guns. 

In  the  right  wing  there  were  the  First,  Second,  and 
Fourth  Brigades,  commanded  respectively  by  Colonels 


SKIRMISH  ON  THE  BIG  BLUE.  477 

Jennison,  Moonlight,  and  Ford,  besides  a  brigade  of 
Kansas  State  Militia  Cavalry  under  Brigadier-General  M. 
S.  Grant,  which  had  taken  position  on  the  Big  Blue 
above  its  junction  with  Indian  Creek.  Captain  McLain's 
Colorado  battery  was  assigned  to  the  right  wing  in  addi 
tion  to  the  mountain  howitzers  attached  to  each  brigade. 
There  were  also  some  unassigned  Kansas  militia  under 
Colonel  George  W.  Veale,  of  the  Shawnee  County  regi 
ment,  in  the  right  wing,  who  were  guarding  the  upper 
fords  of  the  Big  Blue  when  General  Blunt's  command  fell 
back  from  Independence  on  the  night  of  the  2ist.  The 
banks  on  both  sides  of  the  Big  Blue  from  its  junction  with 
Indian  Creek  to  its  mouth  were  generally  steep  and  pre 
cipitous,  with  very  few  good  fords  for  the  passage  of 
trains  and  artillery.  Of  the  four  or  five  fords  above  the 
crossing  of  the  Independence  and  Kansas  City  road, 
General  Curtis  knew  not  at  which  one  Price  would  make 
the  most  determined  effort  to  force  a  passage.  It  was 
therefore  impracticable  to  post  the  Federal  troops  so  as 
to  effectually  check  the  Confederates  and  prevent  them 
from  crossing  the  stream  at  whatever  point  they  might 
select.  There  was  heavy  timber  or  brush  woods  on  both 
sides  of  the  river,  extending  out  a  mile  or  so  except  where 
cleared  farms  came  up  to  the  banks,  so  that  it  was  diffi 
cult  for  the  Federal  signal  officers  to  observe  the  early 
movements  of  the  Confederates  when  making  a  demon 
stration  against  any  particular  point. 

On  the  morning  of  the  22d,  General  Blunt  directed 
Colonel  Ford  to  send  six  companies  of  the  Second  Colo 
rado  Cavalry  forward  on  the  Independence  and  Kansas 
City  road  east  of  the  Big  Blue  to  skirmish  with  the  enemy 
and  observe  their  movements  from  that  quarter.  This 
force  engaged  Jackman's  brigade  for  several  hours,  when 
Shelby  withdrew  his  troops  from  that  part  of  the  field 
and  concentrated  them  five  or  six  miles  south  of  that 
point  to  force  a  passage  of  the  Big  Blue  at  Byram's  Ford. 


478  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

This  movement  of  Shelby  towards  the  Federal  right  was 
immediately  reported  to  General  Curtis  by  Captain  E.  I. 
Meeker,  his  chief  signal  officer,  who  had  early  that  morn 
ing  sent  out  his  assistants  to  make  observations  from 
favorable  positions  of  the  movements  of  the  Confederate 
forces,  with  instructions  to  report  every  thirty  minutes. 
As  soon  as  General  Blunt  was  informed  of  this  movement 
being  made  against  his  right,  he  sent  Colonel  Jennison 
with  the  First  Brigade  to  defend  Byram's  Ford,  and 
Colonel  Moonlight  with  the  Second  Brigade  to  hold 
Simmons'  Ford  and  two  other  fords  between  that  point 
and  the  mouth  of  Brush  Creek.  Colonel  Ford,  of  the 
Fourth  Brigade,  formed  on  the  left  of  Colonel  Moonlight 
with  six  companies  Second  Colorado  Cavalry  and  the 
Twelfth  Kansas  State  Militia,  having  already  sent  the  Six 
teenth  Kansas  Cavalry  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sam 
uel  Walker  to  the  assistance  of  Colonel  Jennison  at 
Byram's  Ford. 

The  Fourth  Kansas  State  Militia  under  Colonel 
McCain  was  also  sent  to  reinforce  Colonel  Jennison. 
That  morning  the  advance  of  Price's  army  moved  for 
ward  from  Independence,  and  at  eleven  o'clock  Thomp 
son's  brigade  of  Shelby's  division  appeared  in  front  of 
Jennison  at  Byram's  Ford,  making  an  attack  upon  his 
outposts  and  endeavoring  to  force  a  passage  of  the  stream. 
The  entrance  to  and  exit  from  the  ford  were  obstructed 
by  trees  which  had  been  felled  across  the  road.  Trees 
had  also  been  felled  so  as  to  form  breastworks  near  the 
ford,  behind  which  Colonel  Jennison  posted  a  strong  line 
of  skirmishers,  and  with  the  aid  of  a  section  of  howitzers 
repulsed  every  attack  the  Confederates  made  in  front. 
After  skirmishing  had  been  kept  up  for  several  hours  be 
tween  the  opposing  forces  at  and  near  the  ford,  General 
Thompson  dismounted  a  part  of  his  brigade  and  ordered 
his  men  to  wade  the  river  and  effect  a  lodgment  on  the 
west  side.  As  soon  as  this  was  accomplished  the  rest  of 


SKIRMISH  ON  THE  BIG  BLUE.  479 

his  brigade  at  once  crossed  over,  when  he  attacked  Jenni- 
son  and  drove  him  back  nearly  to  Westport.  On  hearing 
cannonading  at  one  o'clock  some  distance  to  his  right, 
General  Blunt  despatched  a  courier  to  Colonel  Moonlight, 
commanding  the  Second  Brigade,  with  an  order  to  move  at 
once  to  the  assistance  of  Colonel  Jennison  at  Byram's 
Ford.  Captain  Grover,  with  his  Missouri  battalion,  hold 
ing  a  ford  near  the  mouth  of  Brush  Creek,  on  hearing  the 
cannonading  galloped  to  the  assistance  of  Colonel  Jenni 
son  and  participated  in  the  action  at  the  ford  and  on  the 
retreat.  But  as  the  First  Brigade  had  commenced  falling 
back  from  Byram's  Ford  before  Colonel  Moonlight  re 
ceived  the  order  to  reinforce  it,  he  moved  back  by  West- 
port,  and  two  or  three  miles  southwest  of  that  place  on 
the  State  line  joined  Colonel  Jennison. 

The  two  brigades  now  formed  line  of  battle  facing  east, 
threw  out  a  strong  skirmish-line,  and  advancing,  soon  en 
gaged  the  Confederates,  who,  after  making  slight  resist 
ance,  fell  back  about  two  miles. 

Shortly  after  Shelby's  division  had  forced  Jennison 
from  Byram's  Ford,  flanking  the  Federal  position  on  the 
right,  Generals  Blunt  and  Deitzler  commenced  to  with 
draw  their  forces  from  the  line  of  the  Big  Blue  and  to  fall 
back  upon  Kansas  City.  Captain  Grover's  Missouri  bat 
talion,  which  had  been  taking  an  active  part  in  all  the 
operations  on  the  Big  Blue,  was  in  the  evening  detached 
as  an  escort  to  accompany  Governor  Carney,  of  Kansas, 
who  had  that  day  been  to  the  front  with  the  troops,  back 
to  Kansas  City.  Directly  after  Moonlight  left  his  posi 
tion  on  the  Big  Blue,  Colonel  Ford,  who  was  formed  on 
his  left  with  part  of  the  Fourth  Brigade,  was  ordered  to 
Westport,  and  reached  that  place  about  four  o'clock  that 
afternoon  and  formed  his  command  a  short  distance 
north  of  town,  with  McLain's  battery,  covering  the  ap 
proaches  to  Kansas  City  from  that  direction. 

The  movement  of  Shelby  in  severing  the  Federal  line 


480  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

at  Byram's  Ford  cut  off  the  Kansas  militia  under  General 
Grant  at  Hickman's  Mills,  and  prevented  them  from 
forming  a  junction  with  General  Curtis'  forces  north  of 
that  ford.  After  crossing  the  Big  Blue  General  Shelby 
detached  Gordon's  regiment  from  Thompson's  brigade 
to  observe  the  movements  of  the  Federal  forces  on  his 
left  in  the  direction  of  Hickman's  Mills.  This  regiment 
soon  became  engaged  with  Colonel  Sandy  Lowe's  Twenty- 
first  Regiment  Kansas  Militia,  which  formed  a  part  of 
General  Grant's  militia  force  then  guarding  the  fords  of 
the  Big  Blue  below  Hickman's  Mills.  In  the  first  skir 
mish  the  Confederates  were  driven  back  some  distance,  but 
were  soon  reinforced  by  Jackman's  brigade,  when  General 
Shelby  ordered  his  entire  force  to  charge  the  militia.  In 
this  charge  the  line  of  the  militia  was  broken,  the  men 
thrown  into  some  confusion,  and  a  howitzer  captured  from 
them.  The  militia  under  Colonel  Veale  lost  in  this  affair 
and  in  the  pursuit  by  Jackman  after  their  line  was  broken, 
thirty-six  men  killed,  forty-three  wounded,  and  one  hun 
dred  taken  prisoners.  General  Grant  reported  that  the 
disaster  was  due  to  the  bad  conduct  of  Major  Laing, 
Fifteenth  Kansas  Cavalry,  who  with  a  battalion  of  that 
regiment  was  a  short  distance  in  his  rear  and  failed  to  sup 
port  him  after  he  was  requested  to  do  so.  As  he  was 
unable  to  join  the  forces  of  General  Curtis  at  and  near 
Kansas  City,  General  Grant  retired  with  his  command  to 
Olathe,  Kansas,  that  night.  After  the  skirmish  on  the 
prairie  south  of  Westport,  Colonel  Moonlight,  with  the 
Second  Brigade  and  a  regiment  of  Kansas  militia  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Johnson,  fell  back  to  the  Shawnee 
Mission,  a  mile  or  so  into  Kansas,  and  encamped  for  the 
night,  and  Colonel  Jennison  with  the  First  Brigade  fell 
back  to  Westport  at  dark  and  encamped  between  that 
place  and  Kansas  City,  near  Colonel  Ford's  command  of 
the  Fourth  Brigade.  The  Kansas  militia  and  the  bat 
teries  of  artillery  were  that  evening  ordered  within  the 


SKIRMISH  ON  THE  BIG  BLUE.  481 

fortified  lines  of  Kansas  City,  and  the  early  part  of  the 
night  was  spent  in  making  extensive  preparations  for  an 
attack  early  the  next  morning.  Having  during  the  day 
shown  much  less  energy  and  perseverance  in  pushing  the 
foe  than  on  other  occasions,  Generals  Curtis,  Blunt,  and 
Deitzler  also  moved  their  headquarters  into  the  city  that 
night.  Though  General  Curtis  was  at  the  front  all  day 
and  occupied  suitable  positions  for  directing  the  move 
ments  of  his  forces  and  of  keeping  advised  of  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy,  his  field  batteries,  some  of  which 
consisted  of  excellent  rifled  guns,  did  not  fire  a  single 
shot  at  the  foe,  nor  did  his  troops  make  a  single  charge 
to  resist  the  Confederate  advance. 

General  Pleasonton  with  his  Missouri  forces  had  that 
morning  at  ten  o'clock  attacked  a  brigade  of  Price's  rear 
guard  at  the  Little  Blue,  drove  it  back  upon  Pagan's  and 
Marmaduke's  divisions  at  Independence,  charged  and 
routed  these  divisions,  capturing  two  guns  and  four  hun 
dred  prisoners,  and  before  night  drove  them  back  upon 
the  Big  Blue.  In  the  fighting  during  the  day  both  sides 
used  their  artillery  freely,  and  the  booming  of  cannon, 
five  to  six  miles  distant,  was  certainly  within  hearing  of 
General  Curtis'  troops  nearly  all  the  afternoon.  While 
the  Army  of  the  Border  that  night  was  being  placed  be 
hind  the  lines  of  fortified  works  of  Kansas  City,  General 
Pleasonton's  forces  were  rushing  upon  the  Confederates 

with  a  reckless  fierceness,"  as  General  Clark  character 
ized  the  attack,  in  almost  impenetrable  darkness,  and 
until  nearly  eleven  o'clock. 

When  it  appeared  certain  that  Price  would  endeavor  to 
come  to  Kansas  City,  Colonel  Kersey  Coates,  command 
ing  a  brigade  of  Missouri  Enrolled  Militia  and  Home 
Guards,  commenced  fortifying  and  erecting  field-works 
south  and  southeast  of  the  city  so  as  to  command  the 
approaches  from  those  quarters.  As  the  Southern  army 
continued  to  advance,  and  as  the  danger  became  more 

VOL.  II  .—31 


482  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

imminent,  the  citizens  were  called  out  to  work  in  the 
trenches,  so  that  when  the  Army  of  the  Border  fell  back 
within  the  fortified  lines  the  city  was  in  a  good  defensive 
condition.  Directly  after  General  Curtis  moved  his 
headquarters  into  Kansas  City  that  evening  he  received 
information  that  General  Pleasonton  had  arrived  at  In 
dependence  and  had  attacked  and  driven  Price's  forces 
from  that  place  back  upon  the  Big  Blue.  This  informa 
tion,  and  perhaps  consciousness  of  the  fact  that  his  troops 
could  hardly  have  been  less  effectively  handled  that  day, 
determined  General  Curtis  to  act  with  greater  firmness 
and  resolution,  and  to  order  Generals  Blunt  and  Deitzler 
to  have  their  mounted  forces  and  light  batteries  in  motion 
at  three  o'clock  the  next  morning,  en  route  to  the  front  to 
attack  at  daylight  the  enemy  who  were  in  their  encamp 
ment  on  the  prairie  about  two  miles  southeast  of  West- 
port  and  south  of  Brush  Creek.  That  night  and  the 
next  morning  up  to  the  time  that  he  started  to  the  front, 
General  Curtis  had  an  unreasonable  fear  that  Price's  army 
was  trying  to  get  into  Kansas  City,  and  left  behind  three 
or  four  thousand  Kansas  and  Missouri  militia  and  some 
of  his  heavy  guns,  mounted,  under  General  Deitzler  and 
Colonel  Coates,  to  occupy  the  fortifications  and  to  resist 
any  attack  of  the  Confederates  in  the  event  they  should 
make  a  flank  movement  or  kill  or  capture  or  disperse  the 
force  of  seven  or  eight  thousand  men  sent  forward  under 
General  Blunt  early  that  morning. 

After  General  Pleasonton 's  forces  attacked  and  drove 
Pagan's  and  Marmaduke's  divisions  from  Independence, 
Price  had  no  further  thought  of  coming  to  Kansas  City, 
but  turned  his  attention  to  making  such  disposition  of  his 
troops  as  to  secure  the  safety  of  his  train.  At  daylight 
on  the  morning  of  the  23d,  the  First,  Second,  and  Fourth 
Brigades  under  General  Blunt  marched  in  column  through 
Westport  south,  and  crossing  to  the  south  side  of  Brush 
Creek,  deployed  in  line  of  battle  in  the  timber  along  that 


BATTLE  OF  WESTPORT.  483 

stream.  In  the  formation  of  the  line,  Colonel  Ford's 
Fourth  Brigade  occupied  the  extreme  left,  east  of  the 
road;  Colonel  Jennison's  First  Brigade,  including  Cap 
tain  Grover's  Missouri  battalion,  which  had  just  come  up 
from  escort  duty,  the  centre,  on  the  right  of  the  road ; 
and  Colonel  Moonlight's  Second  Brigade  the  extreme 
right,  extending  nearly  to  the  State  line.  A  section  of 
McLain's  Colorado  battery  was  unlimbered  in  the  road 
near  the  left  centre  and  soon  became  engaged  in  a  hot 
contest  with  Collins'  battery  of  rifled  guns  of  Shelby's 
division.  In  front  of  Jennison  there  was  a  large  field  in 
closed  with  stone  and  rail  fences,  affording  an  excellent 
shelter  for  his  dismounted  skirmishers,  who  were  thrown 
forward  covering  his  main  line. 

These  dispositions  were  just  completed  when  Shelby's 
division,  reinforced  by  two  brigades  of  Fagan's  division, 
advanced  to  the  attack,  so  that  the  entire  Federal  line 
immediately  became  engaged  in  a  fierce  conflict.  General 
Thompson's  brigade  coming  up,  it  was  ordered  to  charge 
the  Federal  centre.  His  men  moved  forward  with  steadi 
ness,  but  they  were  soon  repulsed  by  a  heavy  fire  from 
Jennison's  men  posted  behind  the  stone  fence.  In  a 
few  moments  part  of  Jackman's  brigade  made  a  charge 
to  carry  the  Federal  position,  but  his  men,  too,  were 
driven  back  in  confusion.  The  Arkansas  troops  coming 
up,  they  were  put  into  action  by  General  Shelby  and 
ordered  to  charge  in  column  up  the  road  to  take  the 
guns  of  McLain's  Colorado  battery.  This  charge  was  led 
by  Colonel  James  McGhee,  of  Dobbin's  brigade  Arkansas 
Cavalry,  and  resulted  disastrously  to  him  and  his  com 
mand.  He  was  assailed  on  the  Federal  right  by  the  Fif 
teenth  Kansas  Cavalry  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hoyt, 
and  in  front  by  the  Second  Colorado  Cavalry,  supporting 
the  section  of  the  battery,  and  in  the  hand-to-hand  con 
flict  that  took  place  he  encountered  Captain  Curtis  John 
son,  Fifteenth  Kansas  Cavalry,  both  firing  with  their 


484  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

revolvers  near  each  other,  he  receiving  a  mortal  wound 
and  Captain  Johnson  a  severe  wound  in  the  arm. 

When  the  Confederate  charging  column  was  thrown 
into  confusion,  the  Sixteenth  Kansas  and  Second  Colo 
rado  Cavalry  were  pushed  forward  in  a  counter-charge, 
led  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Samuel  Walker  of  the  latter 
regiment,  in  which  he  received  a  gunshot  wound  in  the 
foot.  In  this  conflict  the  Confederates  sustained  a  heavy 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  and  about  one  hundred  prison 
ers.  After  several  ineffectual  efforts  to  dislodge  the  Fed 
eral  troops  from  their  position,  General  Shelby  pushed  a 
force  to  occupy  a  thick  wood  on  Colonel  Ford's  right.  In 
gaining  this  position  the  Confederates  were  not  only  able 
to  flank  Colonel  Jennison's  men  behind  the  stone  fence 
and  force  them  to  fall  back,  but  they  were  also  able  to 
open  a  flank  fire  on  Colonel  Ford's  command  and  compel 
him  to  retire  to  the  north  side  of  Brush  Creek.  While 
the  Federal  left  and  centre  under  Colonels  Ford  and 
Jennison  were  thus  engaging  the  Confederate  forces, 
Colonel  Moonlight's  Second  Brigade  on  the  right  ad 
vanced,  driving  Shelby's  left  back  nearly  a  mile  after 
considerable  resistance.  But  in  this  movement  Colonel 
Moonlight  did  not  look  out  for  his  left  flank,  and  a  Con 
federate  force  coming  up  on  that  flank  gave  him  an 
enfilading  fire,  doing  some  damage.  He  immediately  or 
dered  two  companies  on  the  left  of  the  line  to  wheel  to 
the  left  and  return  the  fire.  This  movement  had  the 
effect  of  checking  the  enemy,  and  his  command  fell  back 
in  good  order  to  Westport,  his  right  flank  being  protected 
by  Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  M.  Woodworth  with  part  of 
the  Twelfth  Kansas  State  Militia. 

The  entire  Federal  line  had  now  fallen  back  to  the 
north  side  of  Brush  Creek,  and  most  of  it  to  the  suburbs 
of  Westport,  to  await  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Blair's  bri 
gade  of  Kansas  militia  from  Kansas  City,  which  had  been 
detained  at  that  place  until  its  horses  were  brought  back 


BATTLE   OF  WESTPORT,  485 

from  Wyandotte,  they  having  through  mistake  been  sent 
over  to  that  city  the  early  part  of  the  night.  At  this  time 
General  Shelby  was  not  prepared  to  push  the  retiring 
Federal  line,  for  most  of  his  troops  had  so  nearly  ex 
pended  their  ammunition  that  he  was  obliged  to  halt  on 
the  prairie  and  in  the  edge  of  the  timber  south  of  Brush 
Creek  to  await  a  supply.  To  occupy  the  attention  of 
the  Federal  forces  until  his  troops  could  replenish  their 
cartridge-boxes  with  ammunition,  Collins'  battery  was 
ordered  up  to  a  position  recently  vacated  by  the  section 
of  McLain's  Colorado  battery;  on  opening  fire  one  of  his 
rifled  guns  burst  at  the  first  round. 

On  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Blair's  brigade  and  other 
regiments  of  Kansas  militia  at  Westport,  General  Curtis, 
who  had  also  come  to  the  front,  rapidly  re-formed  his 
lines,  brought  up  additional  field  batteries,  and  made 
preparations  for  a  decisive  movement  against  the  foe, 
whose  lines  on  the  prairie  south  of  Brush  Creek  could  be 
plainly  seen  from  the  roof  of  the  Harris  House  in  West- 
port.  Up  to  this  time  only  a  single  section  of  the  field 
batteries  and  about  an  equal  number  of  mountain  howit 
zers  had  been  put  into  action  on  the  Federal  side.  But 
now,  as  the  Federal  line  was  about  to  advance  again,  Mc 
Lain's  Colorado  battery  was  placed  in  position  on  the 
brow  of  the  hill  north  of  Brush  Creek  towards  the  Federal 
left,  and  Captain  Dodge's  Ninth  Wisconsin  Battery,  six 
guns,  was  placed  a  short  distance  to  the  right  of  McLain 
near  the  road,  and  both  batteries  opened  a  vigorous  fire 
of  shot  and  shell  on  the  Confederate  line  on  the  high 
ground  south  of  the  creek.  In  making  new  dispositions 
of  the  Federal  forces,  Colonel  Moonlight's  Second  Bri 
gade  was  sent  around  on  the  Federal  right  to  keep  the 
enemy  out  of  Kansas,  which  Price  was  anxious  to  visit 
with  desolation  and  ruin.  Colonel  Blair's  Third  Brigade 
was  pushed  to  the  front,  south  of  Westport,  and,  dismount 
ing,  formed  on  the  bluff  north  of  Brush  Creek,  with 


486  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE   BORDER. 

Colonel  Ford's  Fourth  Brigade  on  his  left  and  Colonel 
Jennison's  First  Brigade  on  his  right. 

The  Fifth  and  Nineteenth  Regiments  Kansas  Militia, 
commanded  respectively  by  Colonels  Colton  and  Hogan, 
were  dismounted  to  support  McLain's  and  Dodge's  bat 
teries.  General  Curtis  now  came  upon  the  field  and 
ordered  his  entire  line  to  advance  to  the  attack.  As  the 
ground  on  the  south  side  of  the  creek  extending  for  half 
a  mile  back  was  covered  with  thick  brush  and  unsuitable 
for  manoeuvring  cavalry,  his  heavy  skirmish-lines  were 
dismounted  to  engage  the  enemy  from  the  timber.  On 
the  left  Colonel  Ford  dismounted  part  of  the  Second 
Colorado  Cavalry  and  part  of  the  Twelfth  Kansas  Militia 
to  advance  against  the  Confederate  skirmishers  and  force 
them  back  upon  their  main  line.  After  dismounting  his 
brigade  Colonel  Blair  pushed  his  men  forward  across  the 
creek  and  through  the  timber  and  underbrush  up  to  the 
north  side  of  a  field,  when  he  came  in  sight  of  a  Confed 
erate  force  posted  behind  a  stone  fence  on  the  opposite  side 
of  the  field.  He  held  his  position  behind  a  rail  fence, 
keeping  up  a  hot  fire  on  the  enemy  for  half  an  hour,  when 
he  was  ordered  to  retire  to  the  north  bank  of  the  creek. 
Still  farther  to  the  right  Colonel  Jennison's  First  Brigade 
was  engaging  the  Confederates,  and  on  his  right  Major- 
General  Deitzler  was  bringing  up  several  regiments  of 
Kansas  militia  and  placing  them  in  position  to  cooperate 
in  the  general  advance.  About  the  time  General  Curtis 
had  fairly  commenced  his  general  advance,  Shelby  received 
orders  from  Price  to  fall  back  and  join  the  other  divisions 
of  the  Confederate  army,  from  which  he  was  now  cut  off 
by  Pleasonton's  cavalry,  which  had  just  routed  Fagan  and 
Jackman,  who  were  covering  Shelby's  rear. 

Finding  that  his  rear  was  completely  in  the  possession 
of  Pleasonton's  command,  Shelby  cautiously  withdrew 
from  before  Curtis  and  quickly  prepared  to  make  a  des 
perate  charge  to  break  through  the  line  that  separated 


BATTLE   OF  WESTPORT.  487 

him  from  the  other  divisions  of  the  Southern  army.  Had 
General  Curtis  known  the  desperate  situation  in  which 
the  Confederates  were  placed,  he  would  probably  have 
pressed  the  attack  with  greater  energy  than  that  which 
characterized  his  movements  when  he  first  came  on  to 
the  field.  His  information  led  him  to  overestimate  the 
strength  of  the  Confederate  forces  and  perhaps  made 
him  overcautious  in  his  movements.  But  he  was  always 
to  the  front,  sharing  the  hardships  and  fatigues  of  the  field 
like  the  humblest  soldier,  and  his  presence  was  an  inspira 
tion  to  his  troops.  Directly  after  coming  on  to  the  field, 
he  thought  that  his  artillery  could  be  more  effectively 
employed,  and  took  Captain  Dodge's  battery  to  his  right 
to  cross  to  the  south  side  of  the  creek  to  take  up  a  posi 
tion  from  which  an  enfilading  fire  could  be  opened  upon 
the  Confederate  line.  But  thick  brush  and  a  rough  road 
made  it  impracticable  to  get  the  battery  into  position 
without  loss  of  time,  and  he  moved  to  the  left  and  ordered 
part  of  his  cavalry  of  Jennison's  and  Ford's  brigades  to 
charge  the  Confederate  line.  The  charge  was  made,  the 
enemy  gave  way,  and  then  it  was  soon  discovered  that 
the  entire  Confederate  line  was  retreating  from  the  field, 
with  a  heavy  skirmish-line  to  protect  the  rear  of  the 
column.  The  dismounted  troops  of  Ford's  Fourth  Bri 
gade  on  the  left  and  of  Blair's  Third  Brigade  of  Kansas 
militia  on  the  right  continued  to  advance  through  the 
thickets  and  timber  on  Brush  Creek  until  they  came  out 
upon  the  open  prairie  and  into  the  fields  south  of  that 
stream,  when  they  were  halted  until  their  horses  were 
brought  up  from  the  rear.  They  then  remounted  and 
moved  forward  ;  but  meanwhile  Shelby  had  struck  Pleason- 
ton's  command,  which  gave  him  such  a  shaking-up  that 
he  was  unable  to  get  his  men  together  in  the  semblance 
of  organization  until  late  that  evening. 

When  General  Curtis  found  that  the  enemy  were  falling 
back  from  his  front  he  ordered  up  his  artillery,  drew  in 


488  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE   BORDER. 

his  troops  from  his  flanks,  and  commenced  immediate 
pursuit  on  the  road  south  to  Little  Santa  Fe.  He  knew 
from  the  sound  of  artillery  firing  and  reports  made  to 
him  by  signal  officers  and  aides-de-camp  that  Pleasonton's 
forces  had  all  the  morning  been  engaging  the  Confeder 
ates  on  his  left  front,  and  at  half-past  two  o'clock  he 
overtook  Pleasonton,  who  had  halted  with  his  staff  and 
escort  to  wait  for  him  at  Indian  Creek,  ten  miles  south  of 
Westport.  They  held  a  consultation  in  regard  to  uniting 
their  forces  for  a  vigorous  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  and 
moved  south  to  Little  Santa  Fe,  where  headquarters  were 
made  that  night  and  near  which  place  most  of  their 
troops  encamped.  At  Indian  Creek  General  Curtis  issued 
an  order  relieving  all  that  part  of  Kansas  north  of  the 
Kansas  River  of  the  operation  of  martial  law,  and  dis 
charged  the  Kansas  militia  living  north  of  that  point,  as 
they  were  anxious  to  return  to  their  homes. 

Major-General  Deitzler,  who  commanded  the  Kansas 
militia  in  the  operations  described,  in  his  official  report 
commended  the  officers  and  men  for  their  zeal  and  valor  in 
defending  their  State  against  invasion.  Colonel  George 
W.  Veale's  Shawnee  County  Regiment  suffered  the 
heaviest  loss  of  any  of  the  Kansas  militia  in  the  opera 
tions  on  the  Big  Blue  and  about  Westport.  General  Deitz 
ler  warmly  praised  the  gallantry  of  the  members  of  his 
staff,  particularly  Lieutenant-Colonel  John  J.  Ingalls,  his 
Judge-Advocate  General,  who  bore  himself  with  conspicu 
ous  bravery  on  every  part  of  the  field  where  duty  called 
him.  The  militia  from  Southern  Kansas  continued  to 
operate  with  the  volunteer  forces  of  General  Curtis  until 
the  invading  army  passed  beyond  the  limit  of  threatened 
danger  to  the  State,  and  then  they,  too,  were  disbanded. 
Having  shared  with  the  volunteer  forces  the  dangers  and 
hardships  of  the  campaign,  they  returned  to  their  homes 
conscious  of  having  rendered  material  assistance  in  pre 
venting  the  enemy  from  desolating  their  State. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

BATTLES   OF    MINE    CREEK   AND    LITTLE    OSAGE. 

WHEN  the  Federal  forces  of  Missouri  and  Kansas  united 
at  Indian  Creek,  General  Curtis,  being  the  senior  officer 
present,  assumed  command  and  directed  their  further 
movements,  designating  General  Pleasonton's  command 
as  the  Second  Division,  Army  of  the  Border.  The  two 
divisions  were  ordered  to  march  at  four  o'clock  the  next 
morning  in  pursuit  of  Price,  the  First  Division  under 
General  Blunt  to  take  the  advance.  Colonel  Moonlight 
with  the  Second  Brigade  was  ordered  to  march  south 
through  Kansas  and  to  keep  on  the  right  flank  of  Price 
near  the  State  line  to  prevent  his  marauding  detachments 
from  entering  the  State  to  pillage,  plunder,  and  destroy 
the  property  of  the  citizens.  After  the  defeat  and  rout 
of  every  division  of  his  army  on  the  Big  Blue  and  south 
of  Westport,  General  Price  retreated  rapidly  south,  almost 
in  a  reckless  flight,  encamping  for  a  few  hours  late  that 
night  on  the  Middle  Fork  of  Grand  River  between  Pleas 
ant  Hill  and  the  State  line  to  feed  and  rest  and  await  the 
arrival  of  his  rearmost  troops.  The  Federal  forces  failing 
to  follow  up  their  advantage,  marching  only  three  or  four 
miles  to  Little  Santa  Fe  after  three  o'clock  that  day,  the 
march  of  the  Confederate  army  the  next  day  was  orderly 
and  undisturbed,  so  that  the  different  divisions  went  into 
camp  that  night  on  the  Marais  des  Cygnes  near  the  village 
of  Tradingpost,  in  Kansas.  All  day  long  the  24th,  the 

4S9 


490  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

troops  of  Curtis  and  Pleasonton  marched  steadily  forward 
on  the  trail  of  Price's  retreating  army,  and  at  eight  o'clock 
that  night,  at  Westpoint,  Pleasonton 's  division  was  given 
the  advance,  with  instructions  to  keep  in  motion  until  the 
Confederate  pickets  were  encountered  and  driven  in.  On 
this  night  march  General  Sanborn's  brigade  led  the  ad 
vance,  and  shortly  before  ten  o'clock  came  upon  the 
Confederate  pickets  north  of  Tradingpost  near  the  Marais 
des  Cygnes  River.  It  was  then  very  dark  and  raining 
hard.  Here  General  Sanborn  ordered  Colonel  Gravely, 
of  the  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia,  to  take  his  own  regi 
ment  and  the  Sixth  Missouri  State  Militia  and  move  for 
ward  cautiously  until  he  found  the  enemy  in  force.  The 
Colonel  soon  found  the  Confederate  army  encamped  at 
Tradingpost  on  the  Marais  des  Cygnes,  sent  a  message  back 
to  General  Sanborn  of  the  fact,  and  halted  his  command 
until  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  25th  for  further 
instructions. 

A  short  distance  north  of  the  Marais  des  Cygnes  at 
Tradingpost,  the  old  military  road  to  Fort  Scott  on 
which  the  army  was  moving  passed  through  a  gap  be 
tween  two  high  mounds,  each  perhaps  somewhat  over 
half  a  mile  in  length.  In  the  reconnoissance  made  by 
Colonel  Gravely  he  found  that  the  Confederates  occupied 
the  sides  and  summits  of  the  mounds  and  the  gap  be 
tween  them,  and  were  disposed  to  dispute  the  approaches. 
He  skirmished  with  the  enemy  until  towards  daybreak, 
when,  with  the  assistance  of  the  Fourth  Iowa  Cavalry 
under  Major  A.  R.  Pierce,  which  had  been  directed  to 
report  to  him,  he  was  ordered  by  General  Sanborn  to  ad 
vance  and  drive  the  Confederates  from  the  mounds  in  his 
front  and  take  possession  of  their  summits  and  the  gap 
between  them.  The  possession  of  the  mound  on  the 
right  of  the  road  was  secured  by  the  Fourth  Iowa  with 
out  much  fighting;  but  the  one  on  the  left  of  the  road  was 
defended  by  a  line  of  Confederates  formed  along  its  crest 


BATTLES  OF  MINE    CREEK  AND   LITTLE   OSAGE.     491 

nearly  its  entire  length  who  were  not  disposed  to  yield 
without  a  severe  struggle.  To  carry  this  position  the 
Sixth  and  Eighth  Regiments  Missouri  Militia  were  dis 
mounted.  Though  it  was  still  quite  dark,  they  advanced 
steadily  and  soon  commenced  to  ascend  the  mound,  which 
was  so  steep  that  it  was  with  difficulty  they  could  keep 
their  footing.  In  a  few  moments  more  the  loud  cheers 
of  the  ascending  line  of  troops,  followed  by  several  sharp 
volleys  from  their  carbines,  announced  that  they  had 
gained  the  heights  and  that  the  enemy  had  been  driven 
in  rapid  flight  down  the  southern  slope  of  the  mound 
towards  the  river.  To  aid  in  making  the  attack  effective, 
the  batteries  of  Captains  Montgomery  and  Thurber,  Sec 
ond  Missouri  Light  Artillery,  were  ordered  up,  and  by 
elevating  their  guns  to  a  sufficient  angle  they  were  able 
to  sweep  the  west  end  of  the  mound  and  the  gap  with  a 
storm  of  shot  and  shell. 

At  early  dawn  and  just  as  Sanborn  had  driven  the 
enemy  from  the  mounds  to  the  south  side  of  the  river, 
General  Pleasonton  came  to  the  front  and  directed  the 
further  movements  of  his  division.  He  directed  General 
Sanborn  with  his  brigade  to  immediately  force  a  crossing 
of  the  stream,  which  the  Confederates  were  holding  with 
a  strong  force  and  endeavoring  to  obstruct  by  felling  trees 
across  the  road  at  its  exit  from  the  ford.  General  Sanborn 
dismounted  Major  Mitchell's  battalion  Seventh  Pro 
visional  Regiment  Enrolled  Missouri  Militia,  as  skirmish 
ers  to  advance  on  his  right,  cross  the  river  about  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  above  the  ford,  move  down  on  the  south  side, 
and  drive  the  Confederates  from  the  brush  and  timber. 

On  the  left  of  Major  Mitchell,  the  Sixth  Provisional 
Regiment  Missouri  Enrolled  Militia  under  Colonel  Mc- 
Mahan  was  also  deployed  as  skirmishers,  and  assisted 
in  driving  the  Confederates  from  their  position  along  the 
south  side  of  the  river  bank.  After  some  supporting 
movements,  Colonel  Phelps,  with  the  Second  Arkansas 


4Q2  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

Cavalry,  was  directed  to  take  the  advance  and  cross  the 
river  at  the  main  ford,  which  he  did,  passing  the  obstruc 
tions  on  the  south  side  in  the  face  of  a  heavy  fire  of 
musketry  from  the  Confederates  formed  in  line  a  short 
distance  in  his  front.  He  was  supported  in  this  charge 
by  the  Sixth  and  Eighth  Regiments  Missouri  State  Mili 
tia,  dismounted,  the  Fourth  Iowa  Cavalry  of  the  Fourth 
Brigade,  and  three  companies  of  the  Second  Colorado 
Cavalry  which  had  come  to  the  front  that  morning  from 
General  Blunt's  division  in  the  rear.  On  being  driven 
from  the  timber  along  the  river  bottom,  the  Confederates 
formed  line  on  the  prairie  about  half  a  mile  south  of  the 
ford,  supported  by  a  section  of  artillery.  As  soon  as  he 
reached  the  open  ground  south  of  the  ford,  Colonel  Phelps 
fronted  his  brigade  into  line,  and  advancing,  charged  the 
Confederate  line  of  skirmishers  and  drove  them  back  upon 
their  main  line,  from  which  the  section  of  artillery  opened 
fire  upon  him.  The  other  regiments  of  the  Third  Brigade, 
having  been  dismounted  to  force  the  passage  of  the  river 
and  to  clear  the  brush  and  timber  of  the  enemy,  were 
unable  to  keep  up  with  his  rapid  movement,  and  he  was 
obliged  to  fall  back  upon  their  line  when  he  found  him 
self  unsupported  by  other  mounted  troops.  At  the  mo 
ment  of  the  charge  General  Sanborn  had  returned  to  the 
ford  to  bring  up  artillery  and  other  troops.  General 
Pleasonton  was  there,  superintending  the  removal  of  ob 
structions,  getting  his  troops  and  artillery  over,  and 
pushing  them  to  the  front  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

General  Sanborn  had  just  returned  to  the  front  with  a 
section  of  artillery,  had  opened  fire  upon  the  enemy,  and 
was  mounting  the  regiments  of  his  brigade,  when  Colonel 
Philips  with  the  First  Brigade  came  forward  at  a  gallop 
and  advanced  against  the  Confederate  left.  He  was 
soon  followed  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Benteen  with  the 
Fourth  Brigade  at  a  gallop,  who  bore  to  his  left.  By 
this  time  General  Sanborn  had  mounted  his  brigade,  and 


BATTLES  OF  MINE    CREEK  AND  LITTLE   OS  AGE.     493 

bearing  still  farther  to  the  Federal  left,  advanced  against 
the  Confederate  right.  But  before  these  three  brigades, 
which  were  advancing  in  columns  of  squadrons  and  of 
regiments,  deployed  in  line  of  battle,  General  Marma- 
duke,  who  was  in  command  of  the  Confederate  rear  that 
day,  withdrew  his  line  and  fell  back.  From  the  Marais 
des  Cygnes  to  Mine  Creek,  a  distance  of  four  miles,  the 
road  passed  over  a  broad,  smooth  prairie  and  a  few  un 
dulating  ridges.  As  it  did  not  seem  likely  that  the  Con 
federates  would  make  another  stand  immediately,  General 
Sanborn's  brigade  was  permitted  to  drop  to  the  rear  to 
rest  and  feed  for  a  few  moments.  His  regiments  had  been 
on  duty  all  night  in  the  rain  and  all  the  morning  up  to 
ten  o'clock,  fighting  and  skirmishing,  and  as  his  men  and 
horses  had  been  without  anything  to  eat,  their  powers  of 
endurance  were  put  to  the  severest  test.  Meanwhile 
Philips'  brigade,  followed  by  Benteen's  brigade,  kept  up 
the  pursuit  over  the  broad  prairie  at  a  trot  and  a  gallop 
and  forced  Marmaduke's  and  Pagan's  divisions  into  line 
of  battle  about  one  hundred  yards  north  of  Mine  Creek. 
This  small  stream,  with  precipitous  banks  and  lightly 
wooded,  had  no  good  wagon  fords  in  the  immediate  vicin 
ity  of  the  main  crossing,  which  was  now  blocked  by  the 
Confederate  train,  which  had  been  brought  to  a  halt  by 
some  accident. 

On  being  informed  that  Marmaduke  was  closely  pressed, 
General  Fagan  halted  his  division  to  support  him,  and 
placed  in  position  all  the  artillery  of  Price's  army,  except 
the  three  guns  of  Shelby's  division,  to  check  the  Federal 
advance.  In  the  rapid  pursuit  over  the  prairie,  Philips' 
advance  regiment  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lazear,  First 
Missouri  State  Militia,  had  kept  so  close  upon  Marmaduke 
— within  five  or  six  hundred  yards  of  his  line — that  when 
he  was  brought  to  a  halt  by  the  train  obstructing  the  road 
at  the  crossing  of  the  creek  he  was  obliged  to  make  the 
most  hurried  dispositions  for  battle.  In  his  hasty  con- 


494  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

sultation  with  Generals  Fagan,  Clark,  and  Cabell,  it  was 
decided  that  the  situation  was  so  critical  that  it  would  be 
unsafe  to  attempt  to  dismount  their  troops  and  send  their 
horses  to  the  rear  so  as  to  make  the  fight  on  foot.  Many 
of  their  troops  were  armed  with  infantry  rifles,  which, 
after  being  once  discharged,  could  not  easily  be  reloaded 
on  horseback,  and  were  therefore  very  ineffective  in  a 
cavalry  fight.  In  coming  upon  the  field  Colonel  Philips 
deployed  the  regiments  of  his  brigade  in  line  at  a  gallop, 
placing  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lazear  with  the  First  Missouri 
State  Militia  on  his  left,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Crittenden 
with  the  Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia  in  the  centre,  and 
Major  Kelley  with  the  Fourth  Missouri  State  Militia  on 
his  right.  He  saw  at  once  from  the  high  ground  of  his 
position  overlooking  the  valley  of  Mine  Creek  two  divisions 
of  the  Confederate  army  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  in  his 
immediate  front,  supported  by  eight  guns,  and  most  of 
the  Confederate  train  south  of  the  creek  was  plainly  seen 
making  desperate  efforts  to  get  away.  He  sent  an  aid  to 
General  Pleasonton  to  lay  before  him  the  situation  and 
to  request  immediate  assistance.  As  the  long  lines  of 
Marmaduke  and  Fagan  threatened  to  flank  him  on  the 
right  and  left,  he  was  obliged  to  extend  his  line  to  the 
right.  The  Confederate  batteries  had  commenced  to 
play  upon  his  position  and  he  saw  that  the  Confederate 
officers  were  preparing  to  charge  him  by  advancing  in 
double  columns.  He  knew  that  it  was  of  the  utmost  im 
portance  to  strike  the  Confederates  before  they  com 
menced  to  advance,  and  at  the  moment  of  his  supreme 
anxiety  he  was  delighted  to  see  Colonel  Benteen's  brigade 
coming  up  on  his  left.  Lieutenant  Smiley,  with  a  section 
of  Captain  Montgomery's  battery,  Second  Missouri  Light 
Artillery,  having  been  sent  forward  by  Colonel  Cole,  came 
up  at  a  gallop,  and  unlimbering,  went  into  action,  using 
double  charges  of  canister  within  easy  range. 

As  soon  as  the  advance  regiment  of  the  Fourth  Brigade 


PHILIPS  BRIGADE 


BLNTEELN'S    BRIGADE: 


MARMA  D  UKL' 


CABLLL'S          D  I  V  I  S 


--FIELD 


D /V / S  I  ON 


FEDERAL  MM 

CONFEDLRA  T£  rw~i ' 


BATTLE   OF   MINE   CREEK,    KANSAS,   OCTOBER   25,    1864. 


BATTLES  OF  MINE    CREEK  AND  LITTLE   OSAGE.     495 

aligned  with  the  left  of  the  First  Brigade,  Colonel  Philips 
ordered  the  charge  and  then  the  two  brigades  were  quickly 
hurled  against  the  Confederate  line  with  such  terrific  en 
ergy  that  it  almost  instantly  gave  way  in  the  wildest  con 
fusion.  The  giving  way  of  the  Confederate  lines  was 
immediately  followed  by  the  triumphant  shouts  of  the 
Federal  soldiers  that  rose  above  the  clamor  of  the  con 
flict.  A  large  number  of  Confederate  soldiers,  consisting 
of  several  regiments,  who  were  armed  with  long  infantry 
guns,  on  discharging  them  wheeled  their  horses  and  turned 
to  flight,  and  running  over  broke  the  lines  formed  in  their 
rear.  In  another  moment  the  troops  of  the  charging 
columns,  drawing  their  sabres  and  revolvers,  were  bear 
ing  down  upon  and  mingling  with  this  demoralized  and 
panic-stricken  mass  of  the  enemy,  cutting  and  shooting 
them  down  and  making  fearful  havoc.  Confederate  offi 
cers  rode  hurriedly  to  and  fro  making  every  effort  to  rally 
their  men,  to  check  the  swelling  tide  of  disaster;  but  all 
their  appeals  and  threats  were  ineffectual,  for  Philips' 
brigade  sweeping  over  the  field  broke  their  left  and  cen 
tre,  cutting  off  and  capturing  Major-General  Marmaduke, 
Brigadier-General  Cabell,  several  colonels,  a  number  of 
line  officers,  upwards  of  four  hundred  enlisted  men,  four 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  one  battle  flag,  besides  killing  and 
wounding  a  large  number  of  men  in  the  general  fight  that 
took  place. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Benteen's  brigade  swept  forward 
on  the  Federal  left  with  almost  equal  success,  breaking 
the  Confederate  right  and  capturing  four  pieces  of  artil 
lery  and  a  large  number  of  prisoners,  including  several 
colonels  and  line  officers,  and  two  stands  of  colors.  With 
out  stopping  to  look  after  the  prisoners  and  captured 
artillery,  a  part  each  of  the  First  and  Fourth  Brigades 
crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  creek  and  took  up  the 
pursuit  of  the  broken  and  demoralized  Confederate  troops, 
who  in  reckless  flight  were  endeavoring  to  escape  from 


496  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

the  scene  of  their  disaster.  In  this  pursuit  the  Federal 
soldiers  used  their  revolvers  and  sabres  freely,  increasing 
the  consternation  among  the  Confederates  and  causing 
them  to  throw  away  their  arms  and  equipments  and  every 
thing  that  impeded  their  flight.  Colonel  Colton  Greene, 
commanding  a  brigade  in  Marmaduke's  division,  reported 
that  over  two  thirds  of  his  men  threw  away  or  lost  their 
arms  in  this  disastrous  rout. 

General  Price,  who  was  riding  in  his  carriage  in  the  rear 
of  Shelby's  division  several  miles  in  advance  and  in  front 
of  his  train,  on  receiving  a  note  from  General  Marmaduke 
that  the  Federal  troops  were  advancing  in  force,  mounted 
his  white  horse  and  rode  towards  his  rear  until  he  met 
the  men  of  Marmaduke's  and  Fagan's  divisions — all  who 
had  escaped  from  the  scene  of  the  recent  disaster — re 
treating  in  the  wildest  confusion.  With  some  of  his 
officers  he  endeavored  to  rally  them ;  but  all  his  efforts  in 
that  direction  were  ineffective,  for  in  their  mad  flight 
they  paid  very  little  attention  to  entreaties  or  commands. 

After  making  some  details  to  take  charge  of  the  prison 
ers  and  captured  artillery  on  the  field,  General  Pleasonton 
pushed  forward  Philips'  and  Benteen's  brigades  in  pur 
suit  of  the  enemy,  and  sent  his  aids  back  to  bring  up  the 
Second  and  Third  Brigades  of  his  division.  General 
Sanborn,  who  had  halted  his  brigade  to  rest  and  feed 
behind  a  ridge  in  the  prairie  about  a  mile  from  the  battle 
field,  on  hearing  the  roar  of  the  artillery  and  small-arms 
immediately  mounted  his  command  without  waiting  for 
orders  and  rode  to  the  front  at  a  gallop,  arriving  there 
just  as  the  fight  was  over.  He  then  pushed  forward,  and 
about  three  miles  south  of  Mine  Creek  relieved  Philips' 
First  Brigade  of  the  advance.  His  line  of  march  was  now 
over  a  wide  expanse  of  prairie  to  the  timber  skirting  the 
valley  of  the  Little  Osage  River,  a  distance  of  eight  miles. 
In  passing  over  this  prairie  his  advance  was  almost  con 
stantly  in  sight  of  the  Confederates  of  the  two  broken 


BATTLES  OF  MINE   CREEK  AND  LITTLE   OSAGE.     497 

divisions  and  he  twice  formed  his  brigade  in  line  to  en 
gage  them,  but  they  showed  no  disposition  to  make  a 
stand.  On  approaching  the  Little  Osage,  he  came  in 
sight  of  part  of  Shelby's  division  under  General  Thomp 
son  and  Colonel  Slayback  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  to 
cover  the  retreat  of  the  demoralized  troops  of  Marma- 
duke's  and  Pagan's  divisions.  He  at  once  threw  his 
brigade  into  line  and  commenced  to  advance,  when  Shelby 
withdrew  his  troops  to  the  timber  along  the  Little  Osage 
without  making  a  fight.  The  Federal  line,  however,  con 
tinued  to  advance,  and  when  nearing  the  timber  General 
Sanborn  received  the  order  to  charge,  which  his  troops 
received  with  eagerness  and  pushed  forward,  driving  the 
Confederates  from  the  brush  and  timber  and  across  the 
stream  to  a  ridge  a  mile  beyond,  when  he  halted  to  re 
form  his  line.  Here  General  Pleasonton  succeeded  in 
getting  General  McNeil's  Second  Brigade  to  the  front, 
about  two  o'clock,  with  instructions  to  form  on  the  left 
of  Sanborn.  His  First  and  Fourth  Brigades  were  closed 
up  to  support  his  advance  line,  and  he  now  had  his  entire 
division  on  the  field  under  his  immediate  direction. 

General  Shelby  had  taken  up  a  strong  position,  formed 
his  troops  in  three  lines,  part  of  them  being  protected 
behind  the  fences  of  a  cornfield,  and  he  was  determined 
to  make  a  desperate  struggle  before  yielding.  His  divi 
sion  up  to  this  time  in  the  campaign  had  fought  the  Fed 
eral  forces  more  successfully  than  the  other  divisions  of 
Price's  army,  giving  it  a  prestige  that  enabled  him  to  hold 
his  men  under  fire  with  great  steadiness.  There  was 
skirmishing  between  the  opposing  forces  for  perhaps  half 
an  hour  before  General  Pleasonton  ordered  his  troops  to 
the  charge. 

McNeil's  brigade  had  been  brought  forward  at  a  gallop 
for  ten  miles,  and  on  reaching  the  front  his  command  was 
much  scattered  and  the  horses  of  many  of  his  men  so 
nearly  exhausted  that  it  was  with  difficulty  they  could  be 

VOL.   II.— 33 


498  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

moved  to  a  trot.  The  horses  of  Sanborn's  brigade  were 
also  much  worn  out,  having  been  on  duty  all  night  and 
all  day  and  having  been  frequently  urged  to  the  gallop 
in  advancing  or  taking  position  in  line.  As  soon  as  the 
rearmost  regiment  of  McNeil's  brigade  had  closed  up  and 
Colonel  Cole  had  brought  forward  the  artillery  of  the 
division,  General  Pleasonton  ordered  the  Second  and 
Third  Brigades  to  advance  to  the  attack.  Colonel  Epp- 
stein,  with  the  Fifth  Missouri  State  Militia  dismounted, 
charged  through  the  cornfield,  driving  the  Confederates 
before  him,  while  the  other  regiments  of  the  Second 
Brigade  charged  mounted  to  his  right  around  the  field, 
forcing  the  Confederates  from  their  position  in  that  quar 
ter.  Still  farther  on  the  Federal  right  the  regiments  of 
Sanborn's  brigade  were  charging  and  driving  the  enemy 
before  them  with  steadiness  and  courage.  In  the  pursuit 
of  the  next  four  miles  over  the  prairie  there  were  a  suc 
cession  of  charges  made  by  the  regiments  of  McNeil's  and 
Sanborn's  brigades  whenever  the  Confederates  attempted 
to  make  a  stand. 

About  eight  miles  north  of  Fort  Scott  Sanborn's  bri 
gade  halted  for  a  short  rest,  the  horses  of  his  command 
being  so  nearly  exhausted  that  they  could  not  be  urged 
to  move  out  of  a  walk.  They  had  had  only  a  few  hours' 
rest  and  very  little  feed  since  the  brigade  encamped  at 
Little  Santa  Fe",  eighty  miles  in  the  rear,  on  the  night  of 
the  23d.  General  McNeil,  with  the  Second  Brigade,  con 
tinued  the  pursuit,  and  was  soon  joined  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Benteen  with  the  Fourth  Brigade,  when  they 
advanced,  and  in  a  short  time  came  upon  Price's  entire 
army  on  Shiloh  Creek  about  six  miles  northeast  of  Fort 
Scott.  At  this  place  Generals  Fagan  and  Clark  had 
rallied  the  troops  of  the  routed  divisions  and  formed 
them,  including  those  who  had  thrown  away  their  arms 
in  their  flight,  with  the  other  troops  of  Price's  army,  who 
were  drawn  up  in  quadruple  line  of  battle,  making  an  im- 


BATTLES  OF  MINE    CREEK  AND  LITTLE   OSAGE.    499 

posing  appearance  by  their  immense  numbers.  Shelby's 
division  formed  the  front  line  of  this  great  display  of 
force — the  only  troops  to  be  depended  upon  in  making 
the  fight,  except  perhaps  Tyler's  brigade  of  recruits,  who 
had  not  yet  been  much  demoralized  in  the  operations  of 
the  day.  Colonel  Cole,  Chief  of  Artillery,  brought  up  the 
batteries  of  the  division  as  rapidly  as  his  worn-out  horses 
could  be  urged  forward,  and  placing  his  guns  in  position, 
commenced  shelling  the  great  masses  of  the  enemy  directly 
in  his  front.  His  batteries  expended  in  this  and  in  the 
other  actions  of  the  day  220  rounds  of  shell  and  canister. 
In  making  this  last  attack  General  Pleasonton  ordered 
McNeil  to  form  the  Second  and  Fourth  Brigades  into 
double  line  of  battle  and  advance  and  charge  the  enemy. 
The  charge  was  made,  but  it  was  made  at  a  walk,  for  it 
was  impossible  to  urge  the  horses  forward  at  a  more  rapid 
gait,  they  were  so  much  worn  out  by  the  exertions  of  the 
day  and  the  continuous  hard  service  of  the  campaign.  In 
their  steady  advance  the  two  brigades  soon  encountered 
Shelby's  division,  when  a  fierce  conflict  took  place  in 
which  the  Confederates  were  driven  back  a  short  distance. 
Shelby  then  brought  to  his  front  line  other  brigades  of 
his  division,  and  with  the  rallied  troops  of  the  routed 
divisions  the  Confederate  line  was  extended,  threatening 
to  outflank  McNeil.  At  this  moment  Colonel  Cole  turned 
the  rifled  guns  of  his  batteries  on  the  Confederate  flanks, 
using  shell  and  canister,  and  drove  them  back  in  confu 
sion.  He  then  concentrated  the  fire  of  his  ten  guns  on 
the  Confederate  centre  and  soon  broke  that  part  of  Price's 
line,  and  at  sundown  the  Southern  forces  moved  off  in 
rapid  retreat  to  the  crossing  of  the  Marmiton  River  ten 
miles  east  of  Fort  Scott.  In  this  fight  the  three  remain 
ing  guns  of  Price's  army  were  not  brought  into  action,  so 
that  Colonel  Cole  was  able  to  use  all  the  guns  of  his  bat 
teries  in  sweeping  the  Confederate  lines  with  shell  and 
canister  on  every  part  of  the  field  where  he  found  them 


500  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

most  dense  and  accessible.  It  appears  that  the  entire 
Southern  army  now  became  seized  with  panic,  losing  all 
regimental  and  brigade  organization.  The  Confederate 
train  had  been  sent  on  to  the  Marmiton  River  under 
heavy  escort  while  the  fight  was  going  on.  It  was  near 
midnight  when  the  last  of  the  Confederate  troops  crossed 
that  stream.  A  halt  of  an  hour  or  so  was  made  to  close 
up  the  demoralized  troops,  destroy  the  train,  and  blow 
up  the  artillery  ammunition  of  the  lost  guns,  when  the 
retreat  was  commenced  and  continued  without  interrup 
tion  to  Carthage,  a  distance  of  sixty  miles.  Shortly  after 
midnight  the  loud  explosions  from  the  blowing  up  of  the 
Confederate  ammunition  train  were  distinctly  heard  at 
Fort  Scott. 

From  the  Marmiton  River,  where  Price  ordered  his  train 
burned,  back  to  Mine  Creek,  a  distance  of  upwards  of 
twenty  miles,  the  route  over  which  the  Confederate  army 
retreated  was  strewn  with  arms,  equipments,  abandoned 
wagons  and  teams,  and  the  debris  of  a  routed  army.  In 
all  the  operations  of  the  day,  General  Pleasonton  had  dis 
played  energy  and  good  judgment,  and  when  night  came 
he  could  view  with  satisfaction  what  he  had  accom 
plished.  At  dark  he  took  Philips'  First  Brigade  and  San- 
born's  Third  Brigade  and  his  artillery  and  marched  into 
Fort  Scott  to  obtain  rations  for  his  men  and  feed  for  his 
horses,  of  which  they  were  in  great  need,  leaving  the 
Second  and  Fourth  Brigades  under  General  McNeil  to 
bivouac  on  the  field.  On  leaving  the  field  he  saw  the 
advance  of  the  Kansas  troops  under  General  Curtis  com 
ing  in  sight  and  he  was  soon  overtaken  by  General  Cur 
tis,  who  protested  against  taking  his  troops  to  Fort  Scott 
for  supplies.  General  Curtis  expressed  some  anxiety 
about  leaving  General  McNeil  with  two  brigades  to 
bivouac  on  the  field ;  but  the  Kansas  troops  under  the 
immediate  command  of  General  Blunt  coming  up,  they, 
too,  bore  to  the  right  and  moved  into  Fort  Scott  for 


BATTLES  OF  MINE    CREEK  AND  LITTLE   OS  AGE.     50! 

supplies,  thereby  losing  a  golden  opportunity  of  securing 
laurels  which  might  have  been  easily  won.  These  troops 
having  rested  all  night  and  a  good  part  of  the  day  and 
coming  up  fresh  were  in  good  condition  to  continue  the 
pursuit  of  the  enemy  then  scarcely  out  of  sight.  Had 
General  Curtis  led  his  troops  in  a  night  attack  on  the 
Confederate  forces,  supported  by  the  two  brigades  under 
McNeil,  he  might  have  secured  Price's  train  before  it  was 
destroyed,  and  captured  most  of  his  men.  On  this  day 
he  did  not  display  his  usual  energy  and  good  judgment 
in  handling  his  troops ;  nor  were  all  his  actions  consistent. 
When  General  Sanborn,  who  was  commanding  the 
advance,  came  up  within  shelling  distance  of  Price's  en 
campment  on  the  Marais  des  Cygnes  about  midnight  and 
reported  the  fact,  General  Curtis  sent  an  aid  to  him  or 
dering  him  to  open  fire  with  his  batteries  at  once  on  the 
Confederate  camp.  It  was  intensely  dark  and  raining, 
and  as  he  knew  nothing  about  the  topographical  features 
of  the  locality,  Sanborn  declined  to  take  the  responsibil 
ity  of  making  the  attack  until  towards  daybreak.  Had 
it  not  been  for  his  good  judgment  in  declining  to  take 
the  responsibility  of  making  the  attack  as  directed,  Price's 
army  would  unquestionably  have  got  away  without  dis 
aster,  for  he  certainly  would  have  retreated  in  great  haste 
had  the  heavy  field  batteries  of  Pleasonton  opened  upon 
his  camp  at  that  time  of  the  night.  It  was  the  purpose 
of  General  Curtis  thus  to  keep  Price  moving  south  by 
firing  artillery  in  his  rear,  but  General  Pleasonton  pro 
posed  to  overtake  the  Confederate  army  and  crush  it. 
After  Pleasonton  had  been  busy  all  day  in  destroying 
Price's  army  and  capturing  his  generals  and  troops  and 
artillery  and  trains,  General  Curtis  suddenly  became  seized 
with  a  desire  to  complete  the  destruction  of  the  enemy, 
but  did  not  propose  to  do  it  with  his  own  troops.  He 
weakened  his  effective  force  by  sending  one  of  his  veteran 
brigades  off  on  a  flank  movement  to  keep  Price's  foraging 


5<D2  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

detachments  out  of  Kansas,  when  his  numerous  Kansas 
militia  regiments  would  have  been  ample  for  that  purpose. 
He  permitted  some  of  his  numerous  aids  to  embarrass  the 
operations  of  Pleasonton's  troops  by  their  officious  and 
offensive  bearing  in  giving  and  countermanding  orders  in 
his  name  instead  of  devoting  their  energies  to  bringing  his 
own  troops  on  to  the  field.  Indeed  General  Pleasonton 
was  obliged  to  arrest  at  least  one  of  these  officious  aids, 
Colonel  Ritchie. 

While  Pleasonton  was  at  the  front  fighting  Price  from 
daybreak  until  dark,  General  Curtis  came  up  and  ordered 
his  own  provost-marshal  to  take  charge  of  the  prisoners, 
captured  artillery,  and  property,  and  when  he  got  to  Fort 
Scott  that  night  directed  that  these  trophies  of  the  cam 
paign  be  sent  to  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas.  He  thus 
proposed  to  deprive  the  Missouri  troops  of  their  justly 
won  trophies  and  to  bestow  them  upon  the  Kansas  troops, 
who  were  not  entitled  to  them,  nor  to  the  prestige  such  an 
act  would  tend  to  give,  by  being  bruited  to  the  world. 
Even  before  the  prisoners  and  captured  artillery  arrived 
at  Fort  Scott,  Major  Suess  and  Captain  Yates  of  General 
Pleasonton's  staff  claimed  them  from  General  Curtis' 
provost-marshal  as  trophies  of  the  Missouri  troops,  and 
on  his  refusal  to  give  them  up  hot  words  passed  between 
the  staff-officers  of  the  two  generals  about  the  matter. 
Of  course  when  General  Pleasonton  saw  that  it  was  pro 
posed  to  take  his  hard-earned  trophies  from  him  and  not 
permit  him  to  convey  them  back  into  his  own  Depart 
ment,  he  was  greatly  angered  and  declined  to  take  further 
part  in  the  campaign  by  his  presence  at  the  front ;  but 
ordered  nearly  three  brigades  of  his  command  to  report  to 
General  Curtis  to  continue  the  pursuit  of  Price's  demoral 
ized  army.  Colonel  Philips,  being  disabled  by  having 
received  a  serious  injury  in  his  right  eye  in  the  charge  at 
Mine  Creek,  either  from  an  exploded  cap  near  him  or  from 
a  sliver  from  a  flying  missile,  was  taken  to  the  hotel  at 
Fort  Scott  the  night  of  the  arrival  of  part  of  General 


BATTLES  OF  MINE   CREEK  AND   LITTLE   OSAGE.     503 

Pleasonton's  command  at  that  place,  and  suffered  intense 
agony  all  night.  Though  suffering  from  his  wound,  as 
soon  as  two  regiments  of  his  brigade  were  furnished  with 
subsistence  and  his  horses'  shoes  reset,  which  occupied 
about  six  hours,  he  resumed  the  pursuit  south  after  Price's 
fleeing  army,  travelling  himself  in  an  ambulance.  The 
morning  of  the  second  day  of  this  march  he  received  a 
countermanding  order  from  General  Pleasonton,  and  re 
turned  with  his  command  to  the  military  post  at  Warrens- 
burg,  Missouri.  In  recognition  of  his  gallantry  in  the 
campaign  he  was  soon  afterwards  placed  in  command  of 
the  Central  District  of  Missouri,  by  order  of  General 
Rosecrans,  commanding  the  Department. 

After  seeing  his  detached  brigades  supplied  with  sub 
sistence  and  forage,  and  resting  a  day  at  Fort  Scott, 
General  Pleasonton,  with  part  of  Philips'  brigade,  took 
the  prisoners  and  captured  artillery  and  marched  to  War- 
rensburg,  arriving  at  that  place  on  the  last  day  of  Octo 
ber.  It  was  hardly  generous  of  General  Curtis  and  his 
friends  to  censure  General  Pleasonton  for  withdrawing 
from  the  campaign  at  that  point,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
two  splendid  opportunities  were  given  Curtis  that  day  to 
place  his  troops  in  positions  where  they  might  have  won 
glorious  results.  They  were  not  so  far  in  the  rear  when 
the  fight  opened  at  the  Marais  des  Cygnes  but  what  they 
could  have  been  brought  up  on  the  right  flank  of  the 
enemy,  and  after  the  battle  of  Mine  Creek  they  might 
have  cut  off  and  captured  the  routed  troops  of  Pagan's 
and  Marmaduke's  divisions  who  were  escaping  from  the 
field.  The  country  was  open  prairie,  the  streams  were 
easily  forded  by  mounted  troops,  and  the  Kansas  forces 
could  have  marched  on  a  road  parallel  with  Pleasonton's 
command  and  cooperated  with  it  at  any  point  in  the 
operations  of  that  day. 

At  Fort  Scott  Captain  Grover  was  ordered  by  General 
Pleasonton  to  return  with  his  battalion  of  Missouri  cavalry 
to  Warrensburg,  Missouri.  The  Captain  marched  back 


504 


THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 


to  his  station  via  Hickman's  Mills  and  Pleasant  Hill. 
Near  this  latter  place  he  ran  into  and  engaged  in  a  sharp 
skirmish  part  of  Quantrill's  bandits,  who  had  attacked  a 
company  of  the  Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry 
under  Captain  M.  W.  Foster,  who  was  escorting  Gover 
nor  W.  P.  Hall,  of  Missouri,  to  Warrensburg.  The  Gov 
ernor  had  been  with  the  army  under  Rosecrans  operating 
against  Price  and  was  returning  to  Warrensburg  when 
attacked.  Captain  Grover  came  up  just  in  time  to  save 
the  Governor  and  his  escort  from  possible  disaster,  and 
joined  in  the  chase  of  the  bandits  until  late  that  night. 

LIST  OF  CASUALTIES  IN  GENERAL  PLEASONTON'S  CAVALRY 
DIVISION  DURING  THE  PRICE  RAID  IN  OCTOBER,  1864. 


Command. 

Killed. 

Wound- 
ed. 

Missing. 

oJ 

a 

<D 

1 

Officers. 

B 

<u 

Officers. 

ts 
u 

s 

B 

8 
(S 

O 

c 
<u 

First  Brigade,  Col.  J.  F.  Philips, 
Commanding. 

First  Missouri  State  Militia,  Lieut.  - 
Col.  B.  F.  Lazear,  commanding.  .  . 
Fourth   Missouri  State  Militia,   Maj. 
G.  W.  Kelley,  commanding  

i 

2 
2 

5 

10 

8 
3 

i 
3 

4 
8 

42 

47 
17 

I 

2 

55 
62 
26 

Seventh  Missouri  State  Militia,  Lieut.  - 
Col.T.  T.  Crittenden,  commanding. 
Total 

21 

106 

3 

143 

Second  Brigade,  Brig.  -Gen.  John 
McNeil,  Commanding. 

Second  Missouri  Cavalry,  Capt.  Geo. 
M.  Houston    commanding 

2 
2 

21 
2 
I 

4 

4 

5 
17 

5 
i 

2 

19 
6 

2 

4 

24 
29 
25 

i 

13 
i 

2 

Third  Missouri  State  Militia,  Lieut.- 
Col.  H.  M.  Matthews,  commanding. 
Thirteenth  Missouri  Cavalry,  Col.  E. 
C.  Catherwood,  commanding  
Ninth  Missouri  State  Militia,  Lieut.  - 
Col.  D.  M.  Draper,  commanding.. 
Fifth  Missouri  State  Militia,  Lieut.  - 
Col.  J.  A.  Eppstein,  commanding.. 
Seventh  Kansas  Cavalry,  Maj.  F.  M. 
Malone,  commanding 

Seventeenth    Illinois     Cavalry,    Col. 
John  L.  Beveridge,  commanding.  . 
Total  

28 

4 

30 

3i 

95 

BATTLES  OF  MINE    CREEK  AND  LITTLE   OS  AGE.      505 


Command. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Missing. 

« 

"S 

tJD 
< 

Officers. 

c 

V 

Officers. 

C 
V 

Officers. 

c 

OJ 

S 

Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  B. 
Sanborn,  Commanding. 

Sixth    Missouri    State    Militia,    Maj. 
William  Plumb,  commanding  
Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia,  Col.  J. 
y    Gravely    commanding  

i 
i 

7 

2 

5 

i 

2 

15 

25 

29 

2 
II 

24 
29 

34 

4 
13 

Sixth  Provisional  Missouri  State  Mi 
litia,  Col.  John  F.  McMahon,  com 
manding  

Seventh    Provisional    Missouri    State 
Militia,  Maj.  W.  B.  Mitchell,  com- 

Second  Arkansas  Cavalry,  Col.  John 
E.  Phelps,  commanding  

Total  

2 

16 

3      82 

103 

Fourth  Brigade,  Col.  E.  F.  Winslow, 
Commanding. 

Fourth  Missouri  Cavalry,  Capt.  Chas. 
P    Knispel    commanding 

I 

7 

3 
3 

~M~ 

i 

2 

10 

IS 
42 
6 
6 

I 

2 

18 

21 

45 

12 

6 

Tenth  Missouri  Cavalry,   Lieut.-Col. 
F    W.   Benteen    commanding   .... 

Third  Iowa  Cavalry,  Maj.  B.  S.  Jones, 
commanding 

Fourth    Iowa    Cavalry,    Maj.    A.    R. 
Pierce    commanding  

Seventh  Indiana  Cavalry,  Maj.  S.  E. 
W.  Simonson,  commanding  

Total  

I 

82 

3 

102 

RECAPITULATION. 


First  Brigade,  Col.  J.  F.  Philips  
Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  Mc 
Neil       

5 

2 

21 

28 

8 
4 

106 
*?o 

3 
•Ji 

143 
OS 

Third   Brigade,    Brig.-Gen.   John   B. 
Sanborn      

2 

16 

a 

a? 

103 

Fourth  Brigade,  Col.  E.  F.  Winslow. 

I 

14 

2 

82 

3 

102 

Grand  total  casualties 

IO 

7Q 

17 

-300 

07 

iiAT. 

CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

BATTLE    OF   NEWTONIA— SIEGE  OF   FAYETTEVILLE 
RAISED — CONCLUSION  OF  THE  PRICE  RAID. 

THE  gallant  conduct  of  the  Missouri  forces  under 
Pleasonton  in  engaging  Price's  army  in  close  conflict 
every  opportunity  and  in  capturing  from  it  in  the  last 
four  days  eleven  pieces  of  artillery,  two  generals,  and 
nearly  two  thousand  prisoners,  appears  to  have  impressed 
General  Curtis  that  he  would  have  to  adopt  a  more  vigor 
ous  policy  to  secure  any  substantial  honors  for  his  own 
troops  in  the  campaign  now  drawing  to  a  close.  And 
yet  his  policy  was  lacking  of  that  vigor  which  would 
likely  secure  any  decisive  results.  His  troops  had 
marched  one  hundred  miles  without  engaging  the  enemy, 
and  he  permitted  them  to  remain  in  Fort  Scott  all  night 
and  until  noon  the  next  day  before  commencing  the  pur 
suit,  by  which  time  Price's  army  had  got  from  thirty  to 
forty  miles  the  start  of  him.  There  was  no  necessity  for 
his  command  to  halt  to  draw  ammunition,  for  it  had  ex 
pended  none  since  leaving  Westport.  But  leaving  Fort 
Scott  on  the  26th,  with  the  First,  Second,  and  Fourth 
Brigades  of  his  command  under  General  Blunt,  he  marched 
about  twenty  miles  in  a  southeast  direction  and  encamped 
on  the  south  side  of  Big  Dry  Wood,  in  Vernon  County, 
Missouri,  having  at  that  point  struck  the  trail  of  Price's 
army.  He  was  followed  in  the  further  pursuit  by  the 
brigades  of  McNeil,  Sanborn,  and  Benteen  of  Pleason- 

506 


BATTLE   OF  NEWTONIA.  507 

ton's  division  as  rapidly  as  their  horses  could  be  urged 
forward.  After  making  his  extraordinary  march  from 
the  Marmiton  to  Carthage,  on  Spring  River,  and  no  Fed 
eral  forces  appearing  in  his  rear,  General  Price  halted  his 
army  to  give  his  troops  a  night's  rest.  He  then  con 
tinued  the  retreat  south  by  easy  marches,  and  passing 
through  Newtonia  about  noon  on  the  28th,  encamped  in 
the  timber  three  miles  south  of  that  place.  Before  all 
the  troops  of  his  rear-guard  had  crossed  Shoal  Creek 
north  of  Granby,  they  were  overtaken  by  General  Curtis' 
advance  under  Colonel  Ford,  Second  Colorado  Cavalry, 
and  rapidly  driven  in  upon  Shelby's  division,  which  had 
just  gone  into  camp  in  the  edge  of  the  timber  south  of 
Newtonia  in  the  rear  of  the  other  divisions  of  the  Southern 
army.  Having  rested  and  passed  two  days  and  nights 
without  being  disturbed  by  the  Federal  forces  after  the 
headlong  flight  from  Mine  Creek  and  Marmiton  River, 
the  morale  of  the  Confederate  troops  had  considerably 
improved  when  the  advance  of  General  Curtis  appeared 
on  the  prairie  northwest  of  Newtonia.  But  as  they  had 
destroyed  and  abandoned  most  of  their  train,  with  the 
camp  equipage,  cooking  utensils,  and  supplies  and  plun 
der  with  which  it  was  loaded,  and  as  they  had  taken 
no  time  the  last  two  days  to  collect  subsistence  from 
the  desolate  section  over  which  they  had  rapidly  re 
treated,  many  of  them  were  suffering  from  the  pangs  of 
hunger. 

The  loyal  militia  stationed  at  Neosho  and  Newtonia 
that  year  had  given  the  citizens  the  best  possible  protec 
tion,  so  that  those  who  had  returned  to  their  homes  raised 
fairly  good  crops  in  that  section.  It  was  therefore  Price's 
intention  to  stop  a  day  or  two  near  Newtonia  to  collect 
supplies  for  his  army  from  these  loyal  citizens  who  were 
struggling  so  hard  to  reestablish  themselves  in  their 
homes.  When  General  Sanborn  collected  his  forces  in 
Southwest  Missouri  at  Springfield  in  September,  to 


508  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

march  to  Rolla  and  Jefferson  City,  he  left  two  companies 
of  the  Eighth  Missouri  State  Militia  under  Major  Milton 
Burch  at  Neosho,  and  two  companies  of  the  Seventh 
Provisional  Militia  under  Captain  J.  M.  Ritchey  at 
Newtonia,  to  operate  against  the  Southern  bandits  in 
the  absence  of  the  troops  withdrawn  from  the  district. 
These  officers  kept  themselves  advised  of  the  movements 
of  the  Confederate  army,  and  when  informed  that  it  was 
rapidly  retreating  down  the  Border,  sent  out  their  scouts 
to  watch  all  the  approaches  from  the  north.  When  their 
scouts  returned  and  reported  the  rapid  advance  of  the 
enemy,  they  had  just  barely  time  to  evacuate  their  posts 
without  loss  of  men  or  property  and  retire  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Springfield.  A  part  of  General  Thompson's  bri 
gade  endeavored  to  intercept  and  cut  them  off,  and  in  the 
skirmish  that  took  place  in  the  edge  of  the  timber  east  of 
Newtonia,  Lieutenant  R.  H.  Christian  and  one  enlisted 
man  of  Captain  Ritchey's  company  were  killed. 

On  driving  in  the  Confederate  rear-guard  through 
Granby  and  the  prairie  northwest  of  Newtonia,  General 
Blunt,  who  was  at  the  front,  ordered  Colonel  Ford  to 
form  the  Second  Colorado  and  Sixteenth  Kansas  Cavalry 
of  his  brigade  in  line  on  the  high  ridge  northwest  of  the 
village,  and  as  soon  as  the  two  sections  of  Captain  Mc- 
Lain's  Colorado  battery  came  up  commenced  shelling 
the  Confederate  position  in  the  edge  of  the  timber  about 
a  mile  south.  As  soon  as  he  saw  the  Fifteenth  Kansas, 
under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hoyt,  and  a  detachment  of  the 
Third  Wisconsin  Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant  J.  B.  Pond, 
coming  up  at  a  gallop,  he  led  Colonel  Ford's  two  regi 
ments  in  a  charge  across  the  prairie  with  skirmish-line 
deployed,  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  his  battery,  up  to 
within  musket-range  of  Shelby's  position  behind  a  fence 
on  the  south  side  of  a  field. 

To  meet  the  Federal  attack,  General  Shelby  dis 
mounted  the  troops  of  his  division,  with  Jackman's  bri- 


BATTLE   OF  NEWTONIA.  509 

gade  on  his  right  and  Thompson's  brigade  and  Slayback's 
command  on  his  left,  and  a  mounted  force  to  watch  each 
of  his  flanks.  He  then  brought  up  two  guns  of  Collins' 
battery  and  opened  fire  on  the  advancing  Federal  troops, 
when  the  roar  of  artillery  and  small-arms  announced  that 
the  opposing  forces  had  joined  in  fierce  conflict.  Jenni- 
son's  First  Brigade  coming  up,  formed  on  the  right  of 
Colonel  Ford,  both  commands  taking  position  behind  the 
fence  on  the  north  side  of  the  field,  which  they  held  for 
some  time  under  a  hot  fire.  But  they  were  finally  obliged 
to  fall  back  from  this  position  about  a  mile  under  a  heavy 
fire  from  the  Confederates,  who  advanced  through  the 
field  and  into  the  prairie  on  the  north  side  of  it  until  they 
were  checked  by  the  rapid  discharges  of  canister  from  the 
Colorado  battery. 

With  his  superior  numbers  General  Shelby  commenced 
at  once  to  press  his  advantage  by  pushing  forward  his 
dismounted  troops  in  his  centre  and  his  cavalry  on  his 
flanks,  a  movement  which  so  seriously  threatened  the 
safety  of  the  Colorado  battery  that  it  was  ordered  to  fall 
back.  As  his  command  was  dismounted,  except  some 
cavalry  on  his  flanks,  he  could  not  effectively  charge 
Blunt's  mounted  troops,  and  was  obliged  to  content 
himself  with  steadily  driving  them  back  as  far  as  seemed 
desirable.  The  situation  was  by  no  means  encouraging 
to  General  Blunt.  His  line  was  gradually  retiring,  his 
battery  in  danger  of  capture,  and  stragglers  from  his  com 
mand  were  moving  to  the  rear.  Were  the  recent  suc 
cesses  at  Mine  Creek  and  Little  Osage  to  be  followed  so 
soon  by  disaster  by  his  rashness  ?  He  not  only  had 
another  brigade  of  his  own  division  with  which  he  could 
have  made  the  attack,  but  the  three  brigades  of  Pleason- 
ton's  division,  now  under  the  orders  of  General  Curtis, 
could  have  been  brought  up  to  his  support.  His  act  of 
rushing  ahead  with  two  small  brigades  of  less  than  two 
regiments  in  numbers  to  attack  the  Confederate  army 


5IO  THE   CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

after  it  had  rested  and  to  some  extent  reorganized  would 
hardly  have  been  excusable  in  a  captain  commanding  a 
company,  much  less  in  a  major-general  commanding  a 
division.  He  knew  that  morning  that  Price's  army  was 
in  his  immediate  front,  and  yet  he  allowed  his  Second 
Brigade  to  halt  and  feed  ten  to  fifteen  miles  from  the 
scene  of  conflict,  with  the  three  brigades  of  Pleasonton's 
division  still  in  the  rear  and  unable  to  make  a  rapid  march 
to  the  front  in  consequence  of  their  horses  being  so  badly 
worn  out  by  the  hard  service  of  the  campaign.  But 
shortly  before  sundown  most  welcome  assistance  came 
up  to  his  support.  General  Sanborn,  with  his  brigade  of 
four  regiments  of  Missouri  State  Militia  and  the  Second 
Arkansas  Cavalry,  left  Fort  Scott  the  morning  of  the 
27th,  and  after  one  short  halt  to  feed  and  rest  made  the 
march  to  Newtonia,  a  distance  of  ninety-five  miles,  in  a 
day  and  a  half,  and  reporting  to  General  Blunt,  immedi 
ately  went  into  action  on  the  Federal  left. 

As  the  horses  of  his  brigade  were  in  no  condition  to 
execute  any  rapid  movements,  and  as  the  Confederates 
occupied  fields  in  his  front  which  were  inclosed  and  in 
tersected  with  stone  and  rail  fences,  he  dismounted  the 
regiments  of  his  command  and  ordered  them  forward  to 
drive  the  enemy  from  the  fields.  He  also  ordered  into 
action  the  section  of  Captain  Montgomery's  battery, 
Second  Missouri  Light  Artillery,  under  Lieutenant 
Smiley,  which  he  brought  along,  and  it  fired  twenty-two 
rounds  of  shell  and  canister  into  the  Confederate  line 
with  good  effect.  The  steady  advance  of  his  dismounted 
troops  soon  brought  them  within  range  of  the  enemy, 
and  after  two  or  three  volleys  the  cheers  that  went  up 
from  his  line  announced  that  the  Confederates  were 
leaving  the  field  and  retreating.  He  pursued  the  retiring 
foe  about  three  miles  into  the  timber,  when  darkness  and 
the  exhaustion  of  his  men  suspended  further  operations. 
His  brigade  remained  at  the  extreme  front  until  nine 


BATTLE    OF  NEWTONIA.  511 

o'clock  that  night,  when  he  received  orders  to  return  to 
Newtonia,  where  there  was  plenty  of  water  and  some 
forage,  and  where  the  other  brigades,  under  General 
Curtis,  which  had  not  participated  in  the  fight,  had 
arrived  and  gone  into  camp. 

Leaving  a  regiment  near  the  scene  of  the  conflict  to 
watch  the  movements  of  the  Federal  forces,  General 
Shelby  that  night  at  twelve  o'clock  retired  with  his 
division  in  the  rear  of  Price's  army,  on  the  road  to  Pine- 
ville.  Had  General  Curtis  not  stopped — stopped  to  feed 
the  horses  of  a  part  of  his  command  a  few  hours  after 
breaking  camp  at  Carthage — he  could  have  put  four  of 
his  brigades  into  action  at  Newtonia  by  the  middle  of  the 
afternoon,  and  by  the  time  they  got  fairly  to  work  the 
brigades  of  Sanborn  and  Benteen  could  have  been  brought 
up  to  support  him.  After  the  troops  of  his  Department 
had  marched  two  hundred  miles  down  the  Border,  a  small 
fraction  of  them  pushed  forward  and  engaged  the  enemy, 
but  with  such  ill-conceived  judgment  that  they  were  soon 
driven  from  the  field  and  would  certainly  have  suffered 
disaster  had  it  not  been  for  the  timely  arrival  of  Sanborn's 
brigade. 

On  driving  the  Confederates  from  the  field  and  pur 
suing  them  until  dark,  General  Curtis  returned  to  New 
tonia  to  rest  until  morning,  when  he  proposed  to  renew 
the  pursuit  vigorously  with  the  hope  of  being  able  to 
destroy  Price's  demoralized  army.  To  his  great  disap 
pointment  a  messenger  arrived  from  Fort  Scott  during 
the  night  with  a  despatch  from  General  Pleasonton,  noti 
fying  him  that  General  Rosecrans  had  ordered  Generals 
Sanborn  and  McNeil  to  return  with  their  troops  to  the 
headquarters  of  their  respective  districts  at  Springfield 
and  Rolla.  On  the  withdrawal  of  these  troops  from  the 
pursuit  the  next  morning,  General  Curtis  was  obliged  to 
give  up  the  chase,  and  marched  to  Neosho,  twelve  miles, 
on  his  return  to  Kansas.  His  unfortunate  determination 


512  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE   BORDER. 

to  keep  the  trophies  captured  by  Pleasonton's  division  at 
Mine  Creek  in  the  Department  of  Kansas  produced  such 
a  feeling  of  resentment  among  officers  commanding  Mis 
souri  troops  that  they  did  not  desire  to  serve  under  him 
any  longer  than  was  absolutely  necessary  to  drive  Price's 
forces  out  of  the  State.  They  very  naturally  held  that 
if  they  cooperated  with  his  command  in  the  further  prose 
cution  of  the  campaign  and  captured  other  trophies,  they 
would  not  be  allowed  to  take  them  back  to  their  own 
Department.  Of  course  those  who  had  no  interest  in  the 
question  as  to  the  disposition  of  the  trophies  won  in  the 
campaign  would  like  to  have  seen  the  united  forces  of 
the  two  Departments  harmoniously  cooperating  for  the 
capture  or  complete  destruction  of  the  Confederate  army, 
then  rapidly  disintegrating  from  the  severe  blows  which 
had  been  given  it. 

A  few  more  days  would  have  determined  whether  Gen 
eral  Curtis  was  to  achieve  any  important  results.  Even 
if  he  did  nothing  more  than  keep  Price  moving,  this 
would  have  had  the  effect  of  driving  the  Confederate 
forces  into  a  region  where  it  was  impossible  to  obtain 
sufficient  supplies  for  themselves  and  their  animals.  Be 
fore  leaving  Newtonia  on  the  29th,  he  sent  a  despatch 
over  to  Cassville,  twenty-five  miles  distant,  the  nearest 
telegraph  station,  to  be  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck, 
Washington,  stating  that  he  was  obliged  to  abandon  the 
pursuit  of  Price  on  account  of  the  Missouri  troops  having 
been  ordered  to  return  to  their  respective  stations.  Gen 
eral  Halleck  had  already  telegraphed  him  and  General 
Rosecrans  that  General  Grant  desired  that  Price  be  pur 
sued  to  the  Arkansas  River,  or  until  he  encountered  the 
forces  of  Steele  or  Reynolds,  the  despatch  reaching  Gen 
eral  Curtis  at  Neosho  that  night.  He  took  a  very  liberal 
view  of  the  meaning  of  the  despatch  and  got  up  in  the 
middle  of  the  night  and  issued  orders  and  sent  them  out 
by  his  couriers  to  overtake  the  commanding  officers  of 


SIEGE   OF  FAYETTEVILLE  RAISED.  513 

Rosecrans'  troops,  directing  them  to  report  to  him  imme 
diately  at  Cassville. 

The  messengers,  however,  did  not  overtake  Sanborn 
and  McNeil  until  they  arrived  near  Springfield,  and  in 
the  meantime  General  Sanborn  received  a  telegraphic 
order  from  General  Rosecrans  placing  him  in  command 
of  the  troops  of  the  Department  of  Missouri  in  Southwest 
Missouri,  with  instructions  to  pursue  Price  to  the  Arkan 
sas  River.  These  instructions  of  course  made  Sanborn's 
command  independent  of  Curtis.  Benteen's  brigade  of 
Sanborn's  command,  which  had  halted  a  day  in  the 
vicinity  of  Newtonia  to  rest,  joined  Curtis  at  once  and 
was  permitted  to  remain  with  him  to  the  close  of  the 
campaign.  After  a  loss  of  nearly  two  days'  time,  instead 
of  following  directly  on  Price's  trail  by  way  of  Pineville, 
General  Curtis  returned  from  Neosho  to  Newtonia  and 
then  deflected  his  march  still  farther  to  the  southeast  by 
way  of  Cassville  and  Cross  Hollows,  thereby  losing  up 
wards  of  sixty  miles  before  he  could  again  strike  the  trail 
of  the  Southern  army.  When  he  struck  the  Springfield 
and  Fayetteville  road  he  moved  forward  by  easy  marches, 
expecting  the  troops  of  the  Department  of  the  Missouri 
under  General  Sanborn  to  overtake  him,  and  on  the 
night  of  November  3d  encamped  at  Cross  Hollows,  in 
Arkansas.  That  night  he  received  a  despatch  from  Colo 
nel  M.  La  Rue  Harrison,  First  Arkansas  Union  Cavalry, 
commanding  the  post  of  Fayetteville,  that  he  was  besieged 
by  Colonel  Brooks'  Confederate  command  and  Fagan's 
division  of  Price's  army,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery,  and 
was  in  great  need  of  reinforcements.  During  the  past 
month,  while  Price's  army  was  moving  through  Missouri, 
the  Southern  partisan  bands  had  become  more  numer 
ous  and  bold  in  Northwestern  Arkansas  and  gave  Colonel 
Harrison  a  good  deal  of  trouble  by  their  frequent  efforts 
to  interrupt  his  communication  with  Springfield  and  Fort 
Smith.  They  cut  and  destroyed  the  telegraph  line  be- 

VOL.  ii. — 33 


514  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON    THE  BORDER. 

tween  his  post  and  those  places,  attacked  his  foraging 
parties,  and  it  was  with  much  difficulty  that  he  was  able 
to  get  his  supply  trains  through  from  Cassville. 

When  it  became  known  that  Price's  army  was  rapidly 
retreating  south  from  the  Missouri  River,  Colonel  Brooks 
collected  all  the  Southern  partisan  bands  in  Northwestern 
Arkansas,  to  the  number  of  about  twelve  hundred  men, 
to  attack  Fayetteville.  He  first  invested  the  place  on  the 
26th  of  October,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  attacked 
the  outworks  with  his  main  force  from  East  Mountain, 
a  little  later  sending  Major  Brown  with  about  six  hundred 
men  to  make  an  attack  from  the  west  side.  These  at 
tacks  were  repulsed  by  noon,  and  Brooks  and  Brown 
retreated  out  of  sight,  leaving  their  killed  and  wounded 
on  the  ground.  In  the  spring  of  1863  fortifications  of 
considerable  strength  were  erected  by  the  Federal  troops 
at  Fayetteville,  and  by  some  additional  work  on  them 
Colonel  Harrison  soon  had  the  place  in  a  fairly  good  de 
fensive  condition  against  attack  from  a  superior  force. 

After  the  action  at  Newtonia  General  Price  retreated 
south  as  rapidly  as  his  half-starved  and  broken-down  men 
and  animals  could  travel  until  he  arrived  at  Cane  Hill, 
Arkansas,  November  1st,  where  he  halted  to  rest  and 
collect  supplies.  At  this  place  he  received  a  report  from 
Colonel  Brooks,  commanding  the  Confederate  forces  in 
Northwestern  Arkansas,  stating  that  he  was  investing 
Fayetteville  and  needed  assistance  to  enable  him  to  cap 
ture  the  garrison  with  its  supplies  and  public  property. 

General  Fagan  at  his  own  solicitation  was  detailed  with 
his  division  and  500  men  and  two  pieces  of  artillery  from 
Shelby's  division  to  aid  Brooks  in  making  the  attack. 
He  formed  a  junction  with  Brooks  en  route,  and  arriving 
before  Fayetteville  on  the  morning  of  November  3d  with 
upwards  of  6000  men,  immediately  commenced  bombard 
ing  the  town  and  Federal  garrison.  To  meet  the  attack, 
Colonel  Harrison  had  a  force  of  1128  men,  consisting  of 


CONCLUSION  OF  THE   PRICE  RAID.  515 

the  First  Arkansas  Cavalry  and  nearly  200  militia,  all  of 
whom  were  well  supplied  with  ammunition  and  subsist 
ence  for  a  ten  days'  siege.  With  only  two  guns  General 
Fagan  could  not  do  much  damage  to  the  Federal  works 
and  garrison,  and  his  men  were  still  so  much  demoralized 
that  he  could  not  push  them  forward  to  make  a  vigorous 
assault.  In  his  eagerness  to  capture  the  place  he  ordered 
three  charges  during  the  day,  but  his  troops  were  each 
time  repulsed  with  heavy  loss  by  the  destructive  fire  from 
the  Federal  small-arms.  His  two  guns  kept  up  their  fire 
on  the  Federal  works  until  towards  sunset,  when,  hearing 
of  the  approach  of  General  Curtis'  command,  he  raised 
the  siege  and  fell  back  to  Cane  Hill  with  part  of  his  troops 
and  the  section  of  artillery,  leaving  about  600  men  until 
the  next  morning  to  cover  his  retreat. 

On  receipt  of  Colonel  Harrison's  despatch  stating  that 
he  was  besieged,  General  Curtis  moved  forward  from 
Cross  Hollows  early  in  the  morning  of  November  4th, 
and  arrived  at  Fayetteville  about  eleven  o'clock,  only  a 
few  hours  after  Fagan's  rear-guard  had  left.  There  were 
large  numbers  of  desertions  from  Price's  army  before  he 
reached  Newtonia,  but  when  he  arrived  at  Cane  Hill  the 
disintegration  was  much  more  rapid,  entire  regiments  and 
brigades  being  disbanded,  particularly  among  the  Arkan 
sas  troops  who  had  entered  the  service  north  of  the  Ar 
kansas  River.  Large  bodies  of  these  troops  were  reported 
retreating  on  all  the  roads  east  and  southeast  of  Fayette 
ville,  so  that  General  Curtis  was  detained  a  day  at  that 
post  before  he  could  ascertain  in  what  direction  the  main 
force  under  Price  had  retreated.  He  finally  received  in 
formation  that  Price  with  the  Missouri  troops  and  recruits 
who  had  not  left  him,  with  a  small  part  of  Fagan's  divi 
sion,  had  retreated  south  from  Cane  Hill,  with  the  inten 
tion  of  crossing  the  Arkansas  River  above  Fort  Smith. 
Leaving  Captain  Dodge's  Ninth  Wisconsin  Battery  at 
Fayetteville  and  taking  Colonel  Harrison  with  part  of 


516  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE   BORDER. 

his  command  along  with  him,  General  Curtis  moved  for 
ward  again  and  encamped  on  the  night  of  the  5th  at  Prairie 
Grove,  after  making  a  march  of  twelve  miles.  Resum 
ing  the  march  the  next  morning,  he  soon  came  to  Price's 
smouldering  camp-fires  in  and  about  Cane  Hill,  captured 
and  paroled  quite  a  number  of  sick  and  worn-out  Confed 
erate  soldiers,  skirmished  with  and  killed  some  of  the 
Confederate  scouts  and  rear-guard,  and  encamped  that 
night  on  Sallisaw  Creek,  Cherokee  Nation,  on  the  trail  of 
the  Southern  army.  He  continued  the  pursuit  on  the 
trail  to  a  point  on  the  Arkansas  River  known  as  Pheasant 
Ford,  arriving  there  at  noon  on  the  8th,  more  than 
twenty-four  hours  after  Price  had  crossed  over  ahead  of 
him.  A  small  force  of  the  Confederate  rear-guard  was  in 
sight  on  the  south  side  of  the  river  and  General  Curtis 
gave  them  a  parting  salute  of  several  rounds  from  Mc- 
Lain's  Colorado  battery — and  thus  terminated  the  cam 
paign  of  the  Army  of  the  Border  against  Price  in  his 
great  raid  through  Missouri  in  the  autumn  of  1864.  Here 
General  Curtis  issued  his  congratulatory  order  to  his 
troops,  commending  them  for  their  gallantry,  devotion, 
and  perseverance  in  the  campaign,  and  here  he  dissolved 
the  organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Border  and  directed 
his  troops  to  return  to  the  Department  of  Kansas  by  the 
most  direct  and  practicable  route.  Colonel  Benteen's 
brigade  from  the  Department  of  Missouri,  which  consti 
tuted  the  largest  part  of  his  command,  was  relieved  and 
the  Colonel  directed  to  return  to  his  proper  Department. 
On  the  last  day's  march  General  Curtis  reported  that 
his  command  captured  a  cannon  which  the  Confederate 
forces  abandoned  in  their  flight.  Along  the  trail  of 
Price's  army  from  Cane  Hill  to  the  Arkansas  River, 
broken-down  wagons,  dead  and  broken-down  horses  and 
mules,  and  scattered  and  abandoned  plunder,  which  could 
not  be  taken  along,  plainly  told  of  the  desperate  straits  to 
which  his  forces  were  reduced.  General  Curtis  was  cer- 


CONCLUSION  OF  THE   PRICE  RAID.  517 

tainly  entitled  to  commendation  for  his  zeal  and  untir 
ing  efforts  in  the  prosecution  of  the  campaign,  and  if  his 
judgment  was  sometimes  in  error,  there  were  doubtless  ex 
tenuating  conditions.  After  passing  below  Newtonia  he 
changed  his  mind  in  regard  to  the  disposition  of  prison 
ers,  for  in  picking  up  some  of  Price's  stragglers  he  sent 
them  to  General  Rosecrans,  St.  Louis,  instead  of  to  Fort 
Leavenworth,  Kansas,  in  his  own  Department.  But  this 
conciliatory  act  came  too  late  to  secure  the  hearty  co 
operation  of  the  Missouri  troops  in  the  closing  operations 
of  the  campaign ;  besides,  General  Rosecrans  did  not  ask 
for  any  trophies  not  captured  by  the  troops  of  his  own 
Department.  General  Sanborn  did  not  rejoin  Curtis  after 
the  action  at  Newtonia  and  probably  had  no  intention  of 
doing  so,  for  his  instructions  allowed  him  to  act  inde 
pendently.  The  policy  of  General  Curtis  would  have 
kept  Price  moving,  but  would  not  have  seriously  hurt 
him,  while  the  policy  of  Pleasonton,  if  kept  up,  would 
have  captured  his  last  gun  and  most  of  his  troops  before 
he  got  to  Newtonia. 

General  Price's  proud  veteran  army  that  had  entered 
Missouri  a  little  over  a  month  ago  feasting  and  boasting, 
plundering  and  murdering,  and  chasing  detachments  of 
loyal  militia  from  their  stations,  was  now  leaving  the 
State  in  a  most  distressing  condition.  Large  numbers  of 
his  troops  of  the  routed  divisions  had  thrown  away  their 
arms  and  equipments  and  the  spoils  with  which  they  were 
loaded  down,  in  their  terrified  flight  after  the  battle  of 
Mine  Creek.  Nearly  all  his  train,  loaded  with  ill-gotten 
plunder  and  necessary  supplies,  he  had  been  obliged  to 
abandon  and  destroy,  so  that  after  he  passed  south  of 
Missouri  he  was  unable  to  obtain  any  bread  for  his  troops. 
In  his  march  from  Newtonia  to  the  Arkansas  River,  sub 
sistence  was  so  scarce  that  his  commissary  and  foraging 
parties  were  unable  to  obtain  even  enough  corn  to  supply 
his  troops  with  rations,  and  men  who  were  so  fortunate 


518  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE  BORDER. 

as  to  have  an  ear  of  corn  each  were  begged  by  their  hun 
gry  and  starving  comrades  for  a  few  grains.  The  horses 
of  his  troops  were  giving  out  by  hundreds  for  want  of 
forage  and  on  account  of  the  constant  hard  service  of 
the  campaign,  thus  adding  to  his  embarrassment  in  col 
lecting  supplies  off  the  country.  While  encamped  at 
Cane  Hill  two  or  three  days  his  foragers  collected  up 
wards  of  a  hundred  head  of  cattle  and  slaughtered  them 
and  distributed  the  meat  among  his  troops  who  in  many 
cases  cooked  and  ate  it  without  salt.  And  when  he 
passed  to  the  south  side  of  the  Arkansas  River  he  had 
still  greater  difficulty  in  obtaining  beef  for  his  multitude, 
and  some  of  his  men  were  obliged  to  live  for  several  days 
on  horse  flesh  and  elm  bark.  The  weather  commenced 
getting  inclement  at  Cane  Hill,  and  for  the  next  ten  days 
rain  and  snow  added  to  the  discomfort,  hardships,  and 
suffering  of  his  half-starved  men  in  their  toilsome  march 
south  through  the  Cherokee  and  Choctaw  Nations.  A 
day  or  so  after  crossing  the  Arkansas  River  the  rest  of 
the  Arkansas  troops  of  Pagan's  division  were  furloughed 
or  disbanded  to  return  to  their  homes,  and  the  Missouri 
troops  and  recruits  continued  the  march  to  Red  River, 
which  they  crossed  on  the  22d  of  November,  entering 
Texas,  where  they  soon  commenced  to  receive  full  rations 
of  subsistence  and  forage. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

ATROCIOUS  ACTS  OF  BANDITS — ACTIONS  AT  ROSEVILLE, 
STONE'S  FARM,  LEE'S  CREEK,  AND  MASSARD  PRAI 
RIE — DEMONSTRATION  AGAINST  FORT  SMITH. 

WrtEN  General  Thayer  left  Fort  Smith  to  join  General 
Steele  at  Arkadelphia  on  the  Camden  Expedition,  he  took 
with  him  nearly  all  the  effective  troops  of  the  District  of 
the  Frontier,  leaving  only  a  few  detachments  under  Colo 
nel  W.  R.  Judson,  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry,  to  hold  the 
posts  of  Fort  Smith,  Van  Buren,  Roseville,  and  Clarks- 
ville  on  the  Arkansas  River.  Of  course  General  Steele 
supposed,  when  his  troops  advanced  from  Little  Rock 
and  Fort  Smith  in  the  direction  of  Camden,  that  General 
Price,  commanding  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  District 
of  Arkansas,  would  concentrate  all  his  available  troops  in 
the  Federal  front,  to  check  if  possible  the  advance  of  the 
Federal  commander.  While  it  was  the  policy  of  the  Con 
federate  commander  to  concentrate  as  large  a  force  as 
practicable  to  oppose  the  advancing  Federal  columns,  it 
was  also  his  desire  to  detach  as  many  troops  as  could  be 
spared  to  operate  in  the  Federal  rear  and  against  posts 
with  small  garrisons  guarding  public  property.  Though 
he  was  unable  to  spare  many  of  his  Regular  troops  for  this 
service  while  the  Federal  forces  were  steadily  advancing 
on  Camden,  the  Southern  partisan  bands  in  Western 
Arkansas  could  be  as  effective  as  his  soldiers,  and  began 
to  display  unusual  activity  a  short  time  after  General 

519 


520  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON    THE  BORDER. 

Thayer's  division  left  Fort  Smith.  A  good  many  of  the 
men  of  these  bands  wore  the  Federal  uniform  and  were 
able  to  deceive  and  surprise  small  Federal  detachments 
now  and  then  when  foraging  or  employed  in  any  service 
that  took  them  a  few  miles  from  their  stations.  There 
were  details  of  ten  to  fifteen  mounted  Federal  soldiers  to 
carry  the  mails  as  often  as  once  a  week  from  Fort  Smith 
to  Fayetteville  and  thence  to  Springfield,  and  the  route 
was  over  the  Boston  Mountains  and  through  a  rough 
wooded  section  in  which  there  were  very  few  houses 
along  the  road. 

A  telegraph  line  had  been  constructed  from  Springfield 
to  Fort  Smith  along  the  road  over  which  the  detachments 
carrying  the  mails  passed.  The  bandits  frequently  cut 
the  wire  at  different  points,  so  that  parties  had  to  be  sent 
out  to  repair  it,  and  if  not  adequately  protected  by  an 
escort  while  repairing  it  they  were  almost  certain  to  be 
fired  upon  and  one  or  more  men  killed  or  wounded.  The 
detachments  carrying  the  mails,  too,  although  well  armed, 
were  frequently  fired  upon  by  the  bandits,  and  sometimes 
with  fatal  results.  In  view  of  the  long  distance — sixty 
miles — between  Fort  Smith  and  Fayetteville  which  the 
detachments  had  been  marching  without  finding  any 
friendly  shelter,  a  station  was  established  at  Prairie 
Grove,  about  fifteen  miles  south  of  Fayetteville,  where 
animals  were  kept  for  a  relay  and  where  there  were  a  few 
soldiers  to  take  care  of  the  stock  and  to  afford  assistance 
to  the  Federal  detachments  passing  over  the  road.  Colo 
nel  M.  La  Rue  Harrison,  commanding  the  First  Arkansas 
Union  Cavalry,  stationed  at  Fayetteville,  kept  part  of 
his  regiment  constantly  scouting  through  that  section,  in 
hunting  down  and  punishing  the  Southern  bandits  wher 
ever  they  could  be  found.  But  it  was  generally  difficult 
to  find  them  by  scouting,  for  they  could  effectually  con 
ceal  themselves  in  the  broken  and  thinly  settled  parts  of 
that  mountainous  region  for  weeks,  and  then  by  making 


ATROCIOUS  ACTS  OF  BANDITS.  $21 

part  of  a  night's  march  reach  a  point  from  which  they 
could  attack  the  Federal  picket  at  Fayetteville,  or  cut  the 
wire  at  one  or  more  points  on  the  wire  road,  or  attack  the 
parties  carrying  the  mails  on  that  road.  These  bandits 
operated  in  parties  of  about  a  dozen  up  to  as  many  as  fifty 
men,  each  party  generally  having  a  leader. 

On  the  evening  of  April  /th,  twenty-two  of  the  most 
desperate  bandits  of  the  Boston  Mountains,  under  a 
leader  named  Lyon,  descended  from  their  hiding-place, 
wearing  the  Federal  uniform,  and  came  to  the  mail  station 
at  the  foot  of  the  mountain  near  the  battle-field  of  Prairie 
Grove,  pretending  that  they  belonged  to  the  Fourteenth 
Kansas  Cavalry.  As  they  were  wearing  the  Federal  uni 
form  and  pretended  to  be  friends  they  were  permitted  to 
advance  to  the  gate  in  front  of  the  house.  There  were 
ten  men  of  the  First  Arkansas  Cavalry  and  one  citizen  at 
the  station  and  nearly  all  the  soldiers  were  in  the  house 
when  the  bandits  came  up.  After  a  short  conversation 
by  the  men  in  the  yard  with  the  bandits,  the  men  in  the 
house  came  out,  and  the  bandits  opened  fire  upon  them, 
killing  nine  of  them  and  the  citizen,  only  one  soldier 
making  his  escape.  Some  of  the  men  thus  murdered 
were  shamefully  mutilated  by  the  desperadoes  before 
they  left  the  scene  of  the  bloody  tragedy.  Information 
of  the  barbarous  act  was  at  once  conveyed  to  Colonel 
Harrison  at  Fayetteville,  who  immediately  sent  Major 
Charles  Galloway  with  a  detachment  of  cavalry  in  pursuit 
of  the  bandits.  The  Major  soon  struck  their  trail,  over 
took  and  killed  part  of  them,  and  captured  four  of  them, 
who  were  tried  by  a  commission  and  found  guilty  of 
murdering  the  men  at  the  station,  all  of  whom  were  un 
armed,  and  the  bandits  were  sentenced  to  be  shot  to 
death.  The  findings  of  the  military  court  were  approved 
by  the  President,  and  the  four  bandits  were  executed  at 
Fort  Smith  on  the  2gth  of  July,  at  the  southeast  edge  of 
the  town.  One  of  them  was  a  red-headed  youth  who 


522  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE   BORDER. 

appeared  to  be  under  seventeen  years  of  age  and  who  was 
charged  with  having  committed  a  number  of  other  mur 
ders  in  the  section  where  he  was  captured. 

Not  only  the  Southern  bandits  wore  the  Federal  uni 
form  when  they  could  get  it,  but  companies  operating 
with  the  regularly  organized  Confederate  forces  fre 
quently  wore  it  with  the  sanction  and  under  the  eyes  of 
Generals  Price  and  Marmaduke  and  other  Southern  offi 
cers  commanding  troops  west  of  the  Mississippi  River. 
In  wearing  the  Federal  uniform  the  bandits  might  now 
and  then  get  ahead  in  killing  Union  soldiers  and  citizens, 
but  it  is  not  likely  that  in  the  end  they  were  ahead,  for 
the  chances  were  more  than  even  that  men  of  this  charac 
ter  in  active  service  would  get  killed,  wounded,  or  cap 
tured  in  the  course  of  a  year  or  so,  and  if  captured  they 
were  certain  to  be  tried  as  spies  or  murderers,  and  if  con 
victed  shot  to  death. 

Action  at  Roseville,  Arkansas. 

When  it  became  known  to  the  Southern  partisan  leaders 
in  Southwest  Arkansas  that  most  of  the  Federal  troops 
had  been  taken  away  from  Fort  Smith  and  vicinity  for 
the  Camden  Expedition,  they  made  desperate  efforts  to 
capture  or  drive  off  the  Federal  detachments  stationed  at 
points  along  the  Arkansas  River  for  the  protection  of 
navigation  and  the  loyal  people  of  that  section.  After 
concentrating  nearly  five  hundred  men  they  proposed  to 
make  an  attack  on  Roseville,  forty-five  miles  below  Fort 
Smith  on  the  south  side  of  the  Arkansas  River.  A  bat 
talion  of  troops  had  been  stationed  at  that  point  during 
the  past  winter,  but  in  the  recent  movement  of  the  troops 
of  the  Frontier  Division  to  join  General  Steele,  en  route 
to  Camden,  there  were  left  at  that  place  only  two  com 
panies  of  the  Second  Kansas  Cavalry  under  Captain  John 
Gardner  and  one  company  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry 
under  Captain  David  Goss.  Captain  Gardner  was  the 


ACTION  AT  ROSEVILLE.  $2$ 

senior  officer  and  in  command  of  the  troops  at  the  station, 
and  directed  their  movements  from  that  point.  The 
mounted  troops  of  this  force  were  employed  not  only  in 
hunting  down  and  breaking  up  and  dispersing  the  partisan 
bandits  of  that  section  to  prevent  them  from  collecting  to 
attack  the  boats  on  the  river,  but  with  the  infantry  de 
tachment  they  were  also  employed  in  guarding  their  sup 
plies  and  several  hundred  bales  of  cotton  which,  later,  had 
been  seized  by  the  Government,  and  were  awaiting  trans 
portation  to  Little  Rock  and  Memphis.  Until  ready  for 
shipment  the  cotton  bales  were  used  by  the  Federal 
soldiers  in  making  breastworks  for  defensive  purposes  in 
the  event  of  attack.  There  were  also  several  brick  build 
ings  in  town  which  had  port-holes  made  in  them  for  small- 
arms.  Captains  Gardner  and  Goss  knew  that  the  country 
around  Roseville  was  full  of  Southern  partisan  bands,  and 
they  now  and  then  heard  of  the  near  approach  of  heavy 
cavalry  scouts  from  Price's  army  in  the  southern  part  of 
the  State. 

On  the  morning  of  April  4th,  a  large  Confederate  force 
of  Texans  and  Southern  partisan  bands  under  Captains 
Stone,  King,  and  Basham,  numbering  about  five  hundred 
men,  drove  in  the  Federal  pickets  south  of  Roseville  and 
immediately  commenced  a  vigorous  attack  on  the  garrison. 
In  a  few  moments  after  the  alarm  was  given,  CaptainsGard- 
ner  and  Goss  had  their  men  out  in  line  and  their  skirmish 
ers  thrown  forward,  protected  by  houses  and  fences,  to 
keep  the  enemy  out  of  town.  The  Federal  soldiers  used 
their  long-range  rapid-firing  Sharp's  carbines  very  effec 
tively  in  holding  the  Confederates  off  from  every  point 
on  which  they  made  an  attack.  They  also  hastily  con 
structed  breastworks  of  cotton  bales  around  a  warehouse 
shed  near  the  river,  which  made  an  effective  shelter  and 
protection  against  the  Confederate  small-arms.  The  Con 
federates  made  several  efforts  to  charge  and  carry  the 
Federal  position,  but  were  driven  off  every  time  with  se- 


524  THE    CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

vere  loss.  They  were  not  permitted  to  approach  nearer 
than  one  hundred  feet  of  the  breastworks.  During  the 
fight  most  of  the  Confederate  force  dismounted  and 
sought  sheltered  positions  from  which  they  kept  up  a 
hot  fire  for  nearly  two  hours,  doing  a  good  deal  of  dam 
age.  They  were  finally  completely  repulsed  and  driven 
off  with  the  loss  of  10  men  killed  and  upwards  of  30 
wounded,  leaving  their  dead  and  severely  wounded  on 
the  ground.  On  the  Federal  side  the  Second  Kansas  had 
5  men  killed  and  1 1  wounded  and  the  Sixth  Kansas  had 
4  men  killed,  number  of  wounded  not  reported.  At  the 
time  of  the  fight  there  was  no  surgeon  nor  assistant  sur 
geon  with  either  of  the  Federal  detachments  to  attend 
to  the  wounded,  and  Captain  Goss  despatched  Sergeant 
W.  A.  Kelley  with  two  men  of  his  company  up  the 
north  side  of  the  Arkansas  River  to  Fort  Smith  with  a 
request  that  a  surgeon  be  sent  down  at  once. 

The  next  morning  shortly  after  daylight,  Assistant 
Surgeon  Stephen  A.  Fairchild,  of  the  Sixth  Kansas,  with 
an  escort  of  twenty-seven  men  under  Lieutenant  Sharp 
McKibbin,  of  the  same  regiment,  left  Fort  Smith  for 
Roseville.  A  woman  on  horseback  passed  out  of  the 
Federal  lines  at  Fort  Smith  with  Lieutenant  McKibbin's 
detachment  and  rode  with  his  advance  for  several  miles, 
when,  moving  forward  at  a  more  rapid  gait  than  he  was 
marching,  she  disappeared  ahead  of  him.  His  detach 
ment  marched  along  without  interruption  until  about  the 
middle  of  the  afternoon,  when  he  made  a  short  halt  at  a 
farmhouse  within  ten  miles  of  Roseville.  He  found  the 
women  at  this  place  much  excited,  and  they  begged  him 
to  move  on,  expressing  a  fear  that  he  would  be  attacked 
by  a  force  of  about  four  hundred  guerillas  who  were  en 
camped  about  three  hundred  yards  from  the  road  on  his 
left  front.  He  sent  two  or  three  men  off  in  the  direction 
of  the  reported  camp  to  make  a  reconnoissance.  They 
soon  returned  with  the  information  that  the  guerillas  had 


S TONE  ' S  FA RM.  $2$ 

just  broken  up  their  camp  at  the  place  designated  and 
marched  in  a  direction  to  intersect  the  road  on  which  he 
was  moving  some  distance  in  his  front.  He  resumed  the 
march,  looking  for  an  attack  at  any  moment.  He  moved 
forward  a  mile  or  so  to  Stone's  Farm,  where  the  guerillas 
were  in  position  on  both  sides  of  the  road,  prepared  to 
attack  him.  The  road  on  which  he  marched  bore  nearly 
due  east,  and  at  the  point  where  the  attack  was  made 
crossed  a  hollow  running  from  a  southwest  to  a  northeast 
direction,  with  timber  on  its  sloping  sides.  A  hundred 
yards  or  so  on  his  right  and  left  front  there  were  two 
fields,  between  which  the  road  passed  through  a  narrow 
lane.  About  two  hundred  yards  on  his  left  lay  another 
field,  the  southeast  corner  of  which  joined  the  northwest 
corner  of  the  field  on  the  left  of  the  road  in  his  front. 

Sergeant  William  H.  Ward,  Company  E,  Sixth  Kan 
sas,  who  was  one  of  the  escort,  stated  that  on  nearing 
the  entrance  to  the  lane,  the  guerillas,  who  were  mostly 
on  the  right  of  the  road,  commenced  to  swing  the  left  of 
their  line  across  the  road  in  the  rear  of  the  detachment 
and  to  move  forward  the  right  of  their  line  to  prevent 
the  Federal  soldiers  from  entering  the  lane,  at  the  same 
time  making  a  charge  from  their  centre.  Lieutenant 
McKibbin  brought  the  escort  right-wheel  into  line  to 
meet  them,  but  as  they  were  dressed  in  Federal  uniforms 
and  he  fearing  that  they  might  be  Federal  soldiers,  the 
Lieutenant  demanded  to  know  who  they  were  before 
firing.  Their  leader  replied,  "Stand  there  a  moment, 
and  we  will  show  you  who  we  are."  The  escort  then 
delivered  their  fire,  and  in  another  moment,  seeing  the 
effort  to  cut  them  off  from  the  entrance  to  the  lane,  made 
a  dash  for  it  and  gained  it  before  the  guerillas  could  throw 
a  sufficient  force  across  it  to  hold  it.  On  firing  the  volley 
from  their  carbines  the  Federal  soldiers  drew  their  revolv 
ers  and  fired  right  and  left  into  the  guerillas  who  were 
endeavoring  to  cut  them  off  from  the  lane.  After  the 


524  TffE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

ver'ort  broke  through  the  guerillas  at  the  mouth  of  the 
.ne  it  was  then  a  race  for  their  lives  the  next  two  miles, 
Ind  in  the  space  of  a  few  minutes  twelve  of  the  Federal 
sdetachment,  including  Surgeon  Fairchild,  were  killed,  or 
fell  wounded  and  were  afterwards  murdered  and  their 
bodies  horribly  mutilated  with  knives  and  stripped  of  the 
outer  clothing.  It  was  reported  at  that  time  that  the 
Southern  bandits  of  that  section  had  bound  themselves 
together  by  an  oath  not  to  surrender  to  the  Federal 
authorities  and  not  to  take  any  Federal  soldiers  prison 
ers,  and  the  fiendish  conduct  of  the  bandits  in  mutilating 
the  Federal  dead  showed  what  desperate  characters  the 
Confederacy  had  called  into  its  service.  The  next  day 
a  detail  was  sent  out  from  Roseville  to  collect  and  bring 
in  the  Federal  dead,  and  on  arrival  of  the  bodies  they 
were  interred  in  the  cemetery  near  town. 

On  the  return  of  General  Thayer's  division  to  Fort 
Smith  from  the  Camden  Expedition,  he  had  more  cavalry 
to  put  into  the  field,  and  the  guerillas  along  the  Arkansas 
River  who  had  participated  in  the  Stone's  Farm  massacre 
met  with  swift  punishment.  Colonel  A.  H.  Ryan,  Third 
Arkansas  Union  Cavalry,  stationed  at  Lewisburg  on  the 
Arkansas  River,  reported  that  different  detachments  of 
his  command  in  the  course  of  one  week  had  hunted  down 
and  killed  fourteen  of  the  enemy,  wounded  sixteen,  and 
captured  fifty-five  men  and  three  officers,  besides  a 
large  number  of  horses  and  mules  and  guns,  without  sus 
taining  any  loss.  The  operations  of  Colonel  Cloud,  who 
was  stationed  at  Clarksville  with  the  Second  Kansas 
Cavalry,  were  scarcely  less  successful  against  the  bandits 
of  that  section.  Detachments  of  Federal  cavalry  were 
sent  out  from  the  different  posts  almost  daily  to  scout 
the  surrounding  country,  and  they  rarely  returned  to 
camp  without  chasing  and  running  down  and  killing 
several  bandits.  Generally,  before  starting  out,  the  com 
manding  officer  of  the  detachment  had  information  of  the 


ACTION  AT  LEE'S   CREEK. 


525 


exact  locality  where  the  bandits  would  be  found,  anc.nd 
was  frequently  able  to  surprise  them  so  completely  the 
few  of  them  would  get  away.  At  almost  every  post  cit- 
zen  scouts  were  employed  and  sent  out  one  or  two  to 
gether  by  the  Federal  commander  to  obtain  information 
in  regard  to  the  movements  of  hostile  bodies  of  men  in 
the  vicinity  and  within  a  day's  march  of  the  station. 
These  scouts  in  most  cases  wore  long  hair,  and  travelling 
through  the  country  visited  Southern  families  and  pre 
tended  to  be  Southern  men  in  order  to  obtain  the  desired 
information.  When  encamped  in  the  deep  recesses  of 
the  mountains  and  forests  the  bandits  were  sometimes 
vigorously  attacked  by  the  Federal  cavalry  and  routed 
with  heavy  loss  on  the  reports  of  the  citizen  scouts  who 
had  thus  been  sent  out. 

Action  at  Lee 's  Creek. 

Mention  has  already  been  made  of  the  hazardous  ser 
vice  imposed  upon  Federal  detachments  carrying  the 
mails  between  Fort  Smith  and  Fayetteville,  a  distance  of 
sixty  miles.  During  the  spring  and  summer  the  mail 
escort  on  this  route  was  fired  upon  nearly  every  week  by 
guerillas  and  several  men  killed  and  wounded.  The 
greater  part  of  the  route  was  over  the  Boston  Mountains 
and  through  the  deep  and  narrow  gorges  of  that  rough 
region.  All  the  mail  from  the  north  and  east  for  the 
Federal  troops  stationed  at  Fort  Smith  and  in  the  vicin 
ity  came  over  this  road  once  a  week  under  escort  of  ten 
to  fifty  mounted  men.  The  escorts  leaving  Fort  Smith 
for  Fayetteville  took  out  the  mail  carrying  the  letters 
from  the  soldiers  to  their  families  and  friends  at  home. 
A  mail  escort  of  twenty  men  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cav 
alry,  under  Lieutenant  J.  C.  Anderson  of  that  regiment, 
left  Fayetteville  on  the  morning  of  August  nth  on  the 
return  march  to  Fort  Smith,  taking  the  wire,  or  telegraph, 
road  over  the  mountains.  There  were  about  twenty-five 


528  THE    CIVIL   WAR    ON  THE  BORDER. 

foot-men,  consisting  mostly  of  soldiers  returning  to  the 
front  from  on  furlough,  who  accompanied  the  escort,  be 
sides  eight  or  nine  women  on  horseback  who  were  going 
down  to  visit  their  husbands  in  the  army.  The  party 
made  a  march  of  upwards  of  thirty  miles  that  day,  and 
crossing  over  the  mountains,  encamped  at  dark  on  the 
place  of  Benny  Hale,  an  old  settler,  on  Lee's  Creek 
twenty  miles  north  of  Van  Buren.  Sergeant  William  H. 
Ward,  Company  E,  Sixth  Kansas,  stated  that  his  de 
tachment  had  received  information  that  the  guerillas  the 
day  before  had  endeavored  to  capture  a  wagon  train  from 
Fort  Smith  to  Fort  Scott  on  the  line  road  near  Cane 
Hill,  and  that  an  attack  on  the  mail  escort  the  next  morn 
ing  was  anticipated.  It  was  believed  that  the  move 
ments  of  his  party  had  been  made  known  to  the  guerillas 
by  a  woman  who  had  passed  out  of  the  Federal  lines  at 
Fayetteville  on  horseback  just  ahead  of  it  and  had  not 
since  been  seen.  Hoping  to  pass  beyond  the  point  of 
danger  before  the  arrival  of  the  guerillas,  the  mail  escort 
started  out  at  early  daylight  the  next  morning,  but  was 
soon  detained  for  a  short  time  by  one  of  the  mule  teams 
stalling  at  a  hill,  requiring  that  the  wagon  be  partly  un 
loaded  and  reloaded  to  enable  it  to  move  forward  again. 
Directly  after  resuming  the  march  the  party  came  to  a 
house  on  the  right  of  the  road  where  there  were  several 
women  who  appeared  much  excited,  and  among  them 
was  observed  the  woman  who  had  passed  out  of  the  lines 
at  Fayetteville  the  morning  before  on  horseback  ahead  of 
the  escort. 

Moving  forward  about  half  a  mile  south  of  the  house 
the  escort  came  to  the  entrance  of  a  deep,  narrow  defile 
about  two  miles  long,  with  very  steep  sides,  known  in  that 
section  as  "  the  narrows."  On  entering  the  narrows  the 
escort  was  fired  upon  by  the  enemy  in  ambush  on  the 
right,  and  in  another  moment  the  guerilla  leader,  Captain 
Buck  Brown,  threw  a  body  of  dismounted  men  across  the 


ACTION  AT  LEE'S  CREEK.  529 

road  in  front,  and  another  body  of  mounted  men  across 
the  road  in  the  rear  of  the  Federal  detachment,  cutting 
off  Lieutenant  Anderson  and  one  or  two  of  his  men  who 
were  still  farther  in  the  rear,  but  who  on  hearing  the  firing 
in  front  dashed  forward  right  through  the  enemy  and  re 
joined  their  comrades.  Galloping  up  to  the  head  of  his 
detachment  and  seeing  the  guerillas  formed  across  the 
road  directly  in  his  front,  Lieutenant  Anderson  shouted 
to  his  dismounted  men  to  save  themselves  as  best  they 
could,  and  then  throwing  his  bridle  reins  over  his  neck 
and  taking  a  revolver  from  each  holster,  spurred  his  horse 
in  a  desperate  charge  through  the  ranks  of  the  enemy, 
followed  by  most  of  his  mounted  men.  He  was  almost 
instantly  followed  in  a  hot  pursuit  by  the  guerillas  for  a 
distance  of  about  two  miles,  to  the  exit  of  the  narrows, 
but  as  their  column  was  confined  to  the  road  through  the 
gorge  they  could  not  make  their  fire  very  effective.  At 
the  point  where  the  attack  was  made,  the  sides  of  the 
mountain  on  each  side  of  the  defile  were  covered  with  a 
heavy  undergrowth,  and  as  the  dismounted  men  were 
mostly  unarmed  they  discreetly  took  to  the  woods  when 
the  firing  first  commenced.  A  few  of  the  mounted  men 
let  their  horses  climb  the  side  of  the  mountain  on  the  left 
of  the  road  where  the  guerillas  had  left  it  unguarded,  and 
after  ascending  several  hundred  feet  came  to  a  bench,  or 
almost  level  ground,  on  which  there  was  a  fairly  good 
road  that  ran  parallel  with  the  one  that  passed  through 
the  gorge  and  intersected  it  a  short  distance  south 
of  the  narrows.  Some  of  the  men  who  came  into  the 
main  road  from  the  road  that  descended  from  the  bench 
of  the  mountain  were  pressed  so  closely  by  the  guerillas 
that  they  were  obliged  to  leave  their  horses  and  take  to 
the  brush  on  foot.  As  most  of  the  Federal  detachment 
had  now  taken  to  the  woods  on  foot,  the  guerillas  gave 
up  the  chase,  having  captured  two  teams  and  all  the  mail 
for  the  troops  at  Fort  Smith.  Sergeant  Ward,  who  was 

VOL.   II. — 34 


530  THE   CIVIL   WAR   ON  THE  BORDER. 

one  of  the  escort,  reported  the  Federal  loss  in  the  affair 
at  two  mounted  and  five  dismounted  men  killed. 

Action  at  Massard  Prairie. 

While  the  Southern  partisan  bands  were  displaying  un 
usual  activity  to  interrupt  General  Thayer's  communica 
tion  with  Springfield,  the  Confederate  forces  of  General 
Maxey  under  the  immediate  command  of  Generals  Cooper 
and  Gano  were  advancing  to  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Smith 
in  his  front,  some  five  or  six  thousand  strong.  As  early 
as  the  iQth  of  July,  General  Cooper  with  a  large  Confed 
erate  force  made  a  reconnoissance  to  Scullyville,  ad 
vancing  to  within  ten  to  twelve  miles  of  Fort  Smith. 
General  Thayer  was  in  great  need  of  cavalry  to  meet 
these  demonstrations  of  the  enemy  in  his  immediate 
front.  He  had  been  ordered  to  send  the  Ninth  Kansas 
to  Little  Rock,  and  the  Second  Kansas  under  Colonel 
Cloud  had  been  at  Clarksville  for  several  months,  leaving 
only  two  battalions  of  the  Sixth  Kansas,  many  of  whom 
were  dismounted,  at  Fort  Smith.  With  his  small  mounted 
force  he  could  not  hope  to  make  a  successful  aggres 
sive  movement  against  the  Confederate  troops  who  were 
mounted.  And  his  lack  of  aggressiveness  impressed  the 
Confedearte  leaders  that  it  was  his  timidity  that  prevented 
him  from  marching  against  them.  General  Cooper,  who 
had  been  repeatedly  defeated  by  Blunt  and  Philips  with 
the  loss  of  his  artillery,  was  now  becoming  so  bold  as  to 
venture  to  attack  General  Thayer's  outposts  near  Fort 
Smith. 

For  about  three  weeks  in  July,  four  companies  of  the 
Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry,  under  Major  David  Mefford  of 
that  regiment,  were  stationed  at  Massard  Prairie  five 
miles  south  of  Fort  Smith,  as  an  outpost,  and  to  keep  out 
scouting  detachments  to  the  front  to  watch  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy.  After  his  reconnoissance  to  Scully 
ville  General  Cooper  ascertained  from  his  scouts  the 


ACTION  AT  MASSARD  PRAIRIE.  531 

position  of  this  Federal  outpost  near  Fort  Smith,  and 
directed  Brigadier-General  R.  M.  Gano  to  take  a  well- 
mounted  force  of  fifteen  hundred  men  from  three  bri 
gades,  move  forward,  and  approach  near  enough  to  the 
Federal  detachment  on  the  night  of  the  26th  to  make 
the  attack  early  the  next  morning.  Owing  to  the  scarcity 
of  forage,  Major  MefTord  had  been  sending  out  to  graze 
early  every  morning,  under  proper  details,  all  his  horses 
not  required  for  scouting  purposes,  so  that  his  command 
of  two  hundred  men  thus  isolated  was  very  little  more 
effective  than  so  many  infantry.  He  kept  his  pickets 
properly  posted  and  sent  out  every  day  scouting  detach 
ments  on  all  the  roads  on  which  the  enemy  would  likely 
approach ;  besides,  citizen  scouts  were  sent  out  every  day 
by  Captain  W.  S.  Tough,  Chief  of  Scouts,  District  of  the 
Frontier,  from  Fort  Smith,  to  watch  the  movements  of 
Cooper's  forces,  who  had  for  several  days  been  encamped 
on  Buck  Creek  about  twenty-five  miles  southwest  in  the 
Choctaw  Nation. 

General  Gano  concentrated  his  force  during  the  night 
on  the  Poteau  River  about  ten  miles  southwest  of  the 
Federal  camp,  and  moving  forward  before  daybreak  on 
the  morning  of  the  27th,  drove  in  the  Federal  pickets 
about  sunrise,  his  advance  arriving  at  Mefford's  camp 
almost  with  the  pickets.  But  the  firing  between  the 
pickets  and  Confederate  advance,  perhaps  half  a  mile  off, 
aroused  the  camp,  and  Major  Mefford  got  his  men  out  in 
line  before  General  Gano  formed  his  troops  to  charge. 
When  it  was  known  that  the  enemy  were  approaching, 
Major  Mefford  ordered  his  herd  brought  in  from  the 
prairie  where  it  had  been  sent  to  graze  that  morning 
at  daylight.  Before  the  herd  could  be  secured  and  the 
men  mounted,  however,  General  Gano  charged  the  camp 
and  stampeded  the  horses,  leaving  Major  Mefford  with  his 
command  dismounted  to  make  the  best  fight  possible. 
The  Federal  camp  was  in  the  edge  of  the  timber  on  the 


532  THE    CIVIL   WAR   ON  THE  BORDER. 

south  side  of  Massard  Prairie,  and  there  was  no  shelter 
by  which  Major  Mefford  could  protect  his  men  in  the 
unequal  contest.  In  making  a  hasty  disposition  for  the 
fight,  Companies  E  and  H  formed  his  left  and  Companies 
B  and  D  his  right,  and  by  skilfully  handling  these  com 
panies,  with  their  Sharp's  carbines,  repulsed  three  dis 
tinct  charges  of  the  enemy  in  defending  his  camp.  In  a 
short  time  the  Confederates  commenced  to  pass  around 
his  flanks  and  to  form  in  his  rear,  and  then  he  was  obliged 
to  retreat  across  the  prairie  in  the  direction  of  Fort  Smith, 
using  part  of  his  force  in  firing  well-directed  volleys  to 
break  the  lines  of  the  enemy  formed  in  his  rear.  He 
kept  up  this  retreating  fight  for  about  a  mile  across  the 
prairie  to  a  house  in  the  edge  of  the  timber,  and  by  his 
effective  volleys  repeatedly  broke  the  lines  and  dispersed 
the  Confederates  who  formed  across  his  line  of  retreat. 
But  now  the  Confederates  had  formed  in  such  heavy 
masses  betweeen  him  and  Fort  Smith  that  he  could  not 
break  their  line  again,  and  he  was  obliged  to  surrender, 
only  a  few  of  his  men  who  were  mounted  being  able" 
to  cut  their  way  through  the  Confederate  ranks  and  get 
away.  He  made  a  most  gallant  fight  and  held  his  men 
intact  to  the  last  volley,  so  that  he  did  not  lose  a  man 
from  demoralization.  The  Federal  loss  in  this  action  at 
Massard  Prairie  was  n  men  killed,  20  wounded,  and  127 
men  captured,  including  Major  Mefford  and  Lieutenant 
J.  M.  Defriese.  On  the  Confederate  side  there  were  9 
men  killed  and  26  wounded. 

As  soon  as  he  captured  the  Federal  detachment  and 
disarmed  the  men,  General  Gano  started  his  prisoners 
south  on  the  double-quick,  for  fear  that  a  large  force 
would  come  out  from  Fort  Smith  and  endeavor  to  retake 
them.  On  hearing  of  the  fight  General  Thayer  sent 
forward  reinforcements,  but  they  did  not  reach  the  field 
until  the  action  was  over  and  they  were  unable  to  over 
take  the  enemy.  It  was  a  very  warm  day,  and  the 


DEMONSTRATION  AGAINST  FORT  SMITH.         533 

prisoners  being  obliged  to  march  double-quick  time  for 
about  ten  miles,  they  were  nearly  exhausted  and  suffer 
ing  terribly  from  thirst  when  General  Gano  went  into 
camp  that  night  south  of  Backbone  Mountain.  From 
this  point  the  prisoners  were  taken  to  Tyler,  Texas,  where 
the  Confederate  authorities  had  an  extensive  stockade 
and  prison  pen  for  keeping  Federal  prisoners  captured 
west  of  the  Mississippi  River,  and  where  the  treatment 
of  prisoners  was  very  little  better  than  at  Andersonville. 
Some  of  the  men  who  were  captured  at  Massard  Prairie 
endeavored  to  escape  from  Tyler,  but  they  were  hunted 
down  by  bloodhounds  and  their  limbs  horribly  lacerated 
by  the  fierce  beasts. 

General  Gano's  successful  movement  at  Massard  Prairie 
encouraged  General  Cooper  to  make  a  demonstration 
against  Fort  Smith  with  nearly  his  entire  force,  to  ascer 
tain  if  possible  the  strength  of  the  Federal  troops,  and  to 
make  a  diversion  in  favor  of  a  force  which  he  had  ordered 
to  cross  to  the  north  side  of  the  Arkansas  River  above 
Fort  Smith  to  attack  some  Federal  detachments  putting 
up  hay  for  army  use  on  Blackburn's  Prairie.  On  the 
morning  of  July  3ist,  the  Confederate  advance  attacked 
and  drove  in  the  Federal  picket  stationed  on  the  Texas 
road  four  miles  south  of  Fort  Smith  under  Lieutenant  L. 
F.  Stewart,  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry,  and  came  up  to  within 
two  miles  of  the  outer  line  of  fortifications.  General 
Thayer  immediately  sent  out  Colonel  Judson,  Sixth 
Kansas,  commanding  Third  Brigade,  to  check  the  enemy. 
He  moved  out  with  two  regiments  of  infantry,  the  avail 
able  men  of  the  Sixth  Kansas  Cavalry,  and  the  four  guns 
of  the  Second  Indiana  Battery  under  Captain  Espey,  and 
taking  up  a  position  on  the  high  ground  about  a  mile 
south  of  town,  sent  forward  his  skirmishers  to  engage  the 
enemy.  In  the  disposition  of  the  Confederate  troops, 
Brigadier-General  Gano  commanded  General  Cooper's 
right  wing  and  Brigadier-General  Watie  his  left  wing. 


534  THE    CIVIL   WAR   ON  THE  BORDER. 

During  the  day  General  Thayer  was  on  the  field  direct 
ing  the  movements  of  his  troops,  but  he  made  no  effort  to 
bring  the  enemy  to  a  general  engagement.  The  oppos 
ing  forces  confronted  each  other  on  ridges  somewhat  more 
than  half  a  mile  apart  a  good  part  of  the  day  without 
either  party  making  a  charge  or  attempting  to  join  in 
close  conflict.  After  some  cautious  skirmishing  at  long 
range,  General  Cooper  brought  up  a  section  of  Howell's 
battery,  which  threw  shells  at  the  Federal  line  for  a  short 
time,  when  it  was  withdrawn  and  a  section  of  Humphrey's 
battery  was  ordered  up  to  take  its  place.  Directly  after 
this  last  battery  went  into  action,  the  four  guns  of  the 
Second  Indiana  Battery  opened  upon  it  with  shell,  and 
on  firing  less  than  half  a  dozen  rounds  came  near  produc 
ing  a  panic  among  the  hostile  Indians  of  Cooper's  com 
mand.  A  single  shell  from  one  of  the  Federal  guns  burst 
in  the  midst  of  the  Confederate  battery  team,  killing  four 
horses  and  taking  a  leg  off  of  one  of  the  gunners,  while 
another  shot  took  a  man's  head  off.  As  soon  as  the  dead 
horses  were  cut  loose  from  the  limber,  the  disabled  gun 
was  drawn  off  by  the  men,  and  General  Cooper  immedi 
ately  retreated  from  the  field  with  his  entire  force.  Gen 
eral  Thayer  did  not  follow  up  his  advantage  by  pursuit, 
claiming  that  he  did  not  have  a  sufficient  mounted  force 
to  do  so  effectively.  The  casualties  on  the  Federal  side 
in  the  skirmish  were  four  men  killed  and  six  men  wounded. 
Colonel  Judson  was  wounded  in  the  leg  by  a  piece  of  shell. 
As  far  as  could  be  ascertained  the  casualties  on  the  Con 
federate  side  were  about  equal  to  those  sustained  by  the 
Federal  forces. 

The  next  day  General  Cooper  fell  back  about  forty 
miles  southwest  of  Fort  Smith  in  the  Choctaw  Nation  to 
rest  and  reorganize  his  forces.  This  was  the  last  dem 
onstration  that  he  made  in  force,  but  he  soon  after 
wards  commenced  displaying  some  activity  in  sending 
heavy  mounted  detachments  north  of  the  Arkansas  River 


DEMONSTRATION  AGAINST  FORT  SMITH. 


535 


to  attack  and  break  up  parties  cutting  and  putting  up  hay 
for  the  Government  and  to  destroy  the  hay  put  up.  Most 
of  Stand  Watie's  command  of  Cherokees  under  Colonels 
Adair  and  Bell  were  sent  north  of  the  river  through  the 
Cherokee  Nation  on  the  east  side  of  Grand  River,  but 
after  some  skirmishing  were  driven  south  by  the  loyal 
Indian  troops  from  Fort  Gibson. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

THE   LAST   FIGHT   OF   BILL  ANDERSON,  THE   BANDIT. 

DURING  the  year  1864,  Bill  Anderson  became  as 
notorious  north  of  the  Missouri  River  as  Quantrill  had 
south  of  that  stream  as  a  Southern  guerilla  leader.  Both 
of  these  leaders  of  guerilla  bands  were  commissioned  by 
the  Confederate  Government  to  carry  on  their  barbarous 
operations  in  Missouri  during  the  war.  Probably  no  age 
has  furnished  bands  of  outlaws  composed  of  men  of  more 
desperate,  cruel,  and  bloodthirsty  natures  than  the  men 
of  these  bands.  Human  life  was  not  held  at  a  lower  esti 
mate  by  the  uncivilized  savages  of  this  or  any  other 
country  than  it  was  by  these  leaders  and  their  followers. 
Even  the  Southern  sympathizers  of  the  localities  where 
they  ranged  generally  feared  and  dreaded  them,  for  they 
nearly  always  wore  the  Federal  uniform  and  often  passed 
themselves  off  for  Federal  soldiers,  and  were  thus  able  to 
deceive  the  secessionists  as  well  as  the  Unionists. 

In  such  cases  a  secessionist  would  now  and  then  pre 
tend  to  be  loyal  to  the  Government,  and  in  answer  to 
questions  would  pretend  that  he  would  truly  inform  the 
questioner  of  the  whereabouts  of  any  Southern  guerillas 
if  he  knew.  Secessionists  who  thus  committed  them 
selves  almost  invariably  forfeited  their  lives.  No  subse 
quent  pleading  or  explanation  could  atone  for  the  error, 
unless  the  party  thus  trying  to  keep  in  favor  with  both 
sides  had  a  friend  or  an  acquaintance  among  the  bandits 

536 


THE  LAST  FIGHT  OF  BILL   ANDERSON.  537 

to  intercede  for  him.  There  were  a  few  men  in  nearly 
every  neighborhood  who  wished  to  be  neutral  and  who 
did  not  have  very  decided  political  convictions,  and  it 
was  generally  this  class  of  men  who  suffered  at  the  hands 
of  the  bandits.  Very  few  Union  men  in  the  country  in 
that  section  stayed  at  their  homes  unless  they  were  very 
old  or  distress  in  their  families  demanded  their  presence. 
Of  course  there  were  many  instances  where  men  en 
deavored  to  return  to  their  homes  to  stay  for  a  few 
days  or  several  weeks,  even  when  the  risk  was  very  great. 

The  operations  of  Anderson's  bandits  were  confined 
mostly  to  the  counties  of  Clay,  Ray,  Carroll,  Chariton, 
and  Fayette,  north  of  the  Missouri  River.  They  made 
raids  into  other  counties,  but  generally  soon  returned  to 
the  Missouri  River  counties,  where  they  dispersed  them 
selves  among  their  friends  for  better  concealment  when 
closely  pursued  by  the  Union  militia.  During  the  war 
these  desperate  men  became  heavily  armed  with  the  best 
arms  used  by  the  Government,  and  were  mounted  upon 
the  best  horses  in  the  country.  Through  their  secession 
friends  in  every  town  where  the  loyal  militia  were  sta 
tioned,  they  were  kept  advised  of  the  movements  of  the 
troops,  whether  in  scouts  of  a  hundred  or  more  men,  or 
of  small  detachments  of  a  dozen  or  so.  They  rarely  ever 
attacked  a  Federal  detachment  larger  than  their  own 
force,  unless  they  found  it  in  a  disadvantageous  position. 
And  they  nearly  always  encamped  in  some  out-of-the-way 
and  secluded  place,  and  their  position  was  not  generally 
known  to  the  commanding  officers  of  Federal  detach 
ments  until  they  made  a  dash  on  some  unprotected  point 
or  on  some  small  detachment. 

By  these  methods  their  operations  were  frequently  suc 
cessful,  and  it  was  in  this  way  that  they  gradually  came 
into  possession  of  the  best  arms  in  use.  Most  of  these 
desperate  men  were  armed  with  one  good  carbine  and 
from  four  to  six  revolvers  each,  and  the  strength  of  the 


538  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

band  was  generally  from  one  hundred  to  three  hundred 
men.  As  they  were  so  thoroughly  armed  and  mounted, 
an  equal  number  of  the  loyal  militia  or  even  the  volun 
teer  forces  of  the  Federal  army  were  not  always  eager  to 
attack  them  when  found.  The  loyal  militia  appear  to 
have  been  better  adapted  to  contend  with  such  desperate 
characters  than  the  volunteer  forces  stationed  in  the  State, 
perhaps  because  they  were  better  acquainted  with  the  to 
pography  of  the  country  in  which  the  bandits  confined 
their  operations,  and  perhaps  also  because  they  adopted 
the  guerilla  tactics  when  they  considered  it  necessary. 

The  Union  people  were  scattered  over  the  State  as  well 
as  the  secessionists,  in  some  sections  largely  in  the  ma 
jority,  in  others  largely  in  the  minority;  but  always  true 
to  their  cause,  even  under  the  severest  tests,  so  that  the 
camps  of  the  guerillas,  even  when  they  supposed  them 
selves  perfectly  secure  in  some  secluded  spot  far  away 
from  roads  or  villages,  was  often  made  known  by  Union 
ists  to  the  loyal  militia  officers,  who,  by  making  a  night 
march,  would  strike  them  unexpectedly  and  rout  them. 

After  the  Centralia  massacre,  so  many  of  the  Federal 
troops  and  militia  were  withdrawn  from  points  in  the 
Missouri  River  counties  to  strengthen  the  defence  of 
Jefferson  City,  the  capital,  and  to  oppose  Price's  invad 
ing  army,  that  a  sufficient  number  of  troops  could  not  be 
immediately  collected  to  pursue  and  effectively  punish 
Anderson's  bandits. 

On  the  23d,  four  days  prior  to  the  Centralia  disaster,  a 
part  of  Anderson's  bandits  attacked  the  train  of  a  detach 
ment  of  the  Third  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  moving 
from  Sturgeon  to  Rocheport,  on  the  Missouri  River,  ten 
miles  northeast  of  the  latter  place,  under  a  small  escort, 
and  killed  eleven  men  of  the  escort  and  teamsters,  most 
of  the  men  having  been  murdered  after  they  had  surren 
dered.  The  train  and  escort  were  attacked  in  a  lane,  and 
being  overpowered,  with  no  chance  of  escape,  most  of  the 


THE  LAST  FIGHT  OF  BILL   ANDERSON.  539 

men  were  killed.  But  even  before  this  event  several 
Federal  mounted  detachments  had  been  sent  into  Boone 
and  Howard  Counties  in  search  of  the  bandits.  As  it 
was  impossible  to  ascertain  what  point  they  intended  to 
strike,  the  Federal  officers  were  obliged  to  get  on  their 
trail  and  follow  them  up.  The  news  of  the  massacre  at 
Centralia  spread  rapidly  through  that  section,  and  the 
next  day  a  detachment  of  the  First  Iowa  Cavalry  from 
Columbia  and  a  detachment  of  two  hundred  men  of  the 
Sixth  Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  under  Major  A.  A. 
King,  Jr.,  came  up  and  struck  the  trail  of  the  bandits  near 
the  scene  of  Major  Johnston's  disaster  and  found  them 
in  camp  near  that  point.  In  a  few  moments  both  sides 
formed  line  of  battle,  the  line  of  the  guerillas  stretching 
out  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  length.  Major  King  had  a 
howitzer  along  and  when  his  line  commenced  to  advance 
opened  fire  on  the  bandits  with  shell.  They  at  once 
broke  and  did  not  make  another  stand  that  day.  The 
troops  under  Major  King  pursued  them  until  dark,  his 
advance  frequently  being  in  sight  of  their  rear-guard. 
He  bivouacked  in  the  rain  during  the  night  within  a  mile 
or  so  of  where  they  had  encamped  and  the  next  morning 
renewed  the  pursuit,  and  soon  coming  in  sight  of  their 
rear,  pressed  them  so  closely  during  the  day  that  they 
broke  up  and  scattered  in  every  direction  in  the  heavily 
wooded  section  of  Howard  County. 

After  this  dispersion  of  the  bandits,  very  little  was 
heard  of  Anderson  until  he  joined  General  Clark  and 
participated  in  the  attack  on  the  Federal  force  under 
Colonel  Chester  Harding  on  the  i$th  of  October  at  Glas 
gow.  When  General  Clark  recrossed  his  division  to  the 
south  side  of  the  Missouri  River  after  the  fight  at  Glas 
gow,  and  continued  the  march  with  the  other  divisions 
of  Price's  army  up  that  side  of  the  river,  Anderson  with 
his  bandits  marched  up  the  north  side  of  the  river  to  Clay 
County,  keeping  as  near  the  river  as  practicable  so  that 


540  THE    CIVIL    WAR   ON   THE  BORDER. 

he  might  be  continually  advised  of  the  movements  of  the 
Confederate  forces.  On  his  arrival  in  Clay  County  he 
heard  of  the  fighting  about  Independence  and  on  the  Big 
Blue  on  the  22d  and  23d  of  October,  and  of  Price  being 
driven  south  down  the  State  line.  He  encamped  with  his 
men,  about  three  hundred  strong,  in  the  Missouri  River 
bottom  near  the  Clay  and  Ray  county  line  for  several 
days  after  Price  retreated  south,  and  his  presence  soon 
became  known  to  some  of  the  Union  families  living  in 
the  vicinity.  His  atrocious  acts  during  the  past  summer 
had  made  his  name  infamous  in  that  section,  but  since 
the  Centralia  massacre  he  was  more  dreaded  than  ever  by 
the  Union  men  and  loyal  militia  of  North  Missouri. 
After  that  disaster  the  militia  officers  were  very  cautious 
about  attacking  him,  for  they  knew  that  if  they  were 
defeated  in  an  engagement  no  quarter  would  be  shown 
them. 

Among  the  loyal  militia  there  were  gallant  and  com 
petent  officers  who  were  not  to  be  intimidated  by  Ander 
son's  desperate  deeds  and  who  were  unwilling  to  yield 
him  undisputed  sway  in  the  counties  along  the  north  side 
of  the  Missouri  River  without  a  severer  test  of  courage 
and  tact  than  had  yet  been  shown.  Among  such  officers 
was  Major  Samuel  P.  Cox,  of  Gallatin,  Missouri,  who 
had  justly  earned  a  reputation  for  bravery,  fearlessness, 
and  tact  in  dealing  with  the  guerilla  bands  of  that  sec 
tion.  He  had  raised  Cox's  battalion  of  six  months' 
militia  in  1861,  and  after  the  organization  of  the  First 
Missouri  State  Militia  Cavalry,  commanded  a  battalion 
in  that  regiment.  He  had  distinguished  himself  as  a 
brave  and  competent  officer  at  the  battle  of  Kirksville, 
Missouri,  in  August,  1862,  in  which  he  commanded  the 
left  wing  under  Colonel  McNeil,  and  in  which  the  Con 
federate  force  was  defeated  with  heavy  loss.  Shortly 
after  this  he  was  taken  sick  with  typhoid  fever  and  re 
signed  and  went  home,  and  was  unable  to  do  anything 


THE  LAST  FIGHT  OF  BILL   ANDERSON.  541 

for  six  months.  The  service  required  just  such  an  officer 
to  check  the  operations  of  the  guerillas  under  Anderson- 
one  who  could  turn  their  own  tactics  against  them.  He 
led  the  detachment  of  loyal  Missouri  militia  that  killed 
the  noted  guerilla  chieftain,  and  this  version  of  that  ex 
citing  incident  is  from  his  own  lips.  At  the  time  that 
Anderson  was  encamped  near  the  Missouri  River  not  far 
from  the  line  of  Clay  and  Ray  Counties,  during  the  Price 
Raid,  Brigadier-General  James  Craig  commanded  the  Dis 
trict  of  Northwest  Missouri,  with  headquarters  at  St. 
Joseph.  The  presence  of  the  bandits  in  that  locality 
was  soon  made  known  to  the  nearest  command  of  loyal 
militia  by  some  of  their  wives  or  children.  In  fact,  the 
recent  acts  of  the  bandits  had  aroused  the  law-abiding 
people  in  all  that  section.  The  situation  had  become  so 
desperate  that  Major  Cox  felt  that  no  Union  man  in 
that  section  could  stay  at  home  if  Anderson  was  not 
whipped,  and  whipped  badly.  Knowing  that  he  could 
not  stay  at  home  in  safety,  the  Major  started  to  join  his 
friends  in  the  service  for  protection,  and  on  the  way  met 
Major  W.  D.  McDonald,  commanding  a  detachment  of 
the  Thirty-third  Regiment  Enrolled  Missouri  Militia  at 
Hamilton,  retreating  from  a  Southern  force  which  he 
supposed  was  Anderson's  guerillas.  Major  McDonald 
admitted  that  he  did  not  feel  prepared  to  fight  Anderson 
or  the  force  from  which  he  was  retreating,  and  requested 
Major  Cox  to  go  to  St.  Joseph  to  see  General  Craig  and 
explain  to  him  the  situation.  The  Major  agreed  to  go 
at  once;  took  a  train  at  Hamilton  for  St.  Joseph;  arrived 
there  that  night;  saw  the  General  and  talked  over  the 
situation  with  him  fully. 

In  the  meanwhile  Major  McDonald  had  telegraphed  to 
the  General  that  Major  Cox  would  arrive  in  St.  Joseph 
that  night,  and  requested  that  he  be  sent  back  to  Hamil 
ton  to  take  command  of  the  force  at  that  point  to  operate 
against  the  enemy.  General  Craig  showed  Major  Cox 


542  THE   CIVIL    WAR    ON   THE  BORDER. 

the  telegram  and  asked  him  to  go  back  and  take  com 
mand  of  Major  McDonald's  force.  The  Major  replied 
that  he  did  not  see  how  he  could,  as  he  was  out  of  the 
service.  The  General  explained  that  he  would  give  him 
proper  authority  to  act ;  that  he  would  appoint  him 
acting  lieutenant-colonel,  and  that  if  he  would  go  he 
would  put  the  troops  under  his  command.  Major  Cox 
finally  consented,  returned  to  Hamilton,  took  command 
of  Major  McDonald's  detachment  the  next  morning,  and 
made  a  forced  march  from  there  to  Richmond,  in  Ray 
County,  where  he  was  joined  by  Major  John  Grimes 
with  about  150  men  of  the  Enrolled  Militia  and  a  com 
pany  of  Caldwell  County  militia.  He  now  had  a  force  of 
about  three  hundred  effective  men,  armed  with  muzzle- 
loading  muskets  and  a  few  revolvers  with  which  some  of 
his  men  had  supplied  themselves.  He  marched  from 
Richmond  four  miles  in  the  direction  of  Liberty;  then 
south  to  Old  Camden,  on  the  Missouri  River,  and  then 
west  up  the  river  to  Albany,  now  Orrick,  where  he  had 
the  fight  with  the  guerillas. 

After  leaving  Richmond  and  when  about  three  miles 
out,  on  the  morning  of  October  26th,  the  command  met  a 
woman  on  horseback  coming  towards  it  at  a  rather  hurried 
pace.  On  coming  up  to  the  advance-guard  she  at  once 
inquired  for  the  commanding  officer  and  was  pointed  to 
Major  Cox.  She  lost  no  time  in  going  to  him  and  mak 
ing  known  her  business.  She  told  him  that  she  had  that 
morning  been  in  Bill  Anderson's  camp;  described  where 
and  how  it  was  located,  and  said  that  he  had  between 
two  hundred  and  three  hundred  heavily  armed  men.  At 
first  the  Major  was  suspicious  of  this  woman  and  inquired 
of  Lieutenant  James  Baker,  who  was  present,  about  her. 
The  Lieutenant  stated  that  he  knew  her  and  that  she  was 
all  right  and  could  be  trusted — that  her  husband  was  along 
in  the  command  ;  and  that  he  knew  the  locality  described 
and  could  take  the  troops  to  it  by  a  nearer  route  than  the 


THE  LAST  FIGHT  OF  BILL   ANDERSON.  543 

one  the  Major  had  intended  taking,  and  led  off  with  the 
advance-guard.  Determined  not  to  be  surprised  Major 
Cox  marched  his  troops  cautiously  along  until  he  got 
within  about  a  mile  of  Anderson's  camp.  The  Federal 
advance,  however,  came  upon  the  picket  of  the  bandits 
about  two  miles  from  their  camp  and  it  hastily  retired  to 
give  the  alarm,  so  that  Anderson  had  notice  of  the  near 
approach  of  the  Federal  force. 

About  three  quarters  of  a  mile  from  the  guerilla  camp, 
the  Union  militia  came  to  a  deep  ravine  which  was  crossed 
by  a  narrow  bridge.  Major  Cox  halted  his  command  just 
back  of  the  steep  ravine,  dismounted  his  men,  and  sent 
forward  Lieutenant  Baker  with  thirty  mounted  men  to 
skirmish  with  the  guerillas,  and  attract  their  attention  by 
firing  upon  them,  while  he  was  forming  and  getting  his 
other  troops  in  position.  After  dismounting  his  men  he 
directed  the  commanding  officers  of  companies  to  have 
every  fourth  man  hold  horses,  took  the  rest  of  his  com 
mand  across  the  ravine  on  the  bridge,  moved  forward 
two  or  three  hundred  yards,  and  formed  his  line  on  each 
side  of  the  road  in  the  open  timber  between  two  fields  in 
the  Missouri  River  bottom.  The  camp  of  the  guerillas 
was  a  little  upward  of  half  a  mile  in  advance  of  this 
position.  After  showing  his  force  to  the  bandits  and  firing 
upon  them,  Lieutenant  Baker  was  instructed  to  retire 
back  along  the  road  through  the  Federal  line.  Having 
heard  much  of  Anderson's  mode  of  fighting,  Major  Cox 
was  satisfied  that  the  fire  of  Lieutenant  Baker's  detach 
ment  would  quickly  draw  him  out  in  a  vigorous  pursuit, 
and  he  was  determined  to  meet  him  with  tactics  which 
were  new  to  him. 

Major  Cox  had  just  got  his  line  formed  when  he  and 
his  men  heard  the  volley  fired  by  Lieutenant  Baker's  de 
tachment,  and  in  another  moment  they  heard  the  guerillas 
coming,  yelling  like  fiends  released  from  the  infernal 
regions,  led  by  their  chieftain,  with  waving  plume  that 


544  THE    CIVIL   WAR    ON  THE  BORDER. 

was  as  red  as  the  blood  that  flowed  from  the  wounds  of 
his  recently  murdered  victims.  In  another  moment  they 
were  coming  in  sight  and  the  Federal  soldiers  could  see 
that  the  foremost  had  their  bridle  reins  in  their  teeth  and 
a  revolver  in  each  hand.  Realizing  the  desperate  charac 
ter  of  the  men  he  was  about  to  engage,  and  that  it  would 
probably  be  a  struggle  which  meant  the  death  of  all  his 
men  or  the  defeat  of  the  guerillas,  Major  Cox  then  for 
the  first  time  announced  to  Major  Grimes  that  it  was  Bill 
Anderson's  band  they  were  fighting  and  that  he  must 
make  his  men  stand  firm,  for  the  conflict  would  likely  be 
one  of  victory  or  death.  He  also  instructed  his  officers 
to  have  their  men  reserve  their  fire  until  the  bandits  came 
up  within  seventy-five  yards  of  his  line,  and  then  to 
deliver  it  with  deliberation. 

On  they  came  in  a  furious  charge,  looking  neither  to  the 
right  nor  to  the  left,  but  seemingly  bent  only  on  overtak 
ing  the  detachment  that  had  audaciously  fired  upon  them. 
The  moment  was  an  exciting  and  a  trying  one,  for  the 
Federal  commander  knew  that  the  slightest  wavering  or 
mistake  on  the  part  of  his  men  would  doom  them  to  cer 
tain  death.  The  bandit  leader  marched  under  the  black 
flag  and  boasted  that  he  gave  no  quarter.  But  the  Union 
militia  behaved  admirably ;  they  waited  until  the  guerillas 
approached  within  easy  range,  and  then  the  volley  from 
two  hundred  rifles  did  its  work  well,  as  was  plainly  seen 
when  the  smoke  was  wafted  away  by  the  gentle  breeze. 
Anderson  and  one  of  his  men  fell  dead  from  their  horses 
in  the  road  just  as  they  passed  through  the  Federal  line, 
pierced  by  several  balls  each ;  another  guerilla  was  killed 
a  short  distance  in  the  rear  of  the  Federal  line ;  five  or 
six  of  the  guerillas  were  taken  off  the  ground  by  their 
comrades  mortally  wounded,  besides  a  number  of  others 
taken  off  severely  and  slightly  wounded.  Anderson 
fell  about  ten  steps  from  Major  Cox  and  had  a  revolver 
in  each  hand,  two  in  his  pistol  holster,  and  two  in  his 


THE   LAST  FIGHT  OF  BILL   ANDERSON.  545 

belt.  Major  Cox  took  one  of  the  revolvers  from  his 
hand,  and  his  bugler,  Adolph  Vogle,  brought  him  the 
other  five  and  his  pocketbook,  containing  six  hundred 
dollars  United  States  paper  currency.  There  was  no 
time  for  looking  closely  into  what  the  dead  guerilla  had 
on  his  person,  for  his  band  were  in  confusion,  and  to 
follow  up  his  advantage  Major  Cox  immediately  ordered 
a  forward  movement  and  pursued  on  foot  the  bandits, 
skirmishing  with  them  for  about  a  mile  in  the  river  bot 
tom.  He  then  returned  with  his  dismounted  men  to 
their  horses,  put  the  dead  guerilla  chieftain  in  one  of  his 
wagons,  and  took  him  back  to  Richmond  that  day  ;  that 
night  he  kept  the  corpse  in  the  court-house  under  guard, 
and  the  next  day  buried  it  in  the  cemetery  near  town. 

In  this  action  Major  Cox  reported  that  he  had  one  man 
killed  and  seven  wounded.  He  also  reported  seeing  four 
of  the  bandits  dead  on  the  field,  and  seeing  the  retreat 
ing  force  take  off  a  good  many  of  their  wounded  comrades 
on  their  horses.  When  Anderson  came  dashing  forward 
at  the  head  of  his  men  he  was  so  intent  on  the  pursuit 
that  he  neglected  to  form  his  men  in  line,  so  that  when 
they  received  the  volley  from  the  Union  line  they  were 
almost  instantly  tumbling  over  each  other  and  in  each 
other's  way  for  offensive  or  defensive  operations.  And 
when  they  saw  their  leader  fall  and  that  they  were  re 
ceiving  a  hot  fire  from  both  flanks,  they  commenced  a 
hasty  retreat ;  nor  did  they  show  any  disposition  to  fight 
for  the  possession  of  the  body  of  their  fallen  leader.  A 
good  many  of  their  horses  having  been  killed  and  disabled 
by  the  heavy  fire  from  the  Federal  line,  in  their  retreat 
quite  a  number  of  the  bandits  rode  off  two  on  a  horse; 
but  being  mounted,  they  soon  got  out  of  range  of  the 
Union  militia,  receiving  from  them  a  continuous  fire  as 
they  retreated. 

When  Vogle,  the  bugler,  brought  to  Major  Cox  Ander 
son's  pocketbook  containing  orders  from  General  Price 

VOL.  II. — 35 


546  THE    CIVIL   WAR   ON  THE   BORDER. 

authorizing  the  guerilla  leader  to  tear  up  the  North  Mis 
souri  Railroad  and  to  burn  and  destroy  property,  the 
Major  instantly  knew  that  it  was  Anderson,  the  notorious 
bandit,  he  had  killed,  and  at  once  announced  the  fact  to 
his  men.  The  information  quickly  passed  along  his  line 
and  a  rousing  cheer  went  up  from  his  men,  and  they 
would  have  fought  then  a  regiment  of  guerillas.  Among 
other  things  found  on  the  person  of  the  dead  guerilla 
chief  was  a  commission  as  colonel,  signed  by  Jefferson 
Davis,  President  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  He  also 
had  on  each  side  of  the  brow-band  of  his  bridle  two 
human  scalps,  which  he  used  as  a  decoration.  Major 
Cox  took  these  scalps,  trophies  with  which  Anderson 
had  in  his  fiendish  nature  decorated  his  bridle,  and  sent 
them,  together  with  a  Confederate  silk  flag  which  he  took 
off  him,  to  Adjutant-General  Gray,  of  Missouri.  Very 
soon  after  the  death  of  Anderson  in  this  action,  his  band 
left  the  State  and  never  returned  to  it  in  an  organized 
capacity  to  carry  on  their  savage  operations  of  murder 
and  robbery. 

THE    END. 


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974219 


T1H--70 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


ICHARl)   S.   WORMSKR 


